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Within the framework of the new European economic governance, neoliberal views 
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restored through a reduction of labour costs. Although all policy interventions on 
wages and collective bargaining ultimately take place at national level, the general 
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been imposed in a more authoritarian and hardly democratic manner by the ‘Troika’.
As a direct result of this new interventionism in wage policy, many European 
coun tries have faced a significant decline in real wages, giving rise to strong negative 
effects on the development of domestic demand and thereby contributing to the 
persistence of economic stagnation and high unemployment. Moreover, as many 
European countries have followed similar strategies of wage restraint, this has largely 
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Preface
In response to the problems posed by the fi nancial and economic crisis, 
the European Union introduced, in 2010, a new set of European eco-
nomic governance arrangements. In this context, wage formation has 
become an important issue on the European policy agenda. This book 
contains major research fi ndings from the CAWIE2 – Collectively Agreed 
Wages in Europe – project, conducted in 2014–2015 for the purpose of 
discussing and debating the currently dominant policy perspectives on 
collectively-bargained wage systems under this new form of European 
economic governance. 
The project was run within the ETUI’s network of trade union-related 
research institutes (TURI) and coordinated by KU Leuven-HIVA (Bel-
gium) and the Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut (WSI) 
at the Hans Böckler Foundation (Germany). The project involved in-
stitutes from 13 European countries including: Arbeiterkammer Wien 
(Austria); Associazione Bruno Trentin-ISF-IRES (Italy); Fundación 
1º de Mayo (Spain); Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales 
(IRES) (France); Labour Research Department (United Kingdom); Pal-
kansaajien Tutkimuslaitos (Labour Institute for Economic Research) 
(FinlandI); Szakszervezetek Gazdaság és Társadalomkutatási Intézete 
Alapitvány (SZGTI) (Hungary); the University of Amsterdam – AIAS 
(Netherlands); and the University of Copenhagen – FAOS (Denmark). 
Researchers from the Instituto Ruben Rolo (Portugal), FAFO (Norway) 
and the European Trade Union Institute (ETUI) were also involved in 
the book project, the fi nal production of which was conducted in close 
cooperation with the ETUI.
The project, of which this book is the fi nal output, was supported by a fi -
nancial grant from the European Commission. We are grateful to James 
Patterson for his careful copy-editing and layout of the book. We would 
like to thank all the authors for their contributions, the grant providers 
for the funding, and the ETUI for publishing our research fi ndings.
Leuven and Düsseldorf, June 2015
Guy Van Gyes and Thorsten Schulten
Preface
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Introduction
Guy Van Gyes and Thorsten Schulten
At a shareholders’ meeting of the largest Dutch retailer Ahold on 15 April 
2015, 19-year old employee and trade unionist Soufi an Afkir takes the 
fl oor and asks the CEO the following: ‘You earned 3.7 million in 2013. 
That’s 1,600 euros per hour. I earn 5.96 euros per hour. … In compari-
son: to match your salary for one year, I have to work 299 years. Full-
time’ (Young and United, 2015). Pursing his lips, Ahold CEO Dick Boer 
answered briefl y and indifferently that salary complaints belong to col-
lective bargaining and should not be raised at a shareholders’ meeting. 
End of discussion.
An anecdote, but one that exemplifi es the analysis and points that will be 
raised in the present book. It is about wages and their crucial role in Eu-
rope’s current economic performance, as well as the role of coordinated 
collective bargaining. In the current political and economic mainstream 
view in Europe wages are mainly an ‘adjustment variable’ for competi-
tiveness. Thus, the political emphasis is on ‘structural reforms’ in order 
to increase the ‘downward fl exibility’ of wage development (European 
Central Bank 2012).
This book proposes an alternative view on wages. It starts from the by 
now widely shared premise that growing inequality is a major threat and 
challenge for contemporary capitalist societies (Piketty 2014; Atkinson 
2015). Therefore, a way out of economic stagnation in Europe and to-
wards a more sustainable economic development model has to be based 
on an ‘inclusive growth strategy’, requiring a much more equal distribu-
tion of income and wealth (OECD 2014). 
Although an inclusive growth strategy has many dimensions and involves 
various policy areas, wages as the main source of income for the mass of 
workers have to play a major role in any such strategy. It is indeed a mat-
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ter of putting right the distorted pay differential between Afkir and Boer 
and defi ning wage bargaining as a (still) very useful instrument for solv-
ing the current European crisis. It is noteworthy in this regard that col-
lective bargaining as we know it is the product of major crises in the past, 
not least the Great Depression of the 1930s. In this book we will there-
fore discuss the political and institutional preconditions for strengthen-
ing collective bargaining at both national and European level in order 
to allow more expansive and solidaristic wage developments. Transna-
tional policy innovation is considered to be crucial in this regard. 
1. A European tradition
In the member states of the EU, organisations representing employers 
and workers play an important role, infl uencing developments at the 
workplace and participating in wider social and economic governance. 
Although the nature and extent of this role varies considerably from 
country to country, social dialogue forms part of the acquis commu-
nautaire. It is promoted by the Treaty establishing the European Com-
munity. The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU also includes the 
right of workers to information and consultation within the undertaking 
(Article 27) and the right of collective bargaining and action (Article 28).
A key part of this European model of social dialogue is collective bar-
gaining, an important way of determining wages, hours and other con-
tractual conditions of employment through direct negotiations between 
the union(s) and the employer(s). The ILO Constitution and ILO Con-
ventions No. 98 and No. 154 state that collective bargaining should be 
based on the following important principles:
– free and voluntary negotiations;
– the autonomy of the social partners, which ‘does not allow inappro-
priate interference by the government or others. However, the gov-
ernment may provide a legal framework for collective bargaining, 
which may be complemented by rules or practices set by the social 
partners themselves’ (Standaert 2005);
– equal status or equal rights for each partner involved in collective 
bargaining. 
Regulation of the employment relationship by institutions of collective 
bargaining mediate economic and social pressures, distribute power 
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among actors and offer solutions to coordination problems facing mar-
ket economies (Hall and Taylor 1996). Collective bargaining has for 
workers a protective function (guaranteeing adequate pay and decent 
working conditions), a voice function (permitting the expression of in-
terests) and a distributive function (securing a share in economic growth 
and the fruits of productivity) (Visser 2013). 
Collective bargaining and especially pay bargaining was a pillar of Eu-
rope’s well performing socio-economic model in the post-1945 period. A 
‘productivity’ compromise between capital and labour formed its back-
bone. As Glyn et al. (1990) argue, wages and employment grew simulta-
neously in a virtuous circle linked by high investment levels, increasing 
productivity and rising wages. In historical perspective this compromise 
was made possible by a series of factors: the development of Keynes-
ian macroeconomic demand management, ‘Pax Americana’ and Fordist 
mass production systems (Marglin and Schor 1990). Institutionalised 
forms of social dialogue were a core feature of the system.
The crown jewel of this organised social dialogue was a solidaristic wage 
formation policy (Schulten 2002). The concept is based on collective 
regulation of wages which ‘uses a deliberate, centrally controlled force 
to counteract … the centrifugal force of the market, that is, its tendency 
towards wage differentiation’ (Meidner and Hedborg 1984: 7). ‘Fair’ 
wages should not be set as a function of either the particular business 
situation or a specifi c balance of power in a company, but instead within 
a framework of multi-employer agreements based on a comprehensive 
system of job evaluation classifi cations and occupational pay scales. This 
wage formation should be underpinned by periodic pay rises, collectively 
negotiated at supra-company level, not linked to the profi tability of indi-
vidual enterprises, but instead geared towards the productivity increases 
of the economy as a whole. After a long period of a decreasing wage share 
in most European countries wage developments need to reverse that 
trend in order to promote a more wage- and demand-led growth strategy 
(Lavoie and Stockhammer 2013) Excessive wage differences were also 
furthermore compressed by the collective setting of wage differentials 
and pay rises. Middle class incomes and consumption were an essential 
driver of economic growth.
Wage bargaining thus generally developed at sectoral level. Coverage 
of collective agreements was high and often backed by legislation on 
extension to other employers and workers in the relevant sector (non-
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members of the signatory organisations). Sectoral bargaining was com-
plemented by forms of cross-sectoral coordination of wage policies. 
Different forms of such coordination were applied: by the national con-
federations; state-sponsored councils setting a wage norm; or pattern 
bargaining (one instance of bargaining served as benchmark for the oth-
ers). In general, this contributed to the creation of a well-performing 
social market economy and the provision of a more or less stable social 
climate at the workplace. 
2. Challenged by fi nance-led capitalism
The oil shock crisis of the 1970s precipitated a worldwide economic 
downturn and accelerated latent socio-economic developments. Falling 
employment in manufacturing, the rise of service sector employment and 
the emergence of particular policy changes altered the way employment 
is organised in advanced industrialised economies. Instead of steady 
wage gains in line with productivity increases for the standard worker, 
real wages of the majority of workers stagnated or lost ground. Labour 
markets were ‘liberalised’. The fi nancialisation of corporate governance, 
globalisation of production processes, technological innovations and 
market ‘deregulation’ resulted in a fi nance-dominated capitalism, the 
main upshot of which was the redistribution of income at the expense 
of (low) wages and rising current account imbalances at the global and 
regional levels, in particular within the European Monetary Union since 
its inception in 1999 (Hein 2012).
These dominant trends since the rise of neoliberal economic policies in 
Europe have changed the landscape of social dialogue and collective bar-
gaining in Europe. This change has been defi ned as ‘competitive corpo-
ratism’ (Rhodes 2001) or ‘supply-side corporatism’ (Traxler et al. 2001). 
The main features are summarised in Table 1.
Since the 1980s, wage policy has thus become increasingly market-driv-
en and competition-oriented, including features such as wage ‘modera-
tion’, a redistribution of income between capital and labour in favour 
of the former and increased inequality within the labour force at large 
(Brandl and Traxler 2011). This development followed the displacement 
of (forms of) Keynesianism with monetarist and neoliberal approach-
es, in a context of expanded market relations (commodifi cation) and 
increased global competition (Streeck and Thelen 2005). Centralised 
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collective bargaining structures came under pressure. Social inequality, 
translated into income gaps and poverty rates, has been continuously ris-
ing in the majority of industrialised nations (Schelke and Hassel, 2012).
Institutionalised wage-setting systems were challenged and put under 
pressure, but nevertheless remained structurally resilient in many EU 
countries. Adaptation rather than destruction was the main institutional 
effect. Union density declined, but in continental Europe collective bar-
gaining structures appeared fairly stable. Collective bargaining coverage 
remained high and decentralisation trends were often counterbalanced 
by increasing coordination efforts. Most countries retained forms of 
supra-company bargaining at sectoral, regional or national level. How-
ever, opportunities for lower-level derogations or adjustments increased 
in several countries, triggering processes of ‘organised decentralisation’ 
(Marginson 2014).
As a result, at the start of the current economic crisis two out of three 
workers in the European Union were still covered by a wage agreement. 
In continental Western Europe this coverage was even 70 to 80 per cent. 
However, in the central and east European countries that joined the EU 
in the 2000s a comparable system of collective bargaining developed 
Table 1 Main features of competitive corporatism since the 1980s
Dominant economic policy Monetarism 
Combating infl ation 
Key role for ‘independent’ central bank 
Supply-side economics
Economic context High unemployment
International competitiveness
Wage bargaining Wage moderation: decreasing labour costs (integrated with 
tax and income policies) 
Bargaining system Sector level still dominant, but trends of decentralisation 
(coordinated or uncoordinated) 
Dominating interest Employers
Shift  from taking wages out of competition to seeing wages 
as key component of competition
Not only companies compete, but also countries (growing risk 
of social dumping) practices)
Main trade union approach Inclusive bargaining (employment) and not only distributive 
bargaining (sharing productivity gains)
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only weakly. The United Kingdom, like many other English-speaking 
countries, meanwhile experienced further deterioration of its bargain-
ing system, with diminishing coverage in the private sector. Germany 
was also confronted with a signifi cant decrease of bargaining coverage.
3. Under European attack since the crisis
In 2008, a worldwide crisis set in due to the crisis in the housing sec-
tor in the United States (the credit crisis). At about the same time, EU 
member states such as Spain and Ireland were trapped by a stimula-
tory monetary policy in the euro zone that led to the overheating of their 
economies, including in the housing sector. The international fi nancial 
crisis followed the crisis in construction and real estate, as many banks 
now held worthless paper derived from the housing market. Countries 
intervened by ‘nationalising’ banks or issuing state bank guarantees to 
prevent the collapse of the fi nancial system and to limit the effects of 
the fi nancial crisis on other sectors. A key aspect of the banking crisis 
was the rising (public and private) debt problems, which affected some 
European countries in particular, involving the European Union in a 
sovereign debt crisis. In 2009 Europe and the world as a whole some-
how scrambled out of recession and some economic growth was realised. 
But this growth was too limited and unevenly distributed across the EU 
member states, causing new problems and bringing about a growth cri-
sis in the euro area. This leaves the European Union now facing three 
interlinked fi nancial and economic crises. Southern European countries 
in particular have been confronted with economic hardship (Shambaugh 
2012; ECB 2012; European Commission DG ECFIN 2012).
For years, European initiatives have had relatively low impact on wage-
setting due to a policy consensus that wage formation should be the re-
sult of national arrangements. In the wake of the crisis a paradigm shift 
took place, from the acceptance of free and autonomous wage bargaining 
to a strategy of direct political intervention (Schulten and Müller 2015). 
The already mentioned ‘Europe 2020’ growth strategy, the successor 
of the unsuccessful Lisbon strategy, introduced a new tool of policy co-
ordination at the EU level in 2010, the European Semester. The Euro-
pean Semester operates in a circular manner, starting with the Annual 
Growth Survey, setting out the broad EU economic policies, the national 
reform programmes presented by the member states, the Commission’s 
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proposals to the Council on country-specifi c recommendations and the 
Commission’s assessment of the actions taken at national level in re-
sponse to these recommendations, including Commission opinions on 
draft budgetary plans.
This new policy cycle was introduced at the same time that Europe and 
especially the euro zone was hit by the severe crisis triggered by Greece’s 
debt refi nancing problems on the fi nancial markets, which led it to ask 
for support from its EU neighbours. In response the European Commis-
sion’s surveillance of member states’ macroeconomic policy was further 
strengthened. Three developments were of key importance for the para-
digm shift from indirectly infl uencing wages through growing market 
competition towards direct policy intervention in wage-setting.
First, in March 2011 the governments of the then 17 euro-zone coun-
tries agreed the ‘Euro-plus pact’. Six other countries signed subsequent-
ly (Bulgaria, Denmark, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland and Romania). The 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Sweden and the United Kingdom remained 
outside the agreement. The pact includes, on one hand, a commitment 
to ensure that wages increase only in line with productivity and on the 
other hand the objective of monitoring and benchmarking trends in unit 
labour costs. While formally stating that it will respect member states’ 
autonomy, the pact also stipulates as part of its monitoring the review of 
wage-setting mechanisms, in particular the degree to which bargaining 
is centralised, the effects of wage indexation mechanisms and the impact 
of pay developments in the public sector. Second, the so-called ‘Six Pack’ 
of regulations on economic governance adopted by the European Coun-
cil in October 2011 introduced the possibility of imposing sanctions on 
countries persistently running macroeconomic imbalances. The regula-
tions as a result indirectly reinforce the powers of the Commission to su-
pervise wage policies and unit labour costs. This regulation gives the EU 
the opportunity to insist on ‘reforms’ of wage-setting systems as a pos-
sible corrective measure. Third, and most starkly, the Memorandums of 
Understanding between the ‘Troika’ of European and international insti-
tutions (the ECB, the European Commission and the IMF) and national 
governments in countries receiving fi nancial assistance packages have 
had a much more direct impact by requiring changes in wage-setting 
mechanisms as part of the fi nancial package deals.
The semester approach is also backed by joint monitoring. In relation 
to wage-setting systems this is done in the context of the employment 
performance monitor and benchmarks. Indicators are nominal unit 
labour costs (and labour productivity) and the benchmark is the EU 
three-year trend average of unit labour costs, again stressing cost com-
petitiveness. 
Guy Van Gyes and Torsten Schulten
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Table 2 European intervention in wage policy, 2011–2015
1. Country-specifi c recommendations within the framework of the European Semester
Decentralisation of collective 
bargaining
Belgium, Italy, Spain
Moderation of minimum wage 
development
Bulgaria, France, Portugal, Slovenia
Moderation of general wage devel-
opment/nominal wages in line with 
real productivity
Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Finland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Slovenia, Spain
Wage development in line with 
productivity growth/to support 
domestic demand
Germany
Addressing high wages at the lower 
end of the
wage scale
Sweden, Slovenia
2. Country-specifi c agreements between EU/ECB/IMF or IMF and national governments 
within the framework of Memorandums of Understanding
Decentralisation of collective 
bargaining
Greece, Portugal, Romania
More restrictive criteria for exten-
sion of collective agreements
Greece, Portugal, Romania
Reduction/freeze of minimum 
wages
Greece, Ireland, Latvia, Portugal, Romania
Reduction/freeze of public sector 
wages
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Portugal, Romania
Wage freezes in private sector Greece
Nominal wage development in line 
with real productivity
Cyprus, Portugal
3. No recommendations in the area of wage policy
Austria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Lithuania, Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia, United Kingdom
Source: Update of Schulten and Müller (2015).
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The policy shift resulted, on one hand, in the EU issuing country-specifi c 
recommendations on wages and collective bargaining from 2011 within 
the framework of the ‘semester’ approach. On the other hand, consider-
able changes were implemented in the (bail-out) countries in relation 
to wage-bargaining systems (partly or entirely at the instigation of the 
Troika). 
The policy rationale was based on the view that divergence in wage de-
velopments/labour costs was a major reason for the economic imbalanc-
es that became so obvious during the crisis in Europe. As the leaders of 
the European Union Jean-Claude Juncker, together with Donald Tusk, 
Jeroen Dijsselbloem and Mario Draghi, asserted in a joint paper on the 
future of economic governance in Europe, the crisis is mainly a ‘crisis of 
competitiveness’, in which wage and labour costs play a major, if not the 
key role (Juncker et al. 2015). Greater fl exibility in wage adjustment is 
expected in countries with large internal or external imbalances to sup-
port adjustment processes. Decentralisation of collective bargaining was 
in this regard seen as a measure for better aligning wages with produc-
tivity at local and fi rm level. On this view, pay demands and collectively-
agreed wages were ‘excessive’ in the period before the crisis and ‘internal 
devaluation’ was needed to restore competitiveness.
Introduction
Table 3 Changes in collective bargaining systems in EU countries under 
EU, ECB and/or IMF surveillance
Measures Aff ected countries 
Abolition/termination of national collective agreements Ireland, Romania
Facilitating derogation of fi rm-level agreements from sectoral agree-
ments or legislative (minimum) provisions
Greece, Portugal, Hun-
gary, Italy, Spain
General priority of company agreements/abolition of the favourability 
principle
Greece, Spain
More restrictive criteria for extension of collective agreements Greece, Portugal, 
Romania
Reduction of the ‘aft er-eff ect’ of expired collective agreements Greece, Spain
Possibilities to conclude company agreements by non-union employees Greece, Hungary, Portu-
gal, Romania, Spain
Source: Schulten and Müller (2015).
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4. Outline of the book
The focus of the present book is this recent policy shift in European eco-
nomic governance in which wages and wage formation systems have 
come under attack. In its various chapters the book provides:
– an evaluation and critical review of the policy theory underpinning 
this new policy approach;
– an (empirical) assessment of its impact;
– an outline and evaluation of other views on the role that wages and 
collective bargaining can play in a (different) EU socio-economic 
perspective.
The fi rst part of the book confronts the new European economic govern-
ance with current wage developments and institutional trends ‘before’ 
and ‘after.’ 
Chapter 1 by Guy Van Gyes and Sem Vandekerckhove (KU Leuven-
HIVA, Belgium) provides a methodological overview of the existing data 
(problems) on collectively-agreed wages in Europe. Noélie Delahaie 
(IRES, France), Sem Vandekerckhove (KU Leuven-HIVA, Belgium) and 
Catherine Vincent (IRES, France) in Chapter 2 discuss trends in both 
collectively agreed wages and actual wages since the early 2000s. In 
this work, the TURI database on collectively agreed wages in Europe 
is used. The southern part of Europe has probably been hardest hit by 
the changes in wage formation and collective bargaining since the crisis 
and the development of Europe’s new economic governance. From the 
broader perspective of economic governance, Chapter 3 by Jesús Cruces 
Aguilera, Nacho Álvarez and Francisco Trillo, Foundation 1° de Mayo, 
Spain and Salvo Leonardi (IRES, Italy) discusses the ‘real’ practice of 
‘internal devaluation’ strategies by looking at trends in Italy, Spain and 
Portugal. Chapters 4 and 5 bring in additional evidence to complete the 
current European landscape of collective bargaining and pay develop-
ments. Szilvia Borbély and László Neumann (SZGTI, Hungary) write in 
chapter 5 about similarities and diversities in the development of wages 
and collective bargaining in Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Repub-
lic, while in Chapter 4 Søren Kaj Andersen and Christian Lyhne Ibsen 
(FAOS, Denmark), Pekka Sauramo (Finnish Labour Institute for Eco-
nomic Research) and Kristine Nergaard (FAFO, Norway) debate chang-
es in wage policy and collective bargaining in the Nordic countries. The 
issues of German wage leadership and the need for more coordination 
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due to increased labour migration are raised. Chapter 6 by Lewis Emery, 
LRD, United Kingdom, zooms in on a particular case: multi-employer 
bargaining in the United Kingdom, where this practice has long been in 
decline. What has been the impact of this loss, where is it still used and 
how is multi-employer bargaining discussed? 
The second part of the book embarks on a theoretical and analytical 
discussion of particular reforms and policy alternatives. Chapter 7 by 
Torsten Müller (ETUI, Brussels), Thorsten Schulten (WSI-HBS, Ger-
many) and Sepp Zuckerstätter (AK, Austria) discusses the implied EU 
policy views on collectively agreed wages and economic performance. 
The chapter outlines the narrow conception of competitiveness as cost 
competitiveness, on which the ‘internal devaluation’ approach is based. 
It goes on to show that cost competitiveness – that is, wage costs – is 
only part of the story and that the neglect of non-price competitiveness 
and the underlying growth models of national economies (role of exports 
and domestic demand and the structure of the export basket) highlight 
two things: fi rst, the one size fi ts all ‘austerity’ approach based on wage 
cuts and bargaining decentralisation cannot work and second, that an 
alternative and broader view of the role of wages is needed that takes 
into account the different structures of national economies. 
In Chapter 8 Maarten Keune (AIAS-UvA, The Netherlands) summarises 
the main effects of the current assault on multi-employer bargaining 
in the EU. Less governance capacity and more inequality are the main 
negative effects. Odile Chagny and Michel Husson (IRES, France) show 
in Chapter 9 that Europe is facing a crisis of wage coordination. This 
is why the debate on an optimal wage rule should now be a priority. A 
European wage rule should aim to combine three objectives: a fair dis-
tribution of productivity gains to the wage-earners, the reduction of 
structural disparities of wages across sectors and maintaining relative 
price competitiveness across countries. However, this rule is hampered 
by current incompatibilities in the euro zone. There is no convergence in 
productivity effi ciency and infl ation. The latter has to do with the pro-
ductivity transfers to wages in services, which leads to less inequality, 
but also to more infl ation.
The last two chapters of the book discuss possible institutional instru-
ments to optimise this kind of wage coordination. Thorsten Schulten 
(WSI-HBS, Germany), Torsten Müller (ETUI, Brussels) and Line El-
dring (FAFO, Norway) discuss the prospects and obstacles of a European 
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minimum wage policy, while Thorsten Schulten (WSI-HBS, Germany), 
Line Eldring, (FAFO, Norway) and Reinhard Neumann, (Ruben Rolo, 
Portugal) clarify the role of extension mechanisms for the stability of 
multi-employer bargaining systems. The conclusion wraps up the main 
fi ndings and policy views.
5. Re-focusing EU growth strategy
The book as a whole can be read as a plea for a substantial refocusing of 
the current EU socio-economic growth strategy. Early in 2010 the Eu-
ropean Union launched its Europe 2020 Strategy, which in the words 
of the European Commission was aimed at making the EU a front run-
ner in developing a growth model beyond simply increasing GDP. Refer-
ring to the roots of the European social market economy, the ambition 
was to ‘come out stronger from the crisis and turn the EU into a smart, 
sustainable and inclusive economy, delivering high levels of employ-
ment, productivity and social cohesion’ (COM(2010)2020 of 3 March 
2010). By taking as a socio-economic premise that we now need more 
than ever a focus on inclusive targets to obtain sustainable growth, the 
fi rst chapters show how macroeconomic governance, renewed within the 
Europe 2020 growth strategy, has delivered the opposite by limiting the 
policy view all too much to a cost perspective on wages and to empiri-
cally wrong beliefs on the coordinating and governing role of collective 
bargaining systems of wage setting. The later chapters bring arguments 
into the European debate on how an alternative view on wages and col-
lective bargaining can play a key role in a renewed, successful inclusive 
growth strategy for Europe.
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Chapter 1 
Indicators of collectively agreed wages in the 
euro zone: a quality report
Guy Van Gyes and Sem Vandekerckhove
1. Introduction
Given the great importance of collective bargaining for wage-setting in 
Europe, it is all the more astonishing that, even today, there is no offi -
cial Europe-wide database or statistics on collectively agreed wages. The 
only exception is the indicator of negotiated wages, which is calculated 
by the European Central Bank (ECB) as an aggregate fi gure for the whole 
euro zone (ECB 2002). Because the ECB does not publish the underly-
ing national data, the ECB indicator of negotiated wages contains only a 
rough calculation at a highly aggregated level, with no information that 
would make possible a European comparative analysis. The indicator is 
considered by the ECB itself to comprise ‘experimental data’: that is, sta-
tistics that are not yet fully developed in terms of coverage, rely on some-
what different source data, are not based on euro area–wide harmonised 
defi nitions or rely heavily on estimation techniques using substantial 
assumptions. There is also an annual report on pay developments in 
Europe published by the European Industrial Relations Observatory 
(EIRO) of the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and 
Working Conditions, which includes data on collectively agreed wages 
(for the latest issue see Cabrita and Fric 2012). 
In response to the problems posed by the fi nancial and economic crisis, 
the European Union has meanwhile put forward a new series of poli-
cies better known as European economic governance. As emphasised in 
the Euro Plus Pact, wages and collective bargaining systems are seen as 
one of the main instruments for the European coordination of economic 
policy. Recommendations on wages can be traced in the EU 2020 rec-
ommendations of the ongoing European monitoring of national reform 
programmes and in the in-depth country reports of the macroeconomic 
imbalances procedure. Although there is still heated discussion of the 
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status and content of these recommendations – especially at the Euro-
pean trade union side – such a policy turn necessitates reviewing and 
improving the available comparative information for European policy-
makers and social-partner organisations. Therefore, a quality review 
and assessment of comparative statistics on collective agreed wages 
seems urgently needed.
The ECB’s quarterly indicator of negotiated wage rates in the euro zone 
is based on non-harmonised data from 10 countries. However, the fi g-
ures from Slovenia and France are based on national indicators of actual 
wage increases. The present chapter compares the design and quality of 
the available indicators of collectively-agreed wages for the other eight 
countries: Austria, Belgium, Finland, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Por-
tugal and Spain. These countries, which belong to the euro zone, have a 
clearly available indicator. Our comparison also digs out the available 
data for France. The indicators play a dominant role in the recent annual 
EIRO reports on collectively agreed pay (Cabrita and Fric 2012).
The quality concept applied in this chapter is in conformity with the defi -
nition developed by the European Statistical System (Eurostat 2009). 
The following quality dimensions are distinguished in this approach: 
relevance, accuracy, timeliness and punctuality, accessibility and clar-
ity. Each of the quality components will be explained briefl y at the start 
of the relevant section. Our main sources are individual quality reports, 
delivered by national experts during the spring and summer of 2012.1 In 
drafting these quality reports, the experts contacted between two and 
fi ve statistics stakeholders (trade unions, ministries of labour or statisti-
cal offi ces). 
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2. Designs and methodology
National indicators of collectively-agreed wages can be divided in two 
types. On one hand, they can be related to pay levels, on the other hand 
to pay increases. 
However, the fi rst type of indicator is, in the countries of study, not avail-
able or limited to a database, and not summarised in an aggregated sta-
tistical index. Only Italy and Portugal are exceptions to this (see Table 1).
As a result, we shall focus on the available indicators of pay increases. 
Table 1 National indicators or databases of collectively-agreed pay levels
Indicator (or database) Comment
BE (Juridisk) Only (legal) database; privately-owned; access fee 
DE (WSI Tarifarchiv) Only database; privately owned; accessible
ES (REGCON database) Only database; Ministry of Employment and Social Security
FR Not available Database of sectoral agreements reported to the Ministry; ad 
hoc studies; DARES and DGT of the Ministry of Labour, Em-
ployment and Health; no access; DGT publishes an extensive 
annual report on collective bargaining
IT Nominal wage amount 
fi gures
ISTAT; published on quarterly and annual basis; annual nation-
al collectively agreed wage levels by accrual and cash value
NL Not available FNV trade union confederation and AWVN employers’ organi-
sations maintain database. The former is accessible via AIAS/
University of Amsterdam
AT (KV-System) Only legal database; privately owned; access fee
PT (Database of collective 
regulations)
Database of collective agreements and in 2011 for the fi rst 
time section in annual report on average collectively agreed 
wage level; DGERT Ministry of Economy and Labour
FI Not available Ministry of Justice maintains a database (FINLEX) that 
also contains collective agreements (that have been legally 
extended)
Source: CAWIE national reports.
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2.1 Basic defi nition
Indexes of collectively-agreed wages measure the proportionate, or per-
centage, changes in a set of prices over time, wages being the price of la-
bour. A price index is typically assigned a value of unity, or 100, in some 
reference period and the values of the index for other periods of time are 
intended to indicate the average proportionate – or percentage – change 
in prices relative to this base. However, the index is limited to changes 
in employee compensation agreed in a collective way, namely in a col-
lective agreement. The ILO Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining 
Convention (No. 98), 1949 describes collective bargaining as ‘Voluntary 
negotiation between employers or employers’ organisations and work-
ers’ organisations, with a view to the regulation of terms and conditions 
Table 2 National indexes of collectively-agreed pay increases, euro zone
Publisher Name
BE Federal Ministry of 
Employment, Labour and 
Social dialogue
Index of the collectively agreed wages (Indexcijfer van de 
conventionele lonen/indice des salaires conventionnels)
DE Federal Statistical Offi  ce 
(Destatis)
Index of agreed earnings (Index der Tarifverdienste)
ES Ministry of Employ-
ment and Social Security 
(MEYSS)
Statistics on collectively-agreed wages (Estadistica de Con-
venios Colectivos de Trabajo, ECCT)
FR Ministry of Labour, 
Employment and Health 
(DARES-DGT)
Average annual change of collectively agreed wages (Evolu-
tions annuelles du salaire conventionnel)
IT Italian statistical offi  ce 
ISTAT
Index numbers of the collectively agreed wages (Indici delle 
retribuzioni contrattuali)
NL Statistics Netherlands 
(CSB)
Collective Labour Agreement Wage Indexes (CAO-lonen 
indexcijfers)
AT Statistics Austria Index of collectively agreed minimum wages (Tarifl ohnindex)
PT Ministry of Labour 
(DGERT)
Annualised weighted average variation between wage tables 
(Variação salarial nominal média ponderada intertabelas 
anualizada, VMPI)
FI Statistics Finland Index of negotiated wages and salaries
Note: It is important to note that Germany also has other indicators. The WSI collective agreement 
archive publishes collectively agreed pay increases and annual increases in collectively agreed basic 
pay. The German Central Bank also produces an index on collectively agreed pay. For further infor-
mation see Germany’s national CAWIE report (Bispinck and Schulten 2012).
Source: National reports CAWIE project.
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of employment by collective agreements’. Collective bargaining may take 
place at the national, sectoral or company level. In no European country 
is it found exclusively at one level. However, in most euro-zone member 
states strong trade unions and employers’ organisations have resulted in 
many agreements being concluded at the national or sectoral level, sup-
plemented by some company-level bargaining.
The existing indexes of collectively agreed pay increases focus on the 
average nominal (basic) pay increase as set by collective agreements 
for full-time workers. Two basic questions determine the content of the 
indicator:
(i) What set of agreed pay increases or collective prices of labour is cov-
ered by the index?
(ii) How are the price movements averaged?
Coverage and weighting, in other words, are key features of this kind 
of index (see below). But fi rst we shall look at the national origins and 
uses of indicators.
2.2 Origins and uses
Five of the nine indicators are developed and published by the offi cial 
national statistical agencies (Austria, Finland, Germany, Italy and the 
Netherlands). The four others are maintained by the ministry of labour. 
The Dutch CSB publishes (since 1926) the ‘indexcijfers van regeling-
slonen’ (index of regulated wages). Statistics Finland and the Italian 
ISTAT started to calculate their indexes in 1938. Others commenced in 
the 1950s (for example, Belgium) and the 1960s (for example, Austria). 
Spain and Portugal introduced their indexes in the 1980s. The French 
Ministry of Labour developed its database only recently. The German 
statistical offi ce expanded and modernised the calculated index mark-
edly in 2010. It has data going back to 1995.
The principal use of the indexes of earnings is to serve as background 
material for the social partners in the process of collective bargaining. 
It provides information on past earnings, facilitating the search for a 
common understanding of past and future earnings trends. However, 
the CAWIE national reports mention that wage-bargaining targets more 
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often depend on actual parameters, such as profi ts, productivity, and 
infl ation. 
The original use of indexes, however, was related to the income-
policy perspective. First, the indicators were used to monitor whether 
the price of labour – or rather, labour income – was following the (‘oth-
er’) consumer price index. Second, they have served as a reference point 
to increase certain social benefi ts. The Finnish index, for example, plays 
a role in the calculation of pension rights. Comparable examples are also 
found in other countries. Wage replacement payments for Altersteilzeit 
– a scheme partially to compensate eligible employees who reduce their 
working time as they approach retirement age – in Austria are increased 
according to increases in the Tarifl ohnindex. In Belgium the index is 
used, for example, in specifi c accommodation contracts to determine the 
rent increase.
In recent times the macroeconomic perspective has become increas-
ingly relevant. The index has always been used in a number of countries 
in economic forecasts because it is a timely measure of wage develop-
ments. It is published frequently (monthly and quarterly). Other wage 
data are available only with some time lag. It is this characteristic in par-
ticular that the ECB also fi nds attractive. This timeliness makes the data 
very useful for monitoring and forecasting wage developments within 
the framework of the broader macroeconomic forecasting that the ECB 
needs in order to meet its (infl ation-related) monetary-policy obliga-
tions.
This macroeconomic perspective has increased in importance due to the 
current European focus on competitiveness and the limiting new frame-
work of euro monetary unifi cation for national policies. In this perspec-
tive, wage ‘moderation’ is considered an important policy instrument, 
which has brought increased attention to bear on wage-setting systems 
and collective bargaining (the Euro Plus Pact is a recent instance of this). 
A specifi c example of redirected attention is Belgium’s introduction of 
a wage norm. The Belgian state tries to balance the automatic indexing 
of wages and sectoral bargaining with a strict law on monitoring and in-
tervention in the wage-setting system. The 1989 law on the competitive-
ness of the economy (1989-01-06/31) authorises government interven-
tion if average overall wage increases result – based on past performance 
– in an upsurge in relative labour costs and a deteriorating external 
Indicators of collectively agreed wages in the euro zone: a quality report
 Wage bargaining under the new European Economic Governance 29
performance on the part of private sector companies. The 1989 law was 
extended in 1996 (1996-07-26/32) to enable the government to moni-
tor the wage bargaining process even more closely. The most important 
changes with regard to the 1989 law were a shift from an assessment 
of labour costs based on past performance to one that predicted future 
performance, and the number of countries used as a benchmark was re-
duced to three. The forecast weighted rises in foreign hourly labour costs 
(a weighted average for France, Germany and the Netherlands) now act 
as an upper limit (termed the ‘wage norm’) for wage negotiations at all 
levels (macro, sectoral and company). The lower limit remains the auto-
matic price index.
In sum, fi rst users are ministries, employers’ organisations, trade un-
ions, the political sphere, the academic community and macroeconomic 
institutions. Secondary users are employers and private users (compare 
the use in the price escalator clauses of contracts). Countries such as 
Germany, France, Spain and Portugal also publish basic information 
concerning the indexes – namely the agreed pay increases of individual 
collective agreements – as a service to employers and employees. They 
do this electronically and/or in a journal. Belgium has comparable plans 
for the near future.
2.3 Method of calculation
Choice of index numbers
Two basic approaches can be discerned in the current indexes.
(i) Main approach: Laspeyres price index
A majority of the indicators can be defi ned as Laspeyres indexes. This ap-
plies to Austria, Belgium, Germany, Finland, Italy and the Netherlands.
The purpose of these indexes is to compare the aggregate values of col-
lectively-agreed wages in two time periods. These values include a price 
and a quantitative element. A change in wage costs can be attributed to 
an increase of the wage (price element), but also to a change in how many 
workers receive this wage (quantity element). The constructed indexes 
are intended to measure the price component, just like the consumer 
price index measures the price component of the change in household 
consumption expenditure. Measuring or focusing on the price element 
means that indexes are constructed to capture the change in average 
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collectively-agreed pay, holding quantities constant. This set of quanti-
ties can be described as the ‘basket’ of collectively-agreed wages that is 
compared.
The period whose quantities are used in the index can be described as 
the weight reference period. In most of the studied indexes period zero, 
or the reference period, is also used as the weight reference period. As 
such, the constructed indexes belong to the group of so-called Laspeyres 
indexes. This might be formulated as follows:
 
The values indicate a relative change but not absolute values (that is, one 
price index value can be compared to another or a base, but the number 
alone has no meaning). An index picks a base year for which its value is 
set to 100.
As can be seen from the defi nition, if one already has pay and quantity 
data for the base period, then calculating the Laspeyres index for a new 
period requires only new data on the pay increase. Therefore, calculat-
ing the Laspeyres index for a new period tends to require less time and 
effort.
Table 3 Base reference period used in 2012 for calculating Laspeyres 
indexes
Publisher Name
Belgium 1997 Base period irregularly revised (future plan every 10 years)
Germany 2005 Weight reference period = 2006; revision aft er 5 years
Italy 2005 Revision aft er 5 years
Nether-
lands 
2000 Revision aft er 10 years
Austria 2005 Weight reference period = 2006; revision every 10 years
Finland 2005 Revision aft er 5 years, starting in 2010 
Source: CAWIE national reports.
?? ? ?
? ??????
? ??????
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The Finnish index has a slightly different approach. The index of negoti-
ated wages and salaries measures the effect of collectively-agreed pay 
rises on the average regular pay rises. The index is, as such, calculated as 
a chained index using the same weight structure as in the (actual) wage 
and salary index. The effects of negotiated pay rises are estimated in re-
lation to the earnings level as at the previous year-end.
(ii) Alternative, simplifi ed approach
The Spanish and Portuguese indicators are constructed in a different 
way. The two countries’ ministries of labour publish monthly overviews 
of the wages laid down in newly signed collective agreements. By way 
of synthesis they calculate an average of these agreed wages. In Spain 
this is done in a cumulative way, resulting in an average agreed wage 
increase for all reported collective agreements that year. Once a collec-
tive agreement is signed, each of the bargaining or peer committees (at 
sectoral, provincial or company level) must fi ll in a statistical sheet to be 
attached to the agreement when recorded at the Collective Agreement 
Registry. In the sheet the bargainers have to indicate the agreed wage 
increase as a percentage and the employees covered. This information 
is used to obtain the average increases. The French approach, still be-
ing developed, currently focuses mainly on calculating average annual 
collectively-agreed pay increases by branch. An average is calculated for 
the whole economy. 
Coverage
Wage defi nition
Key to the calculation is of course what kinds of pay element are included 
in the index. In most countries index calculations take into account a 
broad defi nition of earnings (see Table 4). 
As such, the defi nitions can be situated between the two concepts used 
internationally in wage statistics on pay (ILO 1973):
(i) The concept of wage rates is related to basic prices of a unit of labour, 
before adding any bonuses for overtime, shift work or family allow-
ance, and before deducting contributions for social security and ad-
vanced tax payments. Wage rates can be expressed in units of time, 
such as an hour, a week, a month or as piece rates. It is the narrowest 
of all pay concepts and applies to workers in paid employment only.
(ii) The concept of earnings typically relates to the pay that employers 
directly give to their employees on a regular basis during a specifi ed 
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Table 4 Wage defi nitions of national indicators of collectively-agreed pay 
increases
Wage defi nition
BE Base wage; does not include bonuses such as premiums, year-end bonuses and holiday 
allowances; factors included are wage increases due to automatic indexation, collec-
tively agreed and working time revisions for workers with an hourly pay base. Seniority 
increments are not included, but are taken into account in the weighting procedure of 
averaging.
DE Agreed earnings; not included are individual bonuses and premiums, one-off  payments, 
fl at rate payments and remuneration in excess of agreed earnings.
FR Level of and increases in the minimum wage, which forms the content of sectoral col-
lective agreements in the French wage bargaining system. This minimum wage can be 
a ‘hierarchical’ wage (salaire hierarchique) or ‘guaranteed’ wage (salaire garanti). The 
former are hourly or monthly wages which are close to the minimum wage, including 
basic pay, production or individual performance bonuses and benefi ts in kind. Guaran-
teed wages are monthly or annual wages whose defi nition is broader than the previous 
one and includes certain benefi ts, such as a seniority premium or bonuses related to 
working conditions.
ES The wage increase considered is the increase in the base salary (without bonuses). 
Nevertheless many collective agreements refer to increases in total salary.
IT Basic pay; seniority allowances; shift  work allowances; all bonuses specifi ed in national 
agreements and payable to all workers (but not one-off  payments), as well as those 
paid periodically (for example, thirteenth-month payment as end-of-the-year pre-
mium).
NL Collectively agreed wages, including specifi c remuneration: gross wages for regular 
working hours of full-time employees; all binding prescribed, regularly prescribed 
paid benefi ts; all binding prescribed, special (non-monthly) benefi ts, such as holiday 
allowances or end-of-year payments. Excluded are allowances only for specifi c worker 
groups or individuals, such as age allowances, shift  allowances, or strictly individual pay 
increases.
AT Included in the wage are all regular payments that are conditional on the job the per-
son holds. Not included are payments that are conditional on personal circumstances 
of a particular person, such as special payments for parents, payments for special occa-
sions, jubilee premia and so on. The wage also does not include wages paid in kind, due 
to the diffi  culty of attaching a monetary value to them. In most collective agreements 
wages are usually fi xed in monetary terms while admissible deductions for in-kind 
rewards, such as food or housing, are fi xed in the contract.
PT Basic rates as defi ned in the wage tables annexed to the collective agreements.
FI Increases in gross average earnings for regular working hours in sectoral collective 
agreements. The earnings concept includes one-off  payments based on the relevant 
collective agreements. Compensation for overtime, holiday pay and other such items 
are not included.
Source: CAWIE national reports.
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reference period. It includes basic pay for time worked or work done, 
as well as for time not worked, such as holidays and sickness. In ad-
dition, it includes other payments granted by the employer for vari-
ous reasons, such as: overtime work, unsocial hours or schedules, 
diffi cult work, regular bonuses and fringe benefi ts, such as family al-
lowances. On the other hand, it excludes all irregular bonuses, even 
if provided by the employer. Earnings are, like time rates, recorded 
gross of social security contributions or tax deductions.
The latter concept refers also to the gross earnings statistics published 
by Eurostat, referring to EU 1738/2005 of 21 October 2005. Gross earn-
ings in this defi nition cover remuneration in cash paid directly by the 
employer, before tax deductions and social security contributions pay-
able by wage earners and retained by the employer. All bonuses, regard-
less of whether they are regularly paid (such as thirteenth or fourteenth 
month pay, holiday bonuses, profi t-sharing, allowances for leave not 
taken, occasional commissions and so on) are included.
The defi nitions used by Belgium, Portugal and Spain are more confi ned 
to the wage rate defi nition. The other defi nitions are closer to the con-
cept of gross earnings, although all exclude some pay elements that are 
included in the actual gross earnings statistics. Overtime pay is always 
excluded. 
Collective agreements included
The pay increases taken into consideration in Austria, Belgium, Finland, 
France and Italy are limited to sectoral or branch agreements. This bar-
gaining level is dominant in these countries; nevertheless lower-level 
collective agreements are not included. Portugal and Spain report on the 
average pay increases of all agreements that are mandatorily registered 
at the Ministry of Labour. The Netherlands and Germany work with a 
sample of collective agreements of different levels to obtain representa-
tive coverage. Belgium has plans to include the company agreements of 
large companies in sectors in which the sectoral level is not dominant.
Sectoral/occupational scope
The scope of the index in Austria, Finland, Germany, Italy, the Nether-
lands and Spain is the whole economy. However, domestic help or the 
private households sector is explicitly not included in Italy and Germa-
ny. The Spanish ECCT provides information on all private sector work-
ers (agriculture, industry and services) who are covered by collective 
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bargaining, as well as public sector workers covered by such bargaining 
(public administration, defence, social security, education, health care 
and so on). The scope of the Portuguese, French and Belgian indicators 
is more limited. They do not include public administration (civil serv-
ants). The Belgian index currently excludes also the collective agree-
ments of large (semi-)privatised public enterprises (post, telecommuni-
cations and public transport). The French data exclude agriculture and 
parts of entertainment in their indicator for the private sector.
In most countries the indexes are also available as a national aggregate 
and presented in terms of a sectoral classifi cation. NACE classifi cation 
is common practice. In Austria, Germany, Italy and Spain the informa-
tion is available in terms of NACE-2-digit, while in Belgium, Finland, 
the Netherlands and Portugal it is available at the level of letter codes 
(1-digit). Specifi c classifi cations based on industrial relations practice 
are, furthermore, used in Austria, Belgium, Finland and the Nether-
lands. In France these branches are the only sectoral classifi cation used. 
A total of 278 industries are divided into three overall sectors: metal, 
construction and general.
Occupational classifi cations also play a role in the manner of calcula-
tion. In Belgium the index is calculated separately for blue-collar and 
white-collar workers, which are still recognised as a separate employ-
ment status in labour law. The French indicator deals with blue-collar 
workers (ouvriers), white-collar workers (employés), intermediary pro-
fessions (professions intermédiares) and higher professional and mana-
gerial staff (cadres). Finland and the Netherlands distinguish between 
hourly-paid and monthly-paid employees (which is to a large extent also 
the main division between the blue-collar and white-collar segments in 
Belgium). 
Sampling and weighting
The second important methodological question of the constructed indi-
ces of collectively-agreed wages is related to averaging – the quantity di-
mension of a price index. For the countries producing a Laspeyres index, 
this procedure concerns the base year (see Table 3). Figure 1 summarises 
the approach taken for the Austrian Laspeyres index. 
Population or sampling
It is important in this regard to note that Austria, Belgium, Portugal and 
Spain use the whole population of registered collective agreements. In 
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Belgium and Portugal, however, this population is restricted to sectoral 
collective agreements (see above).
Others use samples of collective agreements. Statistics Austria includes, 
for each of the differentiated sectors – NACE and section of the Chamber 
of Commerce and Trade (WKOe) – the most important collective agree-
ments until at least 75 per cent of the wage earners covered by a branch-
level agreement are included. The Italian ISTAT uses as selection cri-
terion the fact that the pay increases of the leading national agreement 
are taken into account for each sector. As a result, the calculated index 
is based on a sample of 76 leading agreements. For the private sector 
this sample covers 85 per cent of employees. Statistics Finland monitors 
216 base series to construct 70 industry-specifi c indices. In Germany the 
statistics cover at least 75 per cent of people covered by collective agree-
ments in any sector or branch that is included in the index, for both old 
and new Länder. A total of 600 collective agreements are included. The 
Source: CAWIE national report Austria.
Figure 1  Weighting procedure of the Austrian Tarifl ohnindex
 
1
•Take all non-self-employed persons in Austria (excluding apprentices)
2
•Assign them according to groups of employers by potential contracting parties to a 
collective agreement or similar regulation
3
•Adjust for part-time employment to get full-time equivalent employment
4
•Adjust for non-coverage
5
•Get the distribution across collective agreements
6
•Select collective agreements and ensure representive statistics for (Ö)NACE by WKOe 
(nonWKOe) subdivisions
7
•Select representative job slots – wage grade steps – from the collective agreements 
for the calculation of the index
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
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Dutch CSB samples 250 of the approximately 900 collective agreements, 
including all agreements covering at least 2 500 employees. The French 
database monitors all industries with more than 5 000 employees, total-
ling 278 and covering 66 per cent of the French private sector.
Determination of the average wage: weighting within collective agreements
A fi rst step in calculating the average is to determine the average pay 
increase in collective agreements. In the majority of cases, this is not 
diffi cult, namely when the increase is set as a percentage increase for 
everybody covered by the collective agreement. 
The diffi culties start when increases are set not in relative but absolute 
amounts. A 5-euro increase in the monthly wage has a bigger propor-
tional impact on lower wages than on higher wages. One complication 
occurs when a wage increase is granted only to certain wage categories. 
This can happen because a certain occupational group needs a higher 
increase due to labour shortages or to make the occupation more attrac-
tive. Another possibility is that lowest wages are subject to a higher in-
crease. This happens, for example, in countries with a national minimum 
wage, although infrequently. The lowest wages in a collective agreement 
might, as a result, be below this minimum wage and must be raised to 
comply with the law. This has happened in France, for example, in recent 
years (André 2011).
Different approaches have been developed to handle the issue of de-
termining the average pay increase within a collective agreement. The 
Spanish method is fairly straightforward, but also very ‘subjective’: bar-
gainers complete a statistical sheet and this is one of the questions they 
have to answer. The Belgian ministry has, through its social security 
data, information on how many people are covered by a collective agree-
ment, but lacks information on the distribution of these wage earners 
over the cells used in the wage tables of the collective agreement. It uses, 
as a consequence, a ‘rough’ construct, namely the median pay of all wage 
categories or the mean overall pay levels in the different categories. The 
latter is done when a sophisticated occupational wage classifi cation sys-
tem is used (including seniority increments per wage category).
The Portuguese have a fairly comprehensive method. For each collec-
tive agreement the average pay increase is calculated on the basis of 
a comparison of pay levels in the respective wage tables (present and 
earlier agreements). The weight of each wage group in the average of 
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an agreement is calculated on the basis of statistical employment data 
provided by the statistical offi ce of the Ministry of Labour (GEP). These 
employment data are drawn from the annual company survey (Quad-
ros de Pessoal) carried out by the Ministry of Labour. Companies are 
legally obliged to answer this survey and therefore the coverage tends to 
be complete.
The Italian statistical offi ces uses survey data, administrative fi gures 
and information provided by interviewees of employers’ organisations 
to weight FTE employment by job levels and average for each agreement 
(the 76 national sectoral agreements monitored) the index by broad cat-
egories of occupation (blue-collar, white-collar and complex). 
The French system monitors 278 branches. The weighting is organised 
on the basis of the tri-annual ACEMO survey on the development of 
monthly base wages. The year 2008 is currently used as the reference 
period. In this survey covering more than 200 000 enterprises and 12 
million wage earners, employers with more than 10 employees have to 
indicate for three skill levels of four occupational categories (blue-collar, 
white-collar, intermediate profession and cadres) the base wage and the 
number of people. For each of the 12 socio-professional categories, the 
company can choose a reference job position to answer the wage ques-
tion. This information is then used to select reference wages in the wage 
tables of the collective agreement. The lowest wage category in the table 
is accorded to skill-level one, the highest wage category to skill-levels 
two and three, for each of the four occupational categories (when in-
cluded in the agreement). When different types of wages are agreed for 
this wage category, the so-called ‘salaire hièrarchique’ is selected. The 
employment fi gures of the ACEMO survey are used to weight wage data 
in calculating the average.
Austria, Germany and the Netherlands apply comparable methods. The 
Dutch CSB monitors 259 collective agreements. The wage tables of these 
agreements contain altogether 28 000 different wage categories or meas-
ure points. Until 2006 the CSB organised a large-scale quarterly/annual 
company survey on employment and wages. Information was collected 
on the contract wage and wage scale. Employment weights for the dif-
ferent wage categories could thus be reconstructed. In a next step the 
statistical offi ce sampled 4 700 of these measure points, guaranteeing 
that at least 60 per cent of the total wage sum is covered for each collec-
tive agreement. Use of the non-selected points is attributed, in the next 
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move, to the ‘nearest’ sampled points. As a result, weighted average pay 
increases for each collective agreement can be calculated by referring 
to the base year information as reference period.2 The German Destatis 
collects the same type of information as part of the Structure of Earn-
ings Survey. The German statistical offi ce uses this information as main 
variable for occupational class (compare ISCO) as part of the individual 
wage information that is asked for concerning the sampled employees. 
The German statistical offi ce thus uses all the wage groups, in contrast 
to the Dutch approach.
Another confusing element is the type of wage increase. The agreed pro-
portional wage increase can be specifi c to the wage level as indicated in 
the wage table of a collective agreement or it can be a general percent-
age increase of the total wage. Both may be the same for an individual 
worker, but also may not. In a range of countries it is common practice 
that some wage increases are limited to wages represented in the wage 
table. However, as the calculated wage increases in the indexes refer to 
the (minimum) wages of the collective agreement tables, this practice 
does not distort calculations. However, conceptually and also for the 
bargaining partners in practice a 2 per cent increase in the total wage is, 
for example, a bigger increase in absolute terms (and cost) than a 2 per 
cent increase in the wage sum reference in the wage table of a (sector) 
collective agreement.
Aggregating average wages: weighting between collective agreements
The next step in calculating the average is the weighting of collective 
agreements. All countries possess employment data by collective agree-
ment. Portugal, France and Germany use mainly (large-scale) survey 
material for this weighting; the Netherlands (since 2006), Finland and 
Belgium mainly administrative data; Austria and Italy a mixture of the 
two. Spain uses self-reported fi gures from the statistical sheets of the 
collective agreement.
Belgium, Germany, Italy and Austria – of the countries working with a 
base year – use only the employment distribution of this base year. The 
Netherlands and Finland adjust these fi gures, although in a different 
2.  The Dutch CSB stopped organising the survey in 2006 and now relies on information from 
the tax administration for such data. These data do not include contract wage information 
related to collective agreements, however.
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Figure 2  Weighting procedures to calculate average pay increase
way. The Finnish statistical agency uses annual changing weights in the 
aggregation of the 216 base series of the industry-specifi c indexes and 
fi xed-weights of the base year for the aggregation to 70 industry-specifi c 
indices. The Dutch statistical offi ce uses changing weights of employ-
ment between collective agreements, but not for the weighting within 
agreements.
Summarised
Figure 2 summarises these weighting procedures for calculating the ‘av-
erage’ increase. Key differences concern whether:
– it is based on a sample or the whole population of covered collective 
agreements;
– it is a base year, current year or a mixture of the two;
– the weighting within an included collective agreement is based on 
the objective collection of employment fi gures by pay scales or based 
on a simple or subjective method.
Population: PT, ES, BE
Sample: All other countries 
Base year: BE, DE, AT, IT
Mix: NL, FI
Current year: PT, ES, FR
Sector 1 Sector 3Sector 2
Pay scale 
Employ-
ment
Employment weight 1:
between collective agreement/sectors
Pay scale 
Employ-
ment
Pay scale 
Employ-
ment
Simple (median): BE
Subjective: ES (FI) 
Objective sampling basis:
all other countries 
Employment weight 2:
within collective agreement
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2.4 Periodicity and revisions
Belgium, Finland and Germany publish indexes on a quarterly basis. The 
French data are also quarterly updated, but they are not published regu-
larly (currently usually annually). Italy publishes monthly, quarterly 
and annual data. The annual data are published in March together with 
the monthly data for January and February. Portugal and Spain publish 
monthly averages, which are cumulated in an annual fi gure.
Preliminary monthly calculations are published by Austria and the Neth-
erlands. The Dutch offi ce indicates the number of agreements on which 
the calculation is based and updates it monthly until the fi gures are de-
fi nitive. It also publishes quarterly and annual indexes. Statistics Austria 
takes the same approach, publishing preliminary calculations 15 days 
after the end of the month; the fi nal fi gures come three months later. 
Retroactive revisions, that is, are included only in these three months, 
but for this rule, again, there is an exception for important agreements 
(representing more than 5 per cent of workers covered by the index).
The French data take into account the effective date when the wage in-
crease is foreseen by the agreement. When this date has passed (for ex-
ample, an agreement in November refers already to an increase in Janu-
ary), the signing date is used as the date of implementation. The Italian 
ISTAT, to counter this problem of retroactive wage increases, publishes 
two indicators on pay levels: ‘accrual’ with retroactive revision and ‘cash 
value’, which is what people actually received at the time of payment. 
The Italian index is published monthly and annually.
The Spanish indicators differentiate between ‘agreed’ and ‘revised wage 
increases’. The revised wage increase is the result of incorporating the 
impact of revisions on account of ‘wage guarantee clauses’ to the agreed 
wage increase for the period, in cases when such revisions are retroactive 
whatever the date on which they were actually paid. In other words, the 
result of the revisions is attributed to the year for which they are retroac-
tively calculated (and agreed).
3. Comparative quality assessment
There is no universal defi nition of quality; it is multifaceted and can 
therefore mean different things to different people, depending on the 
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various procedures and products. In relation to statistical output qual-
ity, the European Statistical System’s (ESS) six dimensions of quality are 
generally used: relevance, accuracy, timeliness, accessibility and clarity, 
comparability and coherence. The structure of the section is based on 
this ESS quality concept. Our assessment is organised from a harmoni-
sation perspective. Harmonisation can be defi ned as actions or processes 
that, through matching and blending, bring about agreement, reconcili-
ation or standardisation. Harmonisation is the process of agreeing and 
applying standards that can lead to comparability. Comparability, as we 
have seen, is one of the ESS dimensions of quality. As we embrace the 
harmonisation perspective in this chapter, comparative coherence is of 
course a key aspect of relevance. Thus we fi rst discuss relevance, compa-
rability and coherence combined.
3.1 Relevance, coherence and comparability
Relevance is the degree to which statistics meet current and potential 
user needs. It depends on whether all the statistics that are needed are 
produced and the extent to which the concepts used refl ect user needs.
Changing needs
In the different countries the relevance of the statistics on collectively-
agreed pay increases has been attributed mainly to income policies, in-
forming social dialogue on this issue and linking this information to so-
cial policies. Especially in countries with varied or diffuse agreements at 
different levels (local, regional, national) and demarcations (company, 
sub-sector, sector) and different timings, this reporting is instructive 
for other bargainers (see, for example the examples of the Netherlands, 
Portugal and Spain). However, it is certainly the case that it is only one 
of the statistics bargainers look at (and probably not the main one). The 
following passage of the French CAWIE report is illustrative in this re-
gard: ‘the main conclusion of interviews with social partners is the weak 
use of French statistical data. At the time of collective bargaining, social 
partners mainly focus on consumer price index, on the minimum wage 
(SMIC) and housing charges. They look at the hourly wage for manual 
worker index (SHBO) which is supplied by DARES publications to un-
derstand the development of the SMIC’ (Delahaie et al. 2012: 10).
This kind of horizontal coordination usage is complemented by a more 
macroeconomic perspective. Evidence of this perspective is most clear in 
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countries where vertical coordination of collective bargaining has been 
strong. Statistics Finland cooperates with the Information Committee 
on Cost and Income Developments, established for four years in Octo-
ber 2008 by the Finnish Prime Minister’s Offi ce (its predecessor was 
the Incomes Policy Settlement Commission.) The Information Commit-
tee prepares economic reports and estimates for collective bargaining 
and decision-making. It also monitors how collective agreements are 
implemented and assesses their impact, taking account of euro-area re-
quirements and labour market stability and functioning. In addition, the 
Committee serves as a discussion forum for assessing the extent to which 
wage formation and collective bargaining can promote employment and 
advance the functioning of the labour market as circumstances evolve. 
The Committee has a tripartite composition. Trends of collectively-
agreed wages in the country and its three main neighbours (France, Ger-
many and the Netherlands) play a dominant role in the technical report 
that the Belgian Central Economic Council publishes each autumn. Eve-
ry two years the Council tries to determine a wage norm to coordinate 
collective bargaining in Belgium. Also in other countries, statistics on 
collectively-agreed pay rises play a role in macroeconomic discussions, 
among other things because of the timely availability of this wage in-
formation in forecasting (by central planning offi ces or national banks).
These macroeconomic purposes of coordination have in recent years in-
creasingly attained a European dimension. Attempts at horizontal co-
ordination, especially on the trade union side, have been developing at 
sectoral level (for example, European Metalworkers Federation, EMF) 
or in neighbouring countries (the Doorn Initiative). Most recently, the 
ETUC, in a 2010 resolution on the coordination of collective bargaining, 
urged trade unions to resist wage freezes and wage cuts in the context of 
tentative economic recovery. It notes that trade unions should refuse to 
bargain arrangements that have the effect of poaching jobs from other 
countries, regions and companies. Within the context of the dominant 
mantra of competitiveness and of euro-zone monetarism, the EU added 
another dimension to this macroeconomic governance in the current 
economic crisis. The European Commission (2010a, b, c) published six 
proposals which make up the economic governance package, empha-
sising the importance of wage-setting mechanisms that allow for ‘com-
petitive wages’ and proposing indicators (the so-called ‘scoreboard’) to 
safeguard this aim (by evaluating wage indexation mechanisms, decen-
tralising bargaining, decreasing wages in the public sector and so on). Fi-
nally, in March 2011 a majority in the European Council (the 17 euro and 
 Wage bargaining under the new European Economic Governance 43
six non-euro member countries) endorsed a pact on competitiveness, 
now renamed the Euro Plus Pact, which has resulted in a reinforcement 
of fi scal austerity policies and an increase in competitive-wage pres-
sures. In February 2012, the European Council adopted the abovemen-
tioned scoreboard to tackle macroeconomic imbalances.
3.2 Coherence and comparability
From these developing user perspectives, which increase the need for 
European comparison, it is important to note that only nine of the 17 
countries belonging to the euro zone construct this type of index. How-
ever, these countries represent more than 90 per cent of euro-zone GDP; 
only Greece and Ireland, of the countries that constitute more than 1 per 
cent of euro-zone GDP, are missing. A starting base, in other words, is 
certainly available, especially when one considers that a basic approach 
can be detected in the various countries, namely monitoring the trend in 
nominal average pay increases.
It is also important that most of the countries can already produce statis-
tics using the common NACE sectoral classifi cation. France is an excep-
tion. Private sector data are everywhere included. Public sector data are 
missing in Belgium, France and Portugal, however. Employees of private 
households are also not always included (for example, in Germany).
Two fundamental issues, furthermore, have to be dealt with in order to 
make further progress: the lack of a common wage defi nition and meth-
od of averaging hamper coherence and comparability.
Six of the nine existing indicators calculate an average collectively-
agreed pay increase based on a fi xed-weight system with a base year or 
a so-called Laspeyres index. The French have not yet invested adequate-
ly in making average increases available. The Portuguese and Spanish 
ministries take another approach, calculating an average increase in the 
monthly/quarterly/annually published agreements. This is a fundamen-
tally different approach from those of Austria, Belgium, Finland, Germa-
ny, Italy and the Netherlands. The latter countries focus on monitoring 
the collectively agreed pay increase of the average (representative) work-
er. The average worker is constructed by distributing the employment 
of a base year over the wage tables of ‘representative’ collective agree-
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ments, using this distribution to weight the averaging. ‘Representative-
ness’ is linked to the coverage of collective agreements in this base year.
The approach taken by Portugal and Spain looks at the average agreed pay 
increase. The main current approach, however, is a price index, namely 
the price of labour. The difference is best illustrated with a theoretical, 
but illuminating example. When most of the collective agreements in a 
country foresee no wage increase (probably because no agreement will 
be signed) and only one, which covers 5 per cent of employees, foresees 
an increase of 5 per cent, the Portuguese and Spanish indexes would end 
up with a 5 per cent increase (averaged to an annual fi gure). Laspeyres 
indexes, however, would indicate only a 0.25 per cent increase. Of course 
this is a theoretical case, but it shows how sensitive the Portuguese and 
Spanish indicators are to ‘zero’ or ‘no’ agreements. 
The Portuguese and Spanish approaches are, however, better at catching 
new trends in employment. The moment these new sectors are covered 
by a collective agreement, they are included in the Portuguese and Span-
ish indicators. In the price index system, these new agreements would 
only enter when the coverage of the index system is revised. Most price 
index systems are updated every fi ve years. The Dutch system does so 
only every 10 years, but they update the weighting between collective 
agreements on an annual basis.
To conclude, from the ‘price of labour’ perspective, the Laspeyres index 
approach is superior, when a well-developed weighting methodology is 
available.
Another diffi culty with regard to coherence is the varieties of wage defi -
nitions applied. Some focus more on basic wage rates (Belgium, France, 
Spain and, to a lesser extent, Austria), others use a more comprehensive 
earnings defi nition. Peculiarities reign. The German indicator currently 
does not include fl at sum increases (but this will change). Holiday and 
end-of-year premiums also cause confusion. From the macroeconomic 
perspective, it would be advisable to streamline as much as possible the 
wage defi nition with the wage concept of the statistics on actual earn-
ings. For example, in the present Belgian index, the congruence between 
the labour cost indicator and the indicator of negotiated wages is imper-
fect. Some public/private enterprises (for example, postal services and 
telecommunications) do appear in the labour cost index, but negotiated 
wages are not measured. On the other hand, schools are absent from 
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the (private sector) labour cost index, while negotiated wages are meas-
ured. The fi rst of these two issues is purportedly to be resolved. The Ital-
ian CAWIE report (Birindelli and Leonardi 2012) pinpoint the fact that 
labour-cost data are mainly left out of national accounts. These calcula-
tions include estimates for the informal economy, which again makes 
comparison more diffi cult and open to interpretation.
A stress on the macroeconomic perspective would in any case involve 
the broader ILO defi nition of earnings. Also illuminating in this regard 
are Dutch and Finnish practices. The Dutch calculate and publish two 
types of index: regular payments with and without special premiums and 
bonuses. Statistics Finland produces the index of negotiated wages and 
salaries as an organic part of the construction of the index of wage and 
salary earnings. Because wage drift can thus be measured consistently, 
the index of negotiated wages and salaries has been an indispensable 
tool in studies on wage determination in Finland.
From a scholarly perspective a restriction to basic wage rates equates 
the wage drift with the wage cushion. If variable wage components are 
monitored, however, a distinction can be made between uncontrolled 
wage drift (a wage change that was not negotiated) and wage fl exibility 
allowed by the negotiating partners.
3.3 Completeness
The target of calculations and estimations is the average collectively-
agreed pay increase. Besides the already mentioned sectoral ‘gaps’, a key 
issue with regard to completeness is the inclusion of lower-level collec-
tive agreements, in-house company agreements.
The Dutch and German indicators cover this decentralised form of col-
lective bargaining fairly well by sampling collective agreements based 
on an employment threshold. Belgium has plans in the same direc-
tion. Spanish and Portuguese information is also fairly complete in this 
matter. The lowest level of completeness on this issue is found in Italy: 
only leading nationwide sectoral agreements are covered. The territory-
linked bargaining is very partially covered. Collective bargaining at fi rm 
level is absent. As sectoral collective bargaining is still dominant in most 
of the countries, this issue should not be exaggerated. It is nevertheless a 
point of increasing concern (due to decentralisation).
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The issue of time coverage seems to apply mainly in France. Informa-
tion collection for the DGT-DARES database was not always systematic 
before 2003 and the scope of coverage was different: industries covering 
10 000 employees were taken into account (as against industries with 
5 000 employees after 2003). Secondly, before 2003, information on 
wages was available for three occupations only, while four occupations 
are now reported.
We can further conclude that higher-level managerial staff and appren-
ticeships are usually excludes from coverage. The focus is on the average 
pay increase of full-time workers, which is a commendable choice. The 
Spanish ECCT does not provide salary information for different occupa-
tional groups or other job classifi cations (for example, type of contract, 
seniority), because this data is not supplied by all companies and there-
fore is unrepresentative and unreliable.
3.4 Accuracy
The accuracy of statistical outputs in the general statistical sense is the 
degree of closeness of estimates to the true values. Taking into account 
from the previous section the fact that the available indicators do not 
measure the same things in the same way, one could nevertheless argue 
that the measurements are very accurate. There is little criticism of this 
in the countries concerned, except perhaps in Belgium, but there a revi-
sion of the methodology is planned. It is, however, again important to 
stress that part of this high accuracy is obtained by limiting the coverage 
and completeness of the indicator. Limiting it to the basic pay rate and/
or national sectoral level and/or excluding certain sectors/occupations, 
makes the calculations a lot easier and more accurate in a range of coun-
tries, with Belgium again providing an example.
Additional fl aws in accuracy can be detected and we shall focus on some 
sample, coverage and measurement issues.
No sampling errors
Sampling does not play a major role in most of the indexes calculated. It 
is only in the sophisticated indexes of the Austrian, Dutch, Finnish and 
German statistical agencies that sampling plays a role in constructing 
the base reference points or elementary aggregates of the price index. 
Non-probability sampling is the main strategy. One looks at ‘leading’ 
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agreements, the ‘biggest in employment coverage’. Threshold are ap-
plied: coverage of 70 per cent in a sector and the most important pay 
scales. Information for this sampling comes from administrative popula-
tion data or large-scale offi cial surveys to which companies have a legal 
obligation to respond.
One could hypothesise that a focus on bigger, leading agreements has 
the potential to ‘overestimate’ pay increases, because smaller, weaker 
agreements are not included. However, this idea remains speculative as 
no ‘bias’ of this kind is reported in the relevant countries.
Coverage errors in technical details
Coverage errors (or frame errors) are due to divergences between the 
target population and the frame population. Undercoverage is closely re-
lated to the completeness problems already mentioned: not all countries 
cover all agreements and all sectors.
Other possible coverage errors are more probably due to technical de-
tails. 
The fi rst kind have to do with the timing of collective agreements. Agree-
ments can have a multi-annual duration, be retro-active or conditional. 
The indicators that calculate average wage increases and not average 
price increases (see above), particularly struggle with this issue. The 
Spanish ECCT only takes into account agreements with annual econom-
ic effects that are registered with the Labour Authority, but not those 
with ‘ultra activity’. The situation is compounded in the case of multi-
year agreements, which are registered only in the reporting year with-
out annual updates for the duration of the agreement. Thus, the ECCT 
leaves out all agreements that are not newly registered every year (either 
because they are multi-year agreements or because they have to be ex-
tended). Portuguese wage increases are calculated on the basis of the 
agreements published in a determined period (month, quarter, semester 
or year). Different agreements published in the same year may cover dif-
ferent periods. Some may cover 12 months, starting on 1 January, oth-
ers on 1 March, and so forth. Furthermore, there are many agreements 
covering more than 12 months, many of them with a retroactive effect 
of several months or even a year. This raises some problems for the in-
terpretation of the data. The fi rst is that the average increase of wages 
in agreements that were published in a determined year does not refer 
exactly to that year. This is particularly relevant in years with a very long 
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average duration of agreements, for instance 2005 and 2006 (more than 
20 months).
The Dutch CSB solves this by publishing preliminary fi gures and indi-
cating on how many agreements the data are already based. The Italian 
statistical offi ce publishes two indices: accrual (with ex-post revisions) 
and cash values (without).
Another diffi culty with regard to coverage concerns the growing frag-
mentation of collective bargaining in some countries. Opting-out, wage 
cuts or ‘overruling’ of collective agreements by authorities applying g a 
wage freeze cause problems of under-coverage. Until a few months ago, 
the Spanish ECCT, for example, did not generally consider wage cuts, 
which prevented registration of ‘negative increases’. A change in the 
computer software was needed for that purpose, although the effect is 
not yet visible in offi cial statistics. It should also be noted that the ECCT 
does not refl ect recent statutory wage cuts applied by public authorities, 
since wage reductions are incorporated into the database only if they 
have been the subject of discussion and agreement between the parties 
involved in collective bargaining. The agreements still refl ect wage in-
creases that were agreed some time ago and have little bearing on reality. 
In addition, potential improvements on wage levels specifi ed in collec-
tive agreements may be changed unilaterally by employers under the la-
bour reform introduced by Royal Decree-Law 3/2012. The current crisis 
situation highlights an additional problem with the ECCT. Although the 
information is relatively current and regularly updated, wage increases 
for the years 2010, 2011 and 2012 may be overestimated for different 
reasons: many agreements for 2010 and 2011 do not yet include any 
clauses on the revision of wage growth relative to infl ation, many others 
have been revised downwards and others are still unknown, since they 
have not been and may never be registered.
The German statistical offi ce is also considering how to integrate the 
growing practice of opting-out in their country.
Measurement errors
Non-universal granting of pay increases and weighting quality
Measurement errors can be considered low as many pay increases are 
granted as a percentage to all workers. But the risk of measurement errors 
rises considerably when only particular groups of workers are assigned a 
(higher) increase or the increase is a fi xed amount and not a percentage. 
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Accuracy depends heavily in these cases on the quality of the weighting 
procedure. Information on employment through the wage tables of col-
lective agreements is the key issue in this regard. Combining different 
sources, Austria, Finland, Italy and the Netherlands manage to collect 
this employment information in a satisfactory way. Germany and Por-
tugal have high-quality information on this matter based on regular, of-
fi cial survey material: the Structure of Earnings Survey in Germany and 
the Annual National Company Survey (Quadros de Pessoal) in Portugal. 
Belgium has the biggest problem here because it lacks employment fi g-
ures from wage tables and as a result uses only a simplifi ed weighting 
(between collective agreements). At the moment, an average (generally 
arithmetic) is taken of all occupations defi ned by the sectoral agreement. 
A major issue is the fact that we have no insight into the extent to which 
the unknown distribution of functions would deviate from such an aver-
age.
The Finnish data rely on ‘subjective’ information from the employers’ 
organisations to obtain the part of pay increases that can be related to a 
negotiated agreement. For each agreement (the base series) the employ-
ers’ organisations provide their estimates about the contribution of pay 
increases concluded in collective agreements. Using this information 
Statistics Finland constructs the base series-level contributions of col-
lectively agreed pay increases and aggregates these increases to sector-
level contributions.
This ‘subjective’ factor plays an even bigger role in the Spanish case. 
One of the main problems of the ECCT concerns the completion of sta-
tistical sheets. In principle, bargaining or peer committees are respon-
sible for fi lling in the data; however, the sheets are often completed 
by the company or even by contracted agents (without being checked 
by workers’ representatives) and that affects the quality and reliability 
of data. Furthermore, it is next to impossible to translate the complex 
details of collective bargaining into a digit in a statistical sheet. For 
example, the agreed wage increase – one of the main results provided 
by the records – is generally considered with regard to the base salary, 
but in many agreements it is based on the total salary and distributed 
through bonuses, or distributed only to certain categories of workers. 
It is therefore diffi cult to obtain a single or generally valid fi gure for the 
wage increase. As a result of poor completion of statistical sheets, the 
information on the number of workers affected by collective bargaining 
is not very reliable in some agreements above company level (as the av-
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erage number of workers per sector is diffi cult to estimate for bargaining 
committees).
As already stated, this measurement problem should not be exaggerated 
as it is confi ned mainly to particular atypical agreements. However, one 
can estimate that this measurement error is bigger in times of economic 
crisis, when these atypical agreements are negotiated more often (for ex-
ample, lump-sum, particular groups receiving different pay increases).
Pending questions on price index methodology
If one goes further into the technical details, one could raise some ad-
ditional questions about possible measurement errors. These questions 
can be formulated by making analogies with similar reported measure-
ment errors of the better known consumer price index (United Nations 
2009; ILO 2004). The questions mainly concern the use of the index 
number formula: a Laspeyres index based on fi xed weights of a base year.
A fi rst relevant shortcoming of CPIs is new product bias. This occurs 
when new goods and services are introduced into the economy but are 
not incorporated into the fi xed market basket of the CPI until much later. 
A ‘bias’ problem is that a large part of the price decline for many of these 
new goods occurs in the early stages of the product cycle, when they have 
not yet been included in the CPI. One could hypothesise that this new 
product – here a new agreement – bias operates in the opposite direc-
tion for collectively-agreed pay. First-time agreements in a (new) sector 
will probably undergo a kind of ‘catch-up’ process. The index indicators, 
using a base year with a fi xed basket of agreements, are here confronted 
with a distortion. The annual averaging Portuguese and Spanish indica-
tors have an advantage here.
A second strongly debated issue in relation to the CPI is ‘substitution 
bias’, which occurs when consumers substitute between types of goods 
and services when relative prices change. A fi xed market basket measure 
such as the CPI assumes that, contrary to standard economic theory, con-
sumers do not substitute comparable products (for example, fast food) 
when the price of one rises relative to the other. It seems safe to argue 
that this kind of substitution effect does not operate with regard to the 
price of labor, but this type of labor index is hampered by a comparable 
effect, namely the composition effect, related to the anti-cyclical evolu-
tion of low-wage employment. When an economy grows, the amount of 
lower-paid jobs (temporary, low-skilled) rises; when an economy enters 
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a crisis, these jobs are the fi rst to go; this is certainly the case in the euro 
zone. Such jobs also characterise the turn from an industrial to a service 
economy.
The ECB (2012) provides proof of this composition effect for actual wage 
developments. The ECB investigated the changes in actual wages for fi ve 
European countries (France, Germany, Italy, Belgium and Portugal) for 
a period of one or two years between 2007 and 2010. They split the ob-
served wage change into two effects, a ‘prize effect’ which represents a 
real change in wages, and ‘composition effects’. These composition ef-
fects are the effects of changes in (the characteristics of) the workforce. 
For example, during the crisis, in particular workers on low wages 
(young, low skilled) became unemployed, which changed the composi-
tion of the workforce and thus infl uenced the development of the aver-
age wage. When a large part of low wage workers leave employment, it 
is possible that the average wage will increase, even though individual 
wages remain the same or even decrease. This is illustrated by the analy-
ses of fi ve countries. The observed wage change for all countries was pos-
itive. However, when this change is split into a prize effect and composi-
tion effects, a different wage evolution was found. The prize effect was 
negative for four countries and diminished considerably for Portugal. 
Real wages have thus declined in most countries during the crisis years. 
However, large positive composition effects were found for all countries, 
explaining the total positive observed change.
It is probably correct to state that these insights can also be transferred 
to the Laspeyres indexes of collectively-agreed wages. It is important to 
obtain information on what point in the economic cycle the base year 
information is gathered. In periods of severe unemployment, it seems 
fair to assume that a Laspeyres index overstates the ‘average’ price/pay 
increase collectively agreed. The Finnish national expert reports such a 
problem concretely. When the wage and salary earnings index 1990=100 
was calculated, construction had, after the construction boom of the late 
1980s, too great a weight in comparison to the real situation. During the 
depression years of the early 1990s the share of the construction sec-
tor collapsed. A possible solution would be to adopt a Fisher index that 
would take into account the employment distribution weights of the base 
year and the current year. It all depends of course on what one focuses 
on: the trend in the price effect or the trend in the price cost effect. The 
latter is more important from a macroeconomic perspective and neces-
sitates inquiries into the composition effects.
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All in all, one should not exaggerate these technical questions. From a 
scientifi c point of view, however, they invite us to further methodological 
research (and possible solutions), as has been done for the harmonised 
calculation of consumer price indexes.
3.5 Organisational quality
The indexes presented are provided by two types of offi cial organisa-
tion: national statistical offi ces (Austria, Finland, Germany, Italy and 
the Netherlands) and the statistics departments of ministries of labour 
(Belgium, France, Portugal and Spain). In general, one can say that the 
organisational quality provided by the statistical offi ces is higher than 
that of the ministries of labour. A release calendar drives timeliness and 
punctuality. Larger and more sophisticated use of internet tools provides 
better accessibility. Nevertheless, the input of labour ministries is essen-
tial to provide expert knowledge on the basic aggregation points, namely 
collective agreements, their pay settlements and their wage tables or pay 
scales.
Timeliness and punctuality
The timeliness of statistical outputs is the length of time between the 
event or phenomenon they describe and their availability. Punctuality 
is the time lag between the release date of data and the target date on 
which they were scheduled.
As already mentioned several times, timeliness is considered an impor-
tant characteristic of the indicators on collectively-agreed pay increases. 
They are praised for this quality. Monthly or quarterly data are available 
that are published very quickly after the end of such a period. Informa-
tion delay depends mainly on how long the bargaining process takes and 
on the procedure for registering and recording the agreement in the da-
tabase of collective agreements. 
We illustrate this delay issue with the Portuguese case. The period be-
tween signing an agreement and its deposit at the Ministry of Labour 
may take some months; the period between deposit and the publication 
in the Bulletin of the Ministry normally takes only a few weeks. The on-
line publication of the DGERT’s ‘Reports on collective work regulation’ 
normally occurs in the fi rst week of the following month. From this per-
spective the source is very prompt. The wage increases stipulated in the 
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collective agreements often refer to periods that start several months be-
fore their signing and subsequent publication. This kind of delay is the 
sole responsibility of the negotiating parties. As an example we might 
consider an agreement that has been signed during a certain period on 
a regular annual basis, always two or three months before the end of the 
year. Thus, the Ministry has always been able to publish the agreement 
before the date the agreement and its wage table came into force (let us 
say, 1 January). In a particular year, negotiations reach deadlock and 
the agreement is signed only in April, that is, several months after the 
end of the validity of the previous wage table (31 December). The new 
agreement includes a wage table whose validity commences on 1 Janu-
ary, several months before the agreement has been signed. This happens 
with some frequency and causes delays in the publication of agreements 
and subsequently of the statistical data on wage increases.
The time lag between the release date of the monthly reports and the 
target date on which they were scheduled for release is very short in Por-
tugal. The indicators of timeliness and punctuality must be considered 
separately for the Italian monthly indexes and for wage level indicators. 
For the indexes, monthly publication is regulated by an annual calendar 
of press releases, made available by the end of one year for the follow-
ing year (that is, by the end of 2011 for the whole of 2012). Their release 
schedule has always been respected. Annual Wage Levels by accrual 
value are generally published in March with reference to the previous 
year. The degree of information completeness/temporariness varies: in 
March 2010, for a series from 2005 to 2009, only the year 2005 was de-
fi nitive. The degree of coverage gradually decreases for more recent data 
(98.9 per cent of employees in 2006 and 2007; 92.8 per cent in 2008 
and 91.6 per cent in 2009). Dutch data are available for each month at 
the beginning of the next month. Due to the use of annual data concern-
ing the distribution of the labour force over the measurement points, the 
fi nalisation of the index lags more than a year behind. By May 2012, the 
index over 2011 still has to be fi nalised.
Accessibility and clarity
The accessibility of statistical outputs is the measure or the ease with 
which users can obtain the data. It is determined by the physical condi-
tions under which users obtain data: where to go, how to order, deliv-
ery time, pricing policy. The clarity of statistical outputs is the measure 
or the ease with which users can understand the data. It is determined 
by the information environment within which the data are presented; 
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whether the data are accompanied with appropriate metadata; whether 
use is made of illustrations such as graphs and maps; whether informa-
tion on data accuracy are available; and the extent to which additional 
assistance is provided by the producer.
A quality difference can be detected in this matter between the statistical 
offi ces and the other sources. Metadata and elaborated methodological 
notes are produced and easy accessible; in particular, the notes from the 
Netherlands and Austria are very detailed (Statistik Austria 2011; van 
den Berg 2004). Destatis, CSB, Statistics Finland, Statistics Austria and 
ISTAT also have extensive possibilities for presenting the data in dif-
ferent ways and with illustrations, such as graphs and maps. More ex-
perienced professional users – the main users of this type of data – are 
certainly better served by these offi ces.
Occasional users will also fi nd publications produced by these offi ces 
with data in static format that are easy to fi nd and interpret. However, 
the French, Portuguese and Spanish ministries of labour are better at 
integrating these indexes in a more global panorama of collective bar-
gaining or wage development. The Portuguese and Spanish labour ad-
ministrations have also invested in internet tools, whereby collective 
agreements and wage tables can also be consulted. Belgium has compa-
rable plans and now provides collective agreements on the website in a 
basic format. Of the statistical offi ces, only the German Destatis presents 
this type of information (in a partial way).
Three more general remarks can be made about the accessibility and 
clarity of the statistics. 
First, transparency on the basic weights is rather low in comparison with 
information available on, for example, the building blocks of consumer 
price indexes. The Dutch CSB is perhaps the most transparent. They also 
indicate clearly the preliminary character of their fi rst calculations by 
indicating how many agreements the calculation is based on.
Second, long-term time-series are not always available. For example, in 
Finland online data by employer sector are available from 2000 and by 
industry from 2005. Data for longer periods are available on request.
Third, statistics are currently to be traced at the national level. The an-
nual reports on pay developments of the European Foundation for the 
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Improvement of Living Conditions refer to these data, but they are not 
collected in a data-fi le format, nor in detailed form presented by sector. 
Again taking the example of Finland: data are available for regular users 
who pay for access to the relevant database (ASTIKA), but currently they 
are not available free of charge through the internet (even though they 
can probably be obtained free of charge upon request). French data are 
only publicly available as part of a written publication. Belgium data are 
available in Excel fi les buried in the website of the Ministry of Labour.
Finally, a series of countries publish data using an occupational classifi -
cation. This is particularly the case in Belgium and France. Others refer 
to monthly-paid and hourly paid occupations (Finland and the Nether-
lands). Others have no such information. From a European perspective, 
this situation blurs the picture.
Conclusion
In this chapter we compared the nine available indicators on collectively-
agreed pay increases in the euro zone. Basic insights have been provided 
into the methods applied. A quality assessment has been conducted using 
the framework of the European Statistical System as guideline. Besides 
direct input for bargainers and being a trend indicator for other income 
policies, the indicators also play an increasing role in macroeconomic 
policies. Methodological accuracy can be considered high when the basic 
information on the employment distribution by wage tables of collective 
agreements is available, one way or another. However, not all countries 
make this type of information available. The Spanish indicator depends 
in this regard on subjective reporting from collective bargainers, Bel-
gium uses for the employment distribution by pay scale a statistical ar-
tefact (the median pay scale). From a comparative point of view major 
challenges include coherence and completeness. Different wage defi ni-
tions are used; one or several indicators are calculated; sectoral coverage 
is not the same everywhere; lower-level collective agreements are not al-
ways included. As such, each of the indicators faces challenges (see Table 
5). The available indicators are, furthermore, split between two funda-
mentally different approaches. The more sophisticated approach is the 
index type, which is comparable with a consumer price index. However, 
pending technical questions can be raised about the current calculation 
method (a Laspeyres index), when taking the composition effects during 
the business cycle in average wage trends into consideration. 
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Taking this quality assessment into consideration, how can we then ar-
gue for stronger harmonisation of these statistical indicators on collec-
tively-agreed pay in the euro zone?
Reasons for developing such a harmonised statistical system for collec-
tively-agreed wages are certainly growing. The evolving coordination 
of collective bargaining in the euro zone forms the basis of these argu-
ments. Due to globalisation, more and more pay bargaining is taking 
place beyond national borders (Glassner and Pochet 2011). In the euro 
zone this (implicit) horizontal coordination is strengthened by the de-
veloping German leadership on wages (Ramskogler 2012). One is also 
seeing more attempts from the union side to develop this kind of coor-
dination (for example, the Doorn Initiative and the collective bargaining 
networks within IndustriAll). As already stated in the introduction, the 
pressure for vertical coordination as part of the new European economic 
governance is also mounting. An evidence-based policy discussion on 
wage setting in the euro zone would be helped by stronger harmonisa-
tion of the available indicators. It is important to know in this regard that 
the European Central Bank is using these data.
Such harmonisation would be best developed step-by-step, given the 
current fragmentation. We distinguish three main steps within this cu-
mulative learning process that would leave space for experimentation 
Table 5 Specifi c challenges of the indicators studied
Challenge
BE (Expected and planned) revision of the basic weighting procedure and other methodo-
logical improvements
ES Quality of the subjective basic data
IT Coverage beyond national agreements
FR Growing into a regular statistical publication
PT Use the data potential to calculate a more sophisticated price index
NL Maintain the data information to update weights of a reference period/base year
AT Inclusion of other forms of remuneration (by extra indices)
FI Increase transparency of basic data collection
DE Maintain coverage of the currently fragmented German pay bargaining system (opting-
out; company-level)
Source: CAWIE national reports.
Indicators of collectively agreed wages in the euro zone: a quality report
 Wage bargaining under the new European Economic Governance 57
and for an informed debate with users: open coordination, minimal har-
monisation and strong harmonisation.
Although only nine of the current 17 euro zone countries calculate a sta-
tistical indicator of collectively agreed pay, this can be considered an im-
portant starting basis. The countries with an indicator cover 93 per cent 
of total euro-zone GDP. Only Greece and Ireland are missing among the 
larger countries (by GDP). The international sector classifi cation NACE 
has broadly been adopted. Databases with high reliability exist on the basic 
raw data, namely pay increases within collective agreements. A key issue 
on the road to more harmonisation is of course the different approach-
es. France, Portugal and Spain monitor average increases in collective 
agreements annually. The other countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, 
Germany, Italy and the Netherlands) calculate a more sophisticated in-
dex with a base year of the collectively agreed increases in average pay.
In a fi rst step of open coordination the whole group could learn about 
the quality procedures used mainly by the offi cial statistical offi ces in 
the group. Transparency concerning the adopted weight system could 
inspire a mutual learning process. Making reference to each other indi-
cators would also help in this regard. Solutions could be exchanged on 
the accuracy problems that have been dealt with: the threshold for in-
cluding company agreements; the development of more than one index 
to include premiums; how to deal with opting-out clauses in agreements, 
pay decreases, working time changes and retroactive pay deals. Creating 
this European level of statistical exchange and coordination would prob-
ably also help to increase the national attention (in time and resources) 
to tackle specifi c pending methodological issues.
A second level could be defi ned as minimal or weak harmonisation. 
Adopting ‘less is more’ as a pragmatic principle, the countries involved 
would attempt to produce, besides their national practices or needs, a 
Laspeyres index of the average nominal basic pay increases as set by col-
lective agreements for full-time employees. It would involve a collabora-
tion of statistical offi ces and ministries of labour. The focus would be on 
the private sector and the sectoral level (NACE letters) and, as stated, be 
limited to basic pay. Belgium, France, Spain and Portugal have to make 
the biggest efforts to achieve this point of minimal harmonisation.
In a third step it seems feasible to speak or think about strong or maxi-
mal harmonisation. Besides a fast and quarterly availability of the 
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changes in basic pay rates, it would be helpful also to have more compa-
rable indicators on an annual basis about earnings – regular payments 
and special payments. Such data would make it easier to make connec-
tions with actual earnings or compensation data and to make a better 
comparison with labour cost developments possible. One should at that 
moment strive to include private and public sector and lower levels of 
pay bargaining. The step would require a lot of defi nitional work and a 
full investigation of the use of a Laspeyres index or a more elaborated 
form of such indexes (see in this regard the experiences of the Nether-
lands and Finland).
Important drivers of such strong harmonisation could be, on one hand, 
a possible (European) revision of the ILO Resolution on the statistics of 
collective agreements (dating from 1926) and, on the other hand, using 
the European Structure of Earnings Survey as a harmonised database 
for the weighting issue. As already stated several times in this chapter, 
key to calculating a high-quality and robust index of collectively-agreed 
pay increases requires employment data about collective agreements 
and their pay scales. How is the workforce covered by collective agree-
ments; which part of the wage increase is determined by collective 
agreement; and how is the workforce distributed within the pay scales 
of these agreements. The German statistical offi ce uses the Structure 
of Earnings Survey to collect this information. Including questions for 
each sampled individual on their collective agreement and accompany-
ing pay scale also helps the surveyed companies to fi ll in the requested 
data more quickly. Adopting this practice on a Europe-wide scale would, 
on one hand, solve key methodological issues for a lot of countries (see, 
for example, Belgium) and would, on the other hand, almost automati-
cally make strong harmonisation feasible. One could then easily debate 
an extension to other countries.
This step-by-step harmonisation effort would of course also require the 
institutional or organisational leadership of an international organisa-
tion or agencies. Who would take up the challenge: the European Em-
ployment Committee (EMCO), the Economic and Social Committee 
(EESC), Eurofound Dublin, Eurostat, or ILO Europe?
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Chapter 2 
Wages and collective bargaining systems in 
Europe during the crisis1
Noélie Delahaie, Sem Vandekerckhove and Catherine Vincent
Introduction
Collective agreements are important wage-setting institutions in many 
European labour markets. They provide wage fl oors below which wages 
cannot be set. However, it is not always clear how collective bargaining 
infl uences wages paid. On one hand, collectively agreed wage increases 
may spill over into actual wage increases, but on the other hand, rising 
actual wages may permit higher collectively agreed wage fl oors. As em-
ployee compensation is not limited to the collectively agreed pay levels, 
trends in collectively agreed wages and actual wages may be different. 
Numerous factors may play a strong role in these differences: workforce 
structure, the development of variable pay, institutional mechanisms 
and so on.
While wage restraint has been ongoing for two decades across Europe 
(Keune and Galgóczi 2008), the 2007–2008 crisis reinforced this phe-
nomenon in many countries (O’Farrell 2010; Le Bayon et al. 2014). Nu-
merous studies argue, however, that labour adjustments in the crisis not 
only involved wage cuts or freezes. Apart from the public sector, which 
was particularly subject to wage cuts in order to contain public debt, al-
most all fi rst reactions to the crisis were characterised by a sharp fall in 
employment and hours worked in the private sector (O’Farrell 2010). In 
the context of implementing the new economic governance, industrial 
relations regimes have also come under growing pressure from Euro-
pean institutions to reform collective bargaining and wage-setting mech-
anisms. In recent years, pressure for more decentralisation of collective 
bargaining at fi rm level and proliferation of opt-out clauses in many coun-
1.  We are grateful to Odile Chagny (IRES) for her valuable assistance on data analysis and 
comments on the chapter. Obviously, any residual mistakes are our own responsibility.
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tries have eroded the trade unions’ power and their capacity to ensure 
the effectiveness of sectoral agreement in fi rms (Marginson 2014). This 
raises the question of how far collective bargaining may infl uence the 
development of actual wages, that is, wages in fact paid by employers. 
To deal with this question, we examine trends in both collectively agreed 
wages, which refl ect the outcomes of collective bargaining, and actual 
wages in Europe since the early 2000s and especially since the onset 
of the economic and fi nancial crisis in 2007–2008. We also attempt to 
understand the ways in which actual wages may deviate from collective-
ly agreed wages by paying greater attention to changes in wage-setting 
mechanisms over the recent period. Our analysis covers ten European 
countries that were involved in the CAWIE project in 2012: Austria (AT), 
Belgium (BE), France (FR), Finland (FI), Germany (DE), Italy (IT), Por-
tugal (PT), the Netherlands (NL), Spain (ES) and the United Kingdom 
(UK). 
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 1 briefl y describes the main 
features of national collective bargaining regimes that used to prevail 
among these ten countries before the crisis. Section 2 provides descrip-
tive statistics on wage developments in the selected European countries. 
It also pays attention to relations between the diversity of collective bar-
gaining regimes and wage trends. The fi nal section attempts to explain 
differences between actual and collectively agreed wages analytically by 
focusing on changes in national collective bargaining systems in time of 
crisis. 
1. Main features of wage bargaining regimes before the 
crisis
Collective wage bargaining is a core competence of national social part-
ners in the EU, even if its importance varies from country to country. The 
ten countries under study differ markedly in terms of their wage bargain-
ing models and their collective bargaining coverage. There is a range of 
channels for negotiating pay collectively in these countries. For instance, 
pay can be negotiated at national, sectoral, regional or company level 
and these levels can be interlinked in fairly complex ways. This process 
is always supported by the state, which sets the rules for bargaining, en-
acts minimum wage legislation and has the ability to extend agreements 
to non-affi liated parties, among many other institutional arrangements.
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The way wages are bargained is obviously closely related to the forms of 
social dialogue and to the national bargaining system as a whole. The ar-
ticulation between levels, the coordination among actors and the extent 
to which government intervenes distinguish the different national sys-
tems. In the industrial relations literature, two variables are traditionally 
used in order to classify countries according to their wage-bargaining 
regimes: the predominant level of bargaining and the degree of coordi-
nation in the wage-bargaining process (Traxler et al. 2001; OECD 2004; 
Visser 2005). In this section, we analyse the main characteristics of col-
lective bargaining regimes, crossing these two variables. This helps us to 
identify whether countries are characterised by multi- or single-employ-
er bargaining and what the main levels of bargaining are. In western Eu-
ropean countries, sectoral bargaining still prevails despite the fact that 
– since the 1980s – the predominant trend in collective bargaining has 
been towards decentralisation, consistent with a logic of marketization 
and sustained pressure from employers for wage settlements to refl ect 
fi rms’ competitive performance (Marginson and Sisson 2004; Keune 
and Galgóczi 2008).
These pressures from the employers’ side for more extensive company-
level bargaining has not always resulted in a move towards decentrali-
sation. On the contrary, with the exception of the United Kingdom and 
certain eastern European countries, there has been no change in the 
dominant level of collective bargaining (Du Caju et al. 2008). Moreover, 
a number of examples show meaningful moves towards higher levels 
(see below). Although a widespread decentralisation can be observed, 
the question is whether this move has been organised; in others words, 
whether increased company-level bargaining is within the framework of 
rules and standards laid down by cross-sectoral or sectoral agreements. 
The coordination of wage setting across different bargaining units can 
be ensured through various mechanisms. First, they include centralised 
wage bargaining arrangements at cross-sectoral level, or, under sector-
based bargaining regimes, the existence of a pattern-setting agreement. 
Pace-setting agreements form the basis for collective bargaining in the 
other parts of the economy, even if additional increases can be agreed 
in the following sectoral or lower-level collective agreements. Further-
more, there are also types of procedural mechanism that are utilised to 
link or articulate the levels concerned: the extension procedure and the 
ordering of bargaining levels. The extension procedure helps to offset 
the weakness of employee and employer representation, as well as the 
employers’ lack of incentives to bargain. Of the ten countries concerned, 
there is no legal procedure for extending collective agreements in Italy 
and the United Kingdom. In Italy, however, judicial decisions have long 
underpinned de facto extension of the wage provisions of sectoral agree-
ments. The most commonly used mechanism for ordering bargaining 
levels is the favourability principle. According to this principle, the social 
advantages attained at multi-employer level take precedence over any in-
ferior content. Clauses that maintain the effect of agreements after their 
expiry, until a further agreement is concluded, also affect the continuity 
of collective bargaining and the coverage of multi-employer agreements.
Last but not least, two types of collective wage-setting mechanism have 
generalised effects: minimum wage standards, set by the state or negoti-
ated by social partners, and indexation mechanisms. Except in Austria 
and Germany2 where there is no minimum wage, all the other countries 
have minimum wages. However, their scope and level have a substantial 
impact on wage-setting process only in France (Husson et al., 2015).
Using the ICTWSS (Visser 2014; Eurofound databases 2014b), Table 
1 presents the state of the various collective bargaining systems in the 
mid-2000s. 
Looking over the past two decades, the data suggest relatively stable 
systems. Major changes have occurred since the crisis in 2009, mainly 
2.  Over the period covered by the database, there were sector-specifi c minimum wages in 
Germany, but no national minimum wage. It was introduced in 2015.
Table 1 Wage bargaining regimes in ten countries (2005)
Coordination
High Medium Low
Le
ve
l
Centralised BE, FI
Intermediate AT, DE, NL ES,4 FR,5 IT, PT
Decentralised UK
Source: ICTWSS, Eurofound, own classifi cations.
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within the programme countries (Portugal, Ireland, Greece), but also in 
the countries that received wage-related recommendations in the Euro-
pean semester3  (Spain and, to a lesser extent, Italy).
2.  Collectively agreed wages and actual wages: main 
trends since the early 2000s
Even if it is well known that individual wages do not tend to fall in nomi-
nal terms (Bewley 1999; Babecký et al. 2010), the question is whether 
real wages are declining in some countries or whether there are wage 
freezes or wage moderation. Do actual wages keep pace with productiv-
ity? Is productivity declining without falling wages or pressure on col-
lective bargaining? Following the ILO’s golden wage rule, if there is to 
be economic stability, wages should grow at the rate of change of prices 
and productivity (Watt 2007). The logic is that increasing productivity 
without increasing wages refl ects either growth of income inequality or 
overproduction, and therefore social or economic crisis.
Quantitatively, a cross-country analysis of trends in collectively agreed 
wages is diffi cult because data are scarce. Information is not gathered 
systematically and national sources use different methodologies and are 
thus not comparable. There have, however, been some developments. For 
instance, the ECB constructs an indicator of ‘negotiated wage rates’ that 
is computed as an aggregate indicator for the whole euro area. Still, it is 
based on non-harmonised national data sources that do not allow cross-
country comparisons. Moreover, it offers a biased view of the potential 
impact of collective bargaining because in some countries (for instance, 
France) the data rather refl ect labour costs than collectively agreed 
wages (Schulten 2013). Alternatively, Eurofound’s European Industrial 
Relations Observatory (EIRO) proposes another indicator on pay devel-
opments, which is annually updated and includes data on ‘collectively 
3. The new economic governance regime (2011–2012) reinforces the powers of the Commission 
in relation to the surveillance of wage policies. 
4.  Spain used to be a country in which sector-level bargaining was predominant. Since 2005, 
because of the conclusion of cross-sectoral agreements on wages, Eurofound codes Spain as 
a centralised country. However, these agreements only provide guidelines for negotiators 
(Vincent 2013). Thus, we do not change the classifi cation for Spain.
5.  Eurofound codes France as a low coordinated country. The wage provisions of sectoral 
agreements are always subject to legal extension and wage increases are constrained by the 
annual revalorisation of the minimum wage: that is why we assign France ‘medium-level 
coordination’.
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agreed wages’.6 In this chapter, we use the TURI data on collectively 
agreed wages, the main goal of which is to provide an indicator of poten-
tial infl uence, namely the ‘bite of collective bargaining’ (Salverda 2014) 
on actual wages in Europe (see Box 1 and Appendix). 
6.  For more details, see the website: http://eurofound.europa.eu/observatories/eurwork/
collective-wage-bargaining/context 
7. Data collection is part of the CAWIE project presented in this book. Data were collected in 
2012 and updated in 2014. For a discussion of the quality of the TURI database, see Van 
Gyes 2012 and Chapter 1 of the present volume.
Box 1 Collectively agreed wages: defi nition and data
The TURI database contains information on collectively agreed wage increases in ten EU 
member states (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain, the Neth-
erlands and the United Kingdom).7 The main objective of this database is to construct an 
indicator of potential infl uence, namely the bite of collective bargaining on actual wages in 
Europe. The sample of member states does not include central and eastern European coun-
tries nor most of the Nordic ones, but it does represent the largest European economies 
and the sectors traditionally known for strong collective bargaining. Another drawback 
of the TURI database is that data are not directly comparable across countries because 
of diff erences in conception and measures of collectively agreed wages among countries. 
Indeed, as mentioned in Section 1, countries covered by the CAWIE project diff er in their 
institutional systems and collective bargaining may take place at national, sectoral or fi rm 
level or at several levels at the same time. Measurements of collectively agreed wage may 
also diff er because of heterogeneous sources and the fact that the data do not always fully 
refl ect the predominant level of wage bargaining in some countries (see Table A in Appen-
dix, which reports the main features of national sources on collectively agreed wages). In 
particular, in two countries (Portugal, Spain), indicators are broad with information coming 
from collective agreements concluded at several levels. Nevertheless, as the sector remains 
the predominant level of collective bargaining in these latter countries, we suppose that 
the data refl ect a substantial part of outcomes related to sectoral agreements. For instance, 
in Portugal, sectoral agreements (national or regional) covered from 89 per cent to 93 per 
cent of employees between 1995 and 2010, while fi rm-level agreements covered from 7 
per cent to 11 per cent of them (Naumann et al. 2012). In almost all countries (Austria, 
Belgium, Finland, France, Italy, Germany and the Netherlands), data come from sector-level 
collective agreements, meaning that the collectively agreed wages indicator allows us to 
measure the bite of collective bargaining at sectoral level on actual wages, even if sectoral 
agreements can be supplemented by agreements at fi rm-level. Finally, the analysis of the 
British case should make us cautious because of this country special features in terms of 
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bargaining and available data. As already mentioned, the British system is characterised 
by a decentralised bargaining regime at company level and low coverage. For the United 
Kingdom, data come from the pay round settlements published by the Labour Research 
Department (LRD).
The wage defi nition included in data is another source of diff erentiation between countries. 
This point appears crucial because bonuses, fi xed premiums and non-wage benefi ts may 
sometimes represent a high proportion of total compensation,8 these components are not 
systematically determined by collective bargaining. In some countries, collectively agreed 
wages include all payments that are conditional on one’s job. The defi nition could be close 
to the concept of total earnings in countries that include base wage and other regular 
payments as fringe benefi ts, family allowances, thirteenth month, holiday pay and so on 
(Austria, Italy and the Netherlands). In these cases, performance-related pay is excluded 
from collectively agreed wages. On the contrary, in other countries data are related to the 
base wage, which does not include bonuses for overtime, family allowances and so forth 
(Belgium, France, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom). Information on France and 
Spain is complex because some agreements provide data on total compensation, which is 
a broader concept. Furthermore, the defi nition of wages in Finland is slightly diff erent as 
it includes performance-related pay but excludes compensation for overtime, holiday pay 
and other such items. Finally, the scope of collectively agreed wages defi ned at sectoral 
level may diff er across countries. 
In the TURI database, statistical series are not fully homogeneous in terms of time period. 
Data cover the period 2000–2012 in Belgium, Germany, Finland and Portugal; 2000–2011 
in Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom; 2003–2012 in France; 2000–2013 in Austria; and 
2001–2012 in the Netherlands.
8.  According to the 2010 Earnings Structure Survey (provided by Eurostat), this proportion is 
particularly high in Spain and in Portugal (approximatively 16 per cent of annual compensa-
tion in 2010; authors’ calculations).
9. Data are provided by Eurostat on the basis on national accounts. Concerning actual wages, 
we use an indicator of hourly labour productivity, which has been constructed by dividing 
GDP (volume terms) by number of hours effectively worked. The main drawback of (cont.)
Figure 1 presents trends in collectively agreed wages and actual hourly 
wages in nominal and real terms, real labour productivity and the in-
fl ation index (HICP, Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices)9 since 
the early 2000s. As a fi rst result, the data show that collectively agreed 
wages and actual wages generally grew in line with price increases in 
almost all countries (with the exception of Germany). In all countries, 
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the economic and fi nancial crisis was preceded by a huge increase in 
infl ation due to rising commodity prices (O’Farrell 2010). As a result, 
despite the grave economic circumstances, both actual and collectively 
agreed wages continued to increase in numerous countries because the 
social partners bargained higher wages in relation to higher expected 
infl ation. This phenomenon is particularly pronounced in Spain where 
nominal actual wages grew annually by 2.3 per cent on average. The rela-
tive resilience of wages during the crisis may also be due to the nature of 
employment adjustment, namely changes in composition workforce. For 
instance, Spain is among the countries that have experienced a sharp de-
cline in employment, whose fi rst victims were low-paid workers, which 
could explain the observed wage increases (for more details, see next 
section). Moreover, in some countries, the role of indexation mecha-
nisms may have been determinative during the crisis because the huge 
2008–2009 infl ation decrease is associated with an increase in both ac-
tual and collectively agreed wages. Indexation systems aim to link wage 
developments to the evolution of living costs to ensure that actual wages 
are not overtaken by infl ation.
Turning to the cross-country comparison, as in previous research (ETUI 
2012), we are able to highlight relationships between national collective 
bargaining systems and wage trends. First, in the Netherlands, Germany 
and Austria, countries that are characterised by an intermediate degree 
of centralisation and high coordination, wage restraint has been the 
major trend since the early 2000s. In these three countries, wage re-
straint is not a new phenomenon and has been practiced since the early 
1990s, a period marked by a sharp degradation of the labour market and 
the opening up of foreign trade resulting from the EU’s single labour 
market. The German situation has shown the most pronounced wage 
moderation, as nominal hourly wages grew below infl ation, whereas 
collectively agreed wages exceeded prices rises, albeit to a lesser extent 
9.  (cont.) this indicator is that it refers to a broad defi nition of wages because it includes 
employees’ gross earnings and indirect costs (employers’ social contributions plus taxes less 
subsidies). Such a defi nition may be problematic as collective wage agreements do not deal 
with tax and social contributions. However, national accounts provided by Eurostat remain 
the most reliable source for wage comparison across countries. Moreover, using such an 
indicator allows adjustment in terms of worked hours and employment during the crisis 
to be taken into account. In almost all countries, downsizing and reducing worked hours 
were the fi rst reactions to the crisis, while wage adjustment has remained relatively low. For 
instance, in Germany, reductions of total working hours were prevalent through extensive 
use of short-time working schemes, encouraged by state subsidies (O’Farrell 2010).
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after the onset of the crisis in 2008. Since 2008, the increase in wages 
has been attributed largely to agreements reached before the crisis when 
negotiators anticipated higher infl ation. As a result, the development of 
real actual wages and real collectively agreed wages is lagging behind 
labour productivity growth.
Data on Finland and Belgium are more contrasting. The Finnish case 
reveals that nominal wage growth was higher and more dynamic than in 
the three previous countries: until 2008, nominal wages (whatever the 
indicator under consideration) largely exceeded labour productivity and 
infl ation increases. However, the sharp decline of labour productivity in 
2008–2009 led to wage restraint with regard to both actual and collec-
tively agreed wages from 2009. This period also saw the establishment 
of a more decentralised procedure: no central agreement was in force 
in 2009–2011 and a number of sectoral agreements allowed for wage 
deviation in fi rms facing economic diffi culties. In 2011, the social part-
ners agreed a so-called framework agreement on pay and conditions, 
which expired at the end of 2013. The renewal of this agreement proved 
diffi cult, but in August 2013, the social partners concluded a long-term 
national centralised labour market settlement, including wage increases 
under those of consumer prices. Despite this return to centralised bar-
gaining, in Finland the collective agreement in the technology sector 
(including metalworking) continues to serve as the pace-setting agree-
ment. Although there have been no recent major changes, the Finnish 
employers’ organisation has expressed its dissatisfaction with the recent 
wage trend. A one-off and time limited crisis response was implemented 
in 2010 with the conclusion of opening clauses in several sectors (Mar-
ginson and Weltz 2014). Unlike Finland, trends in nominal wages are 
in line with infl ation in Belgium. This may be due to the high degree of 
centralisation and the role of wage indexation. 
In the group of countries (France, Italy, Spain and Portugal) that are 
characterised by an intermediate degree of both coordination and cen-
tralisation of collective bargaining, data show that nominal actual wages 
grew in line with productivity and prices during 2000–2009. In par-
ticular, in France and Italy nominal collectively agreed and actual wages 
were more dynamic than price increases. Although there is no proper 
automatic pay indexation mechanism in Italy, the infl ation rate indica-
tor is meant to protect the purchasing power of wages. This indicator, 
which is only to be considered a reference for collective bargaining ac-
tors in order to establish wage increases, may play a role in observed 
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Figure 1  Development of collectively agreed wages (CAW), actual hourly 
wages (HW), labour productivity (LP) and HICP since the early 2000s 
(base 100=2003)
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trends. Labour productivity in Italy and France grew at a moderate rate 
from the early 2000s and, at the same time, real wage trends are in line 
with labour productivity increases. Since the economic crisis, there has 
been a growing gap between productivity and collectively agreed wage 
increases in Italy due to the decline in productivity. Signifi cant diver-
gence can be observed in recent years – a period marked by the crisis– in 
Spain and Portugal. In both countries, since the early 2000s real col-
lectively agreed wages have increased faster than labour productivity, 
while actual wage growth has remained in line with labour productivity 
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Figure 1 (cont.)  
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Source: Turi database; Eurostat, national accounts.
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increases before a sharp decline from 2009. However, trends in collec-
tively agreed wages are divergent. Since 2009, collectively agreed wages 
have grown faster in Portugal, but have experienced a huge fall in Spain. 
This trend may be due to changes in the indexation mechanism. Un-
til 2010, the ex-post wage indexation mechanism followed by the social 
partners was based on the infl ation rate. Since 2010, however, collec-
tively agreed wage increases have been based more on company-based 
indicators, such as labour productivity.10 These guidelines, which are set 
by the cross-sector agreement for employment and collective bargaining 
and which the social partners commit to follow at lower levels, advocate 
wage moderation. 
In the United Kingdom, where bargaining is uncoordinated, wages grew 
dynamically while infl ation remained moderate despite the recession. 
However, looking at values in real terms, wage restraint during the eco-
nomic crisis has been severe, resulting in wage growth below productiv-
ity. In the United Kingdom, the dramatic fall in real wages may have 
something to do with the rising value of the pound against the euro, as 
well as falling bonuses (particularly in the fi nancial sector, where bo-
nuses were reduced by 30 per cent between 2008 and 2009, O’ Farrell 
2010). In the United Kingdom, the economic crisis is associated with a 
growing gap between real wages and labour productivity. 
Finally, looking at trends in real wages, the data indicate wage modera-
tion in almost all countries since the early 2000s. As already pointed out 
by numerous studies, we show that wage moderation is ongoing not only 
with respect to collectively agreed wages but also in actual wages. Prior 
to the crisis, in almost all countries, fi gures show modest wage growth 
since the early 2000s, with the exception of 2008–2009 (and to a lesser 
extent 2010) when wages continued to increase despite the economic 
downturn. Since 2009–2010, hourly wage increases have remained 
moderate and some countries– Spain, Portugal and the United King-
dom – have experienced a sharp decline in real actual wages, despite an 
increase in collectively agreed wages since 2007–2008. These observa-
tions raise the need to understand and appreciate the bite of collective 
bargaining on wages. 
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3. Assessment of the bite of collective bargaining on 
wages 
One way to appreciate the potential infl uence, namely the bite of col-
lective bargaining on wages is to consider so-called ‘wage drift’, which 
measures the difference between actual wages and collectively agreed 
wages. Positive ‘wage drift’ would indicate that actual wages are grow-
ing faster than collectively agreed wages, while a negative sign reveals 
that collectively agreed wages remain higher than actual wages. At the 
same time, we would expect that the more collective bargaining is decen-
tralised, the higher wage drift will be. Such a result means that a larger 
part of total compensation is determined outside collective bargaining. 
To appreciate the bite of collective bargaining, we thus compare trends 
in collectively agreed wages and trends in actual wages. Besides collec-
tive bargaining, other factors also have to be taken into account. First, 
as already underlined (Box 1), the indicators of collective agreed wages 
vary across countries (in terms of level of collective bargaining, concep-
tion and set of wages). Second, the literature suggests that several fac-
tors may play a strong role in differences between actual and collectively 
agreed wages: (i) the composition effect related to changes in workforce 
composition (by gender, age, type of contract, working hours); (ii) hu-
man resource management (promotion effects, compensation policies, 
extra payments; and (iii) the existence and level of a statutory minimum 
wage. As far as possible, we will take into account these potential effects 
in the next section. We shall then focus on the main institutional changes 
in times of crisis. 
3.1 Descriptive statistics on wage drift 
Figure 2 reports the difference in percentage points between collectively 
agreed wages and actual wages over the period of observation. It gives a 
fi rst overview of the magnitude of wage drift across countries. As men-
tioned by Eurofound (2014a), there are no systematic relationships be-
tween the development of wage drift and national collective bargaining 
regimes. Among the ten countries, only four (Finland, France, Austria 
and Italy) present positive wage drift, meaning that actual wages grew 
faster than collectively agreed wages over the entire period. The highest 
wage drift is registered in Finland (10.2 percentage points), but it re-
mains relatively low in the other three countries. By contrast, fi ve coun-
tries show negative wage drift, suggesting that on average actual wages 
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lagged behind collectively agreed wages. The phenomenon is particular-
ly pronounced in Spain and Portugal – 52 percentage points in Portugal 
and less than 30 percentage points in Spain– and to a lesser extent in 
the United Kingdom. Belgium constitutes an intermediate confi guration 
since wage drift is close to zero, meaning that the developments of actual 
and collectively agreed wages are similar. 
Figure 3 reports annual changes of the main variables in order to bet-
ter understand the relationships between collectively agreed wages and 
actual wages and thus the magnitude of wage drift in time of crisis. With 
no connection to national collective bargaining regimes, three groups of 
countries can be distinguished on the basis of wage drift trends since the 
onset of the crisis. The fi rst group includes countries that have experi-
enced huge wage drift, driven in the year preceding the crisis by increas-
es in actual wages that were lower than collectively agreed wage rises. In 
southern countries, the data indicate that wage drift is counter-cyclical: it 
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Figure 2  Cumulated wage drift  since the early 2000s (percentage points)
Note: Data cover 2000–2012 in Belgium, Germany, Finland and Portugal; 2000–2011 in Italy, Spain 
and the United Kingdom; 2003–2012 in France; 2000–2013 in Austria; and 2001–2012 in the 
Netherlands.
Source: TURI database; Eurostat, national accounts.
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was negative prior to the crisis and became positive during 2007–2009. 
Since 2009–2010, a dramatic trend reversal has taken place, with col-
lectively agreed wages largely exceeding actual wages. The second group 
includes countries in which wage drift remained, on average, relatively 
low over the entire period (Austria, Belgium, Germany, France and, to a 
Figure 3  Annual changes in collectively agreed wages (CAW), hourly wages 
(HW) and wage drift 
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Figure 3  Annual changes in collectively agreed wages (CAW), hourly wages 
(HW) and wage drift  (cont.)
Note: Data cover 2000–2012 in Belgium, Germany, Finland and Portugal; 2000–2011 in Italy, Spain 
and the United Kingdom; 2003–2012 in France; 2000–2013 in Austria; and 2001–2012 in the 
Netherlands.
Source: Turi database; Eurostat, national accounts.
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lesser extent, Italy and Finland), although trends in collectively agreed 
and actual wages diverge over the period. The common point between 
these countries is an overall reduction of wage drift in the fi rst year or 
so of the crisis. Germany constitutes a specifi c case because actual wages 
grew systematically more slowly than collectively agreed wages prior to 
the crisis, which is consistent with the well-known strong wage restraint 
in that country. Finally, the last group includes countries with erratic 
patterns of wage drift (the Netherlands and the United Kingdom). 
Besides collective bargaining, numerous factors may play a strong role 
in the divergence of collectively agreed wages and actual wages. For in-
stance, examining Dutch wage drift between 1995 and 2005, Salverda 
(2014) concluded that the ‘bite of collective bargaining as regards wage 
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earnings is far from comprehensive: employer contributions are around 
25 per cent on top of wages, the non-CLA (collective labour agreements) 
part of the wage bill is another 20 per cent and average wage drift in 
recent years was 40 per cent’ (p. 20). While the coverage of collective 
bargaining has remained stable in recent decades, Salverda pointed out 
that the infl uence of collectively agreed wages is relatively low (about 
40 per cent of total gross wages). To explain this observation, Salverda 
insists on the role played by two factors: the growth of pay inequality 
(especially at the bottom of distribution) within fi rms that is associated 
with the increase in low-pay jobs and the fact that employees not covered 
by collective agreements earn more than employees who are covered. 
Besides these explanations, Van Klaveren and Tijdens (2012) also high-
light the potential role of additional payments. In some countries, the 
way in which the statutory minimum wage may infl uence both collec-
tively agreed and actual wages is another explanation of wage drift. For 
instance, in France the reduction of the gap between actual wages and 
collectively agreed wages can be explained by an increase in the number 
of sectors that revalued minimum wages between 2003 and 2006. At 
same time, the transition to the 35-hour working time took place and, 
from 2005, the government spurred a revival of collective wage bargain-
ing. Since 2005, more than four sectors out of fi ve have reviewed annu-
ally agreed wages. Since 2006, agreed and actual wages have risen at 
an annual rate close to that of the minimum wage. Sectors have been 
encouraged to raise the lower wage in their job classifi cations to a level 
at least equal to the minimum wage as part of the renewal of collective 
bargaining at sectoral level (Delahaie et al. 2012). These observations 
are consistent with the results of Castel et al. (2014), who argue that the 
effectiveness of collective bargaining (at sector and company levels) de-
pends on compensation policies. In particular, they stress that the scope 
of collective bargaining may be limited because of the growing individu-
alisation of pay practices, directives from parent companies or contrac-
tors, as well as the statutory minimum wage.
Comparing the evolutions of collectively agreed wages and actual wages 
often shows low or very erratic correlations, to the extent that one might 
question the effect of both institutional wage setting and the business 
cycle on wages (see above and Delahaie et al. (2012) for France and Den 
Butter and Eppink (2003) for the Netherlands). There are three possible 
explanations for the absence of an effect. The fi rst explanation is the sim-
plest: it may be that there is no substantial effect between levels or rates 
of change, for instance because coverage is low. The second explanation 
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is that the correlation appears with a lag, because agreements are to be 
implemented or because they are reacting to wage developments, as 
if catching up. The third explanation is that the measurement of wage 
trends is affected by a composition effect. If workers earning low wages 
are the fi rst victims of the crisis, actual wages may increase counter-cy-
clically, while lower bargaining power results in more moderate wage 
demands from trade unions, inverting the intuitive positive relationship 
between collectively agreed and actual wages. ‘Controlled’ wage drift has 
been established in data reported by the Dutch central planning bureau 
(van der Wiel 1999). In the ECB’s 2012 Euro area labour markets and the 
crisis report, these stylised facts appears also over the Great Recession. 
Institutional explanations turn out to be poor predictors of actual wage 
developments and wages do not respond to the negative shock. Follow-
ing the decomposition method of DiNardo et al. (1996), the change in 
wages between peak and trough for fi ve countries (Belgium, France, 
Germany, Italy and Portugal) is then separated into a part due to edu-
cation and experience, and a part due to latent wage adaptations. The 
results indicate that, with the exception of Portugal, a positive selection 
bias (either through dismissals or non-entry) of men has taken place. 
For women, the fi ndings are more mixed, but as a rule the wage change 
is positive and stronger than for men, as is the latent wage change when 
controlling for composition effects. The latter are consistently positive 
for both genders, at the mean as well as at the tails of the wage distribu-
tion, indicating upskilling and insider-protection.
Much research has also indicated the importance of changes in work-
force composition, especially in the crisis. During that period, many 
countries also made huge adjustments in employment and working 
time, which were concentrated on low-paid workers. For instance, Cru-
ces et al. (2012) argue that the counter-cyclical pattern in Spain may 
be due to substantial composition effects. In particular, prior to the cri-
sis, job creation was focused on activities and occupations that required 
low qualifi cations and often concerned temporary jobs with a signifi cant 
proportion of female, young and immigrant workers. By contrast, in the 
economic crisis, these latter jobs are often the fi rst to be removed. Ac-
cording to two recent studies (Puente and Galan 2014; Orsini 2014), real 
wages decreased by twice as much in 2011–2012. Hence the observed 
wage drift in our data is much greater. In France, where increases in 
both actual wages and collectively agreed wages have been registered 
since 2011, composition effects may have played a strong role: employ-
ment of skilled workers tended to increase, while employment of low 
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skilled workers has fallen since 2002 (Husson 2015). According to Hus-
son, these trends may have been reinforced in the crisis. In fact, by taking 
composition effects into account, real actual wages decreased by 0.8 per 
cent over 2008–2011 (Verdugo 2013, cited by Husson 2015). Likewise, 
in Germany, Schulten and Bispinck (2014) argue that the development 
of mini-jobs since the end of 1990 is associated with a growing propor-
tion of workers who have not benefi tted from the higher wage growth 
determined by collective agreement.11 
3.2 Wage drift  and main institutional changes in wage-setting 
mechanisms
As already mentioned, collective bargaining system architectures over-
all remained broadly stable until the mid-1990s (excepted in the Unit-
ed Kingdom). Since then, most European countries have suffered both 
wage moderation and decentralisation of collective bargaining, which 
are clearly interrelated. In a majority of countries, bargaining coverage 
appears to have decreased in recent decades. In four countries – the 
United Kingdom, Germany, Spain and Portugal– there has been a con-
siderable decrease in coverage of more than 10 percentage points (see 
Figure 4).
Since the onset of the crisis, these developments have been reinforced. 
One explanation of the lack of upward wage development is the inten-
sifi cation of the trend towards decentralisation of collective bargaining. 
In our ten countries, the coordination of collective bargaining is more or 
less on a downward trend, with two exceptions: one of increased coor-
dination, namely Belgium and Finland, the other of disorganised decen-
tralisation, as in Spain and Portugal.
Changes to wage-setting mechanisms since the onset of the crisis can 
be clustered into three main types: changes in linkages between levels 
under multi-tier bargaining (including ordering between levels, opening 
and opt-out clauses); withdrawal of legal support for collective bargain-
ing (weakening of extension mechanisms or after-effects of collective 
11.  In connection with the development of mini-jobs, the proportion of low-wage workers 
increased from 18.8 per cent to 24.3 per cent between 1995 and 2012 (data from Kalina and 
Weinkopf 2014, cited by Schulten and Bispinck 2014).
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agreements); and disruption of bargaining by the extension of options 
allowing non-union groups to negotiate (Marginson and Welz 2014). 
The most substantial change concerns the relationships and ordering 
between levels, introducing circumstances under which further negotia-
tion derogates from the higher agreement (opening or opt-out clauses 
in sectoral or cross-sectoral agreements). Opening clauses in sectoral 
agreements provide scope for further negotiations on aspects of wages 
at company level, such as the implementation of a variable (productivi-
ty-related) element of wages. Opt-out clauses permit derogation under 
certain conditions from the wage standards specifi ed in sectoral or cross-
sectoral agreements. The use of derogation is limited mainly to compa-
nies in economic diffi culties, although how strictly this is defi ned varies. 
The development of opening or opt-out clauses may be noted in most of 
the ten countries: Austria, Germany, Finland, France, Italy, Spain and 
Portugal. Another type of disruption in the articulation of bargaining 
levels appears when bargaining competence is accorded to non-union 
representatives, mainly within companies. This occurs in France and 
Portugal. Finally, there have been changes in extension mechanisms or 
in their use in Italy, Germany and Portugal. Clauses providing a continu-
Figure 4  Collective bargaining coverage (% of employees)
Source: ICTWSS, Visser, 2014.
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ation of agreements beyond expiry are found in Austria, Portugal and 
Spain. Changes have been made in the latter two countries.
In light of these facts – wage drift trends and institutional changes in 
collective bargaining– we may distinguish Spain and Portugal, in which 
substantial ‘structural reform’ occurred at the same time as a reversal 
of trend with regard to wage drift. The other eight countries have suf-
fered fewer institutional changes, but among them two cases should be 
particularly stressed. First, France and Italy, where a number of reforms 
have weakened the collective bargaining system but coordination within 
the system has not really been undermined; and Germany, where insti-
tutional changes took place before the crisis in the early 2000s.
A ‘de-collectivisation of labour relations’? (ETUI 2015)
This intensifi cation of reform programmes has been particularly 
strong in Spain and Portugal. Even though the well-established mul-
ti-employer bargaining structures in these countries have remained 
formally intact, their scope and regulatory capacity have been increas-
ingly undermined by the various legal changes introduced in response 
to the demands placed upon these countries by the Troika (Schulten 
and Müller 2014). The far-reaching impact of the various ‘structural re-
forms’ that have been implemented in the collective bargaining systems 
of the southern European countries manifests itself in the dramatic 
decline in numbers of collective agreements and in collective bargain-
ing coverage. The collective bargaining systems in these countries now 
increasingly resemble the highly decentralised systems typical of the 
United Kingdom and many central and eastern European countries 
(Meardi 2014). 
In Spain, huge changes have been imposed by the previous and current 
governments in laws enacted in 2011 and 2012. The 2012 law completely 
inverted the favourability principle. Priority is now given to company-
level agreements rather than the sectoral or provincial levels with regard 
to basic wages and wage supplements. However, employers and trade un-
ions retained the option to re-establish the favourability principle if they 
so wish. They did so in 2013 for some sectors, including metalworking, 
chemicals and construction (Vincent 2013). These agreements were not 
renewed in 2014. The number of sectoral agreements was almost halved be-
tween 2008 and 2013, from 1 448 to 887. However, company-level agree-
ments declined even more, from 4 539 in 2008 to 2 274 in 2013. Hence, 
between 2008 and 2013, the number of workers covered by collective 
82 Wage bargaining under the new European Economic Governance
agreements decreased in Spain from 12 million in 2008 to just 8.5 mil-
lion in 2013 (see Chapter 3 in this volume).
In Spain, the 2012 law also extended the clauses enabling employers to 
‘remove themselves’ from the application of collective agreements, on 
economic, technical, organisational or production grounds. These ‘opt-
out’ exit clauses already existed, but their range of authorisation was ex-
tended signifi cantly. Companies with only two consecutive trimesters of 
defi cit are now permitted to waive the conditions of a sectoral collective 
agreement. In case of disagreement between employers and unions con-
cerning the application of this derogation clause, the National Consulta-
tion Committee on collective bargaining is authorised to settle the dis-
pute within 25 days (Vincent 2013). Finally, the 2012 reform of collective 
bargaining imposes a 12-month time limit, beyond which agreements 
will no longer be binding.
The reforms were more radical in Portugal. The 2012 Labour Code 
inverted the favourability principle, specifying that the provisions of 
agreements concluded at company level take priority over those con-
tained in sectoral or cross-sectoral agreements, but, as in Spain, allows 
employers and trade unions to negotiate a clause in higher-level agree-
ments reverting to the favourability principle. To date, no agreement has 
been signed. Opening clauses have existed since the 2012 Labour Code 
enabled sectoral agreements to delegate the regulation of some issues 
– such as wages– to company level. Portugal’s 2012 Labour Code also 
sets stricter criteria for the application of extension procedures, limit-
ing this to sectors in which employers’ organisations cover over half the 
workforce.
Moreover, the 2009 law provided trade unions with the option of del-
egating negotiating responsibility to company-level employee repre-
sentatives in companies with 500 employees or more. This threshold 
was lowered to 150 under the 2012 Labour Code. The Memorandum of 
Understanding recommended that Portugal remove trade union consent 
for delegation. To date, this has not featured in the government’s legisla-
tive proposals. The Memorandum also asks the Portuguese government 
to think about reforming the continuation of agreements beyond expiry. 
Since a 2009 law, the duration of the after-effect of collective agreements 
is 18 months, although the parties can agree to extend this duration, up 
to a maximum of fi ve years.
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As a result, in Portugal the decline in the number of collective agree-
ments was even more dramatic than in Spain. Here, the total number 
of registered agreements fell from 296 in 2008 to 95 in 2013, when no 
more than 27 sectoral agreements. Since, at the same time, the num-
ber of extended collective agreements fell from 131 in 2008 to only 9 in 
2013, the number of workers covered by collective agreements virtually 
collapsed, from 1.7 million in 2008 to 200,000 in 2013 (Schulten and 
Müller 2015: 349).
Uncertain eff ects of substantial changes
Two countries have suffered a weakening of their collective bargaining 
systems overall, France and Italy, even though the impact of such de-
centralised mechanisms is not easily comparable. The consequences are 
clearly much more effective with regard to the outcomes of collective 
bargaining in Italy.
In Italy, a 2011 cross-sectoral agreement reformed the two-tier bargain-
ing system, setting new rules for the validity of company-level bargain-
ing. To be valid, company agreements had to be approved by a majority in 
the RSU (company union-based employee representative body), now the 
sole entity with the power to reach agreement, a right previously shared 
with the unions. A cross-sectoral agreement in 2013 complemented that 
of 2011, which essentially dealt with company-level agreements. Sector-
level agreements became valid on two conditions: they must be signed 
by the majority of trade unions in the industry (majority of a mixed indi-
cator votes/members) and approved by a majority vote by the industry’s 
workers (Rehfeldt 2013). 
In 2009, a cross-sectoral agreement introduced possible derogation con-
ditions to enable companies to ‘manage crisis situations or to foster eco-
nomic and employment growth’ to encourage company-level bargain-
ing on productivity bonuses. Few industries have implemented the new 
derogation possibilities. 
Simultaneously, the long-established practice of ‘quasi-legal’ extension 
has been called into question by recent court rulings that confi rmed the 
validity of the new plant-level agreement imposed unilaterally by Fiat in 
2011. Italy’s economic diffi culties led to a decrease in company bargain-
ing, its coverage and intensity (Burroni and Pedaci 2011). The fact that 
actual wages remain lower than collectively agreed wages may be due 
to the reduction of the scope for pay bargaining at fi rm level. Indeed, 
between 1990 and 1999, 43.3 per cent of fi rms and 64.1 per cent of em-
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ployees were covered by fi rm-level collective bargaining. These propor-
tions were 30.6 per cent and 54.4 per cent, respectively, in 2000–2008.
France is always hard to place in a European classifi cation. Important 
new laws reformed collective bargaining long before the crisis, but with 
limited practical impact. For instance, opening clauses have existed 
since the 1982 Auroux law, but only for working time. A 2013 cross-sec-
toral agreement, subsequently enacted as law, created a new type of ‘job 
retention’ agreement that allows fi rms experiencing diffi culties to bar-
gain for lower temporary compensation in exchange for continued em-
ployment. Only ten company agreements have been signed since then. 
The limited success of the measure is due to the considerable constraints 
related to this type of agreement. These new devices have not replaced 
the many existing formulas that are used to allow employers to reduce 
wages in time of economic diffi culties, such as ‘competitiveness agree-
ments’, which were implemented by law in 2012 and are still by far the 
most popular.
France was also the only country to make changes in the operation of the 
favourability principle before the crisis. The 2004 Fillon law inverted the 
principle, giving precedence to agreement concluded at company level 
over the provisions specifi ed in higher-level agreements, with the nota-
ble exception of collectively agreed wages and job classifi cation.12 
Unlike the other countries, since the 2008 crisis company-level bar-
gaining in France has enjoyed new growth. Previously, it was permitted 
only with a union delegate present or, in certain circumstances, with an 
employee holding a bargaining mandate issued by a union outside the 
company. The Act of 20 August 2008 allowed employers, under certain 
conditions, to bargain with the works council or even a staff representa-
tive, in the absence of union delegates.
Germany: main changes before the onset of the crisis
In some ways, the evolution of the German collective bargaining sys-
tem may sound fairly unique compared with other European countries. 
The decline in the number of companies bound by collective agreements 
12.  Plant-level agreements could waive higher-level bargaining agreements, even towards less 
favourable dispositions for workers, except in four areas: minimum wages, classifi cations, 
vocational training and supplementary social protection.
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at sectoral level was early and rapid. The weakening of collective bar-
gaining is particularly striking with regard to the coverage of sectoral 
agreements: in 2013, 52 per cent of workers were covered by a collective 
agreement in western Germany and only 35 per cent in eastern Germa-
ny; fi fteen years ago, the levels were around 68 per cent and 52 per cent, 
respectively (Bispinck and Schulten 2014). 
The spread of derogation constitutes another important factor in the 
erosion of collective bargaining. Opening clauses were bargained by 
German trade unions before the crisis. Opening clauses were included 
in the 2009 and 2010 German metalworking and chemical sector agree-
ments. Opt-out clauses were also used not only to make working time 
more fl exible but also to deviate from collectively agreed wages. In 2010, 
58 per cent of companies made use of opening clauses and the number of 
derogation agreements on wages grew. More recently, in direct contrast 
to the other countries, a statutory minimum wage has been implemented 
and the use of extension procedures has increased in Germany, refl ect-
ing a growing problem of low pay in parts of the private sector.
Conclusion
Since the early 2000s, wage restraint has been common in all ten coun-
tries dealt with in this chapter. This trend has further been reinforced 
since the onset of the crisis. We have examined the extent to which col-
lective bargaining may infl uence trends in actual wages; in other words, 
we have tried to to provide indicators of the ‘bite’ of collective bargaining 
in Europe. This also involved an attempt to explain how actual wages 
may deviate from collectively agreed wages (so-called ‘wage drift’). 
First, our analysis shows that wage restraint has been reinforced since 
the onset of the crisis, not only with regard to collectively agreed wag-
es but also actual wages. Second, analysis of the development of ‘wage 
drift’ – measured by the difference between actual wages and collectively 
agreed wages– leads to the identifi cation of three groups of countries. 
The much larger group has experienced fairly weak wage drift, moder-
ately positive or negative: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany 
and Italy. In stark contrast, countries of the second group have experi-
enced huge wage drift, which is a typical feature of southern Europe: in 
our sample, Spain and Portugal. Finally, wage drift has followed a fairly 
erratic pattern over the period in two countries: the Netherlands and 
the United Kingdom. We also highlight that these divergent trends may 
have been due to a wide range of explanations: changes in the composi-
tion of the labour force; minimum wage setting and pay indexation; and 
compensation policies at fi rm level. Besides these latter determinants 
of wage drift, in connection with implementation of new economic gov-
ernance, industrial relations regimes came under growing pressure to 
reform collective bargaining and wage-setting mechanisms. 
We considered in a last section the main institutional changes in wage-
setting mechanisms and their potential impacts on wages and wage drift. 
In particular, our analysis has distinguished Spain and Portugal, which 
were subject to important ‘structural reforms’, which occurred at the 
same time as a reversed trend with regard to wage drift. In the other 
countries, fewer institutional changes are reported but two cases have 
been stressed: fi rst, France and Italy, where a number of reforms have 
weakened the collective bargaining system, although without undermin-
ing coordination; and second, Germany, where ‘deregulating’ institu-
tional changes took place before the crisis in the early 2000s (derogation 
and opting-out), and ‘re-regulating’ changes very recently (minimum 
wage and revised extension mechanism).
The wage moderation recorded in the euro-zone countries goes far be-
yond adjustments in labour costs to restore productivity; it has been 
accompanied by reforms whose worst effects have not yet been felt ex-
cept in countries under Memorandums of Understanding. This can be 
explained by the resistance of institutions to change (path dependency) 
and by the strategies of the social partners, which restrict the negative 
effects. However, the reforms are likely to result in permanent erosion of 
collective bargaining systems.
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Chapter 3
Impact of the euro crisis on wages and collective 
bargaining in southern Europe – a comparison of 
Italy, Portugal and Spain
Jesús Cruces, Ignacio Álvarez, Francisco Trillo, Salvo Leonardi 
Introduction1
The austerity measures implemented in the European Union have re-
inforced the dominance of competitiveness as a central frame of refer-
ence for wage policies. So-called ‘internal devaluation’–based on wage 
cuts– has been presented as the solution needed to overcome the crisis, 
particularly in southern European countries.
However, after several years of austerity measures, there is now uncon-
tested evidence of their negative impact on economic growth and social 
cohesion, which is admitted even by supranational institutions.2 Various 
studies have shown that internal devaluation has been ineffective in ad-
dressing macroeconomic imbalances and the debt crisis in the European 
Union (Holland 2012). There is also a broad consensus that austerity 
has reinforced existing divergent trends with regard to wages and collec-
tive bargaining. In southern European countries, these policies have led 
to deep wage cuts and radical changes in collective bargaining systems, 
resulting in lower standards in terms of incomes, wage-setting arrange-
ments and social cohesion (Bernaciak and Müller 2013).
This chapter aims to address the impact of the euro-crisis on wages and 
collective bargaining in three southern European economies, namely 
Spain, Italy and Portugal.3 To meet this challenge, we decided to struc-
1.  We would especially like to thank Reinhard Naumann for his contributions and suggestions 
during the elaboration of this chapter, which were very relevant and constructive.
2. The International Monetary Fund admitted that large and rapid fi scal consolidation may 
lead to unintended economic consequences for growth and employment (Blanchard and 
Leigh 2013).
3. Taking into account other southern European countries, as Greece, where austerity policies 
have generated much more serious negative consequences, both economic and social (Trian-
tafi llou 2014).
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ture our analysis by moving from more general to more specifi c aspects, 
for example, of legal and economic measures.
The structure of this chapter is as follows. In Section 1 we review so-
called ‘new economic governance’ in Europe, as well as the main ra-
tionale put forward for austerity and internal devaluation. In Section 
2 we explore some microeconomic aspects of labour market ‘reforms’ 
imposed by the Troika, focusing on (i) the intense privatisation process 
and (ii) the strong determination to reduce the importance of collective 
bargaining. We analyse these two dimensions in the three case studies. 
In Section 3 we present the main outcomes of labour reforms, in terms 
of wage development, economic growth and social indicators. Finally, in 
Section 4 we draw some conclusions.
In our analysis we also try to evaluate how homogeneous institutional re-
forms have had different practical consequences, addressing the diverse 
reactions of national governments, as well as the various intensities and 
outcomes of these reforms, especially with regard to wage trends.
It must be noted that our analysis is not based on a narrow comparison 
of experiences, but rather on a synthesis of the outcomes of austerity 
and internal devaluation in southern European countries. Therefore, in 
many cases the use of the data provided, both economic and regulatory, 
may serve as guidance for a more comprehensive understanding of the 
consequences of particular policies for wages and collective bargaining. 
The analysis covers wage developments and other variables until 2013, 
within the framework of the broader impact of austerity measures.
1. The euro-crisis in southern European countries: wage 
policy framework
The fi nancial and economic crisis that began in 2008 metamorphosed 
during 2010–2012 into an intense crisis of the euro. The credit risk of 
government bond yields experienced a sharp rise in peripheral econo-
mies during these years to the point of forcing bailouts by the European 
Union of Greece (May 2010), Ireland (November 2010), Portugal (May 
2011), Spain (June 2012) and Cyprus (March 2013). 
The economies of southern Europe – particularly Spain, Italy and Por-
tugal– had had no signifi cant fi scal problems before the economic crisis. 
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Italy and Portugal had a moderate public defi cit in 2007 (–1.6 per cent 
and –3.1 per cent of GDP, respectively), while Spain showed signifi cant 
surplus (1.9 per cent). Similarly, the ratio of public debt to GDP was not 
excessive in the case of Portugal (68.4 per cent, in line with France and 
Germany), Spain had a low fi gure (36.3 per cent) and the high Italian 
public debt (103.3 per cent) was not considered critical due to its domes-
tic nature (see below).
However, the development of the crisis in these three economies dur-
ing the period 2008–2010 led to a signifi cant increase in government 
defi cits and public debt, making it very diffi cult to obtain fi nancing on 
international capital markets. The economic cycle with an increase in 
spending associated with the automatic stabilisers, the bailouts of the 
fi nancial system and the fall in tax revenues due to the slowdown of eco-
nomic activity thus explain the deterioration of public fi nances.
On the other hand, Spain, Italy and Portugal accumulated – as did Greece 
and Ireland– substantial current account and fi nancial imbalances from 
the establishment of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU): the in-
crease of external private debt (particularly in Spain and Portugal) was 
the consequence of growing trade defi cits toward the core economies of 
the euro zone. With the adoption of the common currency and the ab-
sence of institutional arrangements to prevent and correct these exter-
nal imbalances, current account defi cits in 2007 reached –10 per cent of 
GDP in Spain and Portugal and –1.3 per cent in Italy.
The explanation given by the EU institutions for these fi scal and external 
imbalances has determined the type of policy response implemented. 
First, both Brussels institutions and the German government insist on 
presenting fi scal imbalances as one of the main reasons for the sovereign 
debt crisis. Second, the current account defi cits of peripheral economies 
are interpreted as a result of their uncompetitiveness in relation to the 
central and northern countries, due to higher growth in unit labour costs.
Both macroeconomic imbalances are – according to Brussels– a clear 
sign that these countries have ‘lived beyond their means’. The solution 
implemented is therefore based on strict fi scal austerity packages and 
wage cuts. 
A complementary, but different explanation is not considered, however: 
the current account defi cits within the EMU are not the result of ‘policy 
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mistakes’ by peripheral economies, but of unbalanced growth between 
core and periphery in 1995–2008. 
This unbalanced development is based on two poles. One group of 
economies – particularly Germany – has been characterised by wage 
restraint and weak domestic demand, with economic growth driven 
mainly by a strategy of increasing exports (export-led growth). Another 
group – of which Spain is a good example – has based its expansion 
on strong internal demand fi nanced by external debt (debt-led growth), 
thereby enabling recycling of the trade surpluses of the fi rst group of 
countries.
Both strategies were in fact interdependent: growth in core countries 
was (in part) based on external demand in the peripheral economies 
and, simultaneously, the latter needed the surplus countries to fi nance 
their current account defi cits. A common monetary policy and the exist-
ence of the single currency have played an important role in the devel-
opment of this model, imposing the same interest rate on all economies 
and reducing the credit risk of peripheral government bond yields. 
It is worth stressing the key element underlying the development of this 
unbalanced growth model: the establishment of the Economic and Mon-
etary Union (EMU). The proposal to impose a single currency on differ-
ent economies with diverse industrial structures and productivity levels 
without – crucially – any institutional mechanism aimed at limiting ex-
ternal imbalances between these economies resulted in an unsustainable 
model (Álvarez et al. 2013).With a single currency, the counterpart of a 
strong trade surplus in Germany – partially due to its reduced domestic 
demand – is an intense fl ow of capital towards more dynamic areas, such 
as the south, with corresponding external imbalance problems due to 
high domestic demand (as typifi ed by Spain).
Furthermore, an expansionary monetary policy designed to meet the 
needs of the core countries during the years before the crisis contributed 
to very low real interest rates in the south, leading to rising debt levels.
In addition, the Monetary Union was constructed according to the model 
of the German Bundesbank, with a strategy favouring a strong currency 
and the priority of avoiding infl ation. Companies in core countries had 
decades of ‘practice’ under these conditions and learned to live without 
currency devaluations. Companies in southern Europe, by contrast, had 
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a much shorter period to learn to compete in such a context and the 
result was that many of them got into trouble. This was not the result of 
wrong policies but of a race with very unequal competitors, and EMU 
had no mechanisms to compensate for the ensuing imbalances.
Taking this analytical framework into consideration would have required 
the implementation of quite different policy measures to those applied 
by the EU (for example, an increase in German domestic demand). How-
ever, the crisis has been used by the institutions in Brussels and by politi-
cal and economic elites to deepen the neoliberal economic strategy and 
redefi ne labour and social relations in southern Europe.
1.1 Austerity policies and the new economic governance
The economic policy imposed in the euro zone since May 2010 contains 
a strong dose of external intervention: the infl uence of the EU – through 
the European Council, the Eurogroup, the Commission and the Troika– 
on the policies adopted by the governments of the different member 
states has increased considerably. EU infl uence has been consolidated 
by a series of agreements that strengthen the capacity of the European 
institutions to monitor member state economic policies and to impose 
fi nancial sanctions on countries that do not comply with central direc-
tives.
This external intervention is overwhelming in the Memorandums of 
Understanding signed with the countries bailed out by the European 
Stability Mechanism (ESM). In these cases, the ESM bailout mechanism 
involves strong conditionality in terms of economic policy, similar to the 
structural adjustment policies imposed by the International Monetary 
Fund in Latin America during the 1980s and 1990s. Some authors even 
describe this economic policy as ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ (Bruff 
2012).
The main decisions adopted within the framework of new economic gov-
ernance were taken outside the European Semester. The main actors 
were the Eurogroup and the ECB, neither of which is democratically ac-
countable or open to public debate (Rocha 2014). As an example of this 
lack of open debate we have the ECB’s ‘secret letters’ to Spain and Italy 
(August 2011), demanding reforms in collective bargaining, the aboli-
tion of infl ation-adjustment clauses, private sector wage moderation and 
Jesús Cruces, Ignacio Álvarez, Francisco Trillo, Salvo Leonardi
98 Wage bargaining under the new European Economic Governance
other labour market regulations (Rodriguez Zapatero 2013), which were 
refl ected in the measures fi nally adopted.4 
Among the economic policies imposed by member state governments 
and European institutions on peripheral countries, two in particular 
shape the wage policy framework (European Commission 2011; Schulten 
and Müller 2013):
(i) Fiscal consolidation should be the priority of any economic poli-
cy. This consolidation has been understood as a prerequisite for 
reducing government bond yields in fi nancial markets, restoring 
the country’s access to external fi nancing and stabilising the single 
currency. In accordance with this approach, even though European 
economies are still in crisis, governments decided to cease fi scal 
stimulus, restoring – in line with the Maastricht Treaty– the con-
trol of public defi cits as the top priority. To guarantee such control, 
public spending is cut. History has thus repeated itself with, as in 
1931 and German Chancellor Heinrich Brüning or in 1935 and the 
French government of Pierre Laval, major European governments 
implementing public spending cuts in a recession.
(ii) Internal devaluation by reducing wages is supposed to correct 
differences in competitiveness and current account imbalances. 
The increase in current account imbalances is perceived, as al-
ready mentioned, as being the result of diverging competitiveness 
between economies. At the same time, this divergence is explained 
by discrepant growth of unit labour costs. Since EMU’s institutional 
framework does not allow currency devaluations to regain lost com-
petitiveness, such recovery must come – according to the EU– from 
‘internal devaluation’, understood as a reduction in unit labour costs 
in defi cit countries. Wages are thus considered the main adjustment 
variable with regard to macroeconomic imbalances.
These two macroeconomic policies are presented by the Troika as neces-
sary to ensure fi nancial stability, facilitate international fi nancing and 
4.  For example, in Italy we fi nd Act. 148/2011, Berlusconi’s immediate answer to the ECB’s 
‘secret’ letter (August 2011), in which for the fi rst time a company or territorial ‘proximity’ 
agreement is allowed in Italy –concerning new investments, jobs, savings, adoption of new 
technologies or forms of workers’ participation– to derogate, not only from national sectoral 
agreements, but even from laws, the only limit being respect for constitutional or interna-
tional rights and conventions.
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increase external competitiveness. They are supposed to lead to the re-
covery of credit, investment, exports and employment, as well as an in-
creased potential for long-term growth. 
In order to institutionalise these measures in the euro zone, govern-
ments have substantially transformed economic governance in Europe. 
In 2010, with the adoption of the Europe 2020 Strategy proposed by the 
European Commission, the European Semester got under way, which is 
an annual mechanism of macroeconomic, budgetary and structural pol-
icy coordination. According to this mechanism every year the EU issues 
a series of recommendations to member states that have to be embodied 
in a National Reform Programme, whose implementation is evaluated 
by the European Commission. Furthermore, states also have to sub-
mit their plans for sound public fi nances (stability or convergence pro-
grammes). The European Semester is therefore an instrument designed 
to enable the Commission to achieve more effective ex ante control of 
economic policy in different countries (European Commission 2011).
This new European economic governance has continued to develop. In 
2011 the so-called Six-Pack was adopted, consisting of fi ve Regulations 
and one Directive aimed at strengthening not only fi scal but also mac-
roeconomic supervision of member states (especially in the countries of 
the euro area). This attempt to reinforce economic governance is being 
imposed by three instruments (European Commission 2012a; Uxó et al. 
2011).
First, the Six-Pack ensures tighter fi scal discipline through a stricter 
interpretation of the Stability and Growth Pact. Second, a mechanism 
for preventing and correcting potential macroeconomic imbalances has 
been created, involving the monitoring of various economic indicators 
(not only fi scal indicators). Third, an automatic procedure for sanctions 
has been introduced for countries that do not comply with policy recom-
mendations emanating from this EU alert mechanism. As a result, policy 
recommendations from the EU to member states have ceased to be vol-
untary (Schulten and Müller 2013).
In 2011, the member states ratifi ed the so-called Euro-Plus Pact (later 
the Pact for the Euro). This agreement has also helped to institutionalise 
austerity and internal devaluation policies in the EU. The Pact for the 
Euro contains mechanisms to ensure the ‘sustainability’ of public fi nanc-
es by monitoring and reforming pension, health and unemployment sys-
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tems. Furthermore, this agreement aims to supervise the growth of unit 
labour costs in order to link the evolution of (nominal) wages to (real) 
productivity and thereby improve the external competitiveness of the 
economies of the euro zone. In this sense, the pact was designed with 
the intention of promoting more ‘fl exible’ labour markets and achieving 
(hypothetical) productivity gains.
1.2 Labour reforms and work deregulation in private and public 
sector
As already discussed, the increase in external imbalances experienced 
within the euro zone is perceived by the European institutions as result-
ing from the diverging competitiveness of core and peripheral countries, 
due to growing differences in unit labour costs. The European institu-
tions explain these differences in unit labour costs as a result of so-called 
‘institutional rigidities’ in labour markets: collective bargaining systems, 
regulation of layoffs, minimum wages and employment protection, 
among other things. These ‘rigidities’ explain, according to the orthodox 
approach, the ‘excessive’ growth of unit labour costs in peripheral coun-
tries, the decline in external competitiveness and structural unemploy-
ment, as well as loss of growth potential (Álvarez et al. 2013).
The strategy to reform labour markets – lowering the minimum wage, 
allowing more fl exible dismissals, eroding collective bargaining and ul-
timately limiting the ability of unions to achieve agreements – is sup-
posed to encourage the necessary ‘internal devaluation’ and to facilitate 
recovery of both competitiveness and GDP growth. Thus, wage cuts are 
part of an export-led recovery strategy for peripheral countries, while 
macroeconomic imbalances and aggregate demand problems are sup-
posed to be solved by supply-side measures.
The EU is thus interfering with wage policy in the member states, an area 
traditionally closed to European regulation (Schulten and Müller 2013). 
The legal basis for this intervention is linked, as already mentioned, to 
the Six-Pack and the Pact for the Euro, as a result of which, as already 
mentioned, wage growth is used as the main adjustment variable to pro-
mote competitiveness and reduce macroeconomic imbalances.
Although Article 153 of the Treaty on European Union states that wage 
policy is beyond the powers of the EU, the Macroeconomic Imbalance 
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Procedure linked to the adoption of the Six-Pack provides the basis for 
new intervention in wages. This is not confi ned to monitoring wage 
growth,5 but also covers other areas, such as national systems of collec-
tive bargaining.
In the context of the crisis, and according to the Macroeconomic Imbal-
ance Procedure, the EU has recommended labour market reforms to half 
of the member countries (European Commission 2012b). These recom-
mendations are increasingly unavoidable, to the extent that countries 
that fail to comply with them will risk signifi cant economic sanctions.
However, in the case of peripheral countries with external fi nancing dif-
fi culties this infl uence has been implemented with much greater inten-
sity. Labour market reforms carried out since 2010 by Portugal, Spain 
and Italy have comprised strong deregulation of the institutional frame-
work. These reforms – reviewed in Section 2– are supposed to decen-
tralise collective bargaining, reduce the regulatory scope and duration 
of collective agreements, facilitate opt-out clauses and alleviate redun-
dancy costs. Therefore, labour reforms adopted in these countries have 
the ambition of realigning the collective bargaining systems towards the 
current Anglo-Saxon model based on decentralisation and deregulation.
The high unemployment caused by the crisis has been particularly useful 
in legitimising such ‘reforms’. Unemployment is used not only to claim 
(once again) that a more ‘fl exible’ labour market would ensure the crea-
tion of new jobs, but also to limit employees’ bargaining power in these 
countries (Baylos et al 2014).
In southern European economies labour policy is aimed not only to 
deregulate labour markets and reduce wages in the private sector. Cut-
ting public sector wages and freezing the minimum wage are even more 
important.6 As a consequence of these developments, southern Euro-
5.  The new monitoring of economic indicators adopted with the Six-Pack explicitly includes 
unit labour costs among the indicators to be controlled. The nominal growth of this variable 
may not exceed 9 per cent in a period of three years for euro zone economies (and 12 per 
cent for countries which are not members of EMU). 
6. Public wages in Spain were cut by 5 per cent in June 2010 and Christmas bonuses were abol-
ished in 2012. Later on, they were frozen. In Portugal public wages were frozen in 2010 and 
experienced a 5 per cent cut in 2011; furthermore, above a certain income threshold, the two 
annual bonus payments were eliminated in 2012 and 2013. In Italy public wages were frozen 
in 2012. Moreover, the minimum wage was not updated in 2012 and 2013 in either Spain or 
Portugal.
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pean economies experienced severe wage devaluation during the period 
2010–2014, in both the private and the public sector. 
2. Collective bargaining systems in Italy, Portugal and 
Spain
The disruptive effect of the crisis on industrial relations has been consid-
erable in southern European countries. It is too early to affi rm that the 
reforms enacted in 2010–12 will lead to systemic change, but it is certain 
that they have affected a number of very important institutions, such as 
collective bargaining and thus wealth distribution and the working and 
living conditions of working people.
The southern European countries have traditionally shared some indus-
trial relations features in the EU context, such as high collective bargain-
ing coverage rates and national-level social dialogue.7 Moreover, strikes 
are much more frequent and a class orientation more prevalent in the 
unions. They are also similar in relation to other features, such as union 
fragmentation and politicisation, gaps between large and small compa-
nies and a high degree of informality in the labour market. The Italian, 
Portuguese and Spanish systems are based on the principle of trade un-
ion pluralism.
Specifi cally, the collective bargaining systems share more commonali-
ties than differences. These systems play an essential function in regu-
lating labour relations. In the 1980s, collective bargaining developed in 
accordance with the favor laboris principle.8 However, since the 1990s 
this principle has undergone signifi cant change. It began with the im-
plementation of special acts on specifi c issues aimed at introducing 
more fl exibility in employment relationships. In this way, relations be-
tween legal and conventional regulations changed in order to introduce 
derogations in peius by collective bargaining to achieve greater ‘fl exibil-
ity’. This means that since then the favor laboris principle has under-
gone a major evolution in which legal regulation of collective bargain-
7.  For instance, in Italy and in Spain very important labour market reforms were instigated by 
social dialogue (1997, 2003 and 2006).  
8. This means, in this case, collective bargaining was obliged to improve legal regulations. In 
other words, relationships between legal and conventional regulations produced as a result a 
situation in which labour rules gave advantage to the labour relation weaker part (workers).
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ing has ceased to respect minimum legal rights in an effort to improve 
‘fl exibility’. 
Approaches to collective bargaining differ in Italy, Portugal and Spain. 
While in Italy this process is based on the freedom of negotiators to bal-
ance different interests in bargaining (fl essibilità contrattata), in Por-
tugal and Spain the law has played a more substantial role, determining 
the areas and limits in which collective agreements could introduce this 
fl exibility. This has made it possible for collective agreements to estab-
lish less favourable conditions than those prescribed by law (Palma Ra-
malho 2013). During the crisis, these relations between the law and col-
lective bargaining have experienced another development in which legal 
provisions, often adopted directly by the executive and circumventing 
parliament, have abrogated collective agreements. 
Generally, there is a tendency for legal provisions to override collective 
bargaining, sometimes violating the constitution, as in Spain (Art. 37.1 
CE) and affecting trade union association rights.9 
2.1 Features of the collective bargaining system of each country 
before the crisis
To understand the impact of the crisis and, above all, the anti-crisis 
measures on collective bargaining, it is essential to review corporate and 
industrial relations in Italy, Portugal and Spain prior to the crisis. The 
following features must be taken into account. 
(i)  The majority of Italian, Portuguese and Spanish companies are mi-
cro-size companies, with fewer than 10 workers.10 However, these 
companies employ less than 50 per cent of the total workforce.11 
9.  In this regard, it is interesting to analyse the two complaints brought by Spanish trade 
unions CC.OO. and UGT in 2011 and 2012. Case nº 2918 (http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/
en/f?p=1000:50001:0::NO:50001:P50001_COMPLAINT_FILE_ID:3056434) and Case nº 
2947 (http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:50001:0::NO:50001:P50001_COM-
PLAINT_FILE_ID:3063806). 
10. In Italy: 95 per cent of companies have fewer than 10 workers (source: ISTA. http://www.
istat.it/it/archivio/4870; in Portugal around 95 per cent of companies have fewer than 10 
workers (source: National Institute of Statistics); while in Spain 97.8 per cent of companies 
had fewer than 10 workers in 2008. (source: Spanish Statistical Offi ce http://www.ine.es/
daco/daco42/dirce/dirce08.pdf). 
11. Perhaps Spain is the most representative because almost 99 per cent of companies are small 
or micro companies. See: http://www.ine.es/inebmenu/mnu_empresas.htm.
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(ii)  All systems have a long tradition of social dialogue between the gov-
ernment and the representative associations and organisations of 
employers and employees, especially at the highest level of repre-
sentation. Social dialogue consists of regular consultations on the 
approval of new legislation on employment and industrial legisla-
tion, except in Italy, where social dialogue generally concerns wealth 
distribution policy and trade union regulation (EESC 2011).
(iii)  There is also a long tradition of collective bargaining and collective 
agreements, whose structures are similar, principally at the sectoral 
level (national, regional and provincial). This preference for sectoral 
branch agreements is due to the small size of most companies and 
has played a signifi cant role in the inclusiveness and homogeniza-
tion of working conditions and living standards. In Italy, the nation-
al agreement establishes a basis of rights and standards, including 
minimum wages, for industry at large. 
(iv)  Competence to sign collective agreements, at every level, on behalf 
of employees is mainly accorded to trade unions, except at the com-
pany level, where works councils are the favoured bodies. In this re-
gard, there are some differences between the countries, especially in 
Italy where since 1993 under the Inter-confederal Agreement one-
third of the seats on works councils have been reserved for trade 
union representatives.12 Usually, the company agreement is the level 
at which fl exibility is introduced more frequently.
(v)  In the case of binding collective agreements it is possible to apply 
the results of bargaining to all workers. In Italy (Ferraro 2013) and 
Portugal the general principle is that outcomes apply only to mem-
bers of the trade unions or employer associations that signed the 
agreement (affi liation principle), but in practice it is also possible to 
apply the contents of collective agreements to unaffi liated workers 
13 (in Italy by a judicial ruling and in Portugal through an adminis-
trative extension procedure). However, in Spain the main principle 
is general application to all workers, affi liated and non-affi liated 
12.  Collective bargaining depends only on the social partners’ mutual recognition; agreements 
are not legally binding and their contents are only formally enforceable by affi liates of the 
signatories.  
13.  The exception here is the public sector, in respect of which since the late 1990s there has 
been a law on the selection of representative unions entitled to bargain (Legislative Decree 
No. 296/1997 and 165/2001, Art. 43). Unions need to pass a 5 per cent threshold to take part 
in national collective bargaining, whereas a fi nal agreement is binding if signed by unions 
representing at least 51 per cent of the relevant workforce. These thresholds are calculated as 
a weighted average between votes and members.
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– erga omnes – when collective agreements respect the legal pro-
visions on bargaining legitimacy. Nevertheless, in Spain, trade un-
ions and employers’ associations can sign collective agreements in 
which the negotiating bodies are not composed in accordance with 
the relevant legal provisions. In this case, the contents of the collec-
tive agreement apply only to affi liated workers, although individual 
workers can ask for its extension to them (judicial ruling).
(vi)  One of the most important features of collective agreements in It-
aly, Portugal and Spain is the period of validity. In these collective 
bargaining systems collective agreements remain in force until they 
are superseded by another one. In Italy, this provision is introduced 
by collective agreement, while in Portugal and Spain it is statutory. 
This kind of provision provides the workers with substantial secu-
rity with regard to working conditions and living standards, but it 
has also hampered the development of collective bargaining over 
the years.
As a result of these institutional characteristics of collective bargaining, 
especially extension, coverage rates are very high in the three countries: 
in Italy, collective bargaining coverage in 2008 was about 80 per cent,14 
in Portugal, between 71 and 80 per cent15 and in Spain (depending on the 
source) coverage was between 80 and 85 per cent (EPA 2008)16 in 2008 
(or 74.5 per cent according to the Social Security Survey 2008).
2.2 Main changes in collective bargaining systems: public and 
private sector
According to the European Commission and the institutions regulating 
the fi nancial markets – such as the ECB and the IMF – economic meas-
ures aimed at reducing public defi cits in Italy, Portugal and Spain should 
be accompanied by government action to impose in-depth ‘structural re-
forms’, which entails a series of reforms related to labour relations, the 
social security system and collective bargaining, with the express aim of 
creating and/or preserving jobs. In other words, while state macroeco-
nomic action has tended towards reducing public defi cits, and hence to 
14.  See: http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/country/italy_4.htm.
15.  Ministério do Trabalho e da Solidariedade Social 2008: 86.
16. Also very useful is the information from Comisiones Obreras on collective agreement regis-
tration (REGCON). See in this regard, Secretaria Acción Sindical 2014.
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contract the public sector, efforts to maintain and create jobs have been 
restricted to revising the regulation of employment relationships and 
social protection systems. Two main lines of action have thus emerged 
(Baylos and Trillo 2011).
The fi rst concerns the ‘inevitability’ of austerity measures and public 
defi cit reduction as the only way to exit the crisis and achieve economic 
recovery. The political and economic debate has therefore moved away 
from issues such as changing the production model and reforms needed 
to boost economic activity, thereby absolving economic and business ac-
tors of their responsibilities. Collective bargaining in the public sector 
has been affected by non-application of wage clauses (cutting or freez-
ing, depending on the country). 
The second line of action is closely related to the reforms carried out 
with regard to labour relations, based on the questionable principle that 
jobs can be created or maintained only by reducing legal and political 
employment guarantees and reducing average wages, redundancy costs 
and working conditions, setting job creation against robust employment 
rights. This view, which is hardly new, has not been shown to be cor-
rect, either in the current crisis or in previous crises, such as those in the 
1980s and 1990s.17 During 2009–2013, there was intense reform, both 
qualitative and quantitative, based on the assumption that employment 
rights are the main cause of legislative rigidity and hence job destruction.
Public defi cit reduction measures have been introduced progressively 
since 2010, with particular emphasis on cutting spending within the dif-
ferent public authorities. This does not mean that no decision has been 
adopted affecting revenue, but the majority of legislative work has fo-
cussed on the restructuring of public personnel costs, reducing public 
defi cits, policies intended to reduce social spending and the privatisation 
of public services. 
17.  As we can see from several studies, employment creation is not in the power of labour 
market institutions. Naturally, greater fl exibility in this respect can contribute to greater job 
insecurity, but ultimately the causes of employment creation are not on the supply side. It 
depends rather on demand, in a given model of organisation of production, the difference 
between more and less productive jobs, as well as in the business management model. As an 
example of the impact of trying to create jobs by relaxing statutory employment guarantees, 
in Spain there have been more than 52 labour reforms since 1980, most of them focused on 
employment growth, resulting more and more precarity of employment (Rocha and Aragón 
2012).
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Having stressed the signifi cance of the public sector in Italy, Portugal 
and Spain, we should also mention measures aimed at reducing public 
spending as an anti-crisis strategy. The main measures in this respect 
include suspension of pension adjustments – except for minimum pen-
sions and non-contributory pensions– and reductions in the wages of 
public employees, as already mentioned.
Public sector wage cuts have triggered an ongoing legal debate on the 
binding nature of collective agreements with general scope that govern 
labour relations of employees of public authorities and public compa-
nies. For instance, in Spain such cuts directly contravene the Acuerdo 
Gobierno-Sindicatos para la función pública en el marco del Diálogo 
Social (2010–2012) – a government/trade union agreement on pub-
lic employees within the framework of social dialogue – which, a few 
months previously, had laid down wage rates that took account of the 
ongoing crisis. All collective agreements for people working for the vari-
ous administrations were affected.
Other measures in the public sector concerned, for example: (i) the re-
placement rate for civil servants and (ii) working time increases for pub-
lic employees. The same is true of certain public bodies in which working 
time is set by means of statutory collective bargaining. In this case, there 
was a confl ict concerning the binding nature of collective agreements 
and, ultimately, the right to free collective bargaining.
In the private sector, very important legislative reforms have been adopt-
ed since 2010 in Spain, Portugal and Italy.18 Signifi cant measures have 
affected the main aspects of collective bargaining. Essentially, executive 
power has promoted collective bargaining at company level, even with 
regard to aspects regulated by sectoral agreements, such as wages or 
working time, when there are economic, technical or productive reasons 
for taking action. These reforms are intended to promote the preferen-
tial use of company-level agreements over sectoral agreements, except 
when prohibited by competition rules or by the terms of an agreement.
It is also worth stressing that – at the same time– the demand for de-
centralisation of collective bargaining made by the Troika and national 
18.  A good analysis of the legal reforms of the collective bargaining systems in Spain, Italy and 
Portugal could be seen in Rocha 2014.
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governments could be hiding an other objective: the weakening of collec-
tive bargaining at sectoral level. A good example of this is the Portuguese 
case, which shows clearly that the real effect of these measures is the 
collapse of bargaining at sectoral level and its weakening in general (see 
below), without any sign of decentralisation. The demand for decentrali-
sation is being used to make changes in southern European countries to 
reduce or even eliminate the space for collective bargaining. 
The various regulations adopted in southern Europe include stipulations 
that:
– Priority should be given to the regulation of certain working con-
ditions agreed in the company-level collective agreement, such as 
the amount of the basic wage and wage supplements; payment or 
compensation for over-time and specifi c payments for shift work; 
the hours and distribution of the working day; professional classifi -
cation; measures for reconciling personal, family and working life. 
– The list of issues forming the minimum content of a collective agree-
ment has been increased signifi cantly, while at the same time the 
freedom of the collective parties to decide the content of the text has 
been reduced. 
– A restriction of the time during which a collective agreement can re-
main in force after it has expired, by setting a maximum negotiation 
period according to the agreement’s period in force, establishing an 
obligatory system of arbitration for times when negotiations on the 
collective agreement are deadlocked, which was previously decided 
by the collective bargaining parties. This is intended to restrict the 
time period during which, once an agreement has elapsed, its provi-
sions can remain in force until a new text is agreed. 
– Labour reforms adopted in these countries generalise the applica-
tion of opt-out clauses. (Rocha 2014)
Reforms were adopted against a background of no political debate nor 
participation of social partners. For example, the Spanish labour reform 
in 2012 came to light within two weeks of the Second Agreement on Em-
ployment and Collective Bargaining (2012–2014), reached by trade un-
ions and business organisations (ibid.). This agreement, which required 
a major effort from the social partners, covers the structure of collec-
tive bargaining and lays down a set of coordination and implementation 
rules for collective bargaining, also introducing some changes to wage 
indexation (introducing GDP and other variables in the wage-setting 
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mechanism).19 The efforts of social partners are evident also in Italy, 
with the last Interconfederate Agreements on Workers’ Representation 
and Collective Bargaining (2011/2013/2014).20 
2.3 Impact of collective bargaining reforms
In this section we examine how these austerity-oriented labour reforms 
are affecting collective bargaining. To this end we present statistical data 
on the crisis and collective bargaining. We shall look at how the anti-cri-
sis measures have affected collective bargaining in Southern countries. 
In the area of collective bargaining, the impact of the reforms manifests 
itself in three major areas: (i) growing collective bargaining decentral-
isation or, as in Portugal, the collapse of most negotiations at all lev-
els (sectoral, branch and enterprise); (ii) the failure to apply collective 
agreements as a way of achieving internal devaluation, not only through 
cutting wages, but also modifying in peius other rights, such as working 
time; and (iii) limiting the validity of collective agreements as, allegedly, 
a necessary reform, originating in the productive context in which many 
economic changes are taking place very rapidly. All these policies on col-
lective bargaining are the consequence of these national reform policies, 
supported by Memorandums of Understanding (ETUI 2014). 
The fi rst item, growing decentralisation, has been the most important 
action implemented by the Italian21 and Spanish governments in rela-
tion to collective bargaining. The theoretical basis for this policy con-
19.  Second Agreement on Employment and Collective Bargaining, http://boe.es/boe/
dias/2012/02/06/pdfs/BOE-A-2012-1778.pdf 
20. In Italy, the key issue of certifying the number of trade union votes and members has not 
yet produced its effects because the whole procedure –involving the National Institute for 
Social Protection (INPS) and the almost defunct National Council for Economy and Labour 
(CNEL)– has been going quite slowly. As result, it’s very unlikely that the new wave of secto-
ral agreements will be in accordance with the new rules. 
21. In Italy, on 22 January 2009, a tripartite Framework Agreement for the Reform of Collective 
Bargaining (FARCB) was signed without CGIL and against its opposition. The new rules 
formally safeguarded the two-tier structure, with sectoral agreements continuing to provide 
basic protection nationwide. Their duration was set at three years for both the normative 
and economic parts, having previously been four and two years, respectively. The new sys-
tem aimed to strengthen and enlarge the second level of collective bargaining, at company or 
territorial level. Decentralised collective bargaining will last three years (against the previous 
four) and will cover topics defi ned by sectoral agreements or legislation and which do not 
concern those already regulated at other bargaining levels.
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cerns competitiveness, both domestically, as in Italy – for example, Fiat 
threatened its employees and the Italian government with production 
relocation due to the high labour costs imposed by the national collective 
agreement– and also internationally. In other words, wage cuts as the 
only way of improving competitiveness in international markets, thereby 
producing national economic recovery. Collective bargaining decentrali-
sation has been considered a very important aim. In Portugal, against 
the background of decentralisation a policy has been implemented that 
has resulted in the almost complete collapse of bargaining at all levels 
(including the enterprise level). 
Within this process, the data show us different collective bargaining 
dynamics. In Portugal, for example, the scope of collective bargaining 
has been reduced dramatically since 2010, fi rst at sectoral level, but the 
number of multi-employer and company agreements has also decreased 
substantially. In this case, the huge reduction in the number of collective 
agreements at all levels expresses labour market deregulation and loss of 
bargaining power. The result can be clearly measured by the signifi cant 
reduction of the number of workers covered by collective agreements, 
which has been drastically reduced (almost 1 million of workers fewer 
than in 2010 – see Table 1).
Table 1 Number of collective agreements by type, extensions and coverage, 
Portugal, 2008–2013
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Agreements 295 251 230 170 85 94
Branch 
agreements
173 142 141 93 36 27
Multi-employer 
agreements
27 22 25 22 10 19
Company 
agreements
95 87 64 55 39 48
Administrative 
extensions
137 102 116 17 12 9
Workers 
covered
1,894,788 1,397,355 1,407,066 1,236,919 327,662 242,239
Source: UGT, Relatório anual da negociação colectiva (2013).
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With a similar trend but a different impact, collective bargaining in Spain 
manifests a smaller reduction, derived from the social partners’ interest 
in maintaining collective agreements in exchange for substantial modi-
fi cations of working conditions (mainly wages and working time). Here, 
there has also been a decrease in the number of collective agreements, 
with a progressive rise in the number of company-level agreements, but 
without signifi cant changes in the structure of collective bargaining. As 
in the Portuguese case, the result of this process has been a signifi cant 
reduction of the number of workers covered by collective agreements 
(Table 2). In Spain, sectoral bargaining has been more stable, while at 
the same time registering an increase in new collective agreements at the 
company level, whose main motivation has been the downward modifi -
cation of wages and also the emergence of new enterprise agreements in 
sectors in which previously they were rarer (Secretaria Acción Sindical 
2014) (in 2011, 1,033 new company agreements were signed, rising to 1 
243 in 2012 and to 1 877 in 2013, see Ministry of Employment and Social 
Security of Spain 2015). 
Table 2 Number of collective agreements by type and workers covered, Spain, 
2008–2013
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Agreements 5 987.0 5 689.0 5 067.0 4 585.0 4 376.0 3 161.0
Company 
agreements
4 539.0 4 323.0 3 802.0 3 422.0 3 234.0 2 274.0
Higher level 1 448.0 1 366.0 1 265.0 1 163.0 1 142.0 887.0
Workers cov-
ered (1000)
11 968.1 11 557.8 10 794.3 10 662.8 10 099.0 8 531.1
Company 
agreements
1 215.3 1 114.6 923.2 929.0 925.7 656.0
Higher level 10 752.9 10 443.2 9 871.1 9 733.8 9 173.3 7 875.0
Note: Updated data, February, 2015 (registered until 31 January 2015). * 2013, provisional data.
Source: MEYSS, 2014 (2002–2010) Boletín de Estadísticas Labourales (2011–2014) Principales Series.
Behind these changes in collective bargaining (content and structure), it 
is worth stressing the importance of the production and business context 
of the southern European countries, in which more than 90 per cent of 
companies are small or micro-size. 
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Despite the general trend of collective bargaining decentralisation in 
these systems, in Italy, aware of the risks of chaos, the social partners 
have gradually re-established cooperative relations, signing new frame-
work agreements concerning trade union representativeness and collec-
tive bargaining. The agreement of 28 June 2011 – signed by Confi ndus-
tria and CGIL, CISL and UIL– confi rmed the two-tier system and the 
primacy of the industry level, with the possibility of adopting ’modifying 
agreements’ at company level, but only when permitted by the sectoral 
agreement. Moreover, such modifi cations need to be signed by a major-
ity of works council members (RSUs). 
The second item, the failure to apply collective agreements, is related to 
the aim of ‘internal devaluation’. This policy was generally introduced 
in the fi rst period of the crisis, at least in Portugal and Spain. The ba-
sic assumptions underlying this provision were the dire straits in which 
companies found themselves and the need to maintain employment. 
Employers were given the option to bargain on wage cuts with repre-
sentative bodies in the company to ensure the company’s economic sur-
vival and, at the same time, maintain employment rates. 
However, these options were still not enough for the employers, who still 
raised complaints about downward rigidity. In Portugal’s austerity pack-
ages and the latest labour ‘reform’ in Spain this provision was further de-
veloped to reinforce unilateral employer decision-making.22 As a result, 
employers are no longer obliged to bargain with collective representative 
bodies, but only to engage in consultation. Moreover, this reformed legal 
provision provides the option to refrain from applying working condi-
tions bargained in the company agreement. The result of this bargaining 
process is a failure to implement the wages provided for by collective 
agreement. Once again, the Spanish case is most representative of this 
trend among the three legal systems analysed. In 2012 there were 748 
non-applications of collective agreements, affecting 29 352 workers and 
in 2013 the number increased to 2 512, affecting as many as 159 550 
workers. The provisions not applied were related to wages in 1 932 cases, 
the rest concerning working time (duration and distribution).23 
22.  Reforms implemented in Portugal, with the MoU’s requirements on collective bargaining 
(Law 23/2012), and in Spain, through the labour reform adopted in 2012 (Royal Decree-
Law 3/2012) have had a signifi cant impact on collective bargaining, reinforcing employers’ 
unilateral decision-making. See (Rocha 2014). 
23. Data from Collective Agreement Statistics, Ministry of Employment and Social Security, 
Spain.
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Last but not least, changes in the validity of collective agreements has 
been another way in which Italy, Portugal and Spain have converged. 
The theoretical justifi cation, again, is that collective bargaining systems 
that are oriented towards the long term and maintain a certain level of 
working conditions until a new collective agreement is agreed are much 
too rigid, hindering the adaptation of production and other elements in 
companies. It is also argued that collective bargaining hinders devel-
opment because trade unions are only interested in raising wages and 
improving working conditions, to the exclusion of other topics or con-
siderations. Portugal and Spain have made statutory provisions in this 
regard. In Portugal, when a collective agreement expires, the Labour 
Code that came into force in 2003, with revisions in 2006, 2009 and 
2014, applies.
Finally, it is very important to stress how anti-crisis measures have 
caused collective bargaining coverage rates to fall (ETUI 2013).24 This 
indicates a key trend in the European social model regarding labour rela-
tions. The new European labour relations model is based on individual 
agreements between employer and employee, at least in those countries 
in which companies tend to be small or even micro-sized. This return to 
the principles of economic liberalism is justifi ed in terms of governance 
– so-called new economic governance– by the European political in-
stitutions, especially the European Commission. Last but not least, this 
further diminution of democratic infl uences on labour relations is lead-
ing, among other things, to a rapid rise in inequality in certain European 
members states, as the OECD recently pointed out (OECD 2014).
3.  Internal devaluation in southern European countries: 
the result of wage reforms 
In this section we look at so-called ‘internal devaluation’ in the southern 
European countries Spain, Portugal and Italy during the economic crisis. 
Focusing mainly on wage trends, our analysis attempts to address the 
impact of austerity policies and labour reforms. In Sections 3.1 and 3.2 
we analyse wage developments, related to the main economic indicators, 
sectoral trends and the role of collective bargaining; in Section 3.3 we 
24.  In Italy the collective bargaining rate is 80 per cent, in Portugal, 90 per cent and in Spain it 
fell to 70 per cent in 2013.
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look at structural factors in wage developments; and fi nally in Section 
3.4 we trace recent trends in the economic and social outcomes of inter-
nal devaluation.
3.1 Wage development during the crisis
Nominal gross wages – understood as compensation per employee in 
terms of the national accounts – in the southern European countries 
have shown similar dynamics since the beginning of the crisis. Despite 
diffi culties arising from having to work with aggregated data,25 two 
distinct periods can be identifi ed. From 2008 to 2009, wages in these 
countries grew above the EU average (around 2 to 6 per cent), despite 
the consequences of the economic crisis. This trend can be explained by 
several factors, but mainly by the consequences of the crisis and the de-
struction of employment. During this period, in the southern European 
countries there was a signifi cant loss of temporary jobs, which produced 
a general increase in average nominal wages.
Table 3 Nominal and real compensation per employee in the EU28, Spain, Italy 
and Portugal, 2008–2013 (% of previous year)
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Nominal compensation per employee
EU28 0.6 –0.9 3.9 1.9 3.2 0.9
Spain 6.8 4.4 1.1 0.9 –0.6 1.7
Italy 3.7 2.2 2.7 1.1 0.9 1.2
Portugal 2.6 2.4 2.1 –1.8 –2.1 3.5
Real compensation per employee (HICP)
EU28 –3.1 –1.9 1.8 –1.2 0.6 –0.6
Spain 2.7 4.6 –0.9 –2.2 –3.0 0.2
Italy 0.2 1.4 1.1 –1.8 –2.4 –0.1
Portugal –0.1 3.3 0.7 –5.4 –4.9 3.1
Note: Real compensation per employee = nominal compensation per employee adjusted by the HICP.
Source: Calculations based on AMECO and Eurostat, 2015 (update: 24 February 2015).
25.  In the aggregate data differences between workers are not registered, although they can be 
very signifi cant in terms of level of qualifi cations, job, company size, industrial sector, trade 
union infl uence and collective bargaining systems.
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In the second period (2010–2013), gross wage dynamics in southern Eu-
rope was signifi cantly lower than the EU average. In 2011, nominal wag-
es decreased in Portugal, while Italy and Spain experienced much more 
modest wage development than in previous periods. These changes were 
used as justifi cation for public sector cuts (employment and wages) made 
in southern European countries within the framework of so-called ‘aus-
terity’ measures, with a profoundly negative impact on nominal wages.
This wage decline appears more sharply if we analyse real wage dynam-
ics (wages per employee defl ated by CPI). Thus, real wages fell (by be-
tween –3 and –2 per cent) in the EU28 in the fi rst period (2008–2009), 
while in the southern European countries there was an substantial wage 
increase (1 to 4 per cent).This changed dramatically from 2010 with a 
general downward trend in wages in the EU28, which was particularly 
strong in Spain, Portugal and Italy, with reductions of around –1 per 
cent and –5 per cent in 2011 and 2012 (Table 3). In aggregate terms, the 
austerity period has led to a –1.1 per cent reduction in the EU28 aver-
age real wages, while in the southern European countries the fall has 
been signifi cantly higher (from –4 per cent to –7 per cent), which clearly 
refl ects the impact of austerity measures on wage development (Figure 
Figure 1 Real compensation per employee in the EU28, Italy, Spain and 
Portugal, 2010–2013 (in %)
Note: Real compensation per employee = nominal compensation of employees/ total employees and 
adjusted by the HICP.
*Spain: provisional data, according to National Accounts, Eurostat (update: 24-02-2015).
Source: Calculations based on National Accounts, and HICP, Eurostat, 2015.
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1). In this context, changes in the composition of employment have been 
marked and have played a notable role in aggregate wage developments, 
which could explain part of the increase in real wages early in the crisis 
and at the same time the bigger reduction in the second period. In Spain, 
for example, the process of moderation of nominal wages initiated in 
2010 may be somewhat sharper than is indicated by the aggregate statis-
tics on labour costs (Puente and Galán 2014).
Looking at this general context, it is worth stressing the impact of auster-
ity measures on the different sectoral trends. The most recent published 
data show that in southern European countries the highest wage reduc-
tions have been in the public sector (public administration, defence, 
education, health care and social services), followed by real estate and 
fi nancial services and construction, among others.26 Government auster-
ity has involved freezes or cuts of public sector wages in order to cut pub-
lic expenditure directly, thereby also giving a lead to private sector wage 
reductions. This has also happened in other European countries subject 
to fi nancial bailout programmes (such as Greece, Latvia and Hungary) 
(Bernaciak and Müller 2013).
In Portugal and Spain, the development of the public sector is a crucial 
element in understanding real-wage dynamics, mainly because the sec-
tor represents an important part of added value and employment in the 
whole economy.27 In Italy, a country with a different production profi le, 
the development of real wages in the public sector has had less impact 
on general wage dynamics, although it has also experienced a substantial 
fall in aggregate demand and industry recession during the economic 
crisis.
The public sector is also important in terms of the application of auster-
ity measures in the southern European countries, given the relationship 
26.  According to calculations based on the National Accounts and HICP, the sectors with the 
highest wage reductions between 2010 and 2013 vary between countries. In the EU28 the 
highest reductions have been registered in agriculture (–5.2 per cent), fi nancial services 
(–3.8 per cent) and public administration (–2.3 per cent). In Spain, they have been concen-
trated in real estate (–11.3 per cent), agriculture (–10 per cent) and public administration 
(–10 per cent). In Italy, they were in public administration (–7.1 per cent), fi nancial services 
(–6.3 per cent) and real estate (–6.2 per cent) and in Portugal, the reductions were in public 
administration (–14.1 per cent), real estate (–10.7 per cent) and construction (–7.4 per cent).
27. Despite the crisis, in Portugal and Spain the public sector represented around 18 per cent of 
total added value and 22 per cent of total employment in 2013. Authors’ calculations based 
on National Accounts and Labour Force Survey, Eurostat, 2013.
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Figure 2 Real wages per employee in public administration, defence, 
education, health care and social work in the EU28, Spain, Italy and 
Portugal, 2010–2013 (in %)
Note: Real wages per employee = nominal wages of employees/ total employees and adjusted by the 
HICP.
*Spain: provisional data, according to National Accounts, Eurostat (update: 24-02-2015).
Source: Calculations based on National Accounts, and HICP, Eurostat, 2015.
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between the public sector and trade unions. In Greece, Italy, Spain and 
Portugal trade unions have been able to direct protests against plans to 
cut social expenditure and to mobilise people in general strikes. Govern-
ments have tried to reduce public employment and weaken the trade 
unions’ political infl uence (Glassner 2010). 
Within the framework of government austerity measures, either directly 
or indirectly, there have also been changes in the national development 
of minimum wages, particularly in Portugal and Spain.28 Portugal’s Troi-
ka agreement recognises that ‘over the programme period, any increase 
28.  The main changes in national minimum wages were made in Portugal and Spain, where they 
can be changed by the unilateral decision of the government. In the case of Italy, collective 
agreements are the main mechanism used for regulating low pay, what means that minimum 
wage rates are bargained by the sectoral social partners in collective agreements and applied 
to everyone in the particular sector.
Impact of the euro crisis on wages and collective bargaining in southern Europe
in the minimum wage will take place only if justifi ed by economic condi-
tions and agreed in the context of regular programme reviews’.29 This 
formula limits the development of minimum wages (establishing cuts 
and freezes) and justifi es future external intervention. In Spain, similar 
measures have been adopted since 2011, although intervention has not 
been so direct.30 In both countries, the minimum wage has been frozen. 
As a result, the real minimum wage has fallen since 2011, with a general 
drop of 5 per cent in Spain and 4.6 per cent in Portugal (2011–2013).31 
3.2 Development of agreed wages and wage drift 
Over the past decade, wage dynamics in collective bargaining in south-
ern European countries have been adjusted to the objective of curbing 
infl ation, which has had a strong impact on wage moderation (Birindelli 
and Leonardi 2012; Naumann et al. 2012; Cruces et al. 2012). Since the 
crisis began, wages agreed in southern European countries have fallen 
progressively, demonstrating that collective bargaining has been a fl ex-
ible instrument in the face of changes experienced by companies during 
the economic crisis. However, since 2010, as a result of the changes in 
collective bargaining – which have reinforced the employers’ side and 
weakened collective action among workers– agreed wages have contin-
ued to register a substantial decline in southern European countries. 
In the southern European countries, which are characterised by a com-
paratively high level of bargaining centralisation, austerity policies and 
labour reforms are having a huge impact on agreed wage development. 
At the beginning of the crisis, collective bargaining made it possible to 
preserve wage increases and prevent drastic reductions. However, the 
reforms of collective bargaining summarised above have enabled enter-
prises to reduce wages signifi cantly, including collectively agreed ones. 
There are, nevertheless, a few differences between the southern Euro-
pean countries that have to be taken into account. In Italy, for example, 
wage development – at least compared with other countries– has re-
mained relatively stable and the trade unions (so far) have been able to 
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29.  International Monetary Fund (2011), Portugal: Letter of Intent, Memorandum of Economic 
and Financial Policies and Technical Memorandum of Understanding, 20 May 2011, IMF. 
30. This issue was incorporated in the ECB letter to the Spanish government, in return for the 
fi nancial commitments (El Pais, December 2011). 
31. Authors’ calculations based on Eurostat (2013).
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fend off the most radical procedural reforms of the traditional system of 
coordinated bargaining (Meardi 2012). The wage moderation achieved 
by the social partners through collective bargaining has produced a sig-
nifi cant reduction in agreed wage increases (–1.4 per cent, 2008–2010) 
in line with actual wage development.
Figure 3 Collectively agreed wages and actual wages per hour, 2008–2013 (% 
of previous year)
Note: * Euroarea: selection from the Cawie Database. 2012 and 2013, provisional data in Spain (agreed 
wages).
Source: CAWIE Database, 2014.
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A similar reduction of agreed wages has been experienced in Spain (–1.4 
per cent), due to a strategy based on wage moderation, combined with a 
much steeper fall in actual wages (–7.7 per cent). Among other factors, 
this particular evolution can be explained by the fi rst consequences of 
austerity policies, linked to public sector wage cuts and the destruction 
of permanent employment. It is worth stressing that agreed wages in 
Spain are becoming less representative due to the impact of drastic em-
ployment cuts, the decline of collective agreement coverage and the sig-
nifi cant increase in the non-application of collective agreements. In the 
negotiation process there has also been a moderate increase of agreed 
wages at sectoral level, which before 2012 was higher than the company 
level, but now is falling lower. 
Finally, in Portugal the reduction of agreed wages, although less marked 
than in Italy and Spain (–0.7 per cent), was combined with a fall in gross 
wages (–1.5 per cent). In this case, it is important to point out the im-
pact of wage cuts in the public sector and the freeze on wages in the 
private sector. The employers’ demands – based on a very rigid position 
Figure 4 Wage drift  in the euro area, Spain, Italy and Portugal, 2008–2013 (in 
percentage points) 
Note: * Euroarea: selection from the Cawie Database. 2012 and 2013, provisional data in Spain (agreed 
wages).
Source: CAWIE Database, 2014.
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on wages– and the suspension of the extension mechanisms of collective 
agreements (many employers’ associations did not sign any agreement) 
are the main factors that explain the deep crisis in collective bargain-
ing. Workers in the private sector, subject to a wage freeze, have also 
experienced a signifi cant reduction of their disposable income as a con-
sequence of changes in taxes and benefi ts (tax and social contribution 
increases and benefi t cuts). 
As a result of these different trends with regard to agreed wages and 
gross wages in the southern European countries, substantial variation 
in terms of wage drift can be discerned. Current gross wages in Italy are 
in line with collective bargaining, resulting in very low (positive or nega-
tive) wage drift. In contrast, gross wages in Spain have fallen consider-
ably since 2008. This can be explained by a number of factors that tend 
to reduce the average wage.32 
Finally, in Portugal gross wages have also fallen substantially during this 
period, moving away from agreed wages. Both Portugal and Spain are 
clear examples of the impact of austerity policies (public sector wages) 
and labour reforms, where gross wages actually received deviate more 
from those agreed in the collective bargaining process.
At present (March 2015), in a defl ationary context, wage negotiations are 
facing new challenges with a substantial impact on the social partners.33 
For example in Italy, the chemical and pharmaceutical employers’ asso-
ciations – at the beginning of the renewal rounds of the next three-year 
national agreements– have been wondered about the gap between real 
and forecasted infl ation. For the fi rst time, collectively agreed nominal 
wages have been higher than expected infl ation. In Spain, a new Agree-
ment on collective bargaining is expected to be signed, with a foreseeable 
wage increase and the deepening of changes made in wage indexation 
(incorporated in the previous agreement).34  
32.  Here, we might mention the reduction or elimination of overtime; the reduction of working 
hours below the agreed hours (included in many measures of collective dismissals); the low-
ering or elimination of wage supplements, such those related to profi ts or sales; companies’ 
unilateral cuts in wages not affected by collective agreements and derogations from wage 
conditions laid down in collective agreements. 
33. It is important to be aware of the stratifi cation of framework agreements; Italian industry-
wide agreements, when it comes to economic issues, can address only purchasing power and 
nothing else. Variable and performance-related wages are dealt with at the second level of 
collective bargaining, if it exists. 
34. Second agreement on collective bargaining (2012–2014) http://boe.es/boe/
dias/2012/02/06/pdfs/BOE-A-2012-1778.pdf
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3.3 Understanding other signifi cant factors in wage 
development 
Besides government intervention and collective bargaining, the internal 
devaluation being implemented in southern European countries can be 
fully understood only if we consider other important factors. This allows 
us to transcend the conventional approach of competitiveness based on 
wage cuts. It is important to mention such factors as employment and 
job quality; the specialisation of the economy; unemployment pressures; 
and the development of investment and corporate profi ts. All are struc-
tural factors that have infl uenced wage development (ILO 2012).
Productive specialisation
The specialisation of the economy is one of the most important variables 
to be taken into account in debates on wages, as a factor in a country’s 
competitiveness in the global economy (what is produced and its value).35 
The southern European countries, despite their common situation, have 
several structural differences in terms of economic sectors (value added 
and employment) that must be analysed. 
According to its National Accounts, Italy has a more industrially-orient-
ed economy,36 while Spain and Portugal have developed a similar pro-
ductive structure focusing on wholesale, retail and public administra-
tion, although construction is also important in Spain.37 
These economic structural differences, which were already there at the 
beginning of the crisis, explain why austerity policies have had a deeper 
impact in Portugal and Spain, especially in public services. Thus, be-
tween 2011 and 2013, the value added of public administration in Por-
tugal fell by 24 per cent, followed by fi nancial services (21 per cent) and 
35.  As we have seen in the past, the real foundation of Germany’s strong competitive position 
was not wage moderation but specialisation in high technology and high-quality niche 
markets, in which German companies enjoy strong pricing power. The specialisation model 
of German industry has focused on products that emerging economies are interested in buy-
ing (for example, machinery, telecommunications equipment, transport equipment). In this 
model, the demand for German products was unaffected by price, but rather by technology 
and quality (Felipe and Kurmar 2011; Janssen 2012; see also Chapter 7 in this volume). 
36. In Italy, 21 per cent of value added in 2008 was concentrated in industry and 18 per cent in 
manufacturing. Portugal and Spain have a similar structure with regard to wholesale and 
retail (22 per cent in 2008) and public administration (16 and 21 per cent, respectively). The 
construction sector in Spain represented 14 per cent of total added value in 2008.
37. Authors’ calculations based on National Accounts (second quarters), Eurostat, 2013. 
dias/2012/02/06/pdfs/BOE-A-2012-1778.pdf
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construction (30 per cent). In Spain, public administration was cut by 
6.5 per cent, but the most substantial fall during this period was reg-
istered in construction (19 per cent). In both Portugal and Spain, aus-
terity measures have affected not only public administration, but other 
sectors. In Italy, however, economic decline during this period is linked 
more closely to industry and falling consumption. 
In terms of employment, all countries have experienced a huge reduc-
tion since the beginning of the economic crisis, particularly in the con-
struction sector in Spain and Portugal.38 During the period of strictest 
austerity (2011–2013), employment destruction continued with this sec-
toral pattern, with the exception of public administration.39 In Spain, for 
example, 15 per cent of total employment was destroyed in construction, 
followed by 13 per cent in public administration. In Italy and Portugal, 
the scenario is fairly similar, with construction losing a substantial num-
ber of jobs (25 and 24 per cent of total losses, respectively), but indus-
try and manufacturing have also experienced signifi cant losses (30 per 
cent). Finally, it is important to note the infl uence of declining consump-
tion on employment. In Spain and Portugal there has also been substan-
tial job destruction in wholesale and retail (12 and 10 per cent of total 
employment lost, respectively) during this period. 
Quality of employment
The kind of employment is another factor that has to be taken into ac-
count in wage development. The volume and evolution of temporary and 
part-time jobs have a decisive infl uence. Furthermore, the destruction of 
temporary employment at particular times may produce a ‘composition 
effect’, which is a statistical result from eliminating low-paid wages, in-
creasing the average wage. Similarly, an increase in part-time jobs with 
shorter hours and lower wages can have a signifi cant downward effect 
on wages.
Southern countries registered a huge reduction in temporary employ-
ment in the initial stages of the economic crisis. During 2008 and 2009, 
66 per cent of the jobs destroyed in Spain were temporary. A similar situ-
38.  The construction sector represented 24 per cent and 15 per cent of total employment 
destroyed from 2008 in Spain and Portugal, respectively. In Italy industry and manufactur-
ing accounted for 28 per cent. Authors’ calculations based on LFS data (second quarters), 
Eurostat, 2013.  
39. Here we include public administration and defence, education, health care and social work. 
LFS, Eurostat.
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40. Authors’ calculations based on LFS data (second quarters), Eurostat, 2013. 
ation was experienced in Italy (60 per cent) and Portugal (58 per cent), 
with values much higher than the European average (45 per cent),40 
which is refl ected in the development of temporary employment. Dur-
ing the austerity period (2011–2013), this dynamic was less pronounced, 
partly because of the major loss of permanent jobs, which amounted to 
a qualitative change in employment trends (this represented 52 per cent 
of employment destruction in Spain, 88 per cent in Italy and 70 per cent 
in Portugal).
Table 4 Temporary employment rate, unemployment, part-time 
employment and long-term unemployment in southern 
European countries, 2008–2013 (in %)
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Temporary rate (15–74)
EU28 14.1 13.6 13.9 14.0 13.7 13.7
Spain 29.1 25.2 24.7 25.1 23.4 23.1
Italy 13.3 12.5 12.8 13.4 13.8 13.2
Portugal 22.7 21.9 22.8 22.0 20.5 21.4
Part-time 
EU28 18.2 18.7 19.2 19.5 19.9 20.4
Spain 11.8 12.5 13.0 13.6 14.5 15.8
Italy 14.3 14.3 15.0 15.5 17.1 17.9
Portugal 12.2 11.9 11.9 13.6 14.6 14.3
Unemployment rate (15–74)
EU28 7.0 8.9 9.6 9.6 10.5 10.8
Spain 11.3 17.9 19.9 21.4 24.8 26.1
Italy 6.8 7.8 8.4 8.4 10.7 12.2
Portugal 7.7 9.6 11.0 12.9 15.8 16.4
Long-term unemployment (15–74) 
EU28 37.2 33.4 40.0 43.1 44.6 47.4
Spain 18.0 23.8 36.6 41.6 44.4 49.7
Italy 45.7 44.4 48.5 51.9 53.0 56.9
Portugal 47.5 44.2 52.2 48.4 48.8 56.4
Source: LFS, Eurostat, 2015.
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The austerity period is characterised, however, by growth in part-time 
employment, which is one of the consequences of legal reforms adopted 
in this period to promote labour market deregulation. As we can see, the 
proportion of part-time workers has risen signifi cantly in Spain and Italy 
(2.2 and 2.4 percentage points, respectively, to 2013), less so in Portugal 
(0.7 percentage points).This trend underlies the reduction of real wages 
in all three countries. 
Labour markets in southern Europe have experienced deep labour seg-
mentation. It is important to stress that the most dynamic sectors have 
based their economic growth on intensive use of unskilled jobs, associ-
ated with poor working conditions and greater precariousness, generat-
ing deeper social inequalities, especially among women and immigrants.
Pressure of unemployment 
Southern European countries have also experienced a sharp increase 
in unemployment, which in Spain is among the highest in Europe. Al-
though the impact of unemployment on wages has not been suffi ciently 
analysed (Gregg and Machin 2012), it is a very important variable at 
present. Unemployment has risen constantly during the crisis, but we 
can identify two periods in which austerity policies had a marked effect. 
Spain is the most relevant case: unemployment rose to 20 per cent in 
2010 and 26 per cent in 2013. Italy and Portugal, although with lower 
unemployment rates, have experienced the same trend.41 
Profi ts and investment
Finally, within the internal devaluation process we must also examine 
how profi ts and business investment have behaved during the crisis. 
Conventional economic doctrine claims that by imposing wage cuts 
companies can become more competitive, allowing them to invest more 
in production and increase their export options. However, the experi-
ence of the southern European countries – especially Spain and Italy– 
shows, wage cuts have not been accompanied by increased investment 
or a reduction in corporate profi ts (nor a signifi cant fall in prices).
In Spain and Portugal the percentage of profi ts over gross value add-
ed (GVA), which has increased continuously since the beginning of the 
41.  Even more important is the percentage of long-term unemployment, which in these coun-
tries represented more than 50 per cent of total unemployment in 2013.
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crisis, has experienced a substantial boost during the austerity period. 
In 2008, profi ts represented 41 per cent of GVA in Spain and 40 per 
cent in Portugal; in 2012 they reached 43.7 per cent and 43.2 per cent, 
respectively. In contrast, in Italy there was a signifi cant reduction (1.5 
percentage points in the same period). In terms of investment, all three 
countries have experienced a similar decline, particularly in Spain and 
Portugal (Table 5).
Table 5 Profi ts and investment in southern Europe countries, 2008–2013
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Gross operating surplus (% over GDP)
EU28 41.4 40.4 40.7 40.9 40.3 40.2
Spain 41.7 42.2 41.3 42.2 43.4 43.7
Italy 48.6 47.9 47.7 47.8 46.7 47.1
Portugal 40.6 41.2 41.3 41.6 43.1 43.2
Gross fi xed capital formation (% over GDP)
EU28 22.5 20.6 20.1 20.2 19.7 19.3
Spain 29.2 24.3 23.0 21.4 19.7 18.5
Italy 21.2 20.0 19.9 19.6 18.6 17.8
Portugal 22.8 21.1 20.5 18.4 16.3 15.1
Source: Calculations based on National Accounts, Eurostat, 2015.
Thus, particularly in Spain and Portugal, the reduction of wages and 
unit labour costs has not resulted in a fall in export prices, which have 
remained stable, but to an increase in corporate profi ts. This upward 
trend in profi ts–in inverse relation to wage evolution– and the reduc-
tion of investment in these countries show clearly the shortcomings of 
a wage policy based on ‘moderation’, which, as already experienced in 
previous periods, does not improve export competitiveness, even in the 
most globally oriented economies.42 
42.  The result of the wage moderation that followed Germany during the past decade was a good 
example of this phenomenon (Jansen 2011).
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3.4 Economic and social outcomes of internal devaluation
Internal devaluation has had different effects from those proclaimed by 
the Troika, both economically and socially. Economic growth has not 
recovered since the crisis and we have even experienced a double-dip 
recession since the implementation of austerity and internal devalua-
tion. During the period 2010–2013 job losses continued in the EU, par-
ticularly in peripheral countries. Other macroeconomic variables have 
also evolved adversely: the defi cit has not fallen by much and the targets 
laid down by the European authorities have been missed by a long way; 
in addition, public debt has increased markedly in both the euro zone 
and in peripheral countries, while private debt levels are still very high. 
Overall, development of the real wage in southern European countries 
during the austerity period has had a negative impact on economic activ-
ity. In the early years of the crisis, the three countries analysed registered 
a signifi cant drop in GDP, especially in 2009, as a result of the economic 
decline, especially Italy. During the period 2010–2013 austerity policies 
and internal devaluation deepened the crisis, due to a further drop in 
economic activity as a consequence of the sharp decline in aggregate de-
mand. This occurred in all three countries, starting in Portugal in 2011 
and continuing in Spain and Italy from 2012 (Table 6).
Table 6 Real wage per employee, GDP at constant prices and employment in 
EU28, Spain, Italy and Portugal, 2008–2013 (% of previous year)
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Real wage per employee (HICP) 
EU28 –3.0 –1.9 1.6 –1.0 0.5 –0.7
Spain 2.7 4.4 –1.6 –1.8 –2.2 –1.0
Italy 0.2 0.9 1.2 –1.6 –2.3 0.0
Portugal 0.4 3.7 0.6 –4.2 –4.8 2.3
GDP, constant prices (2005) 
EU28 0.4 –4.5 2.0 1.7 –0.4 0.1
Spain 0.9 –3.8 –0.2 0.1 –1.6 –1.2
Italy –1.2 –5.5 1.7 0.5 –2.5 –1.9
Portugal 0.0 –2.9 1.9 –1.3 –3.2 –1.6
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Table 6 (cont.)
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Employment 
EU28 0.8 –1.8 –0.6 0.2 –0.2 –0.4
Spain –0.1 –6.5 –2.2 –1.9 –4.2 –2.9
Italy 0.2 –1.7 –0.7 0.3 –0.2 –2.0
Portugal 0.5 –2.8 –1.5 –1.9 –4.2 –3.2
Productivity 
EU28 –0.4 –1.5 2.1 1.3 0.6 –
Spain 0.7 2.4 1.9 1.6 3.5 –
Italy –0.7 –2.2 2.4 0.2 –1.0 –
Portugal 0.2 –0.2 3.7 1.3 0.5 –
Notes: Real wages per employee = nominal compensation per employee adjusted by the HICP Productiv-
ity: Real labour productivity per hour worked.
Source: Calculations based on AMECO and Eurostat, 2014.
The decline in wages in peripheral countries since 2010 has, together 
with austerity policies, led to a deep fall in domestic demand. This re-
duction in domestic demand has been more substantial than the expan-
sion of exports (Table 7). In other words, the negative trend in domestic 
demand could not be offset by the positive performance of external de-
mand.
Why has the internal devaluation strategy failed in its objectives? First, 
when all the countries of the euro area try to implement a strategy of 
simultaneous and coordinated wage reductions, as is currently the case, 
they can scarcely expect to exit from the crisis on that basis: the ‘internal 
devaluation’ of one country is cancelled by those of the others.
Second, this strategy seems oblivious to the fact that wages are not just a 
cost, but also a crucial part of aggregate demand. The strategy of reduc-
ing unit labour costs is defl ationary because it reduces domestic con-
sumption and external demand for other economies. This is particularly 
important in a context of high household and business debt, with a rising 
debt-to-income ratio. 
It is worth stressing that the fall in real wages in these countries is linked 
to a signifi cant increase in ‘passive’ labour productivity – that is, produc-
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tivity that stems from job losses (Rocha et al. 2008). During this period, 
productivity growth has not occurred as a result of rising value-added on 
the part of the factors of production, but rather through job destruction, 
which was much higher than GDP growth. This has happened in particu-
lar in Portugal and Spain. In Spain labour productivity has been rising 
since 2009, with annual growth rates between 2.4 and 3.5 per cent, as a 
consequence of massive employment destruction (–6.5 per cent in 2009 
and –4.2 per cent in 2012), combined with a GDP reduction (or even 
light increase) during the same period (Table 7).
Although rising labour productivity in the southern European countries 
has been portrayed as indicating a clear improvement in their econo-
mies, due to enhanced competitiveness, in reality, job losses and wage 
cuts have depressed domestic demand and industrial production, which 
has produced a new downturn in economic activity. 
Table 7 Contribution to GDP increase at constant market prices, EU28, Spain, 
Italy and Portugal, 2008–2013 (% of GDP)
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
EU28
Domestic demand 0.2 –4.4 1.5 0.8 –1.5 –0.4
Exports 0.6 –4.8 4.1 2.7 1.0 0.7
Imports –0.4 4.7 –3.5 –1.7 0.1 –0.2
Spain 
Domestic demand –0.6 –6.7 –0.6 –2.1 –4.1 –2.7
Exports –0.3 –2.7 2.8 2.1 0.6 1.6
Imports 1.7 5.6 –2.4 0.0 1.8 –0.1
Italy 
Domestic demand –1.2 –4.4 2.1 –1.0 –5.1 –2.7
Exports –0.8 –5.0 2.7 1.7 0.6 0.0
Imports 0.9 3.9 –3.1 –0.2 2.1 0.8
Portugal 
Domestic demand 0.9 –3.7 1.9 –5.5 –6.9 –2.6
Exports 0.0 –3.5 2.9 2.2 1.1 2.4
Imports –0.9 4.3 –2.8 2.1 2.6 –1.1
Source: AMECO, 2014.
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The differences between Spain, Italy and Portugal can be attributed to 
various factors (as we shall see below). Among them we might mention 
production specialisation and employment structure (labour-intensive 
sectors), a strong presence of SMEs and the infl uence of various factors 
that contribute to poor overall effi ciency in the use of production factors 
(infrastructure, R&D, low-skilled workers). These differences, which are 
profoundly related to the production model of each country and its role 
in the global economy, explain why Portugal and Spain have been more 
vulnerable to the economic crisis and austerity policies in terms of ag-
gregate demand and employment.
Other economic variables have also been affected by wage development. 
Since the beginning of the crisis, southern European countries have ex-
perienced a huge reduction in the adjusted wage share – compensation 
per employee as a percentage of GDP– due to wage cuts and the substan-
tial increase in corporate profi ts, in which austerity policies have played 
a key role.
Between 2008 and 2010, the adjusted wage share fell slightly in Spain, 
while there was a small increase in Italy and Portugal fl at lined. How-
ever, dynamics changed from 2010 to 2013, when workers’ income fell 
greatly in Spain (–3.5 percentage points) and Portugal (–2.8 percentage 
points). This reduction highlights how austerity policies – with strong 
intervention– have been a key instrument in cutting wages to maintain 
business margins, which could be seen as the foremost expression of in-
ternal devaluation in southern European countries. 
Table 8 Adjusted wage share* in southern European countries, 2008–2013 
(in %)
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
EU28 55.5 57.2 56.4 55.9 56.2 56.2
Spain 58.0 58.7 57.7 57.0 55.2 54.5
Italy 52.9 54.2 54.0 53.6 53.8 53.8
Portugal 56.7 57.6 56.5 55.5 54.1 53.9
Note: * Percentage of GDP at current market prices (compensation per employee as percentage of GDP 
at market prices per person employed).
Source: AMECO, 2015.
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In general terms, the decline in the wage share has entrenched a low-
wage model, which has caused further segmentation and impoverish-
ment of the working population. According to the EU-SILC, Spain and 
Italy have experienced substantial growth in poverty since 2010 and 
more markedly in 2012, when Portugal also increased its poverty rate, 
a dynamic which corresponds to the effects of austerity policies.43 In 
Spain, inequality has also grown signifi cantly, while other countries have 
not registered such variations.
Table 9 Poverty and inequality indicators in southern European countries, 
2008–2013
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
People at risk of poverty or social exclusion (18 and over; in %) 
EU28 – – 22.8 23.6 24.0 23.8
Spain 23.2 23.1 24.5 25.5 26.1 26.1
Italy 24.5 23.8 23.6 27.3 29.1 27.7
Portugal 25.1 24.0 24.6 23.5 24.8 26.5
Gini coeffi  cient (scale from 0 to 100) 
EU28 – – 30.4 30.8 30.4 30.5
Spain 31.9 32.9 33.5 34.0 34.2 33.7
Italy 31.0 31.5 31.2 31.9 31.9 32.5
Portugal 35.8 35.4 33.7 34.2 34.5 34.2
Inequality of income distribution (80/20 income quintile share ratio) 
EU28 – – 4.9 5.0 5.0 5.0
Spain 5.7 5.9 6.2 6.3 6.5 6.3
Italy 5.1 5.2 5.2 5.6 5.5 5.7
Portugal 6.1 6.0 5.6 5.7 5.8 6.0
Source: EU-SILC, Eurostat, 2015. 
We have to recognise that, although these countries have very similar 
social situations, it is diffi cult to compare the impact of the economic 
crisis and the austerity policies by means of poverty and inequality in-
dicators, such as in-work poverty (Pontieux 2010). The different trends 
43.  We have to keep in mind that the EU-SILC income data for 2012 correspond to the previous 
year, 2011.
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are based on several factors, which are strongly infl uenced by employ-
ment status, household characteristics, the development of social and 
redistributive policies and the varying impact on inequality of different 
fi scal measures.44 
4. Conclusions
The diagnoses of the economic and fi nancial crisis, the situation in Italy, 
Portugal and Spain and the measures adopted to tackle it by the Euro-
pean and international institutions (European Commission, European 
Central Bank, IMF) are profoundly distorted by ideology. Various in-
ternational forums are undertaking bold work that aims to expose the 
inconsistency of this economic analysis, however, showing the links be-
tween austerity policy/internal devaluation and the interests of big capi-
tal and business. 
Furthermore, closely related to the above, the neoliberal ideology under-
lying technical analyses and the proposals derived from them is aimed 
ultimately at rewriting the rules on economic governance laid down in 
the Treaties of the European Union. This change is being implemented 
largely by neglecting the democratic principle of ‘free collective bargain-
ing’ that appears in legal texts at European level, with serious repercus-
sions in different national contexts. However, the impact of this process 
at the national level, as we have seen, has varied according to national 
context, indicating scope for political action between national and su-
pranational levels.
We have noted an obsession with austerity and internal devaluation, 
which suggests that fi nancial interests are putting all their bets on shap-
ing a new European social model, characterised by capital unilateralism, 
boosting capital gains and a growing acceptance of social inequalities.
In this context, one of the strongest obstacles faced by neoliberal ideol-
ogy has been trade union action through collective bargaining. Hence, 
44.  To this we must add the varying impacts of fi scal measures on inequality, which in some 
cases can have a progressive effect and in others the opposite (Gutierrez 2013), although 
these factors are beyond the scope of our study. In addition, few comparative studies have 
analysed the effects of the crisis and austerity policies in terms of inequality data (Jenkins et 
al. 2012; Ayala 2013), given that due to the prolongation of the crisis the most severe effects 
came to light later.
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beside the intense privatisation process imposed in return for bailouts, 
collective bargaining has been a prime target of the new austerity poli-
cies, with the revival of old debates, as is the relationship between the 
autonomy of the parties and the unilateralism of employers in setting 
working conditions. The latter is clearly expressed in the collective bar-
gaining mechanisms that favour wage cuts: (i) weakening of collective 
bargaining at sectoral level, only partly compensated by the decentrali-
sation of collective bargaining to the enterprise level in national frame-
works characterised by a high percentage of SMEs; (ii) the unilateral 
imposition of labour conditions and the non-application of collective 
agreements (including those agreed at the enterprise level); and (iii) lim-
iting the authorisation mechanisms concerning the validity of collective 
agreements.
We have also looked at the results of austerity measures and labour re-
forms. The experience of the southern European countries well illus-
trates how changes in collective bargaining frameworks have a strong 
negative impact on wage development.
Against the conventional wisdom, wage dynamics in collective bargain-
ing show that they have not been an obstacle to competitiveness in re-
cent decades, as refl ected by fairly moderate price growth (as can be seen 
in other chapters in this volume). Why has such strong pressure been 
brought to bear on collective bargaining? The answer lies in its success. 
The increasing deregulation of labour and bargaining power is a clear 
and direct attack on the working population. Financial interests are tak-
ing advantage of the current situation to substantially reduce the labour 
share in the distribution of income and, at the same time, to weaken the 
options available to engage in collective action to improve working con-
ditions. This not only increases the impoverishment of a large segment 
of the population, but also limits its ability to exercise a ‘voice’ on work-
ing conditions and living standards.
In addition to the enforced decline in collective bargaining, a number of 
other structural factors explain wage development in southern European 
countries. Austerity policies in the public sector have adversely affected 
employment and wages. Austerity has also squeezed the disposable in-
come of private sector workers via increases in taxes and social contri-
butions and cuts in all sorts of benefi ts. Portugal and Spain are a good 
example of this process. Other important factors include the structure 
of production, job quality (the increase of temporary and part-time em-
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ployment), the pressure of unemployment and the growth of corporate 
profi ts. 
All in all, internal devaluation policies in southern Europe have had a 
lamentable effect, both economically and socially, with a sharp drop 
in domestic demand and degradation of working conditions and living 
standards, with rising poverty and social inequality. Ultimately, this 
threatens to diminish democracy, given the inseparable relationship be-
tween democracy, wages and trade unions.
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Chapter 4
Changes in wage policy and collective 
bargaining in the Nordic countries – comparison 
of Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden
Søren Kaj Andersen, Christian Lyhne Ibsen, Kristin Alsos, Kristine Nergaard, 
Pekka Sauramo
1. Introduction
The policy responses of the European Union to the fi nancial and eco-
nomic crisis have brought wage-setting mechanisms within the sphere 
of the EU’s economic governance regime. Even though these monitoring 
processes and, in some cases, recommendations have had an impact on 
collective bargaining processes in some EU states, the Nordic collective 
bargaining systems have remained relatively unaffected by the European 
initiatives. 
One key explanation for the absence of reactions on the part of the 
Nordic wage-setting systems appears to be the fact that wage mod-
eration and the strengthening of competitiveness have been high on the 
agenda in these countries for the past two decades. One repercussion of 
economic crisis in the 1980s and early 1990s was not destabilisation or 
deterioration, but rather reform of the collective bargaining systems in 
the Nordic states. Among other things this meant steps towards decen-
tralised wage setting and therefore room for negotiations on wage setting 
at company level. This did not happen in a uniform way, but at different 
paces and with various consequences in the Nordic states. However, one 
shared characteristic is that decentralised bargaining takes place within 
a coordinated framework. In other words, national collective agreements 
concluded at sectoral level set the framework for company-level negotia-
tions. In a sense it can be argued that competitiveness was enhanced 
by collective bargaining based on the relatively pragmatic positions 
of dominant trade unions and employers’ associations. It is not that 
confl icts and power struggles were absent, rather there was – despite 
some uncertainties in, for example, Sweden– a basic willingness to try 
to develop the collective bargaining systems. 
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The Nordic states are all small, open economies with well-developed 
welfare states. Their labour markets are characterised by high incomes 
and high taxes, and manufacturing fi rms compete on innovation, com-
petence and, with some variations, natural resources. Denmark has been 
a member of the European Union since 1972, while Finland and Sweden 
joined in 1995. Norway has taken part in the single market since 1994 
through the EEA Agreement. All the countries have a substantial pub-
lic sector. The collective bargaining systems are based on strong social 
partners and a centralised bargaining system, with various degrees of 
decentralisation. 
The fi nancial crisis has had diverse effects in the Nordic countries; the 
oil-based Norwegian economy remained virtually unaffected; Denmark 
was relatively hard hit due to a self-infl icted real estate bubble; while 
Sweden and Finland fared somewhere in between (Andersen et al. 2014). 
Despite these differences it can be argued that the crisis has emphasised 
that European integration does put a strain on Nordic bargaining sys-
tems and, to a large degree, also sets the limits for wage development. 
The strains on bargaining systems have to do with the deepening of the 
single market in the enlarged EU, in which domestic-market oriented 
sectors, such as construction and private services, have faced competi-
tion from migrant labour and service providers from central and eastern 
Europe. Furthermore, it seems evident that German wage trends have 
had a signifi cant impact on national debates in the Nordic countries on 
the potential room for wage – or cost – increases. There is a relatively 
strong lobby, especially among employers’ representatives, that there is 
‘a need to follow the German economy’ in order to remain competitive 
and thereby safeguard the profi tability of companies and jobs. We there-
fore raise the question of how and to what degree we should see German 
wage ‘leadership’ as decisive for wage development in the individual 
Nordic states.
Accordingly, in this chapter we review and compare wage policy and col-
lective bargaining in the Nordic countries. Specifi cally, we do the fol-
lowing. First, explain how in recent decades collective bargaining and 
wage determination systems have been reformed in the Nordic countries 
with a view to securing competitiveness and job creation. Second, show 
how economic integration of European markets – and more specifi cally 
the so-called new economic governance regime of the European Union 
– have had limited direct effects on Nordic bargaining systems, while 
there might be more indirect effects, such as German wage leadership. 
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Therefore we discuss the infl uence of German wage and cost trends in 
Denmark, Finland and Norway. We also address the effects of labour 
migration and the presence of foreign service providers in, for example, 
construction and private services. In the concluding section we summa-
rise the fi ndings and discuss future trends regarding Nordic wage bar-
gaining. 
2. Changes in collective bargaining structures
The Nordic collective bargaining systems went through quite signifi cant 
changes in the 1980s and 1990s against the background of economic 
problems. First, there was a need to overcome wage infl ation and to ad-
just wage formation to the international shift to low-infl ation economies. 
Second, employers demanded more fl exibility in collective agreements. 
Increasing competition, shifting markets, new technology and new 
forms of work organisation resulted in these demands from employers 
and politicians for more fl exible labour market regulation. 
The Nordic economies fared very well through the 1990s and in the early 
2000s; this included increased levels of employment and very low lev-
els of unemployment, modest but stable real wage growth and balanced 
public budgets. The reforms of the Nordic collective bargaining systems 
must be seen as inherent to the relative success – economically and job-
wise – of the Nordic states (Andersen et al. 2014; Dølvik et al. 2014; 
Dølvik 2009). 
It is important to emphasise that, in contrast to other countries, where 
the coordination of negotiations broke down and collective agreements 
were entirely replaced by workplace human resource management – for 
example, the United Kingdom – the Nordic countries have maintained 
a high level of coordination concomitantly with considerable decentrali-
sation, particularly in Denmark and Sweden. This process has been re-
ferred to as ‘centralised decentralisation’ (Due et al. 1993) or ‘organised 
decentralisation’ (Traxler 1995). This section describes the respective 
national solutions to the tension between decentralisation/fl exibility 
and coordination, as well as their signifi cance for the development of 
collective bargaining processes and outcomes. 
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2.1 Denmark: centralised decentralisation
Since the 1980s, negotiations in Denmark have taken place at the branch 
level with multiple-employer agreements that set wages and working 
conditions within a specifi c trade or profession or economic area. The 
confederations LO and DA coordinate negotiations in the private labour 
market, but are not parties to the agreements. Since the major confl ict 
of 1998 in particular, the confederations have taken it upon themselves 
to ensure tightly coordinated bargaining in order to avoid confl icts (Due 
and Madsen 2006). This is achieved by means of so-called ‘climate 
agreements’ or road maps that establish the timetable for negotiations, 
common notifi cation concerning confl icts and joint statements in rela-
tion to bargaining results in order to avoid any doubt about the bargain-
ing results. 
Bargaining is spearheaded by the parties of the manufacturing agree-
ments for blue-collar and white-collar workers. Here, a framework for 
wage and labour cost increases in general is negotiated as part of the 
agreements, which then sets the pattern for the other bargaining areas. 
This principle has been in force since the beginning of the 1990s and 
there has only been a single instance – in 1995 – where other areas have 
reached a collective agreement fi rst. This ensures coordination in the 
private sector – and because of the regulation device, which stipulates 
that if public sector wage increases differ from those in the private sec-
tor, 80 per cent of that difference will be adjusted positively or 100 per 
cent of the difference will be adjusted negatively, as the case may be. This 
ensures that wage developments in the two sectors are parallel. One of 
the main reasons for strong coordination has been the centralisation of 
the employers over the past three decades, the number of associations in 
DA having fallen from 150 to 13. On the trade union side, centralisation 
has also been reinforced, as the LO associations in manufacturing have 
developed the bargaining cartel CO-industry. Other branches have also 
developed negotiation cartels, but they are not parties to agreements. 
The mediation institution (forligsinstitutionen) plays a key role in the 
Danish bargaining systems (Galenson 1955). If negotiations at branch 
level do not result in renewed agreements, the mediation institution 
convenes for mediation. If the parties are not able to reach a settlement, 
the agreement is transferred to a so-called linkage procedure (sammen-
kædning), which is based on the fi nal negotiations between LO and DA 
in which the mediator is involved. Here, the non-renewed agreements 
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are linked and made part of a total settlement proposal, which is then 
sent to the parties for their approval. The mediation proposal will only 
be made if none of the parties objects. In other words, LO and DA can 
oppose proposals that are not in line with what manufacturing has re-
ceived (Ibsen 2013). Additionally, the trade union ballots must produce 
a qualifi ed majority in order to reject the proposed renewal. This means 
that the linkage procedure ensures a high degree of coordination. 
Within the DA area, 80–85 per cent of employees now have minimum 
wage agreements with local wage bargaining, and some even have fi g-
ureless agreements without wage provisions, whereas 15–20 per cent 
have so-called normal wage agreements, where wages are set at the 
sectoral level (DA 2013). The content of bargaining coordination has 
thus changed in tandem with the decentralisation of wages and working 
hours to the workplace level. In the public sector, the scope for local bar-
gaining is still negotiated as part of central collective bargaining agree-
ments, and the implementation of decentralised wage setting can often 
be modest in relation to the collective agreement pay scale. In return for 
the decentralisation of wages and working hours, the Danish trade un-
ions in the private sector have developed a number of social benefi ts in 
the branch agreements. This applies to the occupational labour market 
pension since the late 1980s and early 1990s, maternity leave benefi ts 
in 2004, continued education in 2007, the so-called free-choice account 
(fritvalgskontoen1) in 2007 and the severance pay arrangement reached 
in 2010. Most of these benefi ts are also found in the public sector. 
2.2 Finland: centralised incomes policy
Among the Nordic countries Finland has a lengthy history of incomes 
policy, based on centrally negotiated incomes policy agreements. They 
have resulted from tripartite cooperation between employees’ and em-
ployers’ central confederations and the government. Between 1968 and 
2013 twenty-two centrally negotiated incomes policy agreements were 
concluded, while in eleven cases wage agreements were at sectoral level. 
As regards wage policy, Finland therefore represents continuity rather 
than change. This does not mean, however, that nothing has changed. 
1. ‘Fritvalgskontoen’ is an individual account, where part of the wage or salary is deposited and 
can later be withdrawn either in the form of extra pension, extra paid vacation or wages. 
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Demands for reforming the bargaining system have increased, especially 
during the past twenty years. Among the participants in tripartite co-
operation, employers’ associations have been most active in question-
ing the benefi ts of centrally negotiated incomes policy agreements. In 
2007 the Confederation of Finnish Industries (EK), the employers’ cen-
tral confederation, declared that it would cease to negotiate wages at the 
central level. The announcement was followed by two wage negotiation 
rounds which resulted in sectoral agreements, but since then two cen-
trally negotiated framework agreements have been concluded. 
After the 2007 announcement by EK the revitalisation of incomes policy 
has been somewhat surprising. It can be explained by special circum-
stances, however. In diffi cult times centrally negotiated incomes policy 
agreements have been used as the means of concluding very moderate 
wage increases. In the incomes policy agreement concluded in 1991 wage 
increases were frozen for two years. The latest incomes policy agree-
ment, concluded in October 2013 – that is, in the middle of a recession 
of the Finnish economy – is also based on very moderate wage increases. 
During the past twenty years, centralised incomes policy agreements 
have been proof of consensual behaviour on the part of the peak labour 
market confederations and the government.
Besides special circumstances some peculiarities in Finnish corporatism 
may provide an additional explanation for the continuity of centralised 
incomes policy. In Finland employees’ and employers’ central confeder-
ations have traditionally had a very strong position not only in the arena 
of industrial relations but also in the political system. This has mainly 
been due to the lack of strong ‘friendly’ left-wing and bourgeois parties 
which would have represented employers’ and employees’ interests in 
the political system. For example, in comparison with the Swedish Social 
Democratic Party, the Finnish Social Democratic Party has traditionally 
been much weaker. Nor has there been a strong bourgeois party which 
would have represented employers’ interests. The peak confederations 
have therefore had a strong incentive to enter into the political arena as 
political actors. 
This history provides one reason for the comprehensiveness of the cen-
trally negotiated incomes policy agreements in Finland. In addition to 
agreements on wages and salaries, comprehensive incomes policy agree-
ments have included important social policy reforms and other policy 
issues (Kiander et al. 2011). They have involved, for example, major 
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changes in earnings-related social security and in transfer payments 
in general. In comparison, for example, with Sweden the role of labour 
market confederations as active actors in the political arena has been 
very different in Finland (Kiander et al. 2011).
During the past twenty years, the importance of local bargaining has 
increased, but not at the cost of centrally negotiated comprehensive 
incomes policy agreements. Decentralisation has been organised and 
complementary to higher-level bargaining. It has taken place such that 
higher-order collective agreements constitute benchmarks for local bar-
gaining (Sippola 2012). The role of higher-order agreements have been 
crucial and, for example, the use of opening clauses has been exception-
al. In addition, the high bargaining coverage has increased the impor-
tance of collective agreements in wage formation. It has been one factor 
behind the high level of bargaining coordination. 
The Finnish way of putting decentralisation into practise refl ects the tra-
ditionally strong position of trade unions at local level. It has been ac-
companied by high union membership. Furthermore, trade unions have 
been central actors both in company bargaining and codetermination 
activities. Codetermination has been trade union-based. 
2.3  Norway: tripartite cooperation and reinforcing the 
frontrunner model 
The Norwegian collective bargaining system has never decentralised to 
the same degree as the Danish and Swedish ones. Except for parts of the 
1980s, incomes policy and coordinating measures by the social partners 
at peak level have been key elements of the wage-setting model. Whereas 
the early and mid-1990s were marked by relatively extensive incomes 
policy measures combined with moderate wage increases – triggered by 
an economic downturn (Solidarity Alternative) – the end of the 1990s 
was characterised by high wage increases compared with Norway’s trad-
ing partners, high wage drift and tensions within the bargaining system 
as public employees felt that their wages were lagging behind the private 
sector. This led to renewed focus on the wage-setting mechanisms.
In 2000 and 2003, state appointed committees with representatives 
from all the major trade unions and employer organisations confi rmed 
the relevance of and support for the so-called ‘trendsetting industries 
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model’. The theory behind the model was fi rst published in the 1960s 
and later formulated as a macroeconomic two-sector model for wage set-
ting and infl ation in small open economies (Aukrust 1977). In Norway 
the rationale has been that the framework for wage increases is given 
by price increases in international export markets and productivity in-
creases in export industries. In addition, currency rates infl uence the 
competitiveness of the export industries and the monetary regime – and 
changes in it – is an important factor in the model. Since 2001 the cen-
tral bank (Norges Bank) has pursued a monetary policy aimed at a stable 
infl ation rate. 
Multi-employer bargaining at peak and industry level is the dominant 
model of collective bargaining, often supplemented by bargaining at 
workplace level. The running period for collective agreements is two 
years, although wage rates are renegotiated after one year. The pay 
rounds always start out with the export industries if agreements are re-
negotiated separately, or with all the LO/NHO agreements if negotia-
tions are conducted at peak level. No agreements will be signed before a 
settlement is reached for the trend-setting industries. Cross-sector rene-
gotiations at confederation level were originally seen as a main charac-
teristic of the collective bargaining model. However, since 2000 only two 
of eight main renegotiations have taken place between the main confed-
erations. So, over the past decade other types of coordination have domi-
nated, such as coordination between employer associations and within 
the main trade union confederation, LO. 
In the public sector, blue-collar and white-collar workers are covered by 
the same agreements, and negotiations are undertaken by bargaining 
cartels within the labour confederations. The implication is that all trade 
union confederations will end up with the same agreement. However, 
the wage structure of academic positions is more decentralised than 
other positions in collective agreements covering municipal employees. 
The Norwegian system of bargaining and incomes policies is anchored 
in tripartite committees and state-supported mediation. The trade 
union and employers’ confederations, the state and Statistics Norway 
all participate in the TBU committee (Teknisk beregningsutvalg). The 
committee publishes detailed wage fi gures, including carry-over effects 
and wage drift for the main bargaining areas, as well as developments 
in labour costs among Norway’s most important trading partners. In 
this way the committee contributes to a common understanding of the 
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economic situation among the social partners. The National Mediator 
plays an important role in facilitating new agreements and will normally 
follow the main framework given by the trend-setting industries agree-
ment in its proposals. In cases in which industrial action is ended by 
compulsory arbitration, the National Wage Board will normally look to 
the trend-setting industries agreement in order to discourage breaka-
ways. Lastly, the state has contributed to moderate settlements through 
incomes policy. Although less pronounced over recent decades com-
pared with the 1970s and late 1980s/early 1990s, it is not uncommon 
that social reforms or labour market measures are introduced through 
collective bargaining. 
2.4 Sweden: coordinated decentralisation
Lack of coordination in Swedish wage bargaining in the 1980s and the 
economic crisis at the beginning of the 1990s, spurred the Swedish gov-
ernment to step in. First, with a failed attempt at incomes policy, there-
after with the Rehnberg Commission, which assisted the parties with 
mediation and coordination in order to restore wage restraint across 
branches and sectors in line with wage developments abroad (the so-
called ‘Edin norm’) (Elvander 2002). The Commission was a success 
from 1991, but coordination broke down in 1995, when bargaining was 
plagued by confl ict and led to higher wage increases than abroad, despite 
high unemployment and continued economic problems. 
In the wake of the 1995 breakdown, the manufacturing trade unions 
across LO, TCO and SACO invited their employer counterparts in 1996 
to draft a new bargaining arrangement based on wage restraint, syn-
chronised negotiations and a strong mediation institution. This resulted 
in the Industry Agreement (Industriavtalet) of 1997, which fi rmly es-
tablished the new principles of the Swedish collective bargaining system 
(Elvander 2002). 
First, competitiveness was to be restored by means of reasonable wage 
development in line with developments among trade partners abroad. 
Second, the negotiations were to be synchronised with consideration of 
the expiration date and length of the collective bargaining agreements 
in order to avoid wage spirals. Third, impartial mediators (opartiska 
ordföranda) were entrusted with helping the parties reach agreement 
and ensuring coordination across the collective agreements in manu-
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facturing. Coordination between the manufacturing partners was also 
strengthened by the establishment of the Swedish Unions within Manu-
facturing (Facken inom Industrin). The employers in manufacturing in-
dustry also increased their coordination, in which Teknikföretagen (pre-
viously, Verkstadsföreningan) assumed the most important role (Ibsen 
2013). 
Agreements regarding cooperation and negotiations were also es-
tablished in other branches in the wake of the Industry Agreement. 
Moreover, the state established the Swedish National Mediation Of-
fi ce (Medlingsinstitutet) in 2000, which includes obligatory mediation 
for parties when they are unable to reach agreement and when they do 
not have their own bargaining agreement with built-in mediation. The 
Swedish National Mediation Offi ce was entrusted with ensuring labour 
peace and socio-economically defensible wage development based on 
the pattern-setting manufacturing agreements. This means that the me-
diators will never present a settlement proposal that exceeds the manu-
facturing pattern, even in the event that the employers might be willing 
to accept. This is to ensure wage restraint in the mediation procedure 
(Ibsen 2013). 
Since decentralisation from central to branch and sectoral levels, the 
new Swedish collective bargaining system has increased coordination 
signifi cantly, while also more agreements have now become framework 
agreements with regard to wages and working hours. In the private 
sector, 83 per cent of the agreements include local wage formation, 
whereas 17 per cent pertain to central wage determination (Medlingsin-
stitutet 2013). However, the collective agreements in the private sector 
still include minimum guarantees and clauses guaranteeing wage in-
creases in the local and individual negotiations – also for civil servants 
(tjenestemænd) and academic groups. Wages are set locally to a much 
higher degree in the public sector. Issues such as continued training, 
however, have not become widespread in collective agreements (Ibsen 
2013).
To conclude this short review of changes to collective bargaining struc-
tures, it seems fair to claim that the Nordic countries have maintained 
a high level of coordination together with much decentralisation de-
spite national variations. Moreover, the export-oriented industries – 
especially manufacturing – were the driving force behind institutional 
changes in the late 1980s and up through the 1990s. Increased interna-
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tional competition and new production methods in the 1980s seem to 
have motivated employers, but in contrast to other European countries, 
reforms did not erode comprehensive bargaining. This does not, how-
ever, mean that the bargaining systems are free from both internal and 
external challenges. It is to some of the most salient challenges that we 
now turn. 
3. European economic integration and challenges facing 
the Nordic bargaining systems
Even though the Nordic collective bargaining systems have been re-
formed in recent decades and thereby have been adapted to more inten-
sifi ed cross-border competition it does not mean that Nordic wage bar-
gaining has remained unaffected by the EU’s new economic governance. 
The direct effects of new European policy initiatives might have been 
limited, but other more indirect effects or consequences of European po-
litical and economic integration are present. This concerns strains on the 
bargaining systems due to the deepening of the single market in the en-
larged EU, where domestic market–oriented sectors, such as construc-
tion and private services, face competition from migrant labour and ser-
vice providers from central and eastern Europe. Furthermore, German 
wage trends have an impact on national debates in the Nordic countries 
on the potential room for wage – or labour cost – increases. Nordic wage 
trends are particularly affected by European trends via trade dependence 
on the German economy. This is not new, but the need to remain com-
petitive and therefore also to keep wage and cost increases on a par with 
the most important trading partners – Germany – has been reinforced 
since the fi nancial crisis. The relative success of the German economy in 
recent years has enhanced its position, creating what could be termed 
a discourse about the ‘need to follow the German economy in order to 
secure balanced budgets and competitiveness’. In the following we raise 
the question of how and to what degree we should see German wage 
leadership as decisive for wage development in, respectively, Denmark, 
Finland and Norway. But before focussing on German infl uence on wage 
bargaining we turn briefl y to the strain on wages and wage regulation 
caused by competition from migrant labour and service providers from 
central and eastern Europe. 
3.1 Labour migration – potential eff ects on wage levels and 
bargaining systems 
The expansion of the EU/EEA labour market has led to a strong infl ux of 
labour migrants and service providers from central and eastern Europe 
(CEE) into the Nordic countries. The volume of migration from those 
countries has varied over time. While Denmark and Sweden were the top 
destinations before 2004, Norway has received an increasing share since 
the 2004 enlargement. In 2006 Norway became the top receiving coun-
try with almost half of all the migrants from CEE countries to the Nordic 
region in 2011. The Finnish share decreased from 2004 to 2008, but 
has increased again since then (Tronstad and Joona 2013). In the years 
2003 to 2011, 335 000 citizens from the new EU countries moved to the 
Nordic countries. In addition, a large number were working temporarily 
in the Nordic countries, for instance as workers posted by foreign service 
providers. It has been estimated that this group in Norway, Sweden and 
Denmark made up about 40 per cent of workers from CEE countries (El-
dring and Friberg 2013; Friberg and Eldring 2013). The use of migrant 
workers has been particularly high in construction, manufacturing and 
the low-skilled parts of private services. 
Labour migration has satisfi ed a great demand for labour in the Nor-
dic countries. This has benefi tted the economy, but has also implied 
challenges for the system of collective bargaining and wage coordina-
tion. Due to large pay differences between CEE countries and the Nor-
dic countries, migrant workers often accept or might be compelled to 
accept wages that are lower than those prevailing in the Nordic labour 
markets (Friberg et al. 2013). None of the Nordic countries have a na-
tional statutory minimum wage. In Finland and Iceland the minimum 
wage fl oor is secured by generally applicable collective agreements. This 
is also the case for a few industries in Norway, such as construction, 
shipyards, cleaning and the green sector. Sweden and Denmark, as well 
as the majority of Norwegian industries rely on collective agreements 
alone to secure a minimum wage fl oor. Foreign service providers are less 
likely to be bound by collective agreements and can in such cases offer 
lower wages and worse working conditions to their employees, thereby 
reducing costs and enhancing their competitiveness. The same may ap-
ply to unorganised domestic fi rms (unbound by collective agreements) 
that rely on hiring cheap migrant labour, either directly or through sub-
contractors.
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Decreasing union density and collective bargaining coverage in com-
bination with a large supply of low-wage employees can make it more 
tempting also for domestic employers to opt out of collective agree-
ments, thus leading to a downward spiral. General application of collec-
tive agreements can to some extent counteract this effect. The Finnish 
system, however, is dependent on collective agreements to cover close 
to half of the workers by being made generally applicable (Seip 2010). 
In Norway it is essentially only the minimum wages of collective agree-
ments that are made generally binding. An increase in the proportion of 
enterprises and workers standing outside organisations and agreements, 
could, everything else being equal, affect the competitive situation be-
tween organised versus unorganised fi rms and workers and thereby 
weaken the organised actors’ infl uence and membership base (Andersen 
et al. 2014). A growing share of unorganised workers reduces the negoti-
ating power of trade unions and can alter the balance between employers 
and employees and accordingly affect wage trends. The Nordic countries 
may also face greater disparities between groups of employers, with low 
skilled workers receiving less and high skilled workers more than they 
would have in a more coordinated wage policy regime. Analyses from the 
Norwegian construction industry show that labour migration has had a 
negative effect on wages for domestic workers, partly due to substitution 
effects, but that extension of collective agreements may counteract this 
(Bratsberg et al. 2013; Holden 2014). 
Table 1 Mechanisms for determining wages in the Nordic countries
Coverage of collec-
tive agreements in the 
private sector*
Extension of 
collective 
agreements
Regime
Denmark 74% No Autonomous collective 
bargaining model
Sweden 85% No Autonomous collective 
bargaining model
Norway 50% Yes, some since 2004 Mixed model
Finland 85% Yes, widespread Statutory regulations (and 
strong unions) 
Iceland 95% Yes, widespread Statutory regulations (and 
strong unions)
Note: *Numbers from Finland and Iceland include employees covered by generally applicable collec-
tive agreements. In Finland bargaining coverage excluding generally applicable agreements was 73 
per cent in 2008 (Ahtiainen 2011). Source: Alsos and Eldring 2014. 
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3.2 Infl uence of the new European economic governance on the 
collective bargaining systems of the four Nordic countries
As members of the EU, Denmark, Finland and Sweden have been poten-
tial objects of the new political interventionism exercised by the EU. In 
the fi eld of collective bargaining, the major instruments of wage policy 
intervention have been Country-specifi c Recommendations (CSRs) issued 
within the context of the European Semester. CSRs could have been re-
lated to wages and wage-policy institutions. The recommendations are 
prepared by the European Commission, but their fi nal adoption is carried 
out by national leaders in the European Council. Accordingly, the rec-
ommendations prepared by the Commission might be approved by the 
Council only after some modifi cation. In addition to CSRs, the European 
Commission can produce, for example in Alert Mechanism Reports and 
in-depth reviews, commentaries on wages and wage-policy institutions. 
Among the three Nordic EU countries, only Finland and Sweden received 
wage-related recommendations from the European Commission during 
2012–2014. Finland obtained two, one in 2012 and one in 2013. In both 
of them, wage restraint, or the alignment of real wages and productivity 
developments, was recommended. The reason for these recommenda-
tions was primarily that Finland within the alert mechanism had exceed-
ed the threshold of increases in unit labour costs. In the in-depth review 
for 2012 ‘rigidities in the wage settlement process’ are regarded as causes 
of the signifi cant rise in unit labour costs (European Commission 2012c: 
2). The recommendations, which are not binding, had no infl uence on 
Finnish policy discussions. Nor was the tone of the recommendations 
demanding. The Commission’s recommendation on Finland’s 2013 
national reform programme advised that Finland should take action 
to ‘support the alignment of real wage and productivity developments 
whilst fully respecting the role of social partners and in line with national 
practices’ (European Commission 2013: 6). Any recommendations that 
might concern the Finnish system of multi-employer bargaining have 
not been put forward. However, there is a comment on wage dispersion 
which can be interpreted as being about the Finnish bargaining system: 
in the in-depth review for 2014 compressed wage distribution is regard-
ed as a cause of high prices, eroding both domestic welfare and external 
competitiveness (European Commission 2014a: 51).
Sweden received one wage-related recommendation from the Commis-
sion (in 2012). It refl ects one of the main objectives of EU policies; the 
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desire to increase downward fl exibility of wages. The European Com-
mission recommends that Sweden should ‘take further measures to im-
prove the labour market participation of youth and vulnerable groups 
by focusing on effective active labour market policy measures, encour-
aging increased wage fl exibility, notably at the lower end of the wage 
scale’ (European Commission 2012d: 5). Sweden is a country with both 
a highly compressed wage structure and, accordingly, a very small low-
wage sector. The recommendation was aimed at enlarging the low-wage 
sector. Overall, in the Commission’s view Sweden is among the most 
competitive EU countries, which explains the absence of comments and 
recommendations related to cost competitiveness. 
Denmark has not received wage-related CSRs from the Commission, but 
in some commentaries the Commission has paid attention to the dete-
rioration of price competitiveness which, it said, was due to high nomi-
nal wage increases in the period of overheating and weak productivity 
growth in the years leading up to the fi nancial crisis (European Commis-
sion 2012a: 14; 2012b: 8). Unit labour costs have since decreased. On 
the whole, in comparison with the crisis countries, the new European 
interventionism has so far not had a notable infl uence on collective bar-
gaining in the three Nordic EU countries. 
4. German impact on Nordic wage bargaining 
Germany’s success in job creation since the fi nancial crisis and the fact 
that wage increases there were modest in the years leading up to it have 
affected debates on wage development in the Nordic countries. Looking 
at wage development, all the Nordic countries experienced a relatively 
high wage growth from 2000 to 2013, whereas German relative wag-
es decreased (see fi gures in chapter 2). The country differences within 
manufacturing are smaller, but still we see clear differences in relative 
wage developments. In this section we will discuss the infl uence of Ger-
man wage policy in Denmark, Norway and Finland in recent years.
4.1 Denmark: infl uence of new economic governance and 
German wage policy 
Although Denmark is not part of the EMU, the government (in offi ce 
since 2011) has nevertheless committed itself to the convergence criteria 
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and carefully sought to restore trust in Danish fi nances. It has done so 
by restoring balanced public budgets and pursuing a reform programme 
designed to increase labour supply and labour productivity. This is in 
line with the Commission’s recommendations to Denmark on preserving 
a sound fi scal position (European Commission 2014b). Moreover, cen-
tral tight control on public spending and sanctions for over-spending in 
local government meant that municipalities have underspent during the 
crisis with a knock-on depressing effect on fi scal stimulus from these im-
portant public sources (Pedersen and Andersen 2014). Critics – among 
them trade union economists – have therefore remarked that the strict 
Danish adherence to the EMU-criteria is dampening growth and the reli-
ance on export-led job-growth might be too one-sided.  Indeed, Danish 
exports are healthy but have not produced the expected job-rebound.
With regard to the Danish wage bargaining system, the EU has not – as 
shown above – made any recommendations of reform. As noted in the 
previous section, Danish wage-setting was gradually transformed dur-
ing the 1980s and 1990s to become quite fl exible while keeping a high 
degree of coordination – what has been called ‘centralised decentralisa-
tion’ (Due et al. 1993). At the onset of the crisis in 2008, the social part-
ners were quick to agree on the real economic consequences for the open 
Danish economy. As thousands of jobs were shed, the pattern-setting 
social partners in manufacturing agreed very modest wage increases in 
2010 and 2012, but the real changes happened on the shop-fl oor with 
wage freezes or sometimes wage cuts in company level bargaining. This 
was possible due to the fl exible wage-systems in most private sector 
companies. 
According to Danish Industry – the largest employer federation – be-
tween a quarter and a third of employees in manufacturing accepted a 
wage freeze in local wage bargaining, setting a new record. Moreover, 
supplementary pay for over-time, odd-hours and so on virtually disap-
peared overnight, depressing wage development even further. Real wag-
es consequently suffered and did not become positive again – albeit very 
modestly – in the private sector until the fi rst quarter of 2013. Wage 
competitiveness has increased relative to pre-crisis levels with employ-
ers and workers using wage fl exibility inherent in collective agreements. 
Some industries have been under such strain from job losses and cost 
competition that minimum wage levels in collective agreements have 
come under pressure. For example, the management of Danish Crown 
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(meat processing) argued that competition from German labour costs 
will force the company to relocate production if wages are not cut dras-
tically (see also below). Other companies, such as in retail, have also 
questioned the minimum wage levels due to the crisis in private con-
sumption. It remains to be seen whether the call for opt-out clauses is 
a passing phenomenon linked to the business cycle or an enduring phe-
nomenon due to structural problems in some industries. 
The infl uence of German wage policies in Denmark
Denmark has a long and deep rooted history of German infl uence on 
Danish economic and political life. This is fi rst of all a consequence of 
Denmark being a small open economy neighbouring the much larger 
German economy. Looking at recent decades Germany has been the 
most important trading partner for Denmark. Further, many Danish 
manufacturing companies have been and still are operating as subcon-
tractors for German corporations. The bottom line is that the state of the 
German economy will always have an impact on the Danish economy. 
Attention towards fl uctuations in the German economy is therefore in-
herent in Danish economic decision-making; both at company and na-
tional level.
This includes attention towards processes of collective bargaining in 
Germany and wage trends in general. Not least due to fact that since 
the 1980s the Danish Krone has been pegged fi rst to the D Mark, and 
later the Euro, the awareness of Danish policy makers, including rep-
resentatives of employers’ associations and trade unions towards Ger-
man wage developments has deepened. The fi xed exchange rate policy 
has created a strong transparency on Danish wage trends versus Ger-
man trends which in turn gives immediate indications whether wage in-
creases hamper companies competitiveness or not. In more recent years 
we also know that the Danish metalworking trade union, Dansk Metal, 
has intensifi ed contacts to their German colleagues in the Baltic Sea re-
gion, IG Metall Bezirk Küste, in order to be able to follow trends and 
developments in Germany (Andersen 2006). Similar contacts exist for 
the employers. 
Next to this long known interest in and dependence of wage trends in 
Germany the German success on job creation since the outbreak of the 
fi nancial crisis has paved the way for an even stronger focus on job crea-
tion and wage trends in Germany in the Danish debate. Especially repre-
sentatives of the dominant employers’ associations are emphasising that 
the competitiveness of Danish exporting industries has been weakened 
not least due to relatively high wage increases from around year 2000 
and until the crisis emerged. Often Germany has been the point of refer-
ence in this debate. Real wages in manufacturing increased quite con-
siderably in Danish manufacturing compared to Germany from 1998 to 
2010. Since then real wages in Danish manufacturing has by and large 
stabilised.
Dominant trade unions did recognise that wage increases in the years 
leading up to the fi nancial crisis were ’unbalanced’. Still in the subse-
quent years think tanks linked to the trade union movement have pro-
duced a number of reports and policy papers responding to the diagno-
sis of staggering wages and lost competitiveness as causes of failing job 
growth. In a report entitled Danes will not be richer following the Ger-
man path the Economic Council of the Labour Movement argues that 
one important difference between the two countries is that Denmark was 
faced with a housing-bubble leading to a drop in house prices, declining 
fortunes and shrinking private consumption. The Council argues that 
the Danish labour market is healthy and well-functioning and warns 
against some German trends i.e. what is termed a polarisation as wage 
developments for some groups like private services are lagging behind 
manufacturing (AE 2014). 
The centre-left think tank Cevea presents an identical critical perspec-
tive on the development on the German labour market and thereby also 
warns against adopting lessons from Germany. Growing wage inequality 
is once again a core theme in this publication (Cevea 2013). 
Specifi c challenges arise from the quite signifi cant differences in wage-
levels between low wage groups in Germany and Denmark. Germany has 
from January 2015 introduced a statutory minimum wage at 8.50 € per 
hour. The minimum wage stipulated in the Danish collective agreements 
is around 15 € per hour for unskilled jobs. This wide gap in minimum 
wage levels between the two countries is to some degree explained by 
different social systems; employers’ social contributions in Germany 
versus a universal social system fi nanced via personal taxes in Denmark. 
Nevertheless, this makes low skilled jobs attractive for some Germans 
as well as other groups of foreign workers. This causes worries in trade 
unions as foreign workers might accept working at minimum wages in 
jobs where native workers typically are paid above minimum wage lev-
els. This has often been framed as ‘wage dumping’ by the trade unions. 
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Another effect of the substantial wage gap between the two countries is 
the outsourcing of jobs to Germany. 
Probably the most prominent example is the slaughter houses. Danish 
Crown is a multinational company accounting for around two-thirds of 
jobs in slaughter houses. Since 2003 Danish Crown has been both cen-
tralising and relocating. Some 20 sites have been closed and jobs have 
been sourced both to larger sites in Denmark and abroad – especially to 
Germany. Approximately 2,000 jobs have been relocated to sites outside 
Denmark (Refslund 2012). One of the main reasons for relocating jobs 
in Germany is that slaughter house workers typically earn 8–12 euros 
per hour there, whereas Danish workers earn 24–27 euros, according 
to Danish Crown. Typically, the German sites employ sub-contracted 
eastern European workers who are exempt from non-wage social con-
tributions and collectively agreed wage rates as they are posted workers 
employed by, for example,  eastern European agencies. 
Summing up, it can be argued the infl uence of German wage policies and 
trends are both quite direct due to the small and open Danish economy’s 
dependence on German markets and has especially in recent years had a 
strong effect at a more discursive level due to the apparent success of the 
German economy, in the sense of how to interpret and understand the 
relatively poor Danish economic performance and what are the neces-
sary policy initiatives in order to bring back growth, jobs and increase in 
real wages for all groups in the labour market.
4.2 Finland: the infl uence of German wage policy is apparent
As a full member of EMU, Finland is in a special position among the 
Nordic countries. In the absence of a sovereign currency, it is impossible 
to use exchange rate policy as a means of affecting price competitiveness. 
Consequently, the importance of domestic wage policy increases, as does 
that of wage policies in neighbouring competing countries. As Germa-
ny traditionally has been an important trading partner for Finland, its 
economic importance as the core country of the EMU has made it even 
more important. Therefore wage trends in Germany have been moni-
tored closely especially since entering the euro zone, and German wage 
policy has been an important topic in Finnish discussions on wages and 
costs. Not only German wage developments but also the German collec-
tive bargaining system has been part of the debate. The most important 
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driver behind these debates has been the employers in the Confederation 
of Finnish Industries (EK). 
Employers’ representatives have maintained that, because of too costly 
collective agreements, the Finnish exports industry has lost its price 
competitiveness. In its statements, EK has emphasised that, in particu-
lar, a drastic deterioration of price competitiveness vis-à-vis Germany 
has taken place. Regarding the bargaining system representatives of 
employer’s confederation have proposed that Finland should learn from 
German experiences. Meaning that wage bargaining should be decen-
tralised in Finland, for example, via expanding the possibility to use vari-
ous kinds of derogation clauses. Currently options to deviate from pay 
norms set by collective agreements are substantially more limited in Fin-
land than in Germany. Obviously Finland provides an interesting case as 
developments since entering the euro illustrates how, within a monetary 
union, not only wage policies but also systems of wage bargaining are 
interconnected. In what follows, we give a more detailed comparison be-
tween Finland and Germany.
Figure 1 summarises some similarities and differences in wage trends 
within manufacturing in Finland and Germany during 2001–2013. Evi-
dently there is a strong similarity in collectively agreed wages during the 
period. Annual changes may have differed a little, but in both countries 
collectively agreed wages increased by 30 per cent from 2000 to 2011. 
There is, however, a noticeable difference between changes in average 
actual wages during the period from 2000 until 2011. In Finland aver-
age actual wages increased faster than collectively agreed wages, while in 
Germany they increased less than collectively agreed wages. This means 
that German wage drift – that is, the difference between the increase in 
actual and collectively agreed pay – has been negative, while it has been 
positive in the Finnish case. 
Even though the difference between increases in actual wages in Finnish 
and German manufacturing is obvious, it needs to be emphasised that 
the difference is not due to the conclusion of too costly agreements in 
spite of what some employers’ representatives often state. 
The discrepancy is due to the difference between the collective bargain-
ing systems in the two countries. In Finland, collectively agreed pay 
increases normally set a minimum for actual pay increases, while in Ger-
many this is not the case. An important explanation for negative wage 
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drift has been the use of opening clauses see, for example (Bispinck and 
Schulten 2011; Schulten and Bispinck 2014). As employers may benefi t 
from the use of opening clauses, it has not come as a big surprise that 
employers in EK are interested in having at least a partial reconstruction 
of the Finnish collective bargaining system. 
Despite higher wage increases in the Finnish manufacturing industry, 
there have not been any signifi cant differences in unit labour cost de-
velopments compared to Germany. Labour productivity growth has 
compensated for higher labour cost increases. According to unit labour 
cost developments in manufacturing, the Finnish exports industry 
has not experienced any dramatic loss of competitiveness. However, 
if one looks at unit labour cost developments in the entire economy, a 
clear discrepancy has developed between Finland and Germany. During 
2001-2012, price competitiveness has deteriorated by some twenty per 
cent. The above mentioned CSRs delivered by the Commission are based 
on the use of unit labour costs in the whole economy as the relevant 
indicator for price competitiveness. In the Finnish debate, employers’ 
representatives have systematically used developments of this indicator 
Figure 1 Developments of average wages and collectively agreed wages in 
Finland and in Germany 2001–2013, manufacturing (%) 
Source: TURI database on collectively agreed wages, Destatis, Statistics Finland.
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as the proof that the Finnish competitiveness has decreased signifi cantly 
vis-à-vis Germany. 
Some noteworthy conclusions can be drawn from the comparison be-
tween Finland and Germany. Within a monetary union, differences in 
wage bargaining systems may give rise to notable differences in actual 
wages even if increases in collectively agreed pay have been similar, and 
consequently, to corresponding differences in unit labour costs. This 
means that the coordination of wage policies, or wage claims between 
trade unions located in various countries, may be extremely diffi cult if 
wage bargaining systems differ among these countries. 
The current situation in Finland supports the view that the basic prereq-
uisite for the strengthening of labour unions’ attempts towards Europe-
an-level coordination of collective bargaining is the maintenance of the 
strengths of multi-employer bargaining systems. On the other hand, it is 
not surprising that currently one of the employer’s organisation, EK’s, 
main objectives is to ‘import German elements’ into the Finnish collec-
tive bargaining system. 
4.3  Norway: Benchmarking of trading partners in a petroleum 
driven economy 
The European economic integration has had less effect in Norway, as 
there is no currency binding to the Euro and as Norway is not part of 
the economic coordination. However, this does not mean that Norway is 
unaffected by the EU development in this fi eld. As mentioned earlier in-
ternational export markets play an important role in the trend setting 
bargaining model. The competiveness of the Norwegian export indus-
tries, or terms of trade, is measured by the tripartite committee Tech-
nical Calculation Committee (TBU), with representatives from all the 
major social partners. The TBU committee has developed an indicator 
based on the Norwegian wage level or the Norwegian labour costs com-
pared to an average wage costs among the most important trading part-
ners. These ratios are measured in common currency (see Figure 2). In 
this context Germany is playing an important role as topping the list of 
the most important trading partners in 2011 to 2013 followed by Sweden 
and Great Britain (NOU 2014: 3). However, a number of other countries 
are included in this indicator as well. The terms of trade, included the 
future prospects of the Norwegian economy, are discussed in the annual 
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reports presented by the TBU committee. The committee does not give 
any recommendation for the coming wage settlement, but is rather con-
tributing to a common understanding of the economic situation which 
is seen as an imperative factor for the opening negotiations in the export 
sectors as well as for coordination across industries and sectors. 
The wage setting model has been under pressure on a number of occa-
sions, among others as a result of high wage settlements or high wage 
drift compared to trading partners. Such periods have often been fol-
lowed by moderate settlements and stronger coordination, often sup-
ported by strengthened tripartite cooperation. In addition the Norwe-
gian dependence on petroleum exports, and thereby the importance of 
the petroleum related industry, means that the Norwegian economy may 
develop otherwise than the neighbouring countries. In 2013 the tripar-
tite Holden Committee which included social partners together with eco-
nomic experts discussed whether the trendsetting industries model had 
to be reconsidered, due to the way the labour market has been affected 
by changes in the Norwegian as well as the international economy. In 
the period 2010–2012 the Norwegian manufacturing sector lost out in 
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Relative hourly wage costs (national currency) Relative hourly wage costs (common currency)
Figure 2 Developments of relatively hourly wage costs in Norway compared 
with average wage costs among trade partners  
Note: Changes from the previous year. Employees in the manufacturing/industry sector.
Source: Norwegian Technical Calculation Committee for Wage Settlements (TBU).
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terms of trade, and representatives from both sides in industry called for 
moderation in wages and costs in order to save jobs. Among the ques-
tions asked by the Holden Committee, was whether the wage bargaining 
model is able to handle a situation with high demand in the petroleum 
sector combined with an international market in recession for the more 
traditional export industries. Major parts of the metal industry – which 
always are part of the trend-setting industries collective agreement – are 
suppliers to the petroleum industry and thereby strongly infl uenced by 
the oil price (which might be high even in a period of international cri-
ses). However, the committee did not propose any changes of the trend 
setting industries model such as removing suppliers to the petroleum 
industry from the relevant collective agreement. The recommendation 
from the committee was to strengthen voluntary coordination measures, 
and pointed to the fact that Norway will face lower income form the pe-
troleum sector due to decreasing oil revenues as well as more variable oil 
prices over time.
In major parts of the private sector company level bargaining on average 
make up more than 50 percent of the annual wage increases. As in the 
other Nordic countries, company bargaining takes place under a peace 
duty clause and under the framework of the central level agreements. 
The parties have agreed that company level bargaining should be guided 
by the profi tability, productivity, future prospects and competitiveness 
of the company (‘the four criteria’ from 1990s) although the compliance 
of this principle is based on a common understanding without any in-
struments for enforcement. The unions for white collar workers never 
had the strength and high density rates as seen in Denmark and Sweden, 
and in the private sector wage setting for white collar workers is mainly 
decentralised and to a large degree based on individual criteria. 
Although the employer side argues in favour of less detailed regulations 
at central level, multi-employer bargaining and the sector-wide agree-
ments have not been challenged by the employer side. Opening-clauses 
or opt-outs from collective agreements have not had any major impact. 
In the 2009 bargaining round, when many companies experienced eco-
nomic insecurity as a result of the fi nancial crises, the trendsetting in-
dustries decided that the general wage increases awarded at central level 
could be postponed or ignored in situations where company fi nances 
were poor. However, this did not open up for local partners to reduce 
wages below the minimum rates in the collective agreement for the in-
dustry and the option was hardly used. Still, in a long-time perspective 
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the trend setting industries model and its strong reliance on coordina-
tion might be challenged by the weakened capacity to regulate wages 
in low-pay sectors as well as by groups who no longer see an interest in 
submitting to the normative framework set by a deceasing number of 
traditional blue-collar workers and their employers. 
5. Discussion: The future of Nordic wage bargaining
The export-oriented industries – especially manufacturing – have been 
the driving force behind changes in the collective bargaining systems in 
the Nordic countries in the late 1980s and up through the 1990s. In-
creased international competition and new production methods in the 
1980s was the motivation for employers calling for changes. As we have 
seen, the collective bargaining systems are intact, but changed. Across 
the Nordic countries, the industrial structure is varied and different 
types of industry dominate in the individual countries. Overall, however, 
manufacturing companies and their exports have maintained an impor-
tant role for the national economies. 
As we have shown, institutional changes in the collective bargaining sys-
tems did not happen in a uniform way, but had varying paces and con-
sequences in the Nordic states. In spite of the differences we fi nd in all 
these bargaining systems decentralised bargaining within a coordinated 
framework. In other words national collective agreements concluded at 
sector level is setting the framework for company level negotiations. Tak-
ing into account the overall economic performance of the Nordic states 
we argued that competitiveness was enhanced via collective bargaining 
based on the relatively pragmatic positions of dominant trade unions 
and employers’ associations. As emphasised this does not mean that 
confl icts and power struggles have been absent, rather that we have seen 
a basic willingness to try to develop the collective bargaining systems. 
This overall trend fi rst and foremost cover the period between the crisis 
of the 1980s and the very early 1990s and the fi nancial crisis. Hereby 
said that over recent years – and accelerated by the fi nancial crisis – new 
challenges have become apparent. Manufacturing industries have expe-
rienced an accelerating internationalisation in recent decades, which in 
turn has increased the competition for the remaining workplaces and 
led to debates as to whether parts of the Nordic manufacturing industry 
are close to hitting the critical levels for what is required to maintain 
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the national preconditions for innovation and competence development 
that are essential for job creation in manufacturing. Many jobs were for 
instance lost in Danish manufacturing in the early years of the fi nan-
cial crisis. In most recent years employment in Danish manufacturing 
has increased, however, with relatively modest fi gures. The question is 
whether we in the years to come will see a substantial increase in innova-
tion, production and job-creation or not. 
After underlining the importance of the reform of the collective bargain-
ing systems in the Nordic states we turned to the question of the po-
tential impact of the new economic governance regime of the European 
Union on the Nordic collective bargaining systems. We concluded that 
the direct effect of these policy initiatives have been limited. Few and 
rather insignifi cant recommendations have been forwarded to the Nor-
dic states regarding the development in wages and income. On the other 
hand, we raised the question of indirect effects, such as the potential 
German wage leadership. The basic argument was that the small and 
open Nordic economies are very interwoven with and therefore depend-
ent of the much larger German economy. The discussion of how German 
wage trends have infl uenced national debates on wages and costs seems 
to suggest that in recent years there we have seen a rather substantial in-
fl uence of German wage trends in Finland and Denmark on the national 
debates on the potential room for wages increase – or even the institu-
tional set-up of the bargaining system (the Finnish case), while this is 
less so in Norway. The reason for Norway to a larger degree bypassing 
the German ‘wage-leadership’ might be Norwegian dependence of petrol 
industry which therefore also infl uence economic dynamics and priori-
ties. With regard to Finland and Denmark it appears to be evident that 
the German economic success in recent years has made the discourse of 
German wage leadership stronger whereas in the pre-crisis years Nordic 
wage increases clearly exceeded German trends. 
Furthermore, we raised the question how European integration in other 
ways infl uence wage developments in the Nordic countries. In recent 
years there has been a quite heated debate on social dumping, especially 
voiced by the trade unions. Moreover, since EU’s enlargement into east-
ern and central Europe, companies in some sectors, typically construc-
tion, shipbuilding, the food industry, slaughterhouses, agriculture and 
horticulture, are exploiting the free movement of labour and services to 
use cheaper subcontractors and temporary employment agencies. Some 
businesses are also employing cheaper workers from abroad in their do-
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mestic manufacturing. There are employers who argue that this is nec-
essary to compensate for the high Nordic labour costs in order to avoid 
increased outsourcing or simply closing the activity in the host country, 
which they claim to be the alternative. This is a major dilemma for the 
employer organisations, where the large companies can exploit the ad-
vantages of free mobility, while many of the members from smaller com-
panies are often left with a diffi cult struggle merely to survive (Alfonso 
2012).
The market integration and internationalisation have also progressed 
rapidly in the transport industry, where the large international logistics 
and transport companies place trucks and drivers in complicated sys-
tems using the various wage and costs levels in the respective European 
countries in order to maximise their returns (Dølvik et al. 2003; Jensen 
et al. 2014). As with manufacturing and construction, road transport is a 
part of the internal market, but there are still rules for how many trips a 
foreign truck or bus may run in another EU country with national goods 
or passengers – the so-called cabotage rules. Nevertheless, internation-
al road transport in and out of the Nordic countries has largely been 
taken over by foreign drivers, often from eastern and central Europe, 
and in the domestic road transport there is a recurring debate about how 
diffi cult it is to control cabotage rules and the increased low-wage com-
petition.
The opening of markets has thus intensifi ed price competition between 
companies and the struggle for earnings and jobs in large parts of the 
domestic-oriented sectors. In this manner, the broader market integra-
tion puts the collective bargaining systems in the affected sectors under 
pressure. In addition to transport and construction, there is reason to as-
sume that especially the labour-intensive private service sectors, such as 
retail trade, hotels and restaurants as well as cleaning will be particularly 
vulnerable, as the development in productivity and added value is more 
modest than in manufacturing, unionisation is much weaker and the hir-
ing of foreign labour is increasing. In the longer term, such trends may 
undermine the basis for the close coordination of agreements and wage 
formation across industries in the Nordic countries and provide the ba-
sis for increased differentiation of wages between and within branches in 
line with what has been seen most clearly in Germany in recent decades.
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Chapter 5
Similarities and diversity in the development of 
wages and collective bargaining in central and 
eastern European countries – a comparison of 
Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic
Szilvia Borbély and László Neumann
1. Introduction1
Besides a common historical background, the three countries examined 
in this chapter have strikingly similar economies (small, landlocked, 
export-oriented countries, relying heavily on manufacturing dominated 
by multinational companies) and thus they are, to some extent, competi-
tors in export markets and for foreign investment. All three economies 
are highly vulnerable: they are characterised by low diversifi cation, a 
small domestic market and dependence on a few export-oriented indus-
tries (for example, Slovakia depends on the car industry). Their labour 
market systems are characterised by income policies – the particularly 
focus of this chapter – that have to fi nd a sustainable balance between 
the population’s social needs and producer competitiveness, although 
labour policy is strongly infl uenced by the ideological standpoint and 
political manoeuvring of whichever government happens to be in power. 
We argue that the role of wage bargaining in the past fi ve years has been 
infl uenced not only by the economic crisis and recovery, but also sig-
nifi cantly by government policies, even if their facilitating or constrain-
ing role changes over time and across countries. Beyond government 
policies on collective bargaining, state intervention in income policies 
and wage determination takes various forms, from setting the minimum 
wage to redistribution through taxation, whose importance also varies. 
(Unfortunately, due to limited space, we cannot deal with the unilateral 
wage setting that characterises the public sector).
Although they all are far from being ‘developmental states’ (Johnson 
1982), policies endorsing economic development and competitiveness 
1. We owe special thanks to Marta Kahancova for her highly valued comments and suggestions.
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often outweigh social and foreign policy considerations. As to the latter, 
at the time of writing (September 2014), a clear example of overriding 
economic interests is the current outlier position of these three countries 
concerning EU sanctions against Russia. When EU leaders negotiated 
a round of sanctions with the outright support of Poland and the Baltic 
states, the Czech, Slovak and Hungarian governments focused on shield-
ing their economies from the impact of trade restrictions.2 More gener-
ally this is an outcome of the policy of ‘selective economic nationalism’ 
(Tóth 2014) which is most prevalent in Hungary, although its elements 
sometimes emerge in competitor countries in the region as well. Such 
opportunistic behaviour and other palpable differences in political pri-
orities in comparison with the established western European democra-
cies stem not only from the still immature democratic institutions, but 
also from post-socialist legacies that continue to shape how politicians 
perceive their countries’ interests. This chapter does not deal with for-
eign policy in detail but this example is one instance of divergence from 
the EU mainstream and of commonalities among the three countries in-
vestigated. 
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 assesses wage develop-
ment in the macroeconomic context, embracing the development of la-
bour cost determinants following the crisis. It also deals with the social 
context, social inclusion and risk of poverty. Section 3 focuses on the 
institutional approach to wage bargaining, namely the legal background 
and collective bargaining structures and coverage. Section 4 deals with 
‘collectively agreed wages’, from both the methodological perspective 
and the point of view of bargaining outcomes, presenting the main avail-
able data. Based on our analysis the concluding section tries to answer 
the question of whether a special economic development model for cen-
tral and eastern European region can be identifi ed. It also highlights the 
diversities and similarities we identifi ed in the region and what role a 
collective system of wage formation plays in this regard. 
2. See: http://washpost.bloomberg.com/Story?docId=1376-NAZBDN6KLVRJ01-545LCK-
V041C6SRS34NG8V1J6D8 , http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2014-08-15/eastern-
europe-don-t-sanction-putin 
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2. Wage development in a macroeconomic context
2.1 Economic, and social policy context
The Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia have a similar historical and 
political background. In 1989 Czechoslovakia and Hungary returned 
to liberal democracy. On 1 January 1993 Czechoslovakia split into the 
Czech Republic and Slovakia. In the 1990s all three countries underwent 
economic reforms and privatisation to create a market economy. All of 
them are small countries: the Czech Republic has a population of 10.5 
million, Hungary 9.9 million and Slovakia 5.4 million according to Eu-
rostat most recent population data. 
Similar level of development
Looking at GDP per capita (in PPS, EU27=100), in 2008–2013 GDP per 
capita in PPS was highest in the Czech Republic and lowest in Hungary. 
The GDP per capita of all three countries is well below the EU28 aver-
age: in 2008, it was 19 per cent below in the Czech Republic, 28 per cent 
below in Slovakia and 36 per cent below in Hungary. This gap has not 
changed substantially during the crisis and recovery; in 2013, the fi gures 
Figure 1 GDP per capita (PPS)
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were 20 per cent in the Czech Republic, 24 per cent in Slovakia and 33 
per cent in Hungary. 
Referring to the Europe 2020 Index3 on terms of competitiveness Hun-
gary occupies twenty-fi fth place in the 2014 EU28 ranking, followed 
only by Greece, Romania and Bulgaria. Slovakia is in twenty-third place. 
Czech Republic is the best performing country of the three (eighteenth 
place), although it fell back two places compared with its 2012 ranking 
(World Economic Forum 2014: 12).
Labour productivity, measured by unit labour costs – a major compo-
nent of competitiveness in countries relying on export-oriented manu-
facturing – also refl ects the relative lagging behind of the three countries 
with regard to the EU28 average and it did not change in 2008–2013. 
3. The Europe 2020 Index is composed of seven pillars: enterprise environment, digital 
agenda, innovative Europe, education and training, labour market and employment, social 
inclusion and environmental sustainability. Each pillar has the same weight (1/7) in the 
overall Europe 2020 Competitiveness Index score.
Figure 2 Labour productivity per hour worked (euro/hours)  
Note: Calculated as real output per unit of labour input which is measured by the total number of 
hours worked. 
Source: Eurostat.
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In 2008 and also in 2013 labour productivity per hour worked in the 
EU28 was 2.8 times higher than in Hungary and 2.4 times more than 
in Czech Republic. Compared with Slovakia the EU28 average was 2.6 
times higher in 2008 and ‘only’ 2.4 times higher in 2013. 
Similar growth dynamics
As the crisis unfolded, in 2009 real GDP decreased substantially in all 
three countries. Later on, as the recovery set in, Hungary in 2012 and 
the Czech Republic in 2012–2013 stagnated or fell further back behind. 
It is noteworthy that Slovakia outperformed the other two countries and 
also the EU28 average: its real GDP growth was 4.4 per cent in 2010 
and 3 per cent in 2011. However, later on, Slovakian real GDP growth 
also slowed down. Taking into consideration the period as a whole, Hun-
gary’s economic growth has been lowest, not least because of the wors-
ening business environment due to government measures restraining 
investors and imposing special corporate taxation, in particular on mul-
tinational companies in the fi nancial, retail and telecom sectors.4 
4. See: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&plugin=1&language=
en&pcode=tec00115
Figure 3 Real GDP growth rate (percentage change on previous year)  
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Importance of labour costs and their determinants
Their comparative advantage has been relatively low labour costs and 
qualifi ed labour. In 2013, average hourly labour costs5 were 23.7 euros 
in the EU28 as a whole and 28.2 euros in the euro zone (EU18) (Eurostat 
News release 49/2014).
Between 2008 and 2013 average hourly labour costs in Hungary and 
Slovakia were around one-third of those in the EU28 and half in the 
Czech Republic. 
Hungarian hourly labour costs in euros seem to have stagnated or even 
decreased between 2008 and 2013. In 2013, Hungarian hourly labour 
costs were only slightly more than one-quarter of average labour costs 
in the euro zone. This is the result of the depreciation of the national 
currency during this time (in 2008, 1 euro was worth 251.51 HUF, while 
5. Labour costs in the whole economy, excluding agriculture and public administration.
Figure 4 Hourly labour costs in the whole economy (excluding agriculture and 
public administration), 2008–2013 (euros) 
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in 2013 it was 296.87 HUF). This means that calculated in Hungarian 
forints hourly labour costs increased (by around 12 per cent). In more 
detail, private sector wage costs exceeded public sector wage costs not 
least as a result of the long wage freeze on public sector employees.
In 2008 Slovakia had the biggest hourly labour cost gap with the euro 
zone, at 28 per cent. While the relative gap in wage costs between the 
euro zone and Hungary widened from 2008 to 2013, Hungarian labour 
costs became relatively cheaper, while the labour cost gap decreased 
somewhat between the euro zone and Slovakia and the Czech Repub-
lic. In both the Czech Republic and Slovakia the trend of hourly labour 
costs showed an increase of 12.4 per cent and 17 per cent, respectively, 
which is higher than the increase experienced in the EU28 and the euro 
zone, meaning that some progress had been made towards labour cost 
harmonisation. 
Figure 5 Hourly labour costs in the private and public sectors, Hungary (euros) 
Source: Eurostat.
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2.2 Development of labour cost determinants following the 
crisis
If we look at the dynamics of real unit labour cost development we may 
establish that after 2008 in Hungary real unit labour costs permanently 
decreased and only in 2013 was the a slight (1.3 per cent) increase. In 
the Czech Republic there was a moderate real unit labour cost increase 
in 2010–2012, and in 2013 a decrease of 2 per cent. In Slovakia a signifi -
cant increase of 7 per cent took place in 2009. 
While the level and development of labour costs is, by and large, similar 
for all three countries, the components and determinants of labour costs 
may differ. As labour costs are made up of wages and non-wage costs, 
such as employers’ social contributions, they depend, on one hand, on 
wage developments (not least the outcome of wage bargaining at differ-
ent levels) and, on the other hand, on social security contributions which 
are subject to government policies. The development of (statutory) mini-
mum wages may also have a pull effect.
Figure 6 Real unit labour cost growth (%)  
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In Hungary the wage cost part of labour costs has increased since 2008; 
in 2013 it already amounted to more than two-thirds of labour costs, 
while the non-wage component decreased to 24.6 per cent. Slovakia 
experienced a reverse process: the wage part of labour costs decreased 
from 74.5 per cent (2008) to 72.6 per cent (2013), as did the non-wage 
component, from 25.5 per cent (2008) to 27.4 per cent (2013). In the 
Czech Republic the proportion of wage and non-wage components var-
ied only slightly in 2009–2011, but in 2013 the wage cost part was again 
a little more than 73 per cent, as in 2008. In 2013 the wage cost compo-
nent in the EU28 was higher than in the two countries not in the euro 
zone, Hungary and the Czech Republic (76.3 per cent) and also higher in 
the euro zone than in euro-zone member Slovakia (74.1 per cent). 
In 2013 the share of non-wage costs in the whole economy was 23.7 per 
cent in the EU28 and 25.9 per cent in the euro zone, varying between 8.0 
per cent in Malta and 33.3 per cent in Sweden (Eurostat news release 
49/2014). In all three countries (Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia) the 
share of the non-wage component of labour costs exceeds the EU28 av-
erage and the Slovakian and Czech non-wage cost components are above 
the same value in the euro zone.
Figure 7 Total wages and salaries as a percentage of total labour costs 
Source: Eurostat.
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Personal income tax: implementation of progressivity (Czech Republic, 
Slovakia)
Since 2011 Hungary has gradually introduced a 16 per cent fl at rate of 
personal income tax. The trade union confederation MSZOSZ at its sev-
enth congress in autumn 2010 emphasised that ‘single rate and propor-
tional personal tax transforms incomes disproportionately and unfairly, 
making it more favourable for people on higher incomes at employees’ 
expense’. From 2011 tax credit for employees started to be gradually 
revoked and was stopped completely in 2012. Meanwhile the so-called 
super gross tax base6 introduced in 2010 was gradually phased out by 
2013. In 2011 a tax credit for children was introduced. The problem is 
that families on average and even above-average earnings do not have a 
suffi cient tax base to benefi t from this. 
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Figure 8 Distribution of labour costs, 2013 (%)  
Source: Eurostat.
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6. This means that the personal income tax base should be calculated on the sum which 
contains the gross wage plus the employer’s social security contributions. (The idea was to 
promote transparency; employees should see details of their whole salary.)
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In 2011 and 2012 in the Czech Republic all earnings were taxed at a fl at 
rate of 15 per cent,7 to rise to 19 per cent, probably from 2015. In Slovakia 
a fl at-rate tax was introduced in 2004 – the year it joined to EU – with 
the aim of encouraging (foreign) investment. All earnings were taxed at 
a fi xed rate of 19 per cent (Deloitte 2013: 11). It seems that in 2013 the 
previously preferred fl at-rate taxes started to lose ground in the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia, not at least by the endeavour to curb the grow-
ing income differences somewhat. In 2013 the Czech Republic imposed 
a solidarity tax of 7 per cent on higher incomes.8 In 2013, Slovakia in-
cluded some progressivity in income taxation: a tax rate of 25 per cent 
was introduced on taxable earnings exceeding 2 866 euros per month. 
Social contributions: implementation of progressivity (Czech Republic) and 
increased limits (Czech Republic and Slovakia)
The social security contribution as part of labour/wage costs in the 
Czech Republic in 2011 was 11 per cent for employees and 34 per cent for 
employers (maximum of 72 585 euros). In 2012 a kind of progressivity 
was implemented in this system, too: employees contribute 6.5 per cent 
and employers 25 per cent (maximum of 48 389 euros) and employees 
pay plus 4.5 per cent and employers plus 9 per cent (maximum of 72 583 
euros).
In 2013 in the Czech Republic the limit for social security contribution 
was increased and the limit for health insurance payments was abolished 
(the employer has to fi nance 9 per cent of health insurance on the full 
income and not only on the maximum income of the previous year). In 
2012 Slovakian employees paid 13.4 per cent and employers 32.5 per 
cent with a limit for contributions between 1 153.5 euros and 3 076 euros 
(depending on the type of unemployment insurance, pension and so on) 
and up to +/– 34 000 euros, in 2013 up to 47 160 euros (Deloitte 2013: 
15, 16; Deloitte 2014: 18).
In Hungary the social security contributions from the employee side 
amount to 17 per cent (health insurances and pensions’ contribution), 
7. According to Deloitte in practice the effective tax rate is 20.1 per cent as the tax base is in-
creased with SSHI (social security and health) contributions made by the employer. (Deloitte 
2014: 15).
8. Solidarity tax of 7 per cent is due on annual income that exceeds the threshold of 1 242 432 
CZK or 48 627.5 euros. The solidarity tax of 7 per cent is also applied on monthly income 
exceeding the threshold of 103 536 CZK or 4 052.5 euros.
the employer has to pay a 27 per cent social security contribution. Hun-
gary is characterised by the highest and increasing average tax rate:9 in 
2008 it was 23.35 per cent and in 2013 it was already 34.50 per cent. 
In the Czech Republic the tax rate oscillated around 14 per cent and in 
Slovakia 15 per cent, almost half the Hungarian value. 
Hungary: very high tax wedge on low wage earners 
Hungary has a very high and increasing tax wedge  on labour costs, par-
ticularly in the case of low wage earners: in 2008 it was 46.7 per cent and 
in 2013 it was already 48 per cent. In the Czech Republic and Slovakia 
the tax wedge has been around the EU27 average. The high tax wedge10 
not only has a negative effect on net earnings and has hit low wage-earn-
ers particularly, but it also puts downward pressure on labour demand. 
Nickell (2003) reported that a 10 percentage point rise in the tax wedge 
reduces the labour input of the working age population by somewhere 
between 1 and 3 per cent (Dolenc and Laporsek 2010: 346). 
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Table 1 Tax rate (income tax on gross wage earnings plus the employee’s 
social security contribution; %)
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Hungary 23.35 23.82 23.77 26.75 34.50 34.50
Czech Republic 14.53 13.48 13.88 14.82 14.70 14.47
Slovakia 15.77 12.94 13.13 15.85 15.74 15.68
European Union (27 
countries)
21.29 21.16 21.30 21.86 22.19
Euro area (17 countries) 21.05 21.02 21.16 22.22 22.57
Source: Eurostat.
9. Average tax rate is defi ned as ‘the income tax on gross wage earnings plus the employee’s 
social security contributions less universal cash benefi ts, expressed as a percentage of gross 
wage earnings’. See Eurostat http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_SDDS/EN/
earn_net_esms.htm 
10. The tax wedge on labour costs is defi ned as income tax on gross wage earnings plus the 
employee’s and the employer’s social security contributions, expressed as a percentage of 
the total labour costs of the earner. The total labour costs of the earner are defi ned as gross 
earnings plus the employer’s social security contributions plus payroll taxes.
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Figure 9 Tax wedge on labour costs (%) 
Source: Eurostat.
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2.3 Risk of poverty and social inclusion: Hungary at highest risk
In the three countries – more in Hungary and Slovakia and less in the 
Czech Republic – the middle class has remained relatively weak, especial-
ly in Hungary. The Gini coeffi cient of disposable income measuring in-
equality in income after taxes and transfers shows a signifi cant increase 
of inequality in income distribution in Hungary between 2008 and 2013.
Table 2 Gini coeffi  cient of equalised disposable income
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Hungary 25.2 24.7 24.1 26.8 26.9 28
Czech 
Republic
24.7 25.1 24.9 25.2 24.9 24.6
Slovakia 23.7 24.8 25.9 25.7 25.3 24.2
European 
Union (27 
countries)
30.9 30.5 30.5 30.8 30.4 30.5
Source: Eurostat.
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11. http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/refreshTableAction.do?tab=table&plugin=1&pcode=t
2020_51&language=en 
12. tHE at-risk-of-poverty threshold in Hungary in 2012 was HUF 796 784/year, in the Czech 
Republic CzK 114 953 and in Slovakia 4 156 euros (source: Eurostat, http://epp.eurostat.
ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/File:At-risk-of-poverty_rate_before_and_af-
ter_social_transfers_and_at-risk-of-poverty_threshold_(for_a_single_person),_2011_
and_2012.png
13. Severely materially deprived persons (persons whose living conditions are constrained by 
a lack of resources and experience at least four out of the nine deprivation items, which are 
as follows: cannot afford (i) to pay rent/mortgage or utility bills on time, (ii) to keep home 
adequately warm, (iii) to face unexpected expenses, (iv) to eat meat, fi sh or a protein equiva-
lent every second day, (v) a one week holiday away from home, (vi) a car, (vii) a washing 
machine, (viii) a colour TV, or (ix) a telephone (including mobile phone). 
The proportion of people living in households with very low work inten-
sity in Hungary was double that in the Czech Republic and higher than in 
Slovakia and the EU28 (around 12 per cent in 2011/2012).11 
It is again Hungary that, among the three countries, is in the worst situ-
ation concerning the risk of poverty or social exclusion: in 2008/2010 
slightly less than 30 per cent and in 2011/2012 more than 30 per cent of 
the population was at risk of poverty,12 materially deprived13 or living in 
a household with very low work intensity.
In Hungary particularly high is the percentage of people at risk of pover-
ty before social transfers (29 per cent in 2011 and 27.1 per cent in 2012 – 
Eurostat).  Also high and growing is the percentage of severely materially 
deprived people (23.1 in 2011 and 25.7 per cent in 2012). Social transfers 
have some effect: the proportion of people at risk of poverty after social 
transfers in Hungary was 13.8 per cent in 2011 and 14 per cent in 2012.
The Czech Republic is in the best situation also in comparison with the 
EU average: in 2008–2012 around 15 per cent of the population could be 
considered to be at risk of poverty or social inclusion. In Slovakia during 
the same period the value of this indicator was around 20 per cent, while 
in Hungary around 32.4 per cent of the population was affected.
In 2011–2012 in the Czech Republic the proportion of severely materi-
ally deprived people was around 6 per cent and in Slovakia 10 per cent 
while in Hungary around 25 per cent of the population was affected. 
To compare, in 2012 the EU28 average for being at risk of poverty was 
24.8 per cent, while the proportion of severely materially deprived peo-
ple was 9.9 per cent.
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Figure 10 People at risk of poverty or social exclusion* (% of population)
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2.4 Interplay between macroeconomic performance and labour-
cost and wage development
Wage development
Table 3 Average gross monthly nominal wage, Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Slovakia (national currency)
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
1st 
quarter
Hungary (HUF) 177 738 183 804 188 048 197 911 208 677 215 676 229 817 
Czech Republic 
(CZK) 
22 592 23 344 23 864 24 455 25 112 25 074 24 806 
Slovakia (EUR) 723 744.5 769 786 805 824 821 
Source: National statistical offi  ces.
Note: * People at risk of poverty – that is, persons with an equalised disposable income below the 
at-risk-of-poverty threshold, set at 60 per cent of national median equalised disposable income (aft er 
social transfers) plus severely materially deprived persons plus people living in households with very low 
work intensity (those aged 0–59 who live in households in which, on average, the adults [aged 18–59] 
worked less than 20 per cent of their total work potential during the past year). The total number of 
people at risk of poverty or social exclusion is lower than the sum of people in the three forms of pov-
erty or social exclusion as some are aff ected by more than one of these situations. Source: Eurostat.
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Table 4 Average gross monthly nominal wage, Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Slovakia (euros*)
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 1st 
quarter
Hungary 
(HUF) 
706.7 655.7 682.6 708.4 721.4 726.5 746 
Czech 
Republic 
(CZK) 
905.6 883 943.8 994.5 966.6 997 902 
Slovakia 
(EUR) 
723 744.5 769 786 805 824 821 
Note: * Calculations based on the tables ‘Average gross monthly nominal wage’ and ‘Exchange rate’. 
Figure 11 Growth of average gross nominal wage in national currency, national 
economy (%)
Source: Eurostat.
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Figure 12 Growth of average gross nominal wage in euros, Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Slovakia (%)
In Hungary nominal wage growth in 2009, 2011 and 2012 and (almost) 
in 2013 matched the wage growth proposal of the national-level social 
partners; in 2010 the wage increase was slightly less than that proposed.14 
Since 2008 the effects of exchange rates on wages may be observed 
only in Hungary and the Czech Republic (as Slovakia has entered the 
euro zone). The difference in the development of wages in the national 
currency and the euro was particularly salient following the outbreak of 
the crisis in 2009. In 2009 the growth of average gross nominal wages 
in national currency was 3.4 per cent in Hungary and 3.3 per cent in 
Czech Republic, while wages converted into euros fell by 7 per cent in 
Hungary and 2.5 per cent in the Czech Republic, indicating wage depre-
14. The National Interest Reconciliation Council –in which the annual wage growth proposal 
agreements were reached– was abolished in 2011. The new body, the Standing Consultative 
Forum for the Private Sector and the Government (VKF) made a wage proposal for 2014. For 
2013 they did not provide a specifi c fi gure, but only referred to the need to maintain the real 
value of wages during wage bargaining at companies.
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ciation (and so of labour costs) in euros;15 something similar happened 
in 2012.
Golden wage rule – regulatory tool for the euro zone
In the euro zone – that is, within a monetary union, an economic area 
without exchange rates – nominal wage setting plays a crucial role in 
driving or preventing macroeconomic imbalances. Competitiveness 
is about prices, especially of tradable goods. There is some scope for 
governments to infl uence price-setting (for instance, by breaking up or 
regulating monopolistic structures), but it is rather limited. Empirically 
(price) infl ation in a country is closely correlated to changes in unit la-
bour costs (the growth of money wages minus the rate of productivity 
growth). To a considerable extent, wages are agreed collectively in most 
European countries. Thus money wages are a decisive lever. Used intel-
ligently, (nominal) wage policy can help to correct existing imbalances. 
All that is required, in theory, is to follow a simple rule, the ‘golden wage 
rule’ of monetary unions: the rate of nominal wage growth should be 
lower than indicated by the above formula in defi cit countries and higher 
in surplus countries, so as to bring countries back into equilibrium. This 
wage norm – nominal wage growth in each country equals medium-term 
national productivity growth, plus the target infl ation rate of the central 
bank, plus/minus a competitiveness correction in surplus/defi cit coun-
tries – can be seen as the ‘golden rule’ of a monetary union. There is one 
important caveat: in applying this rule, negative nominal wage growth 
(that is, pay cuts) in defi cit countries should be avoided in order to pre-
vent the risk of defl ation (Watt 2010). The ‘golden rule’ as regulatory 
tool for the euro zone has been promoted by the European Trade Un-
ion Confederation (ETUC) as a target for wage bargaining. Among the 
three countries in focus here, only Slovakia is a member of the euro zone, 
adopting the euro as its national currency in January 2009. Neverthe-
less, we also look at the other two countries in terms of the ‘golden rule’.
The crisis hit the three countries hard in 2009. Therefore, according to 
the ‘golden rule’, both in Slovakia and in the Czech Republic a pay cut 
would have been expected to take place and almost zero growth in Hun-
gary. Instead, there were nominal wage increases (in national currency): 
15. In 2009 in both countries – particularly in Hungary - the national currencies were signifi -
cantly depreciated. In 2008 in Hungary the average HUF/EUR annual exchange rate was 
HUF 251.5, rising to 280.3 HUF/EUR in 2009, while in the Czech Republic the exchange 
rate for 1 euro was CZK 24.9 in 2008 and CZK 26.4 in 2009. 
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in Hungary by 3.4 per cent, in the Czech Republic by 3.3 per cent and in 
Slovakia by 3 per cent. 
Concerning Slovakia the biggest gap between the required wage growth 
according to the ‘golden rule’ and wage development was in 2011: in-
stead of wage growth of 6.1 per cent wage growth of 2.2 per cent took 
place. In 2012 the situation was not much better: instead of wage growth 
of 5.7 per cent wage growth was 2.4 per cent. In 2013 in place of an in-
crease of 4.3 per cent, wage growth of 2.4 per cent occurred. That is, in 
Slovakia – after entering the euro zone – with the exception of one year 
(2009) wage increases were far less than the wage development required 
by the ‘golden rule’.
Gross real GDP and real wage growth
Following the outbreak of the crisis in 2009 real GDP decreased signifi -
cantly – well above the EU28 average – in all three countries, although 
after 2009 they recovered quickly. In sum, in these countries the cri-
sis only had a short-term effect on GDP. Among the three countries the 
worst real GDP growth rate was observed in Hungary (–6.8 per cent). 
Real wage development did not follow GDP with the same intensity. In 
Hungary in 2009, indeed, we observed a decrease in the real wage, but of 
only 0.8 per cent. The harsh GDP decline in 2009 had its (delayed) effect 
in 2010: in this year the gross monthly real wage in Hungary decreased 
by 2.6 per cent. 
Similarly, in 2012 Hungary and the Czech Republic faced a drop – al-
though not so intensive as in 2009 – in real GDP (–1.7 and –1 per cent, 
respectively) and a lower real wage decrease (–0.3 per cent in Hungary 
and –0.6 per cent in the Czech Republic). In the Czech Republic the real 
wage fall had a delayed effect in 2013 (–1.6 per cent), too.
Table 5 Wage development required by the ‘golden rule’ (%; productivity + 
infl ation)
Golden rule 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Hungary 8.6 0.6 5.2 4.3 8.6 2.6
Czech Republic 6.7 -0.9 2.9 3.9 2.6 1.2
Slovakia 6.2 -1.4 5.1 6.1 5.7 4.3
Source: Eurostat.
As we can see, the decrease of real GDP did not cause the same volume 
of wage decrease: not least because of the (downward) infl exibility of 
wages. This – the mitigating effect – and also the delayed effect depend 
on wage bargaining practice and effi ciency.
In the recovery period Slovakia experienced relatively major real GDP 
growth (4.4 per cent in 2010 and 3 per cent in 2011) and lower real wage 
growth of 2.5 per cent in 2010 and a wage decline (–1.9 per cent) in 2011. 
The Czech real GDP growth rate was 2.5 per cent in 2010 and 1.8 per cent 
in 2011, the wage increase also in this case was less than GDP growth, 
that is 1 per cent (2010) and 0.4 per cent (2011). Hungarian GDP growth 
was 1.1 per cent (2010) and 1.6 per cent (2011). In 2010 – as we have 
already seen – Hungary faced a real wage fall (–2.4 per cent) and in 2011 
only a slight increase (1.3 per cent). 
Real wage growth was slightly higher than real GDP growth in Hungary 
in 2008 and 2013 and in 2009 and 2012 the wage fall was less than the 
fall in GDP. In the Czech Republic and Slovakia the same happened in 
2009: wages slightly increased, while GDP fell. Further, in the Czech Re-
public in 2012 the wage fall was slightly less than the decrease in GDP. 
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Figure 13 Real GDP growth rate (%)
Source: Eurostat.
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The real wage increase in general was less than GDP growth and a de-
layed effect was not observed. This shows the upward and downward 
infl exibility of wages (see the well-known phenomenon of wage ‘sticki-
ness’), but also the bargaining power of the social partners. 
Role of the mandatory minimum wage
In all three countries there is a statutory minimum wage. In the Czech 
Republic the minimum wage is set by the government, while in Hungary 
it has been – with the exception of a few years – set by tripartite nego-
tiations and made binding by government regulation. In Slovakia the 
minimum wage is subject to tripartite negotiations, but the institutional 
mechanism is such that the government may take unilateral action if the 
social partners do not reach an agreement. 
Figure 14 Gross monthly real wage, Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia (%)
Note: Calculations based on tables: ‘Growth of average gross nominal wage in national currency’ and 
Eurostat..
?3
?2
?1
0
1
2
3
4
5
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Hungary Czech?R. Slovakia
Szilvia Borbély and László Neumann
190 Wage bargaining under the new European Economic Governance
Table 6 Minimum wage setting
Czech Republic Slovakia Hungary
National minimum 
wage
Statutory national 
minimum wage – no 
change since 1991
Statutory national 
minimum wage 
Statutory national 
minimum wage since 
1989; since 1992 
revised annually
Minimum wage 
setting
Set by government 
since 1991.
The government de-
termines the amount 
of the monthly or 
hourly minimum wage 
(not the amount of 
a minimum wage 
increase). 
In some years the na-
tional minimum wage 
was set by agreement 
but extended and 
made binding by law 
(1993–1996; 1991–
2001; 2006–2007) 
or set by government 
decree (1997–1998; 
2002–2005; 
2008–2012).
2012: as the social 
partners were not 
able to agree on 
an increase in the 
minimum wage, the 
government decided 
unilaterally.
1992–2011 national 
minimum wage set by 
tripartite negotiations 
in National Inter-
est Reconciliation 
Council.
In July 2011 the 
National Interest 
Reconciliation Council 
was abolished and 
the new body – the 
National Economic 
and Social Council 
– has only right of 
proposal. Government 
decree 390/2012 (20 
December) fi xed the 
minimum wage valid 
in 2013. 
 
2013: national mini-
mum wage for 2014 
negotiated in the 
tripartite body for the 
private sector (VKF) 
and made binding by 
government regula-
tion (government 
decree 483/2013. 
XII. 17).
Source: ICTWSS database version 4.0. (2013), 2011.
The statutory minimum wage in all three countries is far below those 
of the EU15 member states, such as the United Kingdom (1 301 euros a 
month in 2014) and France (1 445 euros a month in 2014), but also lower 
than in Poland (404 euros a month in 2014 or Slovenia (789 euros a 
month in 2014, according to Eurostat). However, purchasing power par-
ity data and the Kaitz index (minimum wage as a proportion of average 
monthly earnings) highlight the differences across the three countries. 
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The 2012 hike in Hungary refl ects the above-mentioned changes in taxa-
tion; the elimination of the tax-credit was compensated by increasing 
the gross minimum wage, although the net value of the minimum wage 
remained unchanged. 
In the Czech Republic 2.3 per cent, in Hungary 4.4 per cent and in Slova-
kia 4.7 per cent of employees earned less than 105 per cent of the month-
ly minimum wage (October 2010, source: Eurostat). 
3. Institutional framework of collective wage bargaining
3.1 National level: fading role of tripartite negotiations
In central and eastern Europe the institution of tripartite social dialogue 
(between government, trade unions and employers’ organisations) plays 
a more important role than collective bargaining and other forms of bi-
partite social dialogue. These bodies were created at the beginning of the 
transition process – that is, at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of 
the 1990s – to serve as forums for consultation and negotiation on pro-
grammes for restructuring national economies on the ruins of the com-
munist regime. According to the ILO they helped governments to un-
Table 7 Statutory minimum wage and the Kaitz index 
2008 (2) 2009 (2) 2010 (2) 2011 (2) 2012 (3) 2013 (1) 2014 (4)
Minimum wage, EUR
Hungary 274 255 267 279 322 330 328
Czech 
Republic 
335 309 311 326 326 332 310
Slovakia 269 296 308 317 327 337 352
Kaitz index, per cent (5)
Hungary 38.8 38.3 38.0 38.6 42.5 43.3 –
Czech 
Republic 
40.6 39.1 36.3 35.5 37.8 38.2 –
Slovakia 33.6 35.7 36.0 36.1 35.6 36.0 –
Sources: (1) Eurostat (online data code: earn_mw_cur), (2) ILO Global Wage Database - 2012, (3) 
Deloitte: European salary survey 2013 European employer pays for the crisis, 4th edition of the 
European Salary Survey, p. 51 and Deloitte: European salary survey 2012, 3d edition, p. 18 and 
Deloitte: European salary survey 2012, 3d edition, p. 5, (4) Eurostat, (5) Eurostat. 
dertake painful economic reforms and pass laws (although some of the 
latter reduced employees’ rights from the communist era) without major 
unrest. Also, they enabled the social partners to access information on 
government reform plans and thus to participate in shaping them, while 
at the same time attaining legitimacy and recognition as partners in so-
cial dialogue (Casale et al. 2001). However, the evaluation of tripartism 
in the academic literature is far from positive; it is enough on this point 
to cite the widespread term ‘illusory corporatism’ coined by David Ost 
(2000).
In the Czech Republic, the Rada hospodářské a sociální dohody (Coun-
cil for Economic and Social Accord, RHSD) is the tripartite forum at 
national level. It was created at federal (Czechoslovakia) and national 
level (Czech and Slovak) in October 1990. The break-up of Czechoslo-
vakia made no substantial difference; tripartism continued through 
the Czech and Slovak bodies. The RHSD also provided legitimacy for 
the social partners, especially for employers’ organisations, which were 
rudimentary at fi rst. This is because on the union side most federa-
tions of the old union movement joined the newly founded ČSKOS in 
March 1990. Thus, in contrast to Hungary’s trade union pluralism, the 
Czech (and Slovak) unions could more or less preserve the unity of the 
movement (Myant 2000). For instance, KOZ SR, the major Slovakian 
confederation, brought together 28 sectoral trade union federations in 
2010, organising 96 per cent of trade unionists in the country (Cziria 
2013). Not incidentally, tripartite negotiations were more important for 
trade unions in Hungary where from 1988 the Országos Érdekegyeztető 
Tanács (National Council for the Reconciliation of Interests, OÉT) pro-
vided the institutional framework. In all three countries the relevant 
bodies’ consultative agenda embraced a wide range of issues beyond the 
traditional collective bargaining issues, such as macroeconomic, em-
ployment, incomes and social policy. In Slovakia the government and 
social partners concluded seven tripartite General Agreements (‘social 
pacts’) between 1991 and 2000, dealing with major economic and social 
reforms. 
However, the signifi cance of tripartite forums has always been subject 
to the willingness of governments to enter into negotiations. All three 
countries witnessed several political ‘ebbs and fl ows’, the common pat-
tern being that right-wing governments withdrew from tripartite negoti-
ations, while left-wing successors restored the functions of these bodies. 
For instance, in the early 1990s in the Czech Republic a series of ‘general 
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agreements’ played a major role, which provided a framework for col-
lective bargaining. Between 1995 and 1997, however, the Vaclav Klaus 
government restricted the agenda of tripartite dialogue, created a new 
body and no further general agreement was concluded. A similar restric-
tion and revival cycle took place in 2012–2014, when fi rst the discon-
tented trade unions abandoned tripartite talks and then the incoming 
government restored them. In Slovakia tripartite consultation was also 
reduced, and its structures were changed during the period of the cen-
tre-right government between 2004 and 2006. Nonetheless, following 
the 2006 election the Economic and Social Partnership Council (RHSP) 
was re-established and became merely a consultative body making rec-
ommendations to the government and no further General Agreement 
was concluded (Cziria 2013). In Hungary, between 1998 and 2002 the 
fi rst Orbán government similarly reorganised the tripartite body, but the 
successor socialist government returned to its original function and in-
stitutional framework. However, the socialist-led government later also 
weakened OÉT when it established a parallel body, the Economic and 
Social Council (GSZT), which also included civil society organisations, 
economic chambers and other organisations. With the landslide right-
wing election victory in 2010 the second Orbán government eliminated 
the standing tripartite forum (OÉT) and replaced it with a quarterly 
convened representative consulting council which includes – apart from 
the earlier members of the GSZT – churches and ethnic Hungarians in 
the adjoining countries. The situation changed again in February 2012, 
when a new tripartite body, the Standing Consultative Forum for the 
Private Sector and the Government (VKF) was set up to discuss employ-
ment issues on the initiative of the social partners. However, only three 
confederations on each side of the social partners have been invited to 
participate in this new body and its role is more limited than the former 
OÉT.
The 2008–2010 economic crisis and austerity packages in connection 
with macroeconomic stabilisation and convergence with the euro re-
gime were a great challenge for tripartite bodies. During the crisis, which 
hit all three countries hard, at most there were consultations on gov-
ernment anti-crisis measures in the three countries, conducted in ac-
cordance with established consultative routine. The crisis even brought 
temporary improvements in tripartite negotiations; for instance, in 
Slovakia a special body, the Council for Economic Crisis, operated for 
a couple of months (Kahancová 2013). However, there was no coordi-
nated response and a lack of consensus on the measures taken in these 
countries, which indicated the overall weakness and fading role of tri-
partite institutions.16 
Despite the tripartite bodies’ consultative nature, their role in wage de-
termination cannot be underestimated. This holds in particular for set-
ting the national minimum wage. In the Czech Republic the minimum 
wage was increased annually by the government after consultation with 
employers and unions from 1998 until 2007, but after the crisis it was 
frozen until 2013. In Slovakia the minimum wage is set annually fol-
lowing discussions in the tripartite HSR between the unions, employers 
and government. However, the government can set the rate if the three 
parties cannot agree.17 Nowadays a similar regulation on unilateral gov-
ernment intervention is in force in Hungary, too, although it does not 
include any rule on the calculation of the minimum wage. Nonetheless, 
from 1990 to 1998 and from 2002 to 2010, formally, the three parties’ 
unanimous decision was needed in the OÉT, and afterwards the govern-
ment issued a decree in line with the decision. This was the only binding 
agreement concluded in the body. The OÉT (and its successor the VKF) 
also issued an annual recommendation for an average wage increase to 
provide ‘orientation’ for lower level bargaining. Participation in mini-
mum wage setting was particularly important for Hungarian unions, as 
it somewhat compensated for trade union weakness in sectoral and com-
pany-level bargaining. There were several years before the crisis when 
the minimum wage increase was far higher than the level that unions 
could successfully bargain at companies, especially in low-wage indus-
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16. See, for instance, Bohle (2011) on the Hungarian case. The expected consensus with the 
social partners, a comprehensive general agreement (practically a western European–style 
social pact) could not be achieved in these countries. According to Meardi (2011): ‘In the 
Visegrád countries (Poland, Czech and Slovak Republics, and Hungary), … public debt (and 
to a lesser extent infl ation) is an open problem, but governments have opted, rather than for 
social pacts, for two opposite strategies: unilateral enforcement of macroeconomic conver-
gence, at the cost of electoral defeat (Slovakia, Poland and Czech Republic) or a Maastricht-
ignoring euro deferral in order to ensure political survival (Hungary). Even more than in the 
West, then, EMU entry and socio-political stability are mutually irreconcilable: you cannot 
satisfy at the same time the electorate on one side, and international fi nancial institutions on 
the other – unless you have an instrument to involve society in the reforms, and make the 
latter acceptable. This is what social pacts were meant to offer, and why governments should 
have looked for support from the social partners. However, this has not happened. Social 
pacts did not occur, or they occurred in one-sided, ineffective ways.’ 
17.  The law consists of a formula for a government-set minimum wage: the new level should be 
an arithmetical product of the current minimum wage and the index of the annual growth 
of the average monthly nominal wage in the previous year. Changes in 2008 allowed the 
government to set a level above this calculated minimum. Nevertheless, due to the impact 
of the economic crisis, the government did not exercise the option to increase its level above 
the calculated minimum until 2013.
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tries. The national agreement to some extent substituted for the lack of 
established wage levels tied to qualifi cation and experience in collective 
agreements, too; from 2007 a special minimum rate was established for 
skilled workers and a recommendation for employees with a university 
degree. Similarly, in Slovakia the mandatory minimum wage is set for 12 
different levels.
3.2 Legal background of collective bargaining
All post-socialist countries introduced new Labour Codes in the early 
1990s as part of the project to create the institutions of a market econo-
my. Dismantling the socialist system meant that trade unions lost some 
of their former prerogatives, but at the same time new fundamental 
rights were established – sometimes in the Constitution – such as free-
dom of association, freedom to take strike action and freedom of collec-
tive bargaining. For instance in the Czech Republic common legal provi-
sions on collective bargaining were laid down in the course of general 
social reforms. Act 2/1991 on Collective Bargaining regulates collective 
labour relations in both the private and the public sector and has not 
been substantially modifi ed. The Act regulates collective negotiations 
between the social partners and requirements and procedures with re-
gard to concluding collective agreements, as well as collective disputes 
(Kuncová 2010). Although it has been amended many times, the same 
law (Act No. 2/1991) regulates collective bargaining and confl ict resolu-
tion in Slovakia. Similarly, in Hungary the 1992 Labour Code regulated 
such issues in the private sector, but in part of the public sector collec-
tive bargaining – where it is allowed at all – is regulated by a separate 
Act. In this section we cannot follow the fairly numerous amendments of 
these laws, only highlight the most important issues concerning labour 
law reform that have emerged in more than one country in recent years.
Flexibility is probably the most frequent buzzword in labour law reforms, 
especially in legislative changes implemented in the course of the crisis. 
However, since the mid-1990s in Hungary a series of legislative changes 
have gradually made greater fl exibility possible in working time arrange-
ments, provided that it is negotiated at industry or company level. For 
instance, the reference period of working time accounts was increased by 
collective agreement and in this way annualised working time has been 
allowed since 2001. The 2012 new Labour Code went further, in cer-
tain cases, allowing greater fl exibility without collective agreements, by 
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unilateral management decision. In Slovakia also changes in the Labour 
Code made employment conditions more fl exible. Since March 2009, the 
Labour Code has allowed the implementation of ‘fl exikontos’ (working 
time accounts) which, on one hand, help employers to meet fl uctuating 
market demand and, on the other hand, helped to maintain employment 
during the economic crisis. As a crisis measure it was initially applica-
ble until the end of 2012 but further amendments to the Labour Code 
allowed its continued implementation (Cziria 2013). Employment fl ex-
ibility was also fostered by other tools, for instance, by introducing job 
sharing, abolishing redundancy payments to employees working during 
their notice period and extending the period for fi xed-term employment 
contracts. Following the crisis, however, from 2013 Labour Code amend-
ments introduced more favourable terms for employees taking redun-
dancy and shortened the maximum period for fi xed-term employment 
contracts by one year.
Possible deviation from the law and from the higher level agreement 
is another fi eld of reforms also related to the fl exibility issue. While to 
begin with all countries adopted the German ‘favourability principle’ –
company agreements may only improve on what has been stipulated by 
law or negotiated at industry level – legislation later gradually relaxed 
this rule. In Slovakia amendments to the Labour Code introduced by 
the centre-right government in 2011 permitted collective agreements to 
worsen legal provisions in some areas, such as probation periods and 
overtime arrangements. However, the government elected in 2012 re-
jected these changes. Probably the new Hungarian Labour Code (2012) 
made the most radical changes in this respect; by default, it allows any 
kind of deviation from the law in terms of individual employment rela-
tions, unless the law explicitly prohibits it (by enumerating such excep-
tional conditions at the end of each section of the law).
Bargaining authorisation of trade unions and, sometimes, of works 
councils. Initially the countries’ Labour Codes considered collective bar-
gaining a basic trade union right; only trade unions had such rights. In 
the Czech Republic the 2001 amendment introduced works councils in 
undertakings in which there is no trade union organisation. While in 
the Czech Republic works councils have only subsidiary status to the 
trade unions, the latter maintaining a bargaining ‘monopoly’, in Slova-
kia –from January 2012 – works councils also had negotiating rights 
where there was no union present. Works councils could conclude agree-
ments covering the same areas as a collective agreement. In Hungary 
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the Labour Code amendment that came into effect in 2012 also allowed 
works councils – which otherwise cannot organise strikes and have a 
very limited ability to infl uence employers – to negotiate agreements 
with the employer, where there is no union authorized to bargain at the 
workplace. The one important exception is that these agreements cannot 
cover pay. This is virtually a return to the position under an earlier right-
wing government when works councils were given negotiating rights at 
company level, where there were no unions present – something that 
was reversed by the socialist government in 2002.
Criteria concerning trade union representativeness/authorisation to 
bargain/union pluralism have been changed several times, too. Accord-
ing to the Czech and Slovak Labour Codes the preferred solution for un-
ion pluralism is to negotiate with a joint body if unions agree; otherwise 
the biggest union has to be recognised as bargaining partner. However, 
in the Czech Republic legislation which stated that an employer could 
negotiate with the largest union at a workplace, where there were several 
and they could not agree, was ruled unconstitutional by the Constitu-
tional Court in March 2008. In Hungary between 1992 and 2012 union 
rights to negotiate depended on their candidates’ support in works coun-
cil elections. A union needed to get 10 per cent of the votes in the works 
council elections to be entitled to negotiate. Local agreements could be 
signed by a coalition of unions in the workplace, provided that together 
they had the support of at least 50 per cent of the workforce – a measure 
which encouraged the creation of local union coalitions. If a single union 
had more than 65 per cent support, it could sign the agreements alone. 
However, here again the Labour Code has made changes. According to 
the 2012 Labour Code, now trade unions can conclude collective agree-
ments at company level only if their membership exceeds 10 per cent of 
those employed at the company. The same 10 per cent rule also applies 
to industry-level agreements: unions must cover 10 per cent of those 
employed in the industry to be able to reach an agreement. Setting the 
representativeness threshold at an even higher level (30 per cent) was on 
the agenda in Slovakia for a while before the 2012 election. 
Trade union protection, support and other rights have also emerged on 
the legislative agenda. While in Hungary in 2011–2012 legislation sub-
stantially undermined unions’ operating conditions (legal protection, 
time-off, essential services during strikes, fi nancial support) and curbed 
trade union rights in the workplace (Nacsa and Neumann 2013), it is 
noteworthy that in the Czech Republic even under right-wing govern-
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ments there has been no signifi cant attempt to reduce existing legal pro-
tection of employee or trade union rights (Myant 2013).
Re-regulation of extension procedure is another area of state interven-
tion. In the Czech Republic the rules on extending industry-level col-
lective agreements were revised in 2004, following the ruling by the 
Constitutional Court. Under the revised procedure, requests to extend 
collective agreements must be made jointly by the largest union and 
the largest employers’ association in the industry. The extended agree-
ments do not apply to companies employing fewer than 20 employees. 
In Slovakia the regulations have changed three times in the past dec-
ade (European Commission 2013). The centre-right governments in 
power from 2002 to 2006 and from 2010 to 2012 required the consent 
of the employer concerned before an agreement could be extended; in 
other words, they gave the individual employer a clear veto. However, 
the social democrat-led government, in offi ce between 2006 and 2010, 
changed the procedure, allowing an extension provided this was re-
quested by one or both of the parties (unions and employers), with the 
fi nal decision being taken by the government following discussions in 
the tripartite consultative committee. According to legislation entering 
into effect on 1 January 2014, extension would be possible again without 
the consent of the employer. Fundamentally, the different opinions of 
trade unions and employers on the extension of collective agreements 
resulted in frequent legislative changes; nonetheless these changes were 
usually related to the political orientation of the government, too.
Legislation may also change the possible scope of collective agreements. 
In Hungary the new Labour Code introduced signifi cant restrictions on 
what can be negotiated in state and local government owned companies. 
In many areas – working time, severance pay, notice periods, industrial 
relations issues including trade union representatives’ rights, protection 
and time-off – it is not permitted for a collective agreement to include 
terms that improve on the minimum set out by law.
Since the 1990s in all three countries governments have intervened di-
rectly and sometimes strongly in wage bargaining; for example, in Slova-
kia with regard to extension rules and in Hungary to reshape bargaining 
authorisation and the scope of collective agreements, as already men-
tioned. With regard to other labour issues statutory regulations (Labour 
Code) also come before social partner negotiations. As a consequence, 
for example, EU-level social partner autonomous agreements are imple-
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mented by law rather than by negotiations between the social partners. 
Nowadays the extent of government intervention in wage bargaining 
seems to be lowest in the Czech Republic. In the other two countries the 
government has recently infl uenced wage bargaining in various ways.
3.3 Collective bargaining structures and coverage 
The main measures concerning collective bargaining are fairly similar in 
the three countries; for instance, the ICTWSS database fi gures and scores 
differ only slightly. Employer-organisation and trade-union density, as 
well as collective agreement coverage are highest in the Czech Republic, 
lowest in Hungary. (It is worth noting that the claimed 40 per cent den-
sity of employers’ organisations in Hungary is not a realistic fi gure; no 
Table 8 Major collective bargaining indicators in Czech Republic, Slovakia and 
Hungary
Employer 
organi-
sation 
density
Employ-
ees’ or-
ganisation 
density
Collective 
agreement 
coverage
Dominant 
level of 
bargain-
ing
Coordi-
nation 
of wage 
setting
Govern-
ment in-
tervention 
in wage 
bargain-
ing
Czech Republic 35.0 17.3 40.9 Local or 
company
2 2
Slovakia 29.2 16.7 35.0 Inter-
mediate 
(sector and 
company)
2 3
Hungary 40.0 16.0 33.5 Local or 
company
2 3
Notes: 
Coordination scores:
2 = mixed industry and fi rm-level bargaining, with no or little pattern bargaining and relatively weak 
elements of government coordination through the setting of basic pay rates (statutory minimum 
wage) or wage indexation.
Government intervention scores:
3 = the government infl uences wage bargaining outcomes indirectly through price-ceilings, indexa-
tion, tax measures, minimum wages, and/or pattern setting through public sector wages;
2 = the government infl uences wage bargaining by providing an institutional framework of consulta-
tion and information exchange, by conditional agreement to extend private sector agreements, and/
or by providing confl ict resolution.
Source: ICTWSS database version 4.0. (2013), 2011.
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survey has endorsed this estimate.) While density rates have decreased 
markedly over the past two decades, bargaining structures have hardly 
changed over time. Nonetheless, the major difference is Slovakia; here 
sectoral agreements play a more important role than in the two other 
countries. The minimum annual wage increase in many sectors is set by 
multi-employer collective agreement. Despite the prevailing decentrali-
sation trend, in Slovakia during the crisis sectoral bargaining remained 
intact despite employers’ attempts to opt out from sectoral bargaining, 
calling for ‘tailor-made anti-crisis measures’. In the Czech Republic and 
Hungary bargaining has taken place predominantly at company level. 
A similar picture can be seen on the EIRO webpage, showing centralisa-
tion and coordination together:
– Czech Republic: intermediate (centralisation), low coordination
– Slovakia: intermediate (centralisation), medium level of coordina-
tion
– Hungary: decentralised bargaining, low coordination
Country sources have detailed information on the number of agreements 
concluded at different levels and their coverage, although it is diffi cult 
to harmonise the statistics due to methodological problems (see Box/
Annex). In the Czech Republic the number of sectoral agreements con-
cluded has not changed much since 2008 but there has been a substan-
tial increase at company level.
Table 9 Number of collective agreements in the Czech Republic
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Number of sectoral 
agreements
18 18 18 18 19 19
Number of 
company level 
agreements
3 155 3 082 4 812 4 904 4 680 4 739
Note: The data are for CMKOS members only. In 2013 there were fi ve other higher level collective 
agreements concluded by trade unions that are not members of CMKOS.
Source: CMKOS (2013): Zpráva o prubehu kolektivního vyjednávání na vyšším stupni a na podnikové 
úrovni v roce 2013 (Progress report on higher-level and company-level collective bargaining in 
2013). Document discussed at the CMKOS Assembly, Prague, 19 November 2013.
˚ 




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Coverage fi gures also come from ČMKOS, the country’s largest union 
confederation. In 2012, 34 per cent of the workforce was covered by 
4,655 agreements signed by ČMKOS affi liates at company level and 16 
per cent by 19 higher level (sectoral) agreements. (There is an uncon-
trolled overlap between the two groups. ČMKOS fi gures do not take into 
account fi ve agreements signed by other confederations.) The Czech Sta-
tistical Offi ce also calculated coverage rates for employers with at least 
10 employees. According to the survey, 37.7 per cent of all employees 
were covered by collective bargaining in 2011, although the position of 
29.7 per cent was unclear. According to this source, collective bargaining 
coverage has declined continuously, from 49.2 per cent in 2005 to 41.2 
per cent in 2009.
In Slovakia the number of industry-level collective agreements (high-
er level collective agreements) was 28, while eight agreements were 
amended in 2012. Previously, the number of registered collective agree-
ments, including their supplements to previously concluded agreements 
(usually concerning wages), decreased, from 37 agreements in 2008 to 
33 agreements in 2010 and 23 in 2012 (fi gures provided by Ministry of 
Labour – MPSVR SR – based on compulsory registration of such agree-
ments). According to KOZ SR, the major union confederation, the over-
all coverage of sectoral collective agreements is falling because employ-
ers are leaving employers’ associations. Company surveys by Trexima 
also show that the proportion of organisations covered by higher level 
agreements fell slightly between 2008 and 2011, from 40.4 per cent to 
38.1 per cent. 
At company level the surveys also show declining coverage. Between 
2008 and 2011 the proportion of organisations with a company-level 
collective agreement fell from 35.8 per cent to 34.1 per cent. Nonethe-
less, this is well below the fi gure for 2004, which was 50.3 per cent. Ac-
cording to Švec (2013), ‘a gradual decline of the representativeness of 
trade unions and employers’ associations can be observed. The reason 
behind the latter is an ongoing degradation of employers’ associations. … 
Gradually, collective bargaining is moving to the enterprise level, where 
the employers are stronger compared with the sectoral level. The trend 
of founding so-called “yellow” trade unions by employers is increasing, 
especially in companies where traditional trade unions already exist and 
the creation of direct competition with the support of the employer is 
damaging the overall image of trade unions in the company.’ However, 
according to other researchers, there is enormous variation across sec-
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tors with regard to the importance of sectoral bargaining coordination. 
In important sectors such as the metal industry the two bargaining levels 
are complementary; it does not make sense to argue for the prevalence of 
either sectoral or company-level (Kahancová 2013).
In Hungary the offi cial number of registered agreements and their cov-
erage did not change between 2008 and 2013. (The coverage fi gures of 
different levels cannot be added in Table 10 because of the overlaps be-
tween the agreements.) However, earlier fi gures on agreements regis-
tered with the Centre for Social Dialogue indicate that collective bargain-
ing coverage fell by 14 percentage points between 2001 and 2012 – from 
47 per cent to 33 per cent. The majority of agreements were for a single 
employer. Almost two-thirds of these agreements were for employers in 
the public sector, although, in terms of the numbers of employees cov-
ered, the proportions are reversed. Figures on multi-employer agree-
ments contain both sectoral ones and agreements concluded by a few 
companies together. There are only 19 genuine industry-level agree-
ments – that is, concluded by employers’ organisations – and despite 
past efforts by previous governments to strengthen industry-level bar-
gaining, there is no indication that the number is likely to increase. The 
prevailing attitude of employers is a reluctance to join employers’ or-
ganisations or to authorise them to conclude industry agreements. Simi-
lar to the Czech Republic, however, another data source, the Hungarian 
Central Statistical Offi ce, produced much lower coverage fi gures. In the 
2009 Labour Force Survey respondents were asked whether their wages 
or employment conditions were affected by a collective agreement and 
only 22 per cent answered positively (although a quarter of respondents 
said they did not know). 
Table 10 Number of collective agreements and their coverage in Hungary
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Number of multi-employ-
er agreements 
80 82 81 81 83 80
Coverage of multi-em-
ployer agreements, %
19.13 20.43 19.86 19.94 19.34 19.13
Number of single em-
ployer agreements
2 737 2 683 2 706 2 707 2 681 2 683
Coverage of single em-
ployer agreements, %
20.80 23.20 27.18 23.52 25,05 24.24
Source: Collective agreement registry, Centre for Social Dialogue.
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The use of the extension procedure changes bargaining coverage some-
what. This phenomenon is probably most remarkable in Slovakia, due 
the recent twists and turns in its legal regulations (although no updated 
statistics are available on the coverage effect of extension). According to 
the MPSVR SR, in 2009 there were fi ve extensions, but in 2010–2013 
none of the multi-employer collective agreements was extended. In 2012 
there was no extension either; the Ministry did not receive any joint writ-
ten proposal from parties to an agreement. In the Czech Republic the 
number of employers and employees covered by industry-level agree-
ments has shown greater fl uctuations, in part because of changes in the 
legal rules allowing the government to extend them more widely.
In Hungary, extension has affected only four industries (construction, 
hotels and catering, electricity and baking) since 1992, when this pos-
sibility fi rst appeared in the Labour Code. The last decree on new exten-
sion was issued in 2006, for the construction industry, and then one of 
the oldest extensions was rejected by the employers in the baking indus-
try. According to expert estimates the employment effect of extensions 
has never exceeded 2 per cent of the labour force. 
Contrary to the above statistics, according to trade unions and research 
fi ndings, collective bargaining coverage, especially that of wage agree-
ments, fell during the economic crisis. In the Czech Republic during the 
crisis, cooperation between the social partners was preferred to save jobs 
and trade union wage claims were predominantly moderate. In Slovakia, 
according to the employers, the decline in coverage of agreements can 
Table 11 Eff ects of extension in the Czech Republic
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Number of employers 
whose agreements were 
extended
3 975 4 004 4 828 4 577 4 356 3 919
Number of employees at 
those employers
607 952 544 649 406 609 347 963 400 781 388 618
Note: Data are for CMKOS members only.
Source: Czech-Moravian Confederation of Trade Unions (Ceskomoravská konfederace odborových 
svazu, CMKOS): Zpráva o prubehu kolektivního vyjednávání na vyšším stupni a na podnikové úrovni v 
roce 2013 (Progress report on higher-level and company-level collective bargaining in 2013). Docu-
ment discussed at the CMKOS Assembly, Prague, 19 November 2013. 
˚


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be attributed to lower interest on the part of employers to sign up to 
multi-employer agreements, which increase their labour costs but can-
not fully guarantee social peace.18 Furthermore, while termination of 
existing agreements is not allowed, amendments are possible only by 
mutual agreement of the parties to the agreement.
A couple of case studies also investigated changes in wage bargaining 
during the 2008–2010 crisis. Myant (2013) found that in the Czech Re-
public decentralised collective bargaining, which had developed over the 
preceding decades, continued through the crisis, albeit with agreements 
that were less likely to include pay increases due to the strong pressure 
from managements for wage freezes or cuts. Workforces often accepted 
zero pay increases as preferable to reduced employment which, manage-
ments indicated, was the alternative. During the economic crisis there 
was a revival of the ‘Švarc system’ – replacement of regular employment 
by bogus self-employment – estimates of which range from 2 to 4 per 
cent of the labour force. According to Kahancová (2013), in Slovakia 
sectoral bargaining contributed to a balanced recovery from the crisis 
more than national-level social dialogue. Instead of accelerated decen-
tralisation, bargaining institutions remained stable during the crisis. In 
the metal industry, social partners shared an interest in adopting sector-
specifi c anti-crisis employment measures and therefore remained com-
mitted to bargaining coordination instead of opting out of sectoral deals. 
With regard to the bargaining outcome, the agreements tend to develop 
a sort of dual labour market, protecting skills and shifting the burden 
of falling production onto precarious and less unionised workers. Neu-
mann and Boda (2011) came up with similar fi ndings in Hungary, where 
company-level bargaining mainly protected the core workforce at the ex-
pense of more precarious workers at suppliers and agency workers. The 
latter lack union protection in the Czech Republic, too (Myant 2013). 
It seems to be a common trend that where bargaining is well-estab-
lished, there is an immediate shift towards protecting jobs of the core 
labour force at the expense of peripheral employees and pay increas-
es. The shifts in the bargaining agenda were also similar in the Czech 
18. This argument is legally valid; according to the Constitution, employees can go on strike at 
any time if their right to strike is guaranteed. In practice, however, trade unions fi nd it very 
diffi cult to organise because strike days are unpaid and employees have to cover their own 
health insurance contributions, which discourages many from taking part in strikes (espe-
cially in high-unemployment and low-income regions).
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Republic and Hungary: shortened working time and working time ac-
counts (fl exikonto) were the key issues. 
While the Czech Republic and Hungary are characterised by mixed in-
dustry and mostly fi rm-level bargaining, in Slovakia multi-employer and 
sectoral bargaining are well established and complement fi rm-level bar-
gaining. Their systems are uncoordinated, lacking pattern bargaining 
and government coordination is also relatively weak due to the statutory 
minimum wage. However, surprisingly little is known about the coordi-
nation of wage bargaining. Czech and Slovak sources often mention the 
favourability principle that strictly regulates the hierarchy of agreements 
and excludes opt-outs. This is declining in Hungary because labour legis-
lation increasingly allows deviations from the legal minimum, to the det-
riment of employees. Institutional coordination of wage bargaining has 
been operating in Hungary through the recommendations issued at na-
tional level. In Slovakia coordination of wage bargaining between most 
relevant sectors was initiated in 2013 via a new cross-industry bipartite 
social dialogue. It is assumed that informal practices are also used to co-
ordinate wage increases agreed at sectoral level, which takes actual wage 
levels in the covered companies into account. The agreed wage increases 
at sectoral level are thus often very low, which relieves the burden on 
employers, even in the car industry, with a wide wage gap between large 
multinationals such as VW and smaller supply fi rms. However, concern-
ing the other side of the bargaining table, sectoral studies reveal that Slo-
vakia has reasonably well established bargaining coordination through 
decent sectoral employers’ organisations (Kahancová 2013).
Interestingly none of the investigated countries witnessed changes due 
to the EU’s new economic governance regime (Euro pact or Euro plus 
pact.) At least, the responses to the EIRO questionnaire ‘Changes to 
wage-setting mechanisms in the context of the crisis and the EU’s new 
economic governance regime’ excluded such developments, even in eu-
ro-zone member state Slovakia.
4. Collectively agreed wages
4.1 Conceptual problems of ‘collectively agreed wages’
All three countries distinguish between collective agreements and wage 
agreements. This is most marked in Hungary: collective agreements are 
valid for 3–5 years or are concluded for an indefi nite period, while wage 
development is agreed annually and parties sign separate wage agree-
ments, although in theory their legal force is identical to collective agree-
ments. In the Czech Republic, agreements with stipulations on wage de-
velopment varied between 42 and 74 per cent, which is the highest share 
among the investigated countries. During the economic crisis employees 
were not offered wage increases and trade unions’ pursued wage mod-
eration with a view to saving jobs. Provisions for a company minimum 
wage are fairly rare. The number of such agreements decreased substan-
tially between 1993 and 2007, from 33.7 per cent to 27.7 per cent. Inter-
estingly, since 2008 a slight increase has been recorded. 
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Table 12 Collective agreements regulating wage developments in the Czech 
Republic (% of agreements)
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
65.5 68.6 66.4 74.0 59.2 42.4 56.1 59.7 59.4
Source: Informacný systém o pracovných podmienkach – ISPP (Information System on Working 
Conditions) issued by the Slovakian Ministry of Labour, Social Aff airs and Family (MPSVR SR) and 
Trexima 1993–2001, 2012, 2013. 
In Slovakia the Trexima survey allows us to estimate the share of wage 
agreements. Although the overlap between different levels of collective 
agreement cannot be taken into account, the survey clearly indicates the 
declining share of organisations with collective agreements during the 
crisis and the extremely low level (3.7–6.3 per cent) of agreements on 
wage increases. 

Table 13 Penetration of single and multi-employer collective agreements in 
Slovakia (% of organisations)
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Organisations with company-
level collective agreements
35.8 34.0 34.6 34.1 – 32.3
Organisations covered by 
multi-employer collective 
agreements
40.4 38.1 36.9 38.1 – –
Agreed average wage 
increase
36.7 23.5 27.2 13.5 – –
Agreed average nominal 
wage increase
6.3 5.4 3.5 3.7 – –
Source: Eurofound (2011), ISPP Slovakia 2013.
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The Hungarian case clearly shows the dramatic decline in the number 
and coverage of annual wage agreements between 2001 and 2008, es-
pecially in company-level bargaining. Unfortunately, there is a break in 
offi cial statistics at 2009, since when much higher fi gures are found. In 
recent years, data processing has been based on collective agreements’ 
‘provisions on wages’, which in practice means wage premiums for dif-
ferent working conditions (overtime, shift-work, on-call, work at week-
ends), and/or multipliers in collective agreement scales, although the 
latter is very rare in Hungarian collective agreements. Obviously this 
does not concern the annual wage agreement, which was registered un-
til 2008 and the focus of our scrutiny. Nonetheless, this statistical bias 
–which nobody appears to have noticed before– indicates that collec-
Table 14 Wage agreements and their coverage in private sector, Hungary*
Multi-employer agreements Single employer agreements
Number of 
agreements
Number of 
employers 
covered
% of employ-
ees covered
Number of 
agreements
% of employ-
ees covered
2001 19 181 3.6 471 13.7
2002 18 172 4.0 531 14.9
2003 22 243 4.7 545 16.8
2004 19 145 1.3 515 18.1
2005 40 145 1.8 298 8.8
2006 44 162 2.2 302 7.8
2007 40 147 1.7 214 8.9
2008 45 150 2.1 202 5.1
2009 62 2 350 10.5 785 20.7
2010 68 2 460 11.6 905 22.7
2011 68 2 199 9.7 888 22.5
2012 73 1 942 10.5 863 22.9
2013 74 1 096 8.8 874 23.2
Note: * Until 2008, the data relate to the number of ’wage agreements’ concerning the next year’s 
average wage increase, in the typical case. In and aft er 2009, the fi gures relate to stipulations within 
collective agreements, which aff ect the remuneration of workers (including long-term agreements 
on wage supplements, bonuses, premia, non-wage benefi ts and rights and responsibilities connected 
with wage payments).
Source: Collective agreement registry, Centre for Social Dialogue.
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tively agreed wages are far from being the focus of economic policy or 
academic interest in Hungary, despite the hype concerning ‘competi-
tiveness’. As mentioned in our methodological annex, the agreed values 
of wage agreements have not been processed since 2004. Interestingly, 
in the early 1990s wage agreement statistics were published because at 
that time governments were worried about wage infl ation, following the 
elimination of central administrative wage control inherited from state-
socialist economic governance. As to the other countries, collectively 
agreed wages are of most interest in the Czech Republic, while Slovakian 
statistics and economic analyses focus on labour cost development as a 
component of competitiveness. 
It is diffi cult to discuss collectively agreed wages in these countries. First 
of all, because annual wage agreements with wide coverage exist only in 
Table 15 Collectively agreed nominal wage increases in selected sectors (%)
Czech Republic Slovakia Hungary 
All Metal Civil 
service
All Metal Local 
govern-
ment
All, recommended 
range by OÉT/VKF
1999 8.2 7.9 11.1 – – – 12.0–15.0
2000 5.1 5.1 6.9 – – – 8.5–11.0
2001 5.2 5.3 14.6 – – – no agreement
2002 5.2 5.2 9.8 – – – 8–10.5
2003 4.1 4.1 8.5 – – – 4.5 real wage
2004 3.8 3.8 7.2 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0–8.0
2005 3.9 3.9 5.5 6.0 7.0 4.0 6.0
2006 3.9 4.0 5.1 5.8 5.8 6.4 4.0–5.0
2007 4.2 4.2 4.9 6.4 6.5 6.5 5.5–8.0
2008 5.4 5.8 4.1 6.3 7.1 4.4 5.0–7.5
2009 4.4 4.0 4.5 5.4 5.0 5.5 3.0–5.0
2010 3.1 2.8 4.2 3.5 3.5 1.7 0.0 real wage
2011 2.9 2.9 – 3.7 3.7 3.4 4.0–6.0
2012 2.8 2.8 – 3.6 3.6 2.8 no agreement
2013 2.8  –  – 3.5 – – 0.0 real wage
Source: Eurofound EurWork Collective wage bargaining database.
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the Czech Republic; their coverage is much narrower in the other coun-
tries. Second, the available data sources are not appropriate for the eval-
uation of agreed wage development, especially in Hungary since 2009. 
Nonetheless, the Czech and Slovak sources are suffi cient for indicating 
the annual agreed increase for the whole economy and for certain indus-
tries. Hungary is the most problematic case, as we know that the cover-
age of genuine wage bargaining at sectoral and company level is very 
small; moreover, the statistical data are missing or biased. That is why at 
most the annual wage increase recommendation can be used (typically 
a range of nominal or real increases), issued by the national tripartite 
forum. 
Box 1  Diff erent methodologies for collecting data on collective 
agreements and collectively agreed wages
In the Czech Republic the Ministry of Labour and Social Aff airs (MoLSA) annually 
publishes statistics on collective agreements (see: http://www.mpsv.cz/en/3390 or 
http://www.kolektivnismlouvy.cz/indexEN.html). The actual data provider is Trexima 
s. r. o., Zlín, which runs the Information System on Working Conditions (ISWC; Infor-
macní systém o pracovních podmínkách, ISPP). This system is not a full register; it is 
claimed to be a regular annual survey of wage and working conditions negotiated 
in collective agreements for the relevant year. However, the sample lacks any repre-
sentativeness criteria, thus the database is rather a collection of all available agree-
ments. The input data are basically entered into the system electronically by means of 
the acquisition programme EKS; in other words, the participating 25–27 trade unions 
themselves upload the data from their agreements. ISWC has been updated every year 
continuously since 1993, therefore ‘panels’ of collective agreements are available. The 
rest of the data come from direct collection of collective agreements. The data collec-
tion embraces both company and sectoral collective agreements. The scope of the data 
collection is wide, including wages and tariff s, employee remuneration, annual bo-
nuses, working hours and holidays, changes in employment, working conditions, wage 
supplementary charges and other wage components, cooperation of contracting par-
ties, employment rate, personnel development, fair treatment, health and safety. The 
database is divided into agreements concluded by private companies and public service 
and administration organisations (on the latter there is only limited information) Al-
though the size of the database is impressive (in 2013 1 727 company-level collective 
agreements from 26 diff erent trade unions, and 22 higher level collective agreements), 
it is diffi  cult to obtain coverage data (in terms of the percentage of the whole work-
ing force/all employers) and data on provisions. Trexima publishes the results of data 
Szilvia Borbély and László Neumann
210 Wage bargaining under the new European Economic Governance
processing annually; the numerous tables contain the major data of wage agreements 
and other issues agreed. They include detailed data on collectively agreed annual wage 
tariff s. However, the published fi gures mainly show the penetration rate as a percent-
age of all (collected) agreements, simple (non-weighted) averages of agreed values or 
the tables arranged by trade unions and by regions. Trexima publications lack averages 
for industries and for the whole economy, although it is possible to obtain them, as 
they appear in the publications of MoLSA and on the EIRO webpage. 
In Slovakia data on collective agreements come from the Information System on Work-
ing Conditions (ISPP) Trexima, s.r.o Bratislava (www.trexima.sk); annual results are pub-
lished on the website of the Ministry of Labour, Social Aff airs and Family (MPSVR SR). 
(In Slovakian only: Informacný systém o pracovných podmienkach v roku 2013; www.
trexima.sk/new/download/ISPP_2013.pdf.) Contrary to the Czech case, the Slovakian 
survey has a pre-defi ned representative sample of selected companies with and with-
out collective agreements. For instance in 2011 it embraced 5 088 organisations with 
809 503 employees, which amounts to 34 per cent of total employment in the econ-
omy. Naturally, only a fraction of such organisations have local collective agreements, 
their number being about 1 600–1 800 (it fl uctuates a little in individual years), cover-
ing about 250 000–270 000 people. The Trexima survey in certain years also includes 
other information on company-level industrial relations, for instance, the presence of 
trade unions and works councils, whether the organisation is covered by company level 
and/or multi-employer collective agreements, whether a union offi  ce is provided by 
the employer and the trade union chair is paid by the employer, trade union benefi ts 
for members, employer’s deduction of union dues. However, the survey focuses mainly 
on labour costs and their various components (wage tariff s, minimal hourly wage, vari-
ous wage supplements, contribution to diff erent insurance funds, occupational safety 
and health costs, the cost of company welfare/Social Fund, severance pay). The an-
nual publication includes numerous tables; they include detailed data on collectively 
agreed annual wage tariff s. However, the fi gures in the tables show the percentage of 
each item in the sample, or the simple (non-weighted) average of values; there is no 
coverage information. No information is available about the share of surveyed collec-
tive agreements in all collective wage agreements. Most of the tables show the results 
by trade unions and by industries. The Ministry of Labour, Social Aff airs and Family 
(MPSVR SR) maintains a register of sectoral agreements, the text of the agreements 
are downloadable from the webpage (only in Slovakian). In 2012 a total of 18 sectoral 
(master) collective agreements were fi led at MOLSAF, as well as fi ve addenda to the 
agreements.
In Hungary only sectoral and company-level annual wage agreement data were col-
lected and the related statistics were published annually between 1992 and 1996. The 
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system was changed in 1997, when a government decree required compulsory regis-
tration of collective agreements. First the register was run by the Ministry of Labour, 
now the successor Information System for Labour Relations (Munkaügyi kapcsolatok 
információs rendszere) is run by the Social Dialogue Centre of the national headquar-
ters of the public labour administration (www.mkir.gov.hu). In theory it should be a full 
register of all single-employer, multi-employer and sectoral agreements, separately in 
the private and public sectors, also showing the chronology of events (concluding new 
agreements, amendments and termination), both for currently valid and terminated 
agreements. For data input the Ministry issued a very detailed questionnaire on the 
contents of the agreements. However, in practice the register fails to provide reliable 
information mainly due to the very low level of compliance. Although a decree requires 
the reporting of all events, in practice there is no sanction for non-compliance. An-
other problem stems from the inappropriate treatment of stock and fl ow data in the 
register: if a sector/company once registers its agreement it is deemed to be valid until 
its termination is reported or until expiry in case of contracts for a limited period. As 
a consequence, the register still contains a large number of agreements last reported 
more than 10 years ago. Even if these agreements formally exist, their outdated stipu-
lations are hardly useful at the workplace due to the changing legal background or 
consumer price infl ation in case of wage agreements. Even if compliance is better, fl ow 
information are missing, for example, the number of agreements containing changes 
in a certain period. 
Until 2004 the Ministry published annual reports (in Hungarian only) on collective 
agreements and wage agreements, which contained detailed tables on the number 
and coverage of diff erent agreements, penetration of diff erent provisions and agreed 
wages (annual increase, company minimum wage, wage tariff s, non-wage elements of 
remuneration). Since then, only the list of registered collective agreements and on-line 
tabulation on the number and coverage of diff erent agreements and the penetration 
of various provisions are available. Unfortunately such predefi ned tables do not include 
collectively agreed wages for a couple of years. (The latest available data on wage 
agreements refer to 2004.) Extended sectoral collective agreements and the related 
administrative documents are also available on the webpage of the registration system. 
Texts of other agreements are rarely available, as it depends on the parties whether 
they consider them public or confi dential.
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4.2  Labour economics research about the labour market impact 
of collective bargaining
Academic research uses data on collective agreements in many ways. 
A simple research design compares statutory minimum wages and col-
lectively agreed wages and investigates whether unions are able to use 
the leverage of the national minimum wage. For instance, such fi ndings 
on Hungary clearly demonstrate the political infl uence –the will of the 
government to intervene– on national minimum wage agreements and 
extension in the case of the construction industry. Skilled workers and 
masters’ premiums grew when the government pushed the social part-
ners to reach agreement; then, as the crisis unfolded and the govern-
ment’s legitimacy eroded, the premium gradually vanished. 
Several sets of statistics use a simple approach to investigate wage drift, 
namely the gap between agreed wages and actual wage developments. 
More sophisticated research designs, using large, matched employer–
employee datasets, investigate the union wage gap, that is, the individual 
wage differences between unionised and non-unionised settings, while 
several individual and company variables are controlled for (Neumann 
2002; Rigó 2013). For instance, Magda et al. (2012) found in the Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Poland that sectoral agreements increase wages 
for low-skilled workers, while company agreements increase medium- 
and high-skilled wages. However, the union wage premium is unevenly 
distributed between cohorts, with substantial cross-country variation. 
Wage premiums are concentrated in the transitional cohorts in the 
Czech Republic and Poland and, to a lesser extent, in the pre-transitional 
cohort in Hungary. 
Although not directly, collectively agreed wages were investigated by 
Gal et al. (2013); their results are strongly correlated with the unions’ 
weak bargaining power in Hungary. There, labour market institutions 
and the level of employee protection allow companies to pursue wage-
adjustment strategies. Following the global crisis of 2008, while wage 
adjustment was most signifi cant in Hungary among the 24 investigated 
OECD countries, employment adjustment was last but three. (Unfortu-
nately the Czech Republic and Slovakia are missing from the sample).
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Figure 15 Interplay between minimum wage and agreed wages (construction)
Source: Bosch et al. (2012).
15a Hungary: diff erences between sectoral wage tariff s and statutory 
minimum wages (%)
15b International comparison of sectoral agreements (2010)
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Conclusion
The three countries have similar historical, political and economic back-
grounds. Current economic development trends also show a lot of com-
monalities. They are still low wage countries in comparison with the EU 
average, and wage and social harmonisation, strongly expected at the 
time of EU enlargement, has been fading. On the other hand, this does 
provide them with something of a comparative advantage: low labour 
costs and relatively well qualifi ed workers. While the relative gap in wage 
costs between the euro zone and Hungary widened from 2008 to 2013, 
the gap fell slightly with regard to Slovakia and the Czech Republic. 
In all three countries, although in different ways, successive govern-
ments have deliberately used income policy tools in relation to which the 
social partners have little or no infl uence, such as taxation, minimum 
wage setting and regulation of social transfers. Though institutionalised 
tripartite bodies of social dialogue exist in all three countries, with re-
gard to wage determination policies ideological and political standpoints 
are sometimes stronger than economic necessities; the national-level tri-
partite dialogue is driven by political forces and interests rather than by 
economic needs. There are many examples of the ruling political forces 
being unwilling (or only formally) to negotiate with the social partners. 
As far as the social cost of pursuing low wage policies is concerned, in-
come distribution is highly unequal, particularly in Hungary and Slova-
kia (not least due to the introduction of fl at taxation). The Gini coeffi cient 
of disposable income (after taxation and transfers) shows signifi cantly 
increasing inequality particularly in Hungary and stagnation in Slovakia 
and the Czech Republic between 2008 and 2013. The proportion of peo-
ple at risk of poverty is much higher in Hungary than in the other two 
countries. In this respect the Czech Republic is in the best situation, also 
in comparison with the EU average. (While in 2011/2012 the propor-
tion of severely materially deprived people was around 6 per cent in the 
Czech Republic and 10 per cent in Slovakia, in Hungary around 25 per 
cent of the population was affected.)
In these countries both trade unions and employers’ organisations are 
relatively weak; their organisational strength is even decreasing. Not 
surprisingly the level of industrial action is comparatively low. In the 
Czech Republic and Hungary bargaining takes place predominantly at 
company level. Despite the prevailing decentralisation trend, in Slovakia 
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during the crisis sectoral bargaining remained intact, although employ-
ers attempted to opt out from sectoral bargaining as they communicated 
to adapt ‘tailor-made anti-crisis measures’. According to trade union 
sources and research coverage of collective bargaining, and especially 
that of wage agreements, decreased during the economic crisis. 
Collectively agreed wages are of policy relevance mainly in the Czech 
Republic, while Slovakian statistics and economic analyses focus on la-
bour cost development as a component of competitiveness. Nonetheless, 
Czech and Slovak sources are suffi cient for indicating the annual agreed 
increase for the whole economy and for certain industries. In this respect 
Hungary is the most problematic case, as we know that the coverage of 
genuine bargaining on annual wage increases is very small at sectoral 
and company level; moreover, statistical data are missing or biased.
Development of wages and collective bargaining in central and eastern European countries
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Annex
Infl ation, annual average rate of change (%)
Labour productivity per hour worked (% change over previous period)
Exchange rate (annual averages, national currency/EUR)
Average gross monthly nominal wage (national economy, and national currency)
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Hungary 6.0 4.0 4.7 3.9 5.7 1.7
Czech Republic 6.3 0.6 1.2 2.1 3.5 1.4
Slovakia 3.9 0.9 0.7 4.1 3.7 1.5
Source: Eurostat.
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Hungary 2.6 –3.6 0.5 0.4 2.9 0.9
Czech Republic 0.4 –1.5 1.7 1.8 –0.9 –0.2
Slovakia 2.3 –2.3 4.4 2.0 2.0 2.8
Source: Eurostat.
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
1st 
quarter
Hungary (HUF) 251.51 280.33 275.48 279.37 289.25 296.87 307.90
Czech Republic 
(CZK)
24.95 26.44 25.28 24.59 25.98 25.15 27.50
Slovakia (SKK) 31.26
Source: UNECE 2014.
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
1st 
quarter
Hungary (HUF) 177,738 183,804 188,048 197,911 208,677 215,676 229,817 
Czech Republic 
(CZK) 
22,592 23,344 23,864 24,455 25,112 25,074 24,806 
Slovakia (EUR) 723 744.5 769 786 805 824 821 
Source: National statistical offi  ces.
Growth of average gross monthly real wage (national economy, %, other sources)
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2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Hungary 1.3 –3.5 –3.4 1.3 –0.9 1.7
Czech Republic 0.7 0.2 –0.7 –6.4 – –
Slovakia 3.5 3 2.7 –1.1 – –
Source: Hungarian Central Statistical Offi  ce; ILO Global Wage database. 
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Chapter 6
Multi-employer bargaining in the UK – 
does it have a future?
Lewis Emery
1. Introduction
The 2008–2009 crisis gave the green light to an approach to public 
policy in the European Union that sees collective bargaining as part of 
the problem rather than a solution to economic recovery. Alongside its 
European Semester process and country-specifi c recommendations the 
European Commission (2012) highlighted reforms ‘likely to increase 
employment’ as including government interventions or tripartite agree-
ments to decrease bargaining coverage or decentralise the bargaining 
system. The Great Depression of the 1930s may have inspired a domi-
nant system of multi-employer bargaining (MEB) in most Western de-
mocracies (Visser 2013) but the fi rst great recession of the twenty-fi rst 
century looks like having the opposite effect. 
In the United Kingdom the form and role of collective bargaining has 
not been part of the offi cial dialogue about economic recovery. Country-
specifi c recommendations for the United Kingdom (themselves all but 
invisible in its national political life) have addressed mainly exports, 
housing, household debt, infrastructure, child care and skill gaps. In the 
latest Council Recommendation (2014/C247/26) ‘lower-than-expected 
growth due to constrained wages curtailing private consumption’ was 
identifi ed as a risk to budgetary projections, but the United Kingdom’s 
wage-setting system itself warranted no comment.
It may be that the Commission had no interest in exploring the United 
Kingdom’s ‘constrained wages’ because collective bargaining already 
plays a much more limited role in private sector pay setting than is 
typical in many other EU countries; and where it does take place it is 
generally already decentralised to fi rm or workplace level. Brown et al. 
(2008), who offer one of the most recent accounts of how UK employers 
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brought pay determination ‘in house’, argue that multi-employer bar-
gaining ‘shrank at a much faster rate than collective bargaining per se’. 
The decline and decentralisation of UK collective bargaining received 
plenty of comment and academic discourse in the past (for example, 
Daniel and Millward 1983) but it has recently begun to attract renewed 
attention in the context of declining real wages and increased inequality 
following the recession (Ewing and Hendy 2013; Onaran 2014). 
For the 2010–2015 Conservative-led coalition government, and for the 
top-level UK employers’ body (the Confederation of British Industry, 
CBI) multi-employer or sector-level bargaining was not really on the ra-
dar. In a comment for the Collectively Agreed Wages in Europe (CAWIE) 
project, Rob Wall (CBI), Head of Education and Employment Policy said: 
‘While multi-employer bargaining is prevalent in large parts of 
the public sector it has limited relevance in the private sector. In 
some industries, where it makes sense, multi-employer bargain-
ing still persists but the presumption is that bargaining usually 
takes place at company level. Effi cient – and that means local, 
responsive and fl exible – labour markets benefi t both employers 
and employees. They help the UK become more productive and 
provide choice and fl exibility for employees.’
But on the union side the decline in bargaining coverage and member-
ship has a sectoral, multi-employer dimension, allied to concerns about 
the weaknesses of UK law on recognition and negotiating rights (Moore 
et al. 2013). Carl Roper, a national organiser at the TUC made the con-
nection, shortly after the 2010 general election: 
‘It locks us in to workplace by workplace campaigns, which for 
individual employers makes them potentially uncompetitive in 
their sector and makes them resist unionisation. Plant-by-plant 
organising is also very resource intensive so there’s a disincentive 
for the employer to be neutral and a disincentive for the union as 
it is expensive and there is no guarantee of success.’ (LRD 2010a)
From that perspective, the previous Labour government’s term in offi ce 
looks like a ‘missed opportunity for the value of sectoral bargaining’.
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However, historical accounts of the decline in bargaining and in particu-
lar of multi-employer bargaining in the United Kingdom (Milner 1994; 
Gospel and Druker 1997) reveal it to have been a more dynamic process 
than is often perceived; an ebb and fl ow between centralised and de-
centralised pay-setting. Even the high point for collective bargaining in 
Britain was characterised by many levels of pay determination (Daniel 
and Millward 1983). 
The long-term direction of travel away from multi-employer bargaining 
in the United Kingdom up to this point is clear but the impulse to col-
lectivise the relationship between employers and trade unions has not 
entirely disappeared, even in the private sector.
2. Overview of the development of collective bargaining 
in the United Kingdom 
Any debate about pay setting in the United Kingdom has to start from its 
shrinking union membership and declining bargaining coverage. Total 
union membership almost halved from a high of 13.2 million in 1979 to 
7.9 million in 1999–2000, before levelling off (see Figure 1). Employee 
membership (GB) fell from 8.7 million in 1989 to 6.76 million in 1999, 
remaining at around that level until the recession hit, although rising 
employment meant that membership density continued to decline (Fig-
ure 2). After some further decline membership stood at 6.21 million in 
2013 (6.45 million UK employee members).
The correlation between union density and levels of bargaining coverage 
is generally weak under conditions of sectoral bargaining as low density 
can go together with high coverage (Visser 2013). However, in the Unit-
ed Kingdom collective bargaining coverage followed union membership 
on a declining path. Having peaked at 70 per cent in the 1970s and early 
1980s (Van Wanrooy et al. 2013), by 1996 it had fallen to 36.0 per cent 
of employees and by 2013 to 29.5 per cent (see Figure 2). 
A huge gap has developed between the private sector, with coverage of 
16.6 per cent and membership density of 14.4 per cent, and the public 
sector, with coverage of 63.8 per cent and membership density of 55.4 
per cent. UK public sector coverage is more reminiscent of countries 
with strong MEB bargaining (Keune and Vandaele 2012, citing Visser 
2011) and indeed that is largely still the case (although pay setting also 
Multi-employer bargaining in the UK – does it have a future?
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involves a number of Pay Review Bodies that advise the government on 
a range of public sector pay settlements1). 
Behind these headline fi gures, collective bargaining coverage remains 
higher in workplaces with 50 or more workers. By industry, it is high in 
the privatised energy and water companies, confi rming that collective 
bargaining can remain dominant without MEB bargaining if member-
ship density is high enough (Kersley et al. 2004). There’s a similar, if less 
marked pattern in transport and storage and in fi nance, neither of which 
is now subject to MEB bargaining. 
Coverage is apparently lower in construction, despite its many large and 
small MEB agreements; as well as in manufacturing, in which multi-em-
ployer bargaining persists in pockets; and in wholesale/retail, in which 
1. In 2014 eight Pay Review Bodies (PRBs) were advising the government in its pay setting, 
taking evidence from stakeholders, which usually include the well-organised public sector 
unions; collective bargaining on terms and conditions can take place in parallel, or replace 
PRB recommendations (as in the NHS 2014–2015).
Figure 1 Employment and trade union membership
Source: Trade Union Statistics, Department of Business, Innovation and Skills (2014).
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the big retail chains recognise unions nationally on a company-by-com-
pany basis. It is largely absent from some other sectors. 
These fi gures – published by the Department for Business, Innovation 
and Skills – are drawn from the household-based Labour Force Survey 
(LFS). There is evidence (from the employer-based Annual Survey of 
Hours and Earnings, ASHE) that bargaining coverage is higher than the 
LFS suggests. In 2011 ASHE results indicated that 46.9 per cent of em-
ployees had their pay set ‘with reference to an agreement affecting more 
than one employee’, 27 per cent in the private sector and 91.9 per cent in 
the public sector (BIS 2013). There are a variety of possible reasons for 
these higher fi gures (including the role of public sector Pay Review Bod-
ies), but one is that they refl ect agreements reached at a higher level than 
the workplace, which householders in the LFS survey were less aware of. 
3. Scope and coverage of multi-employer bargaining
The general decline in bargaining coverage in the United Kingdom has 
been attributed to a variety of factors. Brown et al. (2008) highlight a 
Multi-employer bargaining in the UK – does it have a future?
Figure 2 Union density and bargaining coverage 
Source: Trade Union Statistics, Department of Business, Innovation and Skills (2014).
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tendency by employers not to recognise unions in newly-established 
workplaces and the unions’ inability to extend recognition among con-
tinuing workplaces. They point to implicit de-recognition (a reduction in 
the range and intensity of negotiations); and a fall in private sector col-
lective bargaining associated with increases in the proportion of women 
and non-manual workers employed. 
Nevertheless, they say that only around a tenth of the decline in work-
place collective bargaining in the private sector could be put down to 
compositional change (the decline in manufacturing industry and large 
workplaces). Increased competition is seen as a strong infl uence.
However, the key to a high bargaining coverage rate seems to be multi-
employer bargaining (Visser 2013) and it is that which has disappeared 
fastest in the United Kingdom, according to the infl uential Workplace 
Employment Relations Survey (Brown et al. 2008). In the latest survey 
(Van Wanrooy et al. 2013) 43 per cent2 of public sector workplaces set 
pay for at least some of their workers through multi-employer bargain-
ing, but in the private sector the fi gure was just 2 per cent, as it was in 
2004. To put that into context, only 7 per cent of private sector work-
places used any kind of collective bargaining to set pay but they account-
ed for almost a fi fth (19 per cent) of employees (the 2011 WERS survey 
included very small workplaces with as few as fi ve employees, where col-
lective bargaining is known to be less likely).
The WERS surveys have been criticised for fostering an ‘extreme’ view 
that collective bargaining has ‘almost entirely withered away in the pri-
vate sector’ when in fact it continues in many large and medium-sized 
private sector organisations (Incomes Data Services 2008). Earlier 
WERS surveys (based on workplaces with 25 or more employees) indi-
cate that the big fall in the proportion of private sector workplaces cov-
ered by MEB bargaining can be traced back to the 1980s when it dropped 
from 18 per cent in 1984 to 9 per cent in 1990 and then to 3 per cent in 
1998 and 2004. 
The number of agreements included each year in the Labour Research 
Department’s annual Pay Survey point to a rather more prolonged 
2. The 2011 result was an apparent decline from 58 per cent in 2004 but may have refl ected the 
extension of the Pay Review Body system.
Multi-employer bargaining in the UK – does it have a future?
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decline (see Figure 3). The surveys represent only a fraction of deals done 
(especially at company level, as there is no requirement for all employ-
ers to be included) and coverage varies from year to year. However, over 
time they clearly show that the decline took hold from 1991 onwards. By 
2010 the total number of MEB private sector agreements dwindled to 
just over 30, compared with over 150 in the mid-1980s.
MEB decline was accelerated by the abolition of around 30 Wages Coun-
cils (included in the above fi gures) covering 2.5 million workers dur-
ing the 1993–1994 pay round. These were statutory bodies made up of 
representatives of employers and unions, together with independent 
members that set minimum pay rates and other conditions in particu-
lar industries. They were aimed at ‘sweated’ trades that had no union 
organisation and no parity of bargaining, where ‘the good employer is 
undercut by the bad, and the bad employer is undercut by the worst’ 
(Winston Churchill). 
When it comes to the number of workers covered by MEB bargaining 
(Figure 4) evidence from the LRD survey is also affected by the relia-
bility of estimates of the coverage of individual MEB agreements (see 
Figure 3 Pay deals by bargaining level   
Source: Figures published annually in Bargaining Report, Workplace Report and the LRD Pay Survey.
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below). The biggest deals in construction cover hundreds of thousands 
of workers but some small specialist multi-employer agreements only 
affect hundreds. 
The estimated aggregate number of workers covered by private sector 
MEB bargaining stabilised at 1.5–2 million after 1995, following its ear-
lier decline, including Wages Council abolition (Figure 4). A further de-
cline to a little less than 1 million was recorded after the 2008–2009 
recession, with the result that the number covered by MEB agreements 
from that point on roughly matched the number covered by private com-
pany deals.
The total number of workers covered by the survey (including in pub-
lic sector agreements) fell from around 10 million in the early 1990s to 
somewhere in the region of 6 to 7 million, consistent with the general 
trends in membership and bargaining coverage. The chart refl ects the 
fact that public sector pay deals within the all-worker column (many 
of which operate on a multi-employer basis) affect more workers than 
Figure 4 Workers covered by bargaining level   
Source: Figures published annually in Bargaining Report, Workplace Report and the LRD Pay Survey 
(an aggregate estimate of workers covered was not published before 1991, while fi gures for 2004 and 
2006 are unavailable). 
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private sector deals. In these statistics, higher and further education 
(each with its own MEB bargaining arrangements) are treated as part of 
the public sector, but in offi cial statistics they are classifi ed as being in 
the private sector.
3.1 In which sectors has MEB bargaining survived?
By 2014 private sector MEB bargaining played a much-reduced role. 
However, it remained dominant in construction where there were at 
least sixteen different MEB agreements. It also operates in the offshore 
energy sector, although negotiations are conducted with construction 
contractors, caterers, diving contractors and drilling contractors rather 
than with the oil companies themselves. A multi-employer agreement 
covered a handful of companies in the United Kingdom’s small surface 
coal mining sector. 
In manufacturing there were agreements – some of them specialist 
and narrow in scope, others broader – in baking (Scotland), clothing, 
knitting, textiles (Lancashire), leather producing, footwear, papermak-
ing, corrugated packaging, printing (Scotland), fl at glass, monumental 
masonry, furniture and organ-building. Some of these were specifi c to 
Scotland (in one case, Scotland and Northern Ireland) or England and 
Wales. Others were regional simply because their industry base is geo-
graphically concentrated. 
The Agricultural Wages Board for England and Wales (a statutory nego-
tiating forum between the Unite union and the National Farmers Union, 
with an independent chair) was abolished in 2013 but boards in Scot-
land and Northern Ireland survived and the devolved Welsh government 
was in the process of re-establishing a similar body. In that and other 
ways, public administrations, cultures or traditions in Scotland, Wales 
and Northern Ireland appear to be more open to sectoral pay setting 
arrangements; they also have higher levels of union density (probably 
linked to higher levels of public sector employment3). 
3. As of December 2014 the public sector (as defi ned) accounted for 27 per cent of employ-
ment in Northern Ireland, 23 per cent in Wales and 21 per cent in Scotland; in most English 
regions it was between 15 per cent and 18 per cent but was closer to the Scottish level in the 
North East of England, Offi ce for National Statistics. 
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There are isolated but notable examples of MEB bargaining in the pri-
vate services sector (which plays such a large part in the UK economy). 
They include fi lm production, theatres, sport (horse racing) and volun-
tary-sector housing (in Scotland). Large MEB agreements set the frame-
work for pay in higher and further education.
Finally, many public sector agreements operate in a multi-employer 
fashion, to one degree or another, covering schools; community and 
youth work; the National Health Service Agenda for Change agreement 
(which has recently become differentiated between the four countries 
in the United Kingdom); police staff; and local government (including 
the United Kingdom’s biggest agreement, the local government services 
NJC for England, Wales and Northern Ireland). A cartel of employers 
in the South West of England tried but failed to break away from the 
nationally-agreed terms of the Agenda for Change agreement in 2012. 
The local government agreement is national in scope, covering well over 
a million workers and 350 employers (a parallel agreement operates in 
Scotland). However, as Bach and Stroleny explain (2014) it ‘has not pre-
cluded vigorous debate about the most appropriate balance between na-
tional and local decision making’. That balance has been severely tested 
by successive pay freezes and a national dispute over the 2014 settle-
ment, and by local changes to terms and conditions which are set by the 
national agreement (LRD Workplace Report March 2015). 
Local variations in school teachers’ pay rates and conditions have also 
been encouraged by government-driven changes to their pay system, 
while the growing number of Academies and ‘Free Schools’ were not re-
quired to abide by the nationally set School Teachers’ Pay and Condi-
tions Document for England and Wales or ‘Burgundy Book’ conditions 
of service. 
However, there have been MEB ‘casualties’ since the recession. They 
include the end of national bargaining between the British Printing In-
dustries Federation (BPIF) and the Unite union (there is still a separate 
Graphic Enterprise Scotland agreement). That was followed by the end 
of sectoral bargaining in the building brick industry in 2012 and the end 
of bargaining between the ceramic workers’ union Unity (which subse-
quently merged into the GMB union) and the British Ceramic Confed-
eration (BCC). 
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Government action was instrumental in ending the Agricultural Wages 
Board (AWB) for England and Wales in 2013, following on from the 
scuppering of the then newly-formed School Support Staff Negotiating 
Body (SSSNB). The Conservative-led coalition also attempted to impose 
localised ‘market-facing’ pay on public sector wage setting. Although 
supported in some quarters (Wolf 2010) that approach ran into opposi-
tion from other actors (such as the Welsh government and trade unions) 
and was unsuccessful. 
In 2010 the government also removed the closest thing that the United 
Kingdom had to an ‘extension’ arrangement, the 2005 Code of Practice 
on Workforce Matters in Public Sector Service Contracts (the two-tier 
code, still in force in Wales) and a similar arrangement in the NHS. 
Abolition has led to new starters being appointed on lower rates of pay 
(Smith Institute 2014). 
Finally, recent amendments to the transfer of undertakings regulations 
(TUPE) deny transferred workers the benefi t of any post-transfer im-
provements negotiated under a sector-wide collective agreement, unless 
their new employer agrees (codifying the decision of the European Court 
of Justice in Alemo-Herron v Parkwood Leisure Limited [2013] EUECJ 
C-426/11). 
3.2 Coverage
The number of workers that MEB agreements cover is extremely varied 
and can be diffi cult to verify – even the relevant employer associations 
themselves cannot always make an estimate. The largest numbers of 
workers affected are undoubtedly in the public sector (local government, 
schools, health care) and parts of the private sector that deliver higher 
and further education. 
The Construction Industry Joint Council (CIJC) Working Rule Agree-
ment (negotiated on behalf of nine employer associations and three 
trade unions) is said to cover over 500 000 workers. However, the CIJC 
employers’ side sees this as an overestimate, pointing out that 200 000 
workers are registered under an industry insurance scheme. Never-
theless, the agreement’s basic terms – such as holidays and Christmas 
close-down – are recognised as an industry norm. Other construction 
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agreements cover tens of thousands of workers and potentially large 
numbers of employers.
The Federation of Master Builders, a Building and Allied Trades agreement 
(BATJIC) signatory, has almost 10 000 members. Smaller agreements 
may cover far fewer workers but, potentially, many separate employers. In 
the Steeplejack and Lightning Protection Engineering Industry NJC, the 
employers’ association ATLAS has 45 member companies with a total 
workforce of just 1 100. The Leather Producing Association represents 12 
member companies but its agreement covers only about 500 workers. 
There are some comparatively large agreements in manufacturing, such 
as the paper industry, while the Corrugated Packaging industry agree-
ment covers 50 sites but only three main employers. In 2014 Unite’s col-
lective agreement with Employers in Voluntary Housing (EVH) in Scot-
land covered 97 employers and 3 000 of the industry’s 8 000 staff. Half 
of the Lancashire Textile Manufacturers’ Association’s 39 member com-
panies (concentrated geographically in Cumbria, Lancashire, Greater 
Manchester and West Yorkshire) followed its agreement with the Unite, 
GMB and Community trade unions.
4. Results of multi-employer bargaining
A major factor infl uencing social partner attitudes to MEB bargaining 
will be how they perform when it comes to pay, conditions and other 
issues, and how that is perceived by employees and member companies 
(adoption of the electrical contracting agreement, for example, is expect-
ed to be seen as a way of telling employees that they are valued and that 
the employer wants to retain them). 
The performance of MEB agreements on minimum pay would be impos-
sible to assess without taking into account the existence (since 1999) of a 
statutory National Minimum Wage in the United Kingdom, worth £6.31 
per hour (at the adult rate) up until October 2014 and £6.50 after that. 
Also of increasing signifi cance is the voluntary Living Wage (LW, an ini-
tiative launched in 2001 by London Citizens4 and subsequently taken up 
4. Living Wage Foundation, http://www.livingwage.org.uk/history. The voluntary Living Wage 
preceded the lower, statutory, National Living Wage announced in 2015.
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by the Greater London Authority). It is worth about 20 per cent more 
than the NMW (£7.65 until November 2014, £7.85 after that) with 
a higher rate set separately for London (£8.80 until November 2014, 
£9.15 after that). 
By early 2015 there were over 1 300 ‘accredited’ Living Wage employ-
ers, committed to paying future increases announced by the Living Wage 
Foundation and to extending it to their contractors. Many other employ-
ers are beginning to use the LW as a benchmark without necessarily 
seeking accreditation. 
4.1 Wages
An assessment of MEB-negotiated pay rates for 2013–2014 reveals that 
the surviving agreements perform very differently, whether judged on 
their minimum pay rates, how their rates compare with earnings levels 
in their industries and the scope they offer for higher pay. 
Minimum rates
On the basis of their negotiated minimum rates (excluding trainees or 
youth rates) the surviving MEB agreements can be divided into four 
roughly equal groups: Those whose minimum rate is set at or just above 
the NMW; those that pay a bit more but less than the LW; those that pay 
at or just above the LW; and a slightly bigger group that pay a minimum 
signifi cantly above the LW.
Sectors with the lowest minimums include agriculture (until recently ac-
cepted as needing statutory protection); parts of manufacturing, such as 
textiles, which suffered an 80 per cent fall in jobs between 1979 and 2013 
and with the lowest average wage in manufacturing (Offi ce for National 
Statistics 2014); local government services (hit by a series of pay freez-
es); and parts of the entertainment industry (theatres outside London). 
Being ‘caught up’ by rises in the minimum wage has been an uncomfort-
able experience for some negotiators and a number of MEB agreements 
have managed to stay a little ahead of the NMW. There were cases in 
the local authority craft sector (labourers in England and Wales), educa-
tion (sixth-form college staff), health care (NHS Agenda for Change in 
England), community and youth work, sport (stable staff), and in the 
construction staff agreement (environmental engineering) where pay 
scales start at a basic level but progression towards higher guide rates 
is expected. 
Minimum rates were at or around Living Wage level in some of the bigger 
construction agreements, higher and further education (where unions 
campaigned for the Living Wage) and public service–related agreements 
in Scotland (local authorities and the NHS but also voluntary housing) 
where it is government policy to pay the Living Wage. 
Minimum rates were signifi cantly above LW level in the offshore energy 
sector and most construction industry agreements. That held true in 
2014 because construction unions successfully resisted efforts by some 
of the sector’s main employers’ associations to introduce lower pay levels 
within their agreements. 
Minimum earnings
How negotiated minimum rates compare with earnings levels in their 
immediate sector is arguably a better test of MEB bargaining than the 
NMW. For the purposes of this chapter, comparisons have been made 
against a ‘lower industrial earnings level’ defi ned as the lowest published 
quantile of basic hourly earnings (usually the lowest decile) by two-digit 
Standard Industrial Classifi cation (NACE) in the 2014 ASHE survey.
Once again, MEB agreements can be divided roughly into four groups: 
those whose minimum pay is below the lower industrial earnings level 
(95 per cent of it or less); those at or around the lower industrial earn-
ings level; those paying a bit more (105 per cent to 120 per cent); and 
those paying signifi cantly more. 
The fi rst of these categories includes some agreements with minimum 
pay rates that are close to the NMW, but also some that are at or just 
above the Living Wage (for example, the Police Staff agreement for Eng-
land and Wales). This can happen where the range of earnings in a sector 
is particularly wide. However, where MEB agreements set a minimum 
rate that is signifi cantly above the Living Wage, it is also likely to be 
above the industry lower earnings level. 
Median earnings
The closeness of negotiated pay rates to actual earnings indicates the 
extent to which an agreement is applied in practice (Gospel and Druk-
er 1997) and is likely to be an important consideration for the social 
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partners. But it can also depend on a number of other factors, such as 
whether the range of earnings in a sector is broad or narrow; the involve-
ment of very different occupational types within a single sector; and the 
precision (or lack of it) in the two-digit SIC code. 
A survey of company wage rates by the employers’ side of the furniture 
sector agreement in 2013, covering 22 different occupations in produc-
tion and associated areas, recorded an average wage of just over £9.00 
(considerably higher than the agreed 2012 rates). Evidence from ASHE 
2014 shows that seven out of ten workers in that sector earned between 
£6.50 (the lowest decile) and £13.02 (the 80th percentile), while the me-
dian was £9.40.
Dividing MEB agreements again into four groups, they split roughly equally 
between those whose minimum rate is worth around half the industry 
median; those worth more than half but less than two-thirds; those worth 
around two-thirds but less than three-quarters; and fi nally a group whose 
minimum rate is worth three-quarters or more of the industry median. 
The latter included construction agreements (plumbing, painting, ther-
mal insulation and engineering construction) and also industries in 
which the workforce is divided between professionally qualifi ed staff and 
those without a professional qualifi cation (education and youth work).
Scope for higher pay
The ability of MEB agreements to deliver higher earnings is limited if 
they operate merely as a ‘safety net’, with no negotiated basis for higher 
pay. However, collective bargaining is generally seen as compressing the 
pay distribution (Metcalf et al. 2000; Kersley et al. 2004) and even the 
highest negotiated rates could be expected to fall short of the earnings 
being achieved by the higher or highest-paid employees in the relevant 
industry. 
A comparison between the highest negotiated rates (including pay scale 
maximums, where these exist) and upper industry earnings levels (de-
fi ned for this chapter as the highest published quantile of basic hourly 
earnings, usually the highest decile) again sees MEB agreements divided 
loosely into four groupings. 
There were those with negotiated rates worth less than half of the up-
per earnings level; those with rates worth half to three-quarters of that 
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level; those similar to upper earnings; and also some that exceed it. The 
positioning of different sectors within these four groups is more varied, 
however all of the agreements in the last category covered workers who 
may be professionally qualifi ed. 
Harmonising wages 
The extent to which UK MEB agreements harmonise wage rates within 
their sector depends on whether they are prescriptive, or focus solely 
on setting a wages ‘fl oor’. The offshore caterers’ agreement sets out the 
minimum level of terms and conditions to be applied, while standard 
terms will be for each COTA member company to determine (but no less 
than the minimum terms in the agreement). 
This is a more familiar approach than the ‘no more and no less’ wording 
still found in the electrical contracting JIB agreement, which appears to 
prescribe higher pay as well as lower pay. However, the NHS Agenda for 
Change agreement has job evaluation–based national job profi les that 
indicate which of the nationally agreed salary bands a particular job of-
fered by an individual health care employer should fi t into. 
Although the issue of banding can be discussed at local level, NHS Trusts 
arguably have less leeway over pay than local government services, 
where nationally defi ned grades and scales no longer exist. Under the 
agreement local authorities are in fact expected to develop their own pay 
structures, on an equality basis, using the national pay spine points. 
Equity
As a force for equity, whether measured by pay dispersion, gender pay 
inequality or other considerations, UK MEB agreements vary. Before its 
abolition in 2013 the Agricultural Wages Board for England and Wales 
broadly matched the NMW at its lowest rate, but paid 150 per cent of 
the basic rate to its top grade (management). In practice, pay levels were 
concentrated around the grade 2 rate (60 pence per hour more than the 
minimum), which applied to about half of the workforce,5 with 16 per 
cent on the craft rate (up to £1.90 more than the lowest rate). 
Dividing MEB agreements once again into four groups, the degree of in-
ternal pay dispersion provided for in their pay structures ranged from 
5. Farm Labour and Wage Statistics 2012.
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125 per cent or less (for example, labouring versus craft rates in local 
government in England and Wales) to 300 per cent or more. The maxi-
mum pay level for staff in construction (environmental engineering) was 
333 per cent of the lowest rate, taking the agreement’s provision for pay 
progression fully into account. 
Gender pay inequality has been a driving force behind the renegotiation 
of multi-employer pay structures in the public sector. The issue seems to 
have less prominence among private sector MEB agreements, perhaps 
because it was seen as the responsibility of individual employers. How-
ever, the leather-producing industry’s agreement commits the parties to 
develop positive policies to promote equal opportunity and eradicate any 
form of discrimination in employment. 
Before national pay bargaining between the British Printing Industries 
Federation and Unite came to an end, national policies were developed 
on issues such as dignity at work, cancer screening and part-time, tem-
porary and agency workers. Employers in Voluntary Housing (EVH) 
continued to provide model policies on equality, including diversity, in-
direct and direct discrimination, harassment and victimisation.
Finally, there are issues of equity in the use of precarious or casual forms 
of employment. The engineering construction NAECI agreement ex-
presses support for the principle of direct employment (in an industry 
where contracting out and sub-contracting are common), while the elec-
trical contracting JIB condemns false self-employment.
4.2 Working conditions and other issues
UK multi-employer agreements provide an opportunity to negotiate not 
just over pay but also on conditions of employment where there might 
otherwise be no negotiation or consultation. The Community trade un-
ion is involved in a number of manufacturing MEB agreements and has 
had some success, particularly in recent years, in improving sick pay and 
minimum rates, particularly for younger workers. 
Steve McCool, National Secretary, said: 
‘I think those aspects would have been much harder to negotiate 
on an individual company level. Similarly on guaranteeing rates 
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of pay in possible production breaks, improving training and dis-
pute resolution. Because in some respects the multi-employer ap-
paratus with a resolute approach from the trade union side can 
help prevent a “race to the bottom”.’ 
The ability to negotiate minimum standards over a wide range of work-
ing conditions is a potentially signifi cant aspect of MEB bargaining. The 
2011 Workplace Employment Relations Survey shows that in workplaces 
with fi ve or more employees (where a union was recognised for collec-
tive bargaining purposes and at least one union member was present) 
the employer negotiated over pay in only 56 per cent of private sector 
workplaces, and consulted in 70 per cent. 
Negotiation and consultation on holidays and hours, pensions, griev-
ance procedures, health and safety and training was progressively less 
common (see Table 1). Unless pay and these other conditions have been 
negotiated at some higher level then it means they are not negotiated, 
even if the union is recognised.
These issues, and other aspects of pay and conditions – such as mater-
nity leave, paternity leave and sick pay entitlement – are likely to have 
been addressed in a multi-employer bargaining context, so that negoti-
ated entitlement would probably exist irrespective of an individual em-
Table 1 Negotiation and consultation in workplaces recognising trade unions, 
2011 (%)
Pay Hours Holiday Pensions Training Griev-
ance
proce-
dures
Health 
and 
safety
Private sector workplaces
Negotiate 56 37 41 24 6 19 10
Consult 70 61 61 55 42 68 59
Public sector workplaces
Negotiate 52 45 44 38 17 30 22
Consult 72 72 66 62 54 71 69
Note: Percentage of workplaces with fi ve or more employees with at least one union 
member present and a union recognised for bargaining purposes.
Source: van Wanrooy et al. 2013, p. 81, table 5.4.
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ployer’s willingness to negotiate or not. But, as with pay, MEB conditions 
of service vary substantially, from the equivalent of statutory entitlement 
only, to more generous provision.
Expertise and duplication
Traditional arguments for adopting the multi-employer approach (ef-
fi ciency, expertise and avoiding duplication) can still be heard in the 
United Kingdom. Unite has noted that its negotiations with the Offshore 
Contractors Association (OCA) covering around 70 companies (with a 
total workforce of more than 20 000) can be completed within two days, 
allowing offi cers to spend more time on other aspects of their remits. 
The electrical contracting JIB agreement lists a wide range of effi ciency 
benefi ts: A ‘one-stop shop’ on terms and conditions and legal obliga-
tions on employment matters; a holiday pay scheme to help employers 
with their cash fl ow; work opportunities (JIB members are required to 
sub-contract electrical work to JIB members); funding for training; an 
industry pension scheme; advice and mediation; discounted goods and 
services; and an e-newsletter. 
Quality and innovation
Training and skills have been identifi ed as an area in which the UK 
government needs to improve its performance after the recession. As a 
driver for quality and innovation it can benefi t from a multi-employer 
approach (Gospel and Foreman 2002). Employers and unions can and 
do cooperate over training in sectors without MEB pay bargaining, for 
example through the Sector Skills Councils,6 but a link to industry pay 
structures and bargaining could help ‘anchor’ skills and training in the 
workplace (provided that the agreement has kept abreast of working 
practices and trends at employer-level). 
There is no guarantee of success. In the fl at glass industry, in which 
workers tend to be competent but not qualifi ed, the Glass and Glazing 
Federation was setting up a training programme for installers in 2014 
and hoping to do the same for the processing side (being dissatisfi ed 
with the Construction Industry Training Board and the government’s 
approach to this issue). 
6. Employers already cooperate with each other, trade unions and the government through the 
Sector Skills Councils (SSCs), a network of 18 councils and four other bodies working with 
over 550 000 employers to defi ne skills needs and skills standards in their industries.
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Unions are directly involved in Cogent,7 the SSC for science-based in-
dustries (which also provides research and labour market intelligence), 
while union offi cers from Unite and UCATT sit on the Construction In-
dustry Training Board (CITB). In 2014 the GMB, Prospect and Unite un-
ions were taking part in a new Energy & Utility Industrial Partnership 
encouraging skills and growth in the power, gas, water, renewables and 
waste management industries.8 Arrangements of this kind do not neces-
sarily lead to sector-level wage-setting but do at least transcend a single-
employer framework. 
MEB agreements can also play a role in monitoring training and grad-
ing (as in the electrical contracting JIB); obliging employers to facili-
tate training and employees to take part (as in engineering construction 
NAECI); requiring employers to commit to a minimum level of training 
(1 per cent of the total basic hours worked by all employees in the stee-
plejack and lightning protection sector); and the regulation of quality 
and workmanship standards (mastic asphalt). 
MEB bargaining has the potential to institutionalise skill and training 
issues by linking these directly to pay (as was possible until recently,9 
in courses and apprenticeships provided by Lantra, the SSC for the land 
and agriculture sector). However, the widely varied pay premiums on 
offer for ‘skilled’ rates suggest that the approach taken both to skills and 
pay differs between different MEB agreements and sectors.
 
Social, economic and government policy
The UK does not have a recent history of ‘pacts’ designed to coordinate 
collective bargaining with government policy, although public sector pay 
restraint has been used extensively as a means of applying austerity meas-
ures. Social progress on equal pay was certainly advanced through the rede-
sign of MEB agreements during the period of the previous Labour govern-
ment (for example, in local government and the NHS) and it also helped 
to promote partnership principles, for example in the print industry. 
Employers’ associations do, however, interact with government on is-
sues relevant to their industry, including those (among the 90-plus 
7. See: www.cogent-ssc.com/TU_Toolkit/LMI.php
8. See: www.tuc.org.uk/industrial-issues/skills-policy/employer-ownership-skills-pilot
9. See: www.lantra.co.uk/News-Media/Case-Studies/Agriculture/Harry-Lobb---Penvarcoe-
Farm.aspx
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associations listed by the Certifi cation Offi cer10 in 2014) that still nego-
tiate collectively with trade unions over pay and conditions. Examples 
range from energy policy (CoalPro, the employers’ side of the Surface 
Coal Mining agreement) to knitting (where the employers’ association 
represents the industry to government, the EU, other bodies and the me-
dia); waste, re-use and recycling (the National Federation of Demolition 
Contractors has its own code of conduct on this); and consumer advice 
(the British Footwear Association).
Steve McCool, of Community, argues that multi-employer bargaining 
offers the possibility of a stronger partnership to lobby to protect the 
interests of these sectors and their members’ jobs: 
‘A one company approach can’t work at this level. For example, 
many of Community’s members are in energy intensive indus-
tries. We are all for a greener environment, but it has to be won 
on a level playing fi eld. Otherwise we will just export our mem-
bers’ jobs to areas with weaker or even no environmental protec-
tion. So we will work with employers to protect industry and our 
members’ jobs. The multi-employer approach adds substantially 
to that argument.’
Industrial peace
Ideas of cooperation and peace are still expressed in many MEB agree-
ments. The papermaking agreement talks of its three ‘pillars’: work to-
gether, grow together and stay together. And in footwear, the BFA em-
ployers’ association and Community ‘equally recognise the importance 
of their respective organisation as being numerically strong and as fully 
representative as possible of employers and operatives in all centres of 
the shoe trade’, supporting the principle of 100 per cent membership of 
each other’s organisations. 
But current UK MEB agreements do not stand or fall on their ability to 
deliver discipline, stability or industrial peace. MEB industries hit by dis-
putes in 2013–2014 included corrugated packaging, local government, 
the NHS, further education, engineering construction and the electrical 
contracting industry (once seen as a ‘deviant’ case because of the capac-
ity of its bargaining arrangements to survive; Gospel and Druker 1997). 
10. See: http://www.certoffi ce.org/Nav/Employers-Associations/Active.aspx?
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More recently, the RMT and Unite unions were holding consulta-
tive ballots over industrial action in response to the withdrawal of the 
2015/2016 pay offer as part of the year two deal by the offshore catering 
contractors’ group COTA, following the huge fall in oil prices. The RMT 
union pointed out that the COTA was one of the oldest industrial rela-
tions arrangements ever to be negotiated offshore in the UK continental 
shelf and was born out of one of the fi rst ever successful strikes in the 
North Sea (Blowout 2015). 
5. Collective bargaining and wage developments
The loss of much of the United Kingdom’s multi-employer bargaining 
framework does not seem to have hindered unions – where they are 
recognised – in negotiating pay rises for their members. Indeed, while 
some of Britain’s main competitors (Germany and the United States) 
faced ‘stagnant or declining real wages for over a decade’, full-time Brit-
ish employees saw real wages grow by almost two-thirds since the mid-
1980s (Van Wanrooy et al. 2013). The lowest-paid experienced higher 
than average real wage increases, with the National Minimum Wage (in-
troduced in 1999) acting as a ‘countervailing force’ to the reduction in 
bargaining. 
Between the mid-1990s and 2008 pay settlements in the United King-
dom followed a higher trend (3 per cent or more) than in the euro area 
as a whole or in Germany, until the 2008–2009 recession (see Figure 5). 
Cumulatively (1995–2012), median increases on the lowest basic rate in 
UK pay settlements amounted to 67 per cent compared with 49 per cent 
in the euro area and 44 per cent in Germany (see Figure 6). When the 
annual increases are offset against infl ation (the Harmonised Consumer 
Price Index, see Figure 7) UK pay rises still out-performed the euro area 
and Germany between 2003 and 2008. 
However, since the 2008–2009 recession high infl ation combined with 
exceptionally slow growth in average weekly earnings – due in part to 
compositional changes and public sector pay restraint – has led to an 
‘unprecedented’ fall in real wages and living standards (Gregg et al. 
2014). Figures of 8–10 per cent were widely quoted in 2014 and that was 
on the basis of the Consumer Price Index (CPI) whose use as an infl ation 
yardstick for pay (rather than the generally-higher RPI infl ation fi gure) 
remained controversial. 
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Evidence like this propelled the issue of wages to the centre of the politi-
cal stage and helped open the door to a debate about the role of sector-
level bargaining and ‘modern wages councils’, as proposed by the TUC. 
Some trade unions began to argue for a £10 minimum hourly rate, above 
the level at which state benefi ts or tax credits become payable. But the 
living standards crisis also provided a platform for arguments in favour 
of extending collective bargaining, including sector-level bargaining, 
possibly on a statutory basis (Ewing and Hendy 2013; Onaran 2014). 
Grimshaw et al. (2014) have shown that the strength of collective bar-
gaining dictates the degree of ‘ripple effect’ (weak in the United King-
dom) where pay levels further up the distribution are infl uenced by 
minimum wage increases: ‘Where governments act to improve pay eq-
uity by gradually raising the minimum wage over time, in the absence of 
complementary collective bargaining the positive impact is likely to be 
limited to the lowest paid.’
This debate is relevant to now well-established concerns that the UK 
labour market is not delivering opportunities for progress into higher 
paid work. The Confederation of British Industry (CBI) has warned that 
a third of workers are stuck in the bottom pay group: 
‘Progression needs to be a focus for business and government to 
avoid workers getting stuck on low wages. A job should be an op-
portunity for a worker to progress, either within their fi rm or — if 
opportunities are limited — to use their work as support while 
gaining the skills required for a different role. This will often be 
the case in some sectors, where there are limited possibilities for 
pay progression.’ (CBI 2014)
As has been made clear, the CBI was not in favour of more MEB or sec-
toral bargaining, but that connection could be made. 
MEB pay deals and the economic cycle
MEB bargaining creates an opportunity to regulate pay levels and condi-
tions for wider sections of the workforce but it is not immune to the busi-
ness cycle. When the recession hit in early 2009 the level of pay freezes 
recorded by the LRD Payline database rose to a fi fth and then a quarter 
of settlements. The median in private company deals fell to 2.5 per cent 
for the 2008–2009 pay round as a whole, whereas the private sector 
multi-employer median was 3.7 per cent (4.5 per cent in construction 
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and 2.75 per cent in ‘other manufacturing’ where it compared with a pri-
vate company median of 1.55 per cent). 
However in the 2009–2010 pay round the multi-employer median set-
tlement level fell to zero (including manufacturing and construction 
MEB deals), whereas the overall private company median was held to 
2.0 per cent. LRD’s pay survey concluded that ‘more workers have had 
their pay frozen in 2009–2010 than in 2008–2009 because of the many 
industry-level multi-employer agreements that were affected (in some 
cases for a second year running) coupled with the pay freeze in local gov-
ernment’ (LRD Workplace Report October 2010). 
Post-recession freezes hit the huge Construction Industry Joint Coun-
cil (CIJC) agreement, prompting Phil Davies, GMB National Secretary, 
to warn that the national agreement was ‘in trouble’ and that members 
should ‘negotiate where they can’. But with high levels of casualisation, 
false self-employment and a lack of fi xed sites, people move jobs fre-
quently and expect to negotiate a new rate every time they start at a new 
site (raising the risk of ‘anarchy’ when the industry eventually picked 
up). 
Similarly, in the print industry activists were encouraged to put in claims 
for 3.7 per cent (the rate of infl ation at the time) and 60–65 per cent of 
members normally covered by national bargaining (in companies rang-
ing from a thousand workers down to just half a dozen) were reported 
to have had a pay agreement. Unite offi cer Steve Sibbald said: ‘Deals 
have ranged from 1 per cent to 3.5 per cent, with many employers set-
tling for far more than they would have done had there been a national 
agreement, although others are still on freezes’. At that stage the union 
was working with the employers’ organisation (BPIF) to restore national 
bargaining but admitted there was a chance that it might not happen 
‘ever again’ – as turned out to be the case.
Over the years, successive LRD pay surveys (1995–2014) reveal no clear 
difference between private sector multi-employer and company-level 
settlements, when annual medians are averaged out: private sector MEB 
agreements average a 3.0 per cent increase on their lowest basic rates, 
private company agreements 3.1 per cent. There are similarities to be 
seen, too, in the use of long-term deals (a regular feature of pay bargain-
ing in the United Kingdom, often with an in-built infl ation link) with 
MEB examples in coal, offshore energy and construction. 
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Union premium
As multi-employer bargaining decreased and company-level bargain-
ing increased in the United Kingdom, an increase in the union premium 
might have been expected. Visser (2013) points out that estimating wage 
differentials between union and non-union members and fi rms ‘makes 
sense’ in the North American and British context, although it is mean-
ingless in many European countries because, under conditions of secto-
ral bargaining, the ‘co-evolution’ of union decline and decreasing bar-
gaining coverage is absent. 
There is still a ‘sizable and statistically signifi cant’ union wage premi-
um in the UK labour market (Bryson 2014), but it has declined over the 
years and varies from positive to negative between sectors. Raw statistics 
(unadjusted for worker characteristics) show that it fell from 25.9 per 
cent in 1995 to a low of 12.4 per cent in 2008. After that it displayed a 
counter-cyclical trend, rising to a peak of 18.2 per cent in 2011 before 
dropping back to 15.8 per cent in 2012 and 16.4 per cent in 2013. 
6. What future for multi-employer bargaining in the 
United Kingdom?
At the top level the UK social partners seem to disagree about the rel-
evance of sectoral or multi-employer bargaining, with the employers’ 
side (the CBI) assuming that company-level bargaining benefi ts both 
employers and employees, and the Trades Union Congress (TUC) mak-
ing the case for a more sector-based approach. Comments, interviews 
and reportage taken into account for this chapter show that views among 
the social partners at lower levels are very mixed, but that the door to 
more multi-employer bargaining could be open if it works for both sides, 
supported possibly by a strong push in that direction from government-
level. 
Taking wages out of competition 
A traditional claim for multi-employer bargaining, still heard in the 
United Kingdom today, is that it can ‘take wages out of competition’ or 
– more usually – prevent a ‘race to the bottom’. That style of bargaining 
implies a considerable ability of ‘the higher level to bind the lower level’ 
(Traxler 2003), but it was precisely the historical role of the Ceramic 
Joint Council (CJC) agreement, which in its heyday covered 90 per cent 
of the Staffordshire-based industry.
Pay negotiations through the CJC ceased in 2013 after the ceramic work-
ers union Unity, which has since merged into the GMB union, pulled 
out (see Box 1). Unity general secretary Harry Hockaday explained that 
it had been reluctant to proceed at the speed of the ‘slowest ship’; and 
that to believe the alternative would be a ‘race to the bottom’ would be to 
underestimate its commitment as a trade union.
However, he concluded that multi-employer bargaining may still have a 
place, if all the companies are in a similar state and amenable. But this 
is diffi cult in manufacturing where there are, for example, outsourcing 
costs and the need to take each set of circumstances into account. 
The British Ceramic Confederation (BCC) was party to another MEB 
agreement that ended in 2012, the Building Brick NJC. It followed the 
earlier demise of another BCC agreement, the Refractories Wages Board 
(covering kiln brick businesses whose fortunes were tied to the Sheffi eld 
steel industry). 
According to the BCC these agreements were wound up not as a result 
of ideological opposition or a strategic decision, but because of rationali-
sation in what was a nationally-spread industry of single-site factories 
competing in their local labour markets, as well as declining local de-
mand for a specialist product. These examples highlight circumstances 
that may be more or less favourable to multi-employer bargaining but 
also confi rm that UK employers are not necessarily hostile to this form 
of pay setting.
Tony Burke, Unite Assistant General Secretary, has argued for a return 
to industry bargaining in the print industry on the grounds that it pro-
vided a level playing fi eld where every employer knew exactly the mini-
mum terms and conditions, a safety net with collective bargaining ensur-
ing that the distribution of pay is evenly spread.
Unite was, in 2014–2015, also hoping to end disparities on London’s 
buses where some drivers are paid up to 25 per cent less despite dong the 
same job for the same employer. Len McCluskey, Unite General Secre-
tary, described this decentralisation as madness, demanding a ‘common, 
decent rate for the job’ (September 2014). 
Similarly, a positive effort to harmonise pay and conditions for further 
education lecturers and staff in Scotland was under way in 2014, fuelled 
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by a National Bargaining Development Group survey in 2013 that found 
salaries for an unpromoted college lecturer ranging from £31,009 to 
£37,274.
Fostering social partnership, effi  ciency and good industrial relations
The idea of social partnership still has some relevance in the United 
Kingdom. There was an acrimonious dispute in the construction in-
dustry in 2011–2012 when a group of employers tried (unsuccessfully) 
to substitute what the unions saw as an inferior agreement (known as 
BESNA). 
Peter Corby, chair of the electrical contracting Joint Industry Board 
multi-employer bargaining structure, wrote afterwards (Joint Industry 
Board 2013): ‘Everyone involved in the workings of the JIB sees the im-
portance of a National Framework of employment provisions and proce-
dures which provide for fair and just Social Partnership and engagement 
and for the JIB to be the provider of this to the entire Electrical Contract-
ing sector’ 
In a similar vein, Eamonn Connolly, Director of Employers in Voluntary 
Housing in Scotland, was proud of the continued popularity of its collec-
tive agreement with Unite: ‘There is little point in 100 similar employers 
conducting separate negotiations each year, and to do so may be disrup-
tive and divisive within a clearly identifi able industrial sector’. 
In terms that may strike a chord in other service-sector industries, he 
added that having common benefi ts allows for free movement and de-
velopment of staff between employers, with continuity of service being 
honoured. He said: ‘We would certainly commend our arrangements to 
others in the voluntary housing sector across the UK’ (LRD 2014). 
Protecting low-paid employees and nurturing skills may be best done at 
sector level. When the UK government abolished the Agricultural Wages 
Board for England and Wales in 2013 it was welcomed by the employers’ 
side, the National Farmers’ Union: abolition presented new opportuni-
ties ‘as negotiations between individual workers and individual busi-
nesses become the norm’ (NFU 2013).
However, devolved governments in Scotland, Northern Ireland and 
Wales took the opposite view. Michelle O’Neill, Northern Ireland Agri-
culture Minister, said that the AWB ‘guarantees fair pay and conditions 
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for agricultural workers, including migrant workers’, adding, ‘it is essen-
tial that workers in this industry are both protected and have the skills, 
not only to help the sector fl ourish but to encourage others to consider a 
career within it.’
Delivering results for the social partners
MEB arrangements have to deliver results for the social partners. The 
examples given here confi rm that there are still employers in the United 
Kingdom’s private and voluntary sector who can see the benefi t of multi-
employer bargaining, but on the union side the results also have to be 
worthwhile: if they are not, it may be the union that walks away (see 
Box 1).
Steve McCool, National Secretary of the Community trade union, said: 
‘The multi-employer route has its advantages and disadvantages. Clearly 
there is some history of compromise, where short-term gains were post-
poned for the longer-term goals of creating a mechanism for negotiating 
continuous improvements for the workforce’. 
McCool can point to positive results, but ‘on the negative side there may 
be a tendency for multi-employer bargaining to concentrate on ‘crying 
wolf’ by always concentrating on the company in the sector with the 
lowest profi ts, the biggest problems and the most precarious future’. 
A multi-employer approach adds expertise, objectivity and collective 
strength to a sector that an individual company might lack: ‘Obviously 
we must be vigilant that this possible strength is not used against the 
interests of our members. But then surely that is the point of strong trade 
unions’. 
His conclusion is that the union has to be ‘professional’ in negotiating 
with multi-employer bodies and ‘separate the wood from the weak trees 
they might want to put before us’. But multi-employer bargaining also 
presents great opportunities to organise and recruit new members: ‘If 
trade union density in private industry is about 14 per cent then it is ob-
vious that these bodies represent other companies with more employees 
(and potential members) that we need to sign up’.
But Martin Smith, national organiser for the GMB union, took a more 
critical stance while insisting that the union is no less committed to the 
political and industrial principle of multi-employer bargaining than 
other unions. Many employers like ‘to wear the badge’ of membership 
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of a trade group that bargains with unions, he said, and value them as 
a point of reference (for example, for industry safety regulations), ‘but 
very few employers honour the national pay settlements in our current 
experience, for example in Flat Glass and Furniture – with a large num-
ber of employers paying higher than the agreed rate. So the role sectoral 
bargaining can play right now, in reality, in improving living standards is 
greatly exaggerated’. His comments focussed on the downsides of some 
multi-employer bargaining in the United Kingdom, ‘zombie agreements’ 
with low membership fuelled by disaffection; agreements ‘hollowed out’, 
decayed beyond repair that have to be managed and controlled by na-
tional offi cials on both sides, which are of much more value to the em-
ployer than the workforce: 
‘Certainly local bargaining is more popular with our members and 
offi cials alike and in most cases seems to deliver better results both 
in terms of pay and membership growth. But local pay claims can 
legitimately be submitted in parallel within most agreements and 
this is our plan for regeneration where the patient can be saved. 
In other areas we are also considering maintaining structures for 
the purposes of common agreements on safety standards, train-
ing and the like – but removing pay bargaining.’
The recession has undoubtedly exacerbated problems in one of the in-
dustries mentioned by Smith, fl at glass. Nigel Rees, Group Chief Execu-
tive and National Secretary of the Glass and Glazing Federation, the em-
ployers’ side of the Flat Glass Council agreement, highlighted its impact 
on the window industry where business had virtually halved and the do-
mestic sector had crashed. It suffered from almost ‘suicidal’ costings, un-
dercutting, its goods not being treated as a premium product – in short, 
it is in need of a big change. 
From the employers’ perspective, too, the agreement was seen as strug-
gling and in need of a total overhaul, although Rees hoped it would sur-
vive. Its pay rates were poor and nearly every company paid above them, 
not a great advert for an industry that has a transient workforce (which 
tends to be competent but not formally qualifi ed). It was out of date with 
current activities, the old grade names no longer used and not an aid 
to managing the business. Although other terms and conditions in the 
agreement were very useful, and there was a good relationship with the 
unions, there could be pressure to go to company bargaining. 
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Member involvement
There was a more positive story from the GMB about the engineering 
construction NAECI agreement. It had been nearly ‘dead in the water’ 
fi ve years ago, Smith argued, with pay deals not honoured, member-
ship chronically low and activist membership almost non-existent. The 
dispute at the Lindsey oil refi nery in 2009 (over the application of the 
agreement in the context of the Posted Workers Directive) seems to have 
been a turning point and since then the union’s membership and activist 
base has grown and the pay deals have got better.
But the union’s more critical assessment of multi-employer bargaining 
in the United Kingdom has led it to consider different approaches, from 
ending agreements and rebuilding from scratch, to recapturing long-
standing structures; submitting local claims in parallel with national 
claims; or maintaining agreements on safety standards, training and the 
like, but removing pay bargaining: ‘We don’t think the road to continued 
membership renewal lies in propping up out of date rickety structures or 
in trying to rebuild and reform them from the top down – for example by 
appealing to Government for support’, Smith concluded. 
However, there are other examples of member involvement in the push 
towards raising standards on a multi-employer basis, such as Unite’s 
campaign of industrial action on London buses; or the 2010–2012 cam-
paign by its tanker drivers to secure industry-wide minimum standards. 
Although that did not lead to sector pay bargaining, talks with the major 
oil distribution companies (through the Advisory, Conciliation and Ar-
bitration Service) resulted in agreement on an industry-wide accredita-
tion or ‘passport’ covering health and safety and training (with working 
groups on that, on pay benchmarking and on pensions, to be overseen by 
a Governance Group involving union offi cials and company representa-
tives). 
Government action
As these accounts show, views among the social partners on both sides 
are extremely varied and that leads on to differing expectations as re-
gards the government’s role. The Confederation of British Industry (CBI) 
accepted that concerns about a squeeze in living standards were valid, 
but warned that ‘a more rigid labour market’ is not the answer. And, 
with an eye to the debate about increasing the National Minimum Wage, 
it warned that political interference in that process would undoubtedly 
have a negative outcome for some workers. 
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But while the CBI feared ‘political interference’ the TUC has been cam-
paigning for government action to promote a more sectoral approach. 
Something of the kind featured in the Labour Party’s 2015 workplace 
manifesto (A Better Plan for Britain’s Workplaces) alongside plans for a 
higher National Minimum Wage and ‘carrot and stick’ promotion of the 
Living Wage.
Labour’s plan to ‘tackle the underlying causes of low pay and insecurity in 
different sectors’ involved empowering the Low Pay Commission (already 
tasked with making recommendations on the level of the National Mini-
mum Wage) to identify sectors that can afford to pay more, and lower 
productivity sectors with high levels of low pay. The proposed mecha-
nism for raising productivity and pay, ‘industry-led taskforces’, made no 
reference to unions or collective bargaining, but the sectors to be priori-
tised were ones the unions have been very concerned about: ‘There is a 
case for the fi rst sector taskforces to focus on social care and agriculture, 
in the latter case to address the damage done by the abolition of the Agri-
cultural Wages Board and ensure agricultural workers are properly pro-
tected at the sector level’. Labour said it would also ‘support and not un-
dermine’ national conditions and pay review bodies in the public sector. 
This was all much less ambitious than the calls for a state-led move to-
wards sector-level collective bargaining proposed by Ewing and Hendy 
(2013) or Onaran (2014), but how would the social partners respond? 
International experience suggests that ‘institutional destruction’ is often 
irreversible (Visser 2013), so putting wider MEB collective bargaining 
back on the agenda for the United Kingdom’s private sector will certainly 
be a challenge.
Overcoming doubts
Historically, the UK social partners have plenty of experience with multi-
employer bargaining and state intervention to foster it, in the form of 
Wages Councils and Boards. Much more recently, the success of the Liv-
ing Wage – which, for employers that seek accreditation, implies a com-
mitment to apply minimum-rate pay increases determined by an external 
agency – could also be seen as signifi cant. And despite the many challeng-
es faced by the big public sector bargaining groups they remain a sig-
nifi cant reservoir of multi-employer bargaining in the United Kingdom.
But overcoming doubts among the social partners of the kind identi-
fi ed in this chapter would mean fi nding the ‘middle ground’ (as Nigel 
Rees of the glass employers’ federation put it), a deal that both sides can 
buy into. It would need to deliver not only on minimum pay but also on 
broader pay structures, pay progression, training, more equitable pay 
and employment relationships, conditions of service that improve on 
statutory minima; expertise and back up; and a framework with space 
for quality and innovation.
Experience also suggests that future multi-employer bargaining will 
work best where it fosters active participation by workers and employers 
at all levels, transparency and a sense of mutual ownership. It would not 
be a dispute-free environment, as disputes are a consequence of involve-
ment and engagement, and it could not be a failure-free environment 
either, as some of the examples in this chapter show. But the impulse to 
collectivise industrial relations in the UK private sector has not entirely 
disappeared and might be re-kindled under the right circumstances.
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Box 1  The ceramic industry – a case of role reversal?
Multi-employer bargaining in the ceramic industry ended in 2013, not because of a 
lack of support from the employers’ side (although the industry had fragmented), but 
essentially because the union felt it could do better with single-employer bargaining.
The Ceramic Joint Council (CJC) used to operate as a disciplined, highly formalised and 
locally concentrated industry agreement, although there was some variation between 
individual employers over issues such as bonus payments and piecework rates. How-
ever, from the 1980s onwards, individual employers began to break away. 
The fi rst company to go found it hard to alter its wage structure, but more followed, 
leading the employers’ federation to relax its rules so that they no longer compelled 
adherence to the agreement. Flexibilities (in this case an ‘enabling agreement’) were 
negotiated to provide more latitude for local changes, but problems accelerated aft er 
the National Minimum Wage was introduced from 1999.
Diversity within the ceramic industry (some parts of it depended on the success of the 
construction industry, some did not) created further fragmentary pressures, making it 
diffi  cult to conclude annual agreements and bringing the risk of a ‘lowest common de-
nominator’ approach. As the employers’ side (the British Ceramic Confederation, BCC) 
saw it, things could have stabilised around the remaining dozen gift  and tableware 
manufacturers, had the union been willing to continue. 
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Francis Morrall, BCC Deputy Chief Executive and Employment Director, said that the 
remaining companies still supported the CJC not just because it delivered for them in 
terms of pay but because they had a forum to talk to the union about other issues and 
useful procedures on issues such as grievances, discipline and sick pay. 
He also stressed that there had always been ‘some award’ even during recessions, when 
many companies were freezing wages. The employers’ side regarded that as at least 
some compensation for low basic pay rates. However, for pottery workers in Stoke-on-
Trent, the concentration and domination of the industry in the area seems to have been 
a force for keeping wages low.
The union’s case for stopping industry pay bargaining was, in part, specifi c to its cir-
cumstances (declining employer adherence, diversity in the sector) but it also refl ected 
a view that employers with diff ering abilities to pay should be expected to pay diff er-
ently, even where that means accepting smaller rises or a pay freeze where the alterna-
tive would be job losses.
Those that found the CJC agreement restrictive and decided to pull out included some 
big companies, but some of those left  in were signifi cant employers, too. Some were 
doing well and could aff ord a decent pay rise, others were struggling – for example 
on short-time working – and the union had on occasion been told there would be 
redundancies if a particular deal was agreed. 
Unity general secretary Harry Hockaday confi rmed that there was ‘always something’ 
in CJC deals, but settlements were ‘subsidised’ by members in bigger companies that 
could aff ord to do better. Bigger companies were ‘hiding behind’ the multi-employer 
agreement and might, for example, agree to pay the minimum pay rise but then pay 
big bonuses that were not negotiated (and claim the credit for it). 
Moving to single-employer bargaining meant more work for the union as each em-
ployer had to be spoken to individually and some had never had to negotiate, letting 
the employers’ confederation do it for them. Although they were outside their ‘comfort 
zone’, the union did not fail to reach an agreement. 
Most non-federated companies (those that left  the agreement) had better terms and 
conditions (although not necessarily better rates of pay), things which the union felt it 
could not get in the Federation, such as better overtime rates. The union said it still had 
a good relationship with the employers’ side and hoped to continue to meet to discuss 
non-pay issues (such as the energy intensive industries initiative). It was also very posi-
tive about the industry’s work on health and safety. However, for pay bargaining, the 
focus switched to company level.
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7. Conclusion
Multi-employer or sectoral bargaining has become something of a rarity 
in the private sector of the UK labour market, where union member-
ship density and collective bargaining coverage have fallen to a low level. 
But it has not completely disappeared, remains dominant in the public 
sector and has become a focus for renewed consideration in view of the 
decline in real wages since the recession. However, experience with the 
surviving multi-employer bargaining (MEB) agreements varies and the 
system has its supporters and detractors on both sides (employer and 
trade union). Opinions differ on the extent to which government action 
in support of multi-employer bargaining would be benefi cial and desir-
able but if it is to play a bigger role in future it would need to deliver clear 
benefi ts and foster active participation by workers and employers. This 
chapter focused mainly on the private sector, while recognising that the 
public sector is a major component in UK MEB bargaining. 
Figure 5 Whole economy collectively agreed wage increases (%)
Source: European Central Bank and TURI database (WSI).
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Figure 6 Whole economy index of collectively agreed wage increases  
Source: TURI database (WSI).
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Figure 7 Whole economy index of collectively agreed wage increases minus 
HICP infl ation 
Source: TURI database (WSI).
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Chapter 7
Wages and economic performance in Europe
Torsten Müller, Thorsten Schulten and Sepp Zuckerstätter
1. Introduction
‘Austerity is a form of voluntary defl ation in which the economy 
adjusts through the reduction of wages, prices and public spend-
ing to restore competitiveness which is (supposedly) best achieved 
by cutting the state’s budget, debts and defi cits.’ (Blyth 2013: 2)
Mark Blyth’s defi nition of austerity concisely describes the overarching 
idea that guided the crisis management pursued by policymakers at Eu-
ropean and national level. In particular, it highlights the fact that a nar-
row conception of competitiveness as cost competitiveness has become 
the dominant frame of reference for current approaches to European 
economic policy based on austerity and internal devaluation. 
The fi rst approach follows the logic of ‘expansionary austerity’ (Giavazzi 
and Pagano 1990), which implies essentially that major reductions in 
government spending will help to expand private consumption and 
thereby lead to overall economic growth. The underlying rationale of 
this logic is what Paul Krugman (2013) calls ‘the belief in the confi dence 
fairy’: in other words, the idea that credible attempts at fi scal consoli-
dation by seriously cutting public spending will increase market actors’ 
‘confi dence’ and thus induce them to invest and consume more, thereby 
creating growth and employment. Since public sector wages on average 
account for more than 20 per cent of total public spending in the EU, 
cuts and freezes in public sector wages play an important role in this 
approach.
The key focus of this chapter is, however, on the second approach, name-
ly ‘internal devaluation’, which is essentially based on the view that the 
current crisis of (cost) competitiveness is due mainly to divergent wage 
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developments within the euro zone. Since in the economic and monetary 
union (EMU) currency devaluations are ruled out in principle as a means 
of adjusting cross-country differences in competitiveness, reducing la-
bour costs in defi cit countries through wage cuts and freezes is seen as 
the only way to overcome the growing macroeconomic imbalances and 
to restore growth within the euro zone. Thus, following the ‘ideological 
mantra of competitiveness’ (Misik 2013), one key objective of EU reform 
policies is to achieve moderate wage developments across the euro zone 
by ensuring that nominal wages stay in line with productivity without 
any further compensation for price increases. 
The measures taken in order to achieve this objective include, besides 
direct interventions in national wage policies via the new European sys-
tem of economic governance (see the introduction of this volume), re-
peated political initiatives to put the internal devaluation approach on 
a stronger institutional footing. The latter involve repeated (unsuccess-
ful) attempts by the German Chancellor Angela Merkel to initiate the 
conclusion of competitiveness pacts between the EU and member states 
and, more recently, in June 2015 the ‘fi ve presidents’’ initiative to set up 
so-called ‘competitiveness authorities’ at national level with the explicit 
objective of ‘assessing whether wages are evolving in line with productiv-
ity’ (Juncker et al. 2015: 8). 
Because the powers-that-be claim that ‘there is no alternative’ (TINA) to 
an approach based on improving competitiveness through internal de-
valuation our objective in this chapter is to critically discuss the underly-
ing assumptions and the argument of what we shall call the ‘standard 
view’ of the current crisis and appropriate crisis management. This will 
be done in three steps. In a fi rst step, the standard view will be outlined 
in more detail, focusing in particular on the alleged causal link between 
divergent developments of wages and unit labour costs and macroeco-
nomic imbalances. In a second step the standard argument will be taken 
apart into its main components in order to investigate whether the as-
sumed causal links stand up. The key objective here is to illustrate how, 
at different junctures of the argument, the proponents of the standard 
view have neglected other important explanatory factors, which thus led 
them to the wrong policy conclusions. Against this background, the third 
step is to present an alternative and more sustainable growth model, 
which is based on a more expansive wage policy.
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2. Wages and economic imbalances: the standard view
As Höpner and Lutter (2014: 3) succinctly illustrate, the standard inter-
pretation of the current crisis is based on the following causal link: diver-
gent developments in unit labour costs lead to different price develop-
ments, which in turn lead to divergent trends in competitiveness, which 
then cause divergences in current account balances between surplus and 
defi cit countries. Considering, for example, nominal unit labour cost de-
velopments in Spain and Germany during the 2000s, the former was 
very much above the EU average, while the latter was very much below 
(Figure 1). Thus, the standard view sees the Spanish unit labour cost de-
velopments as the major cause of increasing account defi cits, while the 
large account surplus in Germany is seen as a result of its high degree of 
competitiveness rooted in very moderate unit labour cost developments. 
As divergences in nominal wage developments are claimed to be at the 
root of the current macroeconomic imbalances, the key problem, sup-
posedly, is that, in contrast to the so-called ‘surplus countries’, nominal 
Figure 1 Nominal unit labour costs in Germany, Spain and the European Union 
Source: AMECO Database, authors’ calculations.
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wages in the so-called ‘defi cit countries’ have outpaced productivity 
developments. Since nominal unit labour costs are defi ned as nominal 
wages divided by productivity (usually measured in GDP) the different 
developments of nominal wages led to divergences in the development 
of unit labour costs, which have increased continuously since the estab-
lishment of EMU. Due to the close link between unit labour costs and in-
fl ation, divergences in the former lead to an ever increasing gap in prices 
for goods and services produced. The divergent developments of infl a-
tion meant that the real exchange rates of surplus countries depreciated 
so that comparable goods and services could be offered abroad more 
cheaply. The result was an ever widening (cost/price) competitiveness 
gap between the two groups of countries, which in turn had far-reaching 
implications for international trade fl ows. Due to the competitive cost 
and price advantage, exports in surplus countries far exceeded imports, 
while in defi cit countries the dynamic was the other way around, leading 
to the observed macroeconomic imbalances.
This, in a nutshell, is the logic on which the standard view of the current 
crisis as a cost competitiveness crisis is based. However, with regard to 
the measures needed to address this crisis two different strands can be 
distinguished. For the fi rst strand of the standard view the key problem 
is the ‘excessive’ development of wages and unit labour costs in the defi -
cit countries alone. The proponents of this view therefore suggest that 
the defi cit countries should follow the example of the surplus countries 
– and in particular Germany – in ensuring moderate nominal wage de-
velopments in line with productivity. The policy measures proposed by 
the proponents of this perspective to solve the defi cit countries’ competi-
tiveness problem have two basic elements: fi rst, to pursue a strategy of 
‘internal devaluation’, which is a euphemism for wage cuts and freezes; 
and second, to implement ‘structural reforms’ aimed at increasing the 
downward fl exibility of wages.
This is the dominant perspective among European policymakers, in 
particular the European Commission’s DG ECFIN, the European Cen-
tral Bank (ECB) and the European Council. They have used the new 
system of European economic governance, which was set up in order 
to cope with the current crisis, for unprecedented political intervention 
in national wage setting and collective bargaining in order to ensure 
implementation of the strategy of internal devaluation and neoliberal 
structural reforms (Schulten and Müller 2015). This fi nds its clearest ex-
pression in the Memorandums of Understanding (MoU) signed by the 
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so-called ‘Troika’ and the countries in need of fi nancial assistance, and 
the country-specifi c recommendations (CSR) proposed by the European 
Commission and adopted by the European Council in the context of the 
European Semester (the EU’s annual cycle of economic policy guidance 
and surveillance). Both, the MoUs and the CSRs repeatedly call for mod-
erate wage developments (involving cuts and freezes of public-sector 
and minimum wages) and for measures leading to the decentralisation 
of collective bargaining, in particular the introduction of more restrictive 
criteria for extending collective agreements (Schulten and Müller 2015: 
338).
The second strand of the standard view of wages and economic imbal-
ances shares with the fi rst strand the notion that divergent wage and 
unit labour cost developments are a central factor causing the macro-
economic imbalances. However, while the fi rst strand puts the whole 
burden of rebalancing on the defi cit countries, for the proponents of the 
second strand surplus countries could play an equally important role in 
dealing with macroeconomic imbalances by promoting stronger domes-
tic wage growth (for example, Grauwe 2012; Malliaropulos and Zarkos 
2013; Flassbeck and Lapavitsas 2013). From this perspective, the fact 
that German nominal unit labour costs persistently undershot the com-
monly agreed infl ation target of 2 per cent in the run up to the crisis 
contributed as much to that crisis as the overshooting of nominal unit 
labour costs in many southern European countries. Thus, what is needed 
to deal with the macroeconomic imbalances is a process of asymmetric 
adjustment in which wage moderation in the defi cit countries is comple-
mented by substantial wage increases in the surplus countries. 
This should also be refl ected in the crisis management pursued by Eu-
ropean policymakers. One major criticism levelled by the proponents of 
the second strand against the current crisis management concerns its 
one-sided focus on defi cit countries. The institutional bias towards the 
defi cit countries is refl ected in the fact that the macroeconomic ‘score-
board’ used to monitor current account imbalances foresees different 
thresholds for defi cit and surplus countries. While current account im-
balances for defi cit countries are considered problematic in excess of –4 
per cent, for surplus countries the corresponding threshold is 6 per cent 
measured in terms of three-year averages (Leschke et al. 2015: 311). 
However, regardless of the concrete policy conclusions drawn by the 
proponents of the two perspectives they both share the key focus on 
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wages as the main adjustment variable for the macroeconomic imbal-
ances within EMU. In Section 3 we subject this close link between wages, 
competitiveness and economic performance, which is inherent in both 
variants of the standard view, to a critical review.
3. Critique of the standard view
The objective of the following critique is to debunk the standard argu-
ment by breaking up the causal chain leading from divergent wage and 
unit labour cost developments to differences in economic performance 
into its three main components and basic assumptions. These are: (i) 
there is a direct causal link between unit labour cost developments and a 
country’s price competitiveness; (ii) there is a direct causal link between 
the development of price competitiveness and export performance; and 
(iii) growth and economic performance are driven mainly by a country’s 
export performance.
Figure 2, which provides a stylised overview of the determinants of eco-
nomic performance, illustrates that each of these assumptions is char-
acterised by an overly narrow focus on certain explanatory factors (see 
dashed boxes) at the expense of others that have not been taken into 
consideration suffi ciently. In the following each of these assumptions 
will be reviewed critically in light of recent studies that demonstrate that 
there are alternatives to the interpretation put forward by proponents of 
the standard view. 
The three key assumptions of the standard view are derived essentially 
from the belief that there is an analogy between corporations and coun-
tries. According to this view, countries – just like corporations – are in 
direct competition with each other and can outperform each other in an 
attempt to gain international market shares (Krugman 1994: 30). This 
analogising is problematic in a number of respects. Leaving aside the 
fact that it is not countries as such but companies and their products 
that compete, another problem is that it considers international trade 
to be a zero sum game in which the gain of one country comes at the 
expense of another. However, in an internationally integrated economy, 
countries are not only home to companies that compete in the domestic 
market, but are also one another’s export markets and suppliers of useful 
imports (Krugman 1994: 34). Thus, better economic performance in one 
country can often benefi t other countries as well. 
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Another problem with this thinking in analogies is that it implies a spe-
cifi c measure of competitiveness. It makes a country’s trade balance – 
more specifi cally, its trade surplus – the main yardstick for assessing 
competitiveness. This chimes with a defi nition put forward by the Euro-
pean Commission according to which international competitiveness can 
be viewed as ‘the ability to export goods and services in order to afford 
imports, and hence it will be summarised by world market shares’ (Eu-
ropean Commission 2010a: 23). However, as Krugman succinctly puts 
it, this means that competitiveness is commonly measured in terms of 
‘the ability of a country to sell more abroad than it buys’ (Krugman 1994: 
31), which in turn generates the erroneous view that exports are the key 
determinant of a country’s economic performance. This aspect of the 
standard view’s argument will be dealt with at a later stage. In Section 
3.1 we discuss the relationship between unit labour costs and price com-
petitiveness in more detail.
3.1 The relationship between unit labour costs and price 
competitiveness
One of the key assumptions on which the strategy of internal devalua-
tion is based is that unit labour costs are the main factor that determine 
a country’s price competitiveness. This one-sided focus on unit labour 
costs has been criticised from different angles. One of the fi rst fundamen-
tal criticisms was developed by Cambridge economist, Hungarian-born 
Nicholas Kaldor. He found that between 1963 and 1975 countries with 
the highest increase in unit labour costs also had the best export perfor-
mance measured in market share, which in the literature is referred to as 
‘Kaldor’s paradox’ (Kaldor 1978: 105). His analysis also yielded that for 
the majority of the 12 OECD countries he investigated the development 
of relative unit labour costs did not go hand in hand with the develop-
ment of relative export prices. Against this background he concluded 
that ‘the customary measures of “competitiveness”, whether they be unit 
labour costs or export prices, are arbitrary and not an adequate indicator 
of a country’s true competitive position’ (Kaldor 1978: 106). 
More recent criticism boils down to two main arguments: fi rst, the one-
sided focus on unit labour costs ignores the fact that not only wages and 
unit labour costs but also the cost of capital determine a company’s pro-
duction costs; and second, the one-sided focus on unit labour costs does 
not suffi ciently take into account that price competitiveness is not only 
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determined by a company’s cost competitiveness, but also by its profi t 
margin behaviour; that is, it assumes a direct relationship between cost 
and price developments.
The fi rst argument – that it is mainly unit labour costs that determine the 
cost of production and price competitiveness – has been challenged by 
Felipe and Kumar (2011a). By analogy with unit labour costs as an indi-
cator of competitiveness from the workers’ side they calculated the unit 
capital costs, defi ned as the ratio of nominal profi t rate to capital pro-
ductivity as a measure of competitiveness from the capital side (Felipe 
and Kumar 2011a: 14). Looking at developments in 12 different countries 
for the period 1995–2007, they found that, with the exception of Greece, 
unit capital costs grew faster than unit labour costs in all countries. This 
in turn illustrates that the ‘loss of competitiveness’ is a question not so 
much of nominal wages increasing faster than labour productivity as of 
containing the development of capital costs.
The relationship between the development of unit labour costs and price 
developments has been addressed by various studies from different an-
gles. Feigl and Zuckerstätter (2012), for instance, looked at the extent to 
which unit labour costs and profi t development contributed to infl ation 
developments in different European countries. Their results show that 
for the euro zone as a whole between 2000 and 2007 income from prof-
its contributed more to infl ation than unit labour costs development. 
The most striking example is Spain. The contribution of nominal wages 
to infl ation exceeded the margin that would have been compatible with 
the ECB infl ation target by 7.3 per cent. However, the contribution of 
income from profi ts exceeded the margin defi ned by the ECB infl ation 
target by almost 10 per cent, which in turn illustrates that the main prob-
lem for Spanish price competitiveness was not so much excessive wage 
developments but the profi t margin behaviour of companies.
The limited impact of unit labour costs on international competitiveness 
is confi rmed by Storm and Naastepad (2014b), who found that in the 
southern European countries Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain unit la-
bour costs make up only about 16 per cent of manufacturing gross output 
price, which in turn leads them to conclude that unit labour costs ‘do not 
matter much for competition’ (Storm and Naastepad 2014b: 9).
Developments in Spain and Germany are prominent examples that il-
lustrate the criticism outlined above. Spain is particularly interesting 
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because the country is often portrayed as a model student in implement-
ing the internal devaluation approach. In fact, by 2013 Spain – like two 
other southern European programme countries Portugal and Greece – 
managed to offset all the differences in unit labour costs growth com-
pared with the rest of the euro zone which had been accumulated since 
1999 (Uxó et al. 2014: 13; see also Figure 1). However, despite this sub-
stantial drop in unit labour costs the country still lags behind in terms 
of relative price developments. The key factor that explains this phe-
nomenon is that the decrease in unit labour costs has only partially been 
passed on to prices and has instead been used to increase profi t mar-
gins (Le Bayon et al. 2014). Because infl ation is not only determined by 
wages/unit labour costs but also by profi t margins and indirect taxes the 
substantial increase in profi t margins more than offset the positive con-
tribution of falling unit labour costs to infl ation developments measured 
as the GDP defl ator (Uxó et al. 2014: 9). The increasing profi t margins 
also meant that unit capital costs in contrast to unit labour costs contin-
ued to grow during the crisis. Thus, whereas in the pre-crisis period the 
infl ation differential between Spain and the euro-zone average was ex-
plained by higher growth in both unit labour costs and unit capital costs, 
the differences in price competitiveness since then have been due to the 
increase in profi t margins and unit capital costs (Uxó et al. 2014: 10). 
Germany is an interesting case because it is often presented as the role 
model of internal devaluation that defi cit countries should follow. How-
ever, with regard to developments in Germany, even the European Com-
mission’s DG ECFIN acknowledges that the strong growth of German 
exports in the 2000s was not driven primarily by unit labour cost devel-
opments, but mainly the result of strong economic growth in Germany’s 
main export markets (European Commission 2012a, 2014; Schulten 
2015). As a matter of fact, Germany’s dynamics were quite similar to 
those in Spain because falling unit labour costs did not translate directly 
into falling prices (and therefore export performance which was deter-
mined mainly by Germany’s strong non-price competitiveness). Figure 3 
illustrates that during the fi rst half of the 2000s unit labour costs and ex-
port prices developed almost in parallel. In the second half of the 2000s, 
however, unit labour costs went down, while export prices showed a 
strong increase. Since the second half of the 2000s was also the period 
of Germany’s fastest export growth, many German companies obviously 
saw no need to transfer the gains in price competitiveness from wage 
restraint into lower export prices (Herzog-Stein et al. 2013). On the con-
trary, the companies used wage moderation to realise extra profi ts. 
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Developments in Spain and Germany highlight the defi ciencies of the 
standard view’s assumptions: fi rst, wages and unit labour costs alone are 
not an appropriate measure of cost competitiveness because the cost of 
capital – that is, unit capital costs – also plays an important role. Sec-
ond, there is no direct link between cost and price developments because 
price competitiveness is determined not only by cost competitiveness 
but also by profi t margin behaviour.
3.2  The relationship between competitiveness and export 
performance
Figure 2 illustrates that export performance is determined mainly by for-
eign demand and competitiveness, which can be divided into price and 
non-price competitiveness. Of the three factors, price competitiveness 
plays by far the most important role in the narrative put forward by pro-
ponents of internal devaluation. Accordingly, the key factors often men-
tioned as contributing to the German success story are moderate wage 
developments and changes to the legal framework aimed at deregulating 
Figure 3 Nominal unit labour costs and export prices, Germany, 2000–2013 
(2000=100)
Source: Schulten (2015).
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labour markets and the social security system, promoted in particular 
by the notorious ‘Hartz Laws’ (Knuth 2014). To some observers follow-
ing the standard neoclassical interpretation these policies are the main 
reason why Germany escaped the crisis largely unscathed and was able 
to transform itself from the ‘sick man of Europe’ at the beginning of the 
2000s to an ‘economic superstar’ at the end of the decade (for example, 
Dustmann et al. 2014). The second strand of the standard view, on the 
other hand, heavily criticises these very same policies as ‘wage dump-
ing’, according to which Germany has followed a beggar-thy-neighbour 
approach and has achieved its economic success mainly at the expense of 
other countries (for example, Flassbeck and Lapavitsas 2013). As diverse 
as these interpretations are, they both share the same assumption of a 
direct link between the increase in price competitiveness and the success 
of Germany’s export industries.
The key question with regard to the whole argument made by the propo-
nents of the standard view is whether there really is a direct causal link 
between the development of price competitiveness and the development 
of exports. Empirical evidence suggests that the relationship is not as 
straightforward as the standard view would have us believe. A compara-
tive study by the European Commission investigating the relationship 
between the development of real effective exchange rates (as an indica-
tor of price competitiveness) and market shares (as an indicator of ex-
port performance) shows that price competitiveness in fact accounts for 
less than 40 per cent of the changes observed in the euro-area countries’ 
export performance in the period 1998–2008 (European Commission 
2010b: 24). 
Particularly illustrative in this respect is a comparison between France 
and Germany. While both countries show an almost identical develop-
ment of price competitiveness – both pre-crisis (2000–2008) and dur-
ing the crisis (2008–2012) – the export performance of the two countries 
diverged substantially. While in the pre-crisis period price competitive-
ness in both countries deteriorated at roughly the same rate, Germany’s 
exports grew, on average, by approximately 1 per cent a year, while in 
France the annual average change of exports was almost –3.5 per cent. 
By the same token, price competitiveness during the crisis period grew 
in both countries at roughly the same rate. However, the annual aver-
age change of export performance in France remained slightly negative, 
while in Germany the annual average change was almost 2 per cent (Sau-
tard et al. 2014: 2). 
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According to Sautard et al., these divergent developments in export per-
formance despite almost identical developments in cost competitiveness 
can be explained by the fact that ‘the contribution of non-price com-
petitiveness exceeds the combined contribution of global demand and 
the real effective exchange rate’ (2014: 4). This is confi rmed by another 
study published by DG ECFIN (European Commission 2012b), which in-
vestigated the contribution of foreign demand, price and non-price com-
petitiveness to export growth in manufactured goods. The DG ECFIN 
study yields three crucial results: fi rst, foreign demand is one of the 
key drivers of export performance but to the same extent in France and 
Germany, which means that this cannot explain the difference in export 
performance; second, the role of price competitiveness in explaining the 
differences in export growth is marginal; and third, the factor that really 
makes the difference is the development of non-price competitiveness 
(measured as a residual, that is, that part of export performance not ex-
plained by prices and foreign demand) (European Commission 2012b: 
23). 
The importance of non-price competitiveness for export performance is 
confi rmed by a number of other studies (for example, European Com-
mission 2010b; Felipe and Kumar 2011a, 2011b; Storm and Naastepad 
2014a, 2014b). Even though non-price competitiveness is very diffi cult 
to measure, the various studies show that the structure of the export 
basket in terms of its sectoral composition and in terms of the complex-
ity and quality of the exported products is one of the key factors. Felipe 
and Kumar (2011a, b), for instance, show that between 2000 and 2007 
the German share of total world exports of the top 100 most complex 
products was more than 18 per cent, compared with 3.6 per cent in the 
case of France or less than 1 per cent in the case of the southern Euro-
pean countries Greece, Portugal and Spain (Felipe and Kumar 2011a: 
29). Thus, one important factor that explains Germany’s better export 
performance compared with other European countries is sectoral spe-
cialisation, with a high concentration of its exports in the most complex 
product segments, such as automobiles, chemicals and machine-build-
ing. These are all knowledge- and technology-intensive industries with 
less price-sensitive products in which labour costs play only a minor role 
(Sautard et al. 2014: 6). Returning to the comparison between France 
and Germany, it is the more complex export basket and the lower price 
sensitivity of the exported products that mainly explain why the similar 
losses of price competitiveness in both countries had entirely different 
impacts on export performance. 
Non-price competitiveness also is one of the key factors explaining what 
is sometimes referred to as the ‘Spanish paradox’ (Cardoso et al. 2012). 
The Spanish paradox refers to the comparatively good export perfor-
mance of Spanish industry before the crisis despite above average unit 
labour cost developments and signifi cant losses in price competitiveness 
(measured in terms of real exchange rate appreciation). Several expla-
nations have been offered in the literature, but one crucial factor seems 
to have been that the positive effects of non-price determinants more 
than offset the negative effects of rising export prices (Correa-López 
and Doménech 2012: 25). This is not self-evident, however, given the 
overall low complexity of the Spanish export basket. Here it is important 
to look at disaggregated fi rm-level fi gures because Spanish exports are 
highly concentrated on large fi rms that have stronger non-price posi-
tioning in terms of market access, product complexity and R&D invest-
ment (Braunberger 2012). This does not show up in aggregated fi gures, 
however.
But non-price competitiveness comprises not only such factors as prod-
uct differentiation, technological content or product quality and inno-
vation. It also includes a broad range of features that are not directly 
measurable but which consumers use in making their choices, such as 
design, brand image, distribution networks and customer support ser-
vices (Sautard et al. 2014: 3). From a broader perspective non-price 
competitiveness even includes basic societal framework conditions such 
as technological and logistical infrastructure, systems of skill formation 
and R&D or culture of labour relations.
All this has important policy implications in the context of crisis man-
agement. Even if one follows the assumption of the standard view that 
exports are the key factor determining growth, the focus should not 
be, in particular in the southern European countries, on cutting costs 
to improve cost competitiveness, even though in the short run this vari-
able is the easiest to infl uence. The focus should rather be on boosting 
non-price competitiveness by investing in the (re)construction and up-
grading of economic structures and the goods and services produced 
(Monokroussos 2015). If anything at all, this would be the real les-
son to be learned from the German recovery (Storm and Naastepad 
2014a: 21).
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3.3 Signifi cance of exports for overall growth
Because the standard view measures competitiveness primarily in terms 
of world market shares it systematically overestimates the signifi cance of 
exports for a country’s economic performance and growth. There are dif-
ferent ways to measure the signifi cance of exports for economic growth 
in terms of domestic value added. One option, for instance, is to use the 
share of net exports in GDP, which is the procedure used by standard 
national accounting formulas. The implicit assumption here is that all 
imports are re-exported and that only the difference is used or produced 
domestically. This approach may be best suited to describe the situation 
of a pure trading port; however, even Hong Kong or Singapore would not 
fully fi t into this model. This procedure is suited mainly to calculate do-
mestic production in terms of the expenditure approach, but even then 
it would probably underestimate the importance of foreign trade in the 
national economy.
Another option is to compare total sales within a country to total exports. 
This calculation is based on the implicit assumption that exported goods 
and services have the same content of imported and other intermediate 
inputs as all other expenditure categories. This method could, however, 
run into trouble if, for example, export goods and services are produced 
in highly fragmented value-added chains, while goods for domestic use 
are provided by a single enterprise. 
A more reliable measure based on readily available data seems to be the 
exports-to-fi nal-use ratio. Final use comprises domestic demand and 
export and – by virtue of national accounting identities – has to equal 
GDP plus imports. Using this measure is equivalent to the assumption 
of uniform import contents across exports and domestic uses of goods. 
This assumption seems fairly sensible, at least for highly integrated in-
dustrial nations. As public services are usually not traded across borders, 
the share of exports in demand for national production might still be 
slightly overestimated. Calculations from IO data usually show a some-
what higher share of imported inputs in export goods than in domestic 
use. 
Nevertheless, exports-to-fi nal-use ratios are much closer to IO measures 
of actual value-added exports. Data on value-added exports to GDP, 
which is the correct measure to judge the importance of foreign demand 
for domestic production, are now available from the WIOD project 
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(OECD-WTO). Johnson (2014) gives an overview of their fi ndings and 
consequences for trade analysis.
Calculating the signifi cance of exports for overall demand on this basis 
reveals that, even in Germany, which takes a lot of pride in being ‘export 
world champion’, exports in fact account for only one-third of overall de-
mand for goods and services (2012; see also table 1). For the euro zone as 
whole, exports accounted, roughly, for only one-fi fth of overall demand 
in 2012 (for a more detailed account, see Feigl and Zuckerstätter 2012). 
If one includes the rest of the EU and the European Economic Area the 
number is even smaller, so that aggregate demand and, with this, the 
economic performance of the EU depends on domestic demand to the 
extent of more than 85 per cent. This has important implications for 
economic policy because if the economies of Europe depend largely on 
domestic demand the contribution of exports to economic growth is too 
small to compensate for a decline in domestic demand as a consequence 
of a declining wage share. 
Table 1 presents an overview of overall demand for the EU member 
states and confi rms that the economic performance of EU countries de-
pends overwhelmingly on domestic demand.
Against this background it should be clear that a Europe-wide export-led 
growth model based on a strategy of wage moderation across the EU is 
not sustainable in the long run. Advocates of such a model overlook the 
fact that, in a highly integrated economic area such as the euro zone, in 
accordance with the ‘paradox of thrift’, not all countries can cut their 
way out of the crisis at the same time. Within such an area, one country’s 
domestic demand is another country’s export potential (Janssen 2013). 
Thus, if all countries try to improve their competitive position by cutting 
wages at the same time in order to improve their export performance, 
overall domestic demand will collapse, as will, together with it, the fl ow 
of imports and exports between the euro-zone countries. 
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Table 1 Total demand: domestic, EMU, EU, rest of the world (2013 in %)
Domestic 
demand
EMU Non-EMU 
members 
of EU
Third 
countries
Exports, 
destination 
unknown 
Germany 68 12 7 14
France 78 10 3 9
United Kingdom 76 9 1 13
Italy 77 9 3 11
Spain 75 25
Netherlands 55 24 7 14
Sweden 84 16
Poland 89 11
Belgium 54 46
Austria 65 19 6 11
Denmark 66 11 8 16
Finland 71 8 8 13
Greece 77 8 4 11
Portugal 71 16 4 9
Ireland* 53 17 10 19
Czech Republic 87 13
Romania 70 16 5 9
Hungary 53 26 10 11
Slovakia 51 21 18 8 2
Luxembourg 43 57
Croatia 70 30
Bulgaria 78 22
Slovenia 58 23 6 13
Lithuania 73 27
Latvia 62 11 13 13
Estonia 53 15 18 14
Cyprus 67 8 6 15 3
Malta 38 12 8 14 27
Source: Eurostat.
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4. Conclusion: wage-led growth as alternative to 
internal devaluation
The foregoing discussion of the three basic assumptions of the standard 
argument has shown that none of them are as straightforward as the pro-
ponents of the standard view claim. The discussion has illustrated that 
there is no direct causal link between the development of unit labour 
costs, price competitiveness and economic performance. The discussion 
has also shown that at each critical juncture the standard argument ne-
glects alternative explanatory factors. However, this is not to say that 
wages and unit labour costs play no role at all in a country’s economic 
performance and growth potential. 
On the contrary, as the example of Germany again demonstrates. While 
restrictive wage developments were not the main drivers of Germany’s 
fl ourishing export industries, they nevertheless have contributed strong-
ly to the downside of the German export-led growth model, which is its 
largely underdeveloped domestic sector. 
In the 2000s, German wage developments were – for various reasons, 
such as high unemployment, a partial erosion and fragmentation of col-
lective bargaining and the deregulation of labour markets – character-
ised by two main trends (Schulten and Bispinck 2014). First, wage in-
creases remained largely below productivity growth and were often even 
below infl ation, which led to a further decline of the wage share and an 
ongoing redistribution from labour to capital income. Secondly, Germa-
ny saw a signifi cant increase in income inequality boosted by growing 
wage dispersion and rapid expansion of the low wage sector.
Both wage development trends had a strong negative effect on the over-
all development of domestic demand as they signifi cantly dampened 
private consumption (Sturn and van Treeck 2013). Between 2000 and 
2008 average private fi nal consumption expenditure in the EU grew by 
16 per cent, which was four times that of Germany, where it was only 4 
per cent (Figure 4). Only since the crisis in 2009 has somewhat higher 
wage growth in Germany contributed to higher growth of private con-
sumption, while wage cuts and wage freezes in many other European 
countries have led to a stagnation of private demand (Schulten 2014).
Although Germany has obviously gained from its fl ourishing export 
industries, the weak development of domestic demand has strongly 
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Figure 4 Private fi nal consumption expenditure in Germany and the EU, 
2000–2013 (2000=100)  
Source: Schulten (2015).
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undermined the economy’s ability to realise its growth potential (Her-
zog-Stein et al. 2013; European Commission 2014). Moreover, the un-
derperformance of the domestic sector has also been – at least partially 
– responsible for the fact that import growth rates were no longer in bal-
ance with export growth (Detzer and Hein 2014). Thus, restrictive wage 
development in Germany has indeed contributed to the country’s rising 
account surplus and increasing macroeconomic imbalances. However, 
this was due primarily to the dampening of domestic demand, not the 
strategy of ‘wage moderation’.
In light of the importance of domestic demand for a country’s economic 
performance, rather than focusing on exports a more promising ap-
proach would be to pursue a wage-led growth model based on revers-
ing the current trends of falling wage shares and a redistribution from 
labour to capital income (Lavoie and Stockhammer 2013). Recent re-
search by Onaran and Obst (2015) confi rms that domestic demand in 
the majority of EU countries is wage-led and that therefore a fall in the 
wage share as a result of the policy of internal devaluation leads to lower 
growth. This means that the negative effect of a falling wage share on 
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domestic demand cannot be offset by potentially positive effects in terms 
of international (cost) competitiveness. This is, of course, completely at 
odds with the assumptions of the standard view. However, the study by 
Onaran and Obst (2015) furthermore illustrates that the positive effects 
for growth of an increasing wage share are even reinforced when intro-
duced in a coordinated manner across Europe.
Implementation of a wage-led growth model would require various 
measures to strengthen domestic demand. With regard to wages and col-
lective bargaining this would include the following measures in support 
of an expansive wage policy: the establishment of a decent minimum 
wage that is not below the low-wage threshold of two-thirds of the na-
tional median wage, improved legislative provisions to strengthen the 
bargaining power of trade unions and measures to increase collective 
bargaining coverage (Hein und Mundt 2013). 
However, it is important not to repeat the mistake of the standard view 
by putting too much emphasis on wage policy as an adjustment vari-
able. The pursuit of an expansive wage policy can be only one building 
block in the alternative growth model and needs to be complemented by 
a whole range of measures in other policy fi elds. They include increased 
public investment in social and physical infrastructure and targeted in-
vestments to improve non-price competitiveness by enabling countries 
to upgrade their export basket. In this way the pursuit of a wage-led 
growth model would acknowledge the multiple functions of wages, as a 
cost factor, on one hand, and as a driving force of domestic demand and 
social cohesion, on the other. In doing so, it would avoid the one-sided 
and narrow interpretations of the standard view.
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Chapter 8
Less governance capacity and more inequality: 
the eff ects of the assault on collective 
bargaining in the EU
Maarten Keune
1. Introduction
For many years, the EU was a major promoter of a strong role for em-
ployers’ organisations and trade unions in the EU member states. It in-
cessantly underlined the importance of social dialogue and autonomous 
collective bargaining as a core element of the European Social Model, 
stressing their contribution to democracy, good governance, economic 
effi ciency, innovation and social cohesion (for example, European Com-
mission 2002, 2004). It did so, among other things, to lessen the domi-
nance of economic integration and to strengthen the social face of the EU. 
The commitment of the EU to social dialogue and collective bargaining 
was demonstrated by the development and fi nancing of social dialogue 
structures –both inter-sectoral and sectoral– at the EU level, by the cre-
ation of European Works Councils as workers’ participation bodies in 
European multinationals and by the frequent consultation of EU level 
trade unions and employers’ organisations in the making of EU econom-
ic and social policy over the past 20 years. Also, the right of workers and 
employers, or their respective organisations, to negotiate and conclude 
collective agreements is included in the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the European Union.1 Indeed, the freedom to bargain collectively, at 
the levels chosen by the bargaining actors themselves, was considered a 
basic right within the EU. Strengthening social dialogue and collective 
bargaining was also a key demand from the Commission towards the 
Central and Eastern European countries in the process of preparation 
for their accession to the EU. The then candidate countries were urged 
to develop this core element of the social acquis (European Commission 
1. See: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:083:0389:0403:E
N:PDF
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2002) and specifi c attention was paid to bargaining at levels higher 
than the enterprise. For example, Hungary was criticised by the Com-
mission for the weakness of sector-level social dialogue and collective 
bargaining and received fi nancial and professional assistance from the 
EU to strengthen sector-level industrial relations (Hajdú 2011: 77–78). 
Through all these measures, the Commission played a leading role in es-
tablishing a system of multi-level industrial relations in Europe (Keune 
and Marginson 2013) in which unions and employers have infl uential 
voices and bargain autonomously on wages and working conditions. 
Since the start of the crisis, however, the position of the EU has changed 
dramatically. Its traditional discourse is increasingly being trumped by 
a counter-discourse originating largely in DG Economic and Financial 
Affairs, as well as in the European Central Bank (ECB). It pictures col-
lective labour relations, and in particular trade unions, as obstacles to 
market coordination and hence to economic and employment growth. 
As argued in, for example, DG Economic and Financial Affair’s 2012 La-
bour Market Developments Report (European Commission 2012: 104), 
the coverage of collective agreements should be decreased, collective 
bargaining should be decentralised, minimum wages should be reduced 
and the wage-setting power of trade unions should be diminished. 
Far from being only a discursive shift, this view has also found its way 
into the policy-making process. For example, the 2011 Euro Plus Pact, 
signed by the heads of state of the euro countries and six other EU 
member states, proposes a series of measures to strengthen competi-
tiveness, increase employment and foster fi nancial stability. These in-
clude, among other things, abandoning wage indexation mechanisms, 
decentralisation of collective bargaining, and wage moderation in the 
public sector, all areas in which the EU did not meddle previously and 
in which it has no formal competencies under the EU Treaty. What is 
more, the EU countries that are in deep fi nancial trouble and request-
ing assistance from the so-called Troika (the EU, the ECB and the In-
ternational Monetary Fund) are confronted with stringent demands in 
the area of industrial relations. In exchange for fi nancial support, coun-
tries such as Greece, Portugal, Ireland and Spain have had to introduce 
harsh reforms. These include drastic reductions of the minimum wage, 
public sector wages and pensions, and legislative changes aimed at de-
centralisation and lower coverage of collective bargaining. They allow 
company-level agreements to deviate downwards from multi-employer 
(often sectoral) agreements and have already resulted in a dramatic de-
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cline in the number of workers falling under collective agreements in 
these countries. 
Clearly, through its shift in vision and in policy the EU is further strength-
ening the role of the ‘market’ and putting economic goals before social 
ones. It is also undermining the position of employers’ organisations and 
trade unions and fostering a move towards labour markets in which col-
lective labour relations play only a minor role, contradicting the tradi-
tional EU position on their key importance. In this chapter we will look 
in more detail at the issue of collective bargaining and in particular the 
role of multi-employer bargaining. By calling for limits to and decentral-
isation of collective bargaining, the EU is actively undermining collective 
bargaining in general and multi-employer bargaining in particular. We 
will argue that by doing so it fosters increasing inequality and the de-
struction of governance mechanisms that have proven their worth both 
before and during the crisis. Below we will outline the developments in 
collective bargaining systems in recent years (Section 2). In Section 3 we 
will discuss the implications of these changes in terms of inequality and 
governance capacity. Section 4 concludes.
2. Collective bargaining developments during the crisis
The crisis period has resulted in numerous changes in the EU’s collective 
bargaining landscape and wage-setting mechanisms. Here we will briefl y 
review three main changes: (i) the various ways in which decentralisa-
tion of collective bargaining has occurred; (ii) the declining coverage of 
bargaining systems; and (iii) the one-sided imposition of wages in the 
public sector (Glassner and Keune 2012; Marginson et al.  2014; Mar-
ginson and Weltz 2014).
Where decentralisation is concerned, in particular in the private sector, 
many countries with collective bargaining systems in which national 
or multi-employer bargaining are traditionally the dominant forms 
of collective bargaining, have experienced decentralisation. Margin-
son and Weltz (2014: 4–5) show that such decentralisation has tak-
en place in at least 10 EU countries: Austria, Bulgaria, Cyprus, France, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Romania, Slovenia and Spain (with recentralisa-
tion in Belgium and Finland). Germany could also be added to this list. 
Here we will not discuss the specifi cs of different national cases (see 
elsewhere in this volume for more detailed country analyses) but in-
stead focus on the various shapes decentralisation has taken and give 
some examples. 
A fi rst, longer-term trend in western Europe has been organised decen-
tralisation, in which increasing space has been opened up for compa-
ny-level negotiations within the framework of higher-level agreements 
that defi ne the scope of such decentralised bargaining (Marginson and 
Sisson 2004; Traxler 1995). Through such organised decentralisation 
companies can shape collective agreements more to their specifi c needs 
while they are still embedded in a wider framework that provides pro-
cedural certainty to both parties and sets out what can and cannot be 
agreed upon at company level. A specifi c form of such decentralisation, 
which has been strengthened in a number of countries but has become 
commonplace especially in Germany, are ‘opening’ or hardship clauses 
which allow companies to undercut sectorally agreed standards to safe-
guard jobs. While such clauses were initially meant for companies in dire 
economic circumstances, they have become part and parcel of most sec-
toral agreements in Germany and have resulted in the widespread use 
of company-level employment pacts in which temporary job security is 
traded off against, among other things, the postponement of sectorally 
agreed wage increases, the reduction of special company payments above 
the collectively agreed rate, the reduction of collectively agreed bonus 
payments or the reduction of collectively agreed basic pay (Bispinck and 
Schulten 2011; Hassel 2014). 
A second form of decentralisation is unorganised decentralisation, in 
which national or multi-employer agreements lose their role as a frame-
work for decentralised bargaining. In Germany this happens as compa-
nies terminate their membership of employers’ organisations to avoid 
coverage by sectoral agreements, possibly, but not necessarily followed 
by company bargaining. In Bulgaria, Greece and Cyprus, in a large num-
ber of sectors no agreements are made anymore and are in some cases 
– but not all– replaced by company bargaining (Marginson and Weltz 
2014). In Ireland, in 2009, the practice of national, cross-sectoral agree-
ments was abandoned as a result of the crisis, also to be replaced by com-
pany-level bargaining. Disorganised decentralisation has been further 
strengthened by the reduction of legal possibilities for extending sectoral 
agreements to companies not falling under the original agreement, or 
the reduced use in practice of such possibilities. As Marginson and Weltz 
(2014) show, there have been such changes in eight countries: Greece, 
Ireland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Germany and Italy.
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A third form of decentralisation has been the legal inversion of the fa-
vourability principle, which traditionally holds that agreements con-
cluded at lower levels may only improve on the standards established by 
higher level agreements. Such inversion has taken place since 2008 in 
Greece, Spain and Portugal, largely as a result of pressure exerted by the 
EU, the ECB and the IMF (Marginson and Weltz 2014). France had al-
ready introduced a similar inversion before the crisis, but in the French 
case wages are largely excluded from this measure. The inversion of the 
favourability principle undermines the role of sectoral agreements and 
puts the emphasis on company agreements.
Closely linked to decentralisation, a major change in the collective bar-
gaining landscape has been the declining coverage of collective bargain-
ing; that is, the fall in the number of companies and workers covered 
by collective agreements. Following the declining use of sectoral agree-
ments, the reduced possibilities for or use of extension procedures, the 
inversion of the favourability principle, and, more generally, the reduced 
power of workers and their organisations to get employers to the bar-
gaining table, the coverage of collective agreements has declined sub-
stantially in a number of EU countries. Two particularly dramatic and 
abrupt cases have been Spain and Portugal. In Portugal, the number of 
workers covered by any type of collective agreement fell from 1 894 788 
to 327 662 in the period 2008–2012 (da Paz Campos Lima and Nau-
mann 2014), hence by over 80 per cent. In Spain, it declined from a 
coverage rate of around 85 per cent of workers before the crisis to 57.8 
percent in 2011.2 In both cases, the decline is likely to have continued in 
recent years. In other countries a more gradual longer term decline has 
been observed. For example, in Germany, coverage has declined gradu-
ally from some 75 per cent in the late 1990s to 58 per cent in 2013 (El-
legut and Kohaut 2014). 
A further major change has occurred in the public sector. In most EU 
countries governments have responded to the crisis by embarking on 
severe austerity programmes in order to restore their public budgets. 
These programmes have primarily targeted the public sector, in the form 
of unilaterally decided cuts or freezes of the wages of public-sector em-
ployees (Glassner and Keune 2012). Governments broke the tradition of 
wage bargaining with the public-sector unions that had previously been 
2. See: https://eurofound.europa.eu/sites/default/fi les/ef_fi les/eiro/country/spain.pdf
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followed in the vast majority of EU member states and minimised the 
unions’ role in public sector governance (Glassner and Keune 2012). 
This trend has been strengthened by the budgetary ‘discipline’ de-
manded by the European economic governance framework, which has 
depoliticised budgetary decisions and limits the scope for public-sector 
unions and public authorities to negotiate agreements on wages and em-
ployment. It therefore also limits their options to develop responses to 
the crisis.
3. Implications for governance capacity and inequality 
The above-discussed changes in collective bargaining – that is, the de-
centralisation of collective bargaining that increases the weight of com-
pany agreements over higher level agreements, the decline in the cover-
age of collective agreements and the turn to unilateral decision-making 
in the public sector– have in some member states come as an internal 
response to changing conditions, while in others they have been trig-
gered by European-level policies (such as annual country-specifi c rec-
ommendations under the EU’s new economic governance regime) or as 
part of the reform programmes required by the Troika of European and 
international institutions – the European Commission, European Cen-
tral Bank (ECB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF)– as a condition 
of fi nancial assistance packages provided to some countries. It is among 
this last group of countries – which includes Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, 
Portugal and Spain– that wage-setting regimes have undergone the 
most extensive changes. These changes have had a number of profound 
implications. Here we want to highlight their negative effects on equality 
and governance capacity. Collective bargaining, and in particular multi-
employer collective bargaining, offer a number of unique governance op-
tions that allow the effective pursuit of social and economic objectives, as 
well as the reduction of inequality, as we will discuss below.
Governance capacity
Collective bargaining can be defi ned as the joint and collective regula-
tion of substantive and procedural elements of the employment relation-
ship by trade unions and employers. It sets the terms and conditions 
of employment, determines the rights and obligations of employees and 
employers and outlines joint policies and initiatives in the areas of train-
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ing, social security, employment and others. It is a form of social self-
determination by collective societal forces that possess unique knowl-
edge of the needs of workers, enterprises, sectors and the economy 
and society in general, knowledge that is not necessarily available to 
public policymakers. Collective bargaining as a form of governance 
constitutes an alternative to market governance with a number of ad-
vantages, particularly where encompassing multi-employer bargaining 
is concerned. 
One quality of multi-employer bargaining is that, by setting common 
(minimum) standards for a particular sector or region, it takes elements 
of wages and working conditions out of competition. By limiting com-
petition on wages and working conditions, multi-employer bargaining 
avoids the risks associated with a downward spiral of competition in la-
bour standards: unsafe working conditions, volatile and low earnings, 
excessive working hours and job insecurity, particularly for vulnerable 
groups of workers. In this sense, multi-employer bargaining also acts 
as a ‘benefi cial constraint’ (Streeck 1997), fostering investment in hu-
man resources and a focus on quality and innovation-based economic 
activities, with potential positive effects on competitiveness and growth 
at both the micro and macro levels. Second, multi-employer bargain-
ing helps to promote industrial peace and to avoid multiple efforts and 
confl icts at company level related to the setting of wages and working 
conditions. It allows management and workers at company level to focus 
on producing goods and services and raising productivity in an environ-
ment of social peace and stability.
Third, multi-employer bargaining has the capacity to address negative 
externalities generated by the market (Marginson et al.  2014). External-
ities are effects generated by market processes but which are not incor-
porated within the resulting market transactions, such as environmental 
damage (Crouch 2014). In the labour market externalities include in-
security in the lives of workers and their families arising from actual or 
prospective job loss and/or income reduction (Marginson et al.  2014). 
A core example is incorporating the unemployment effects of wage de-
velopments and the creation of labour market outsiders in collective bar-
gaining. Where bargaining arrangements are extensive in their coverage 
and well-coordinated at national level, union negotiators are likely to 
take account of the effects of wage settlements on employment because 
unemployment will weaken union bargaining power (Crouch 2012; 
Traxler et al.  2001). 
Also, in the initial years of the crisis, collective bargaining demonstrated 
its capacity to deal with similar externalities particularly in manufactur-
ing, through agreements concluded at both the sectoral and company 
levels aimed at maintaining employment through a combination of 
measures, including short-time working, freezes in basic pay, suspen-
sion of pay premia and alternatives to redundancy, such as redeploy-
ment (Glassner et al.  2011). These agreements 
‘served to mitigate the negative effects of a rapid deterioration in 
market conditions for workers, by sustaining employment, and 
also employers, by facilitating retention of skills and experience 
in anticipation of subsequent recovery. Moreover, by generating 
negotiated responses to the impact of the crisis, collective bar-
gaining also helped maintain cooperative relations and therefore 
trust between employers and their workforces, thereby avoiding 
further negative externalities on workforce morale and commit-
ment associated with unilateral management decisions.’ (Margin-
son et al.  2014: 38)
The mitigating effects of collective bargaining were much stronger 
in countries with multi-employer bargaining systems than in those in 
which company bargaining dominates, in particular because of the much 
higher coverage rates of multi-employer bargaining systems. 
Finally, multi-employer bargaining is also of interest from a public policy 
perspective. It allows for coordination between social and economic pol-
icy, on one hand, and collective bargaining on the other and can hence be 
instrumental in achieving national policy objectives concerning income, 
employment and social security. The government and the two sides of 
industry can agree on certain income, social security and labour market 
policies, and multi-employer agreements can be used to implement part 
of these policies. For example, multi-employer agreements have been 
key for the implementation of social pacts across the EU by incorporat-
ing centrally-agreed wage increases and other measures defi ned in such 
pacts (Pochet et al.  2010; Avdagic et al.  2011). They can play a key role 
in labour market management and in the coordination of economic and 
social policy. 
Hence, collective bargaining – and in particular multi-employer collec-
tive bargaining– offer a series of governance alternatives that are not 
available in labour markets where the ‘market’ is the sole governance 
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mechanism. The earlier-discussed decentralisation of collective bargain-
ing, its declining coverage and its suspension in the public sector threat-
en to eliminate these governance alternatives and therefore has reduced 
the capacity of EU countries to respond to the crisis in an effective and 
organised way. 
Inequality
Collective bargaining also has a major effect on developments in ine-
quality (Berg 2015; Keune and Vandaele 2013). Inequality has been in-
creasing in most EU countries in recent years (Berg 2015; Salverda et al. 
2014). This is problematic because rising inequality is more and more 
being identifi ed as one of the key factors weakening countries’ social 
and economic performance (Wilkinson and Pickett 2009; Ostry et al. 
2014). Collective bargaining can fi rst have an equality effect in terms of 
the power relations between workers and employers. It can, to some ex-
tent, balance the power relations between individual workers and their 
employers by collectivising the power of workers. Second, it can foster 
greater equality between workers across companies and sectors. In this 
way, collective bargaining can be an instrument for social justice and en-
sure that the rights and needs of both sides are respected and the fruits 
of progress are shared in a socially just way. This also means that the 
equality effect of collective bargaining is greater where the coverage of 
collective agreements is higher, which is in the countries where multi-
employer bargaining dominates. Multi-employer collective agreements, 
possibly supported by extension mechanisms, can foster inclusion and 
equality by extending bargaining coverage to the weaker groups in the 
labour market that have little bargaining power. They can also, possibly 
in the context of social pacts, moderate wages in favour of employment 
growth, again with the objective of including weaker groups affected by 
unemployment. 
Multi-employer bargaining systems also offer a conducive institutional 
context for an equality-oriented, solidaristic wage policy, which has two 
main aims (Schulten 2002: 174): (i) equal pay for work of equal value, 
implying that wages should not depend on individual company circum-
stances alone but should be standardised in multi-employer collective 
agreements, while pay rises should be in line with growth of the overall 
economy, enabling its benefi ts to be shared between capital and labour 
in a manner ensuring that all workers participate equally in economic 
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progress; and (ii) a more egalitarian wage structure, reducing pay dif-
ferences between higher and lower wage groups and counteracting mar-
ket forces that result in increased wage differentiation. They often do 
so by compressing the overall wage distribution by propping up wages 
at the bottom of the wage pyramid (Berg 2015). Through the common 
standards they set, multi-employer bargaining systems can be expected 
to produce much lower wage inequality than systems in which company 
bargaining dominates or where bargaining plays no important role at all 
(Keune and Vandaele 2013). This does not necessarily mean that multi-
employer bargaining produces high wage growth. In fact, across Europe, 
the wage share has decreased in recent decades, marking a gap between 
productivity improvements and wage growth and a shift in income from 
labour to capital (Keune and Vandaele 2013). This common trend has oc-
curred, however, as a result of different mechanisms. Within the multi-
employer bargaining systems it can be attributed, to a large extent, to 
wage moderation based on collective agreements and social pacts, which 
set additional goals in terms of equality, employment or social policy. In 
the single-employer bargaining systems, with low bargaining coverage, 
wage moderation stems rather from market mechanisms and the unilat-
eral imposition of wage levels. Another difference is that the organised 
nature of the multi-employer bargaining systems, in the longer term, are 
better at limiting the shift of income from labour to capital, which is in-
deed stronger in single-employer bargaining countries. 
Until the crisis, some decentralisation had taken place in most of the EU 
countries with multi-employer bargaining systems but to a large extent 
they maintained their high levels of bargaining coverage and a high wage 
coordination capacity. During the crisis, as discussed earlier, in several 
countries –and in particular in the countries receiving fi nancial aid from 
the EU, ECB and IMF– these systems have come under strong pressure 
and have indeed been overhauled radically in countries such as Spain, 
Portugal, Greece and Ireland. In others, mainly Germany, the system 
is being weakened more gradually. This means that in a number of EU 
countries the institutional architecture for equality-oriented, solidaristic 
wage policy and policies aimed at the inclusion of weaker groups has 
disappeared or is disappearing, fostering the growth of inequality and 
undermining social and economic improvements. 
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4. Conclusion
In the course of the crisis, the EU has abandoned its traditionally fa-
vourable position towards collective bargaining in general and multi-
employer bargaining in particular. It has been arguing in the opposite 
direction and this change has not remained a discursive one but is also 
being translated into recommendations and the imposed destruction of 
multi-employer bargaining systems in the countries receiving fi nancial 
support. Also, the EU criteria for public budgets and debt foster austerity 
policies and leave little space for governments and public sector unions 
to bargain on public-sector wages and employment. Within this context, 
we can observe three main trends in collective bargaining in the EU: an 
ongoing decentralisation of collective bargaining through organised and 
disorganised decentralisation and the inversion of the favourability prin-
ciple; the declining coverage of collective agreements; and the one-sided 
imposition of wages and working conditions in the public sector, effec-
tively cancelling out public sector bargaining. The fi rst two trends result 
in a bigger role for the ‘market’ in the defi nition of wages and working 
conditions, while the third increases the weight of the state. All three 
reduce the role of organised workers and employers. These trends affect 
the various EU countries in different ways, but few of them are exempt 
or moving in the opposite direction.
These trends have two major negative consequences. One is that they 
impoverish the available range of governance mechanisms available in 
EU countries by reducing the possibilities of governance through collec-
tive bargaining and in particular multi-employer bargaining, which has 
proven itself an effective alternative to market governance. By tak-
ing elements of wages and working conditions out of competition it 
sets a floor in the (sectoral) labour market and promotes a focus on 
productivity, quality and innovation. It also promotes industrial peace, 
has the ability to address negative externalities and can play a key role in 
the implementation of consensus-based public policy. The other major 
negative consequence is that they undermine the equality-promoting, 
solidaristic and inclusive capacities of multi-employer collective bar-
gaining and hence foster inequality and undermine social and economic 
progress.
The new European economic governance, as it has been emerging before 
and especially since the start of the crisis, is detrimental to social and 
economic justice and to high quality social and economic development. 
Maarten Keune
294 Wage bargaining under the new European Economic Governance
There is an increasing awareness that European economic governance is 
in dire need of a new vision and a new institutional design. Widespread 
collective bargaining in general and multi-employer bargaining in par-
ticular should be part and parcel of this new design as it can play a major 
role in delivering social and economic justice, as well as higher quality 
economic and social development.
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Chapter 9
Looking for an ‘optimal wage regime’ for the 
euro zone
Odile Chagny and Michel Husson
Introduction
Is an ‘optimum wage rule’ for the euro area a realistic prospect? By ‘op-
timum wage rule’, we mean a wage regime that would be able to offer 
a way out of the crisis as an alternative to so-called ‘internal devalua-
tion’, with its recessionary impact and stimulation of new divergences 
between countries. 
In order to answer this question, we start by analysing the wage regimes 
organising the relationship between wages and labour productivity in 
the euro-zone countries. The analysis is carried out along three axes:
(i) between the tradable and non-tradable sectors;
(ii) between ‘northern’ (Austria, Belgium, Germany, Finland and the 
Netherlands) and ‘southern’ euro-zone countries (Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Portugal, Spain), with France occupying an intermediate posi-
tion most of the time;
(iii) between the pre- and post-crisis periods.
We start with a comparison between France and Germany, which ena-
bles us to identify the main parameters governing country-specifi c wage 
regimes. In a second step, we extend the comparison to the other euro-
area economies.
Given that productivity provides the material basis for wage increases, 
two areas of divergence among euro-zone countries emerge: (i) the con-
vergence of productivity performance expected as an outcome of the 
creation of a single currency area has not happened; (ii) divergence of 
productivity performance has been accompanied by increased disparity 
in infl ation rates. This double no-convergence has been a major barrier 
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to the emergence of an ‘optimum wage rule’ that would have made the 
dynamics specifi c to each country consistent with their integration in a 
single currency zone.
Today, the risk is high that the way chosen to exit this non-optimal con-
fi guration may lead to the abandonment of the rule that prevailed in 
most countries before the crisis (with the notable exception of Germa-
ny), which allowed wages to increase at a very homogeneous pace across 
sectors, exposed or sheltered.
We argue that any progress toward an optimum wage rule in the euro 
zone requires:
– clear recognition that the European construction is incomplete;
– economic policies aimed both at enforcing balanced wage regimes 
and ensuring convergence of productive performance.
1. Comparison of France and Germany
We start by comparing the two largest countries in the euro area, France 
and Germany. This will provide us with a general framework of analysis 
that, in a second step, we shall extend to the other euro-zone countries. 
Our fi rst fi nding concerns productivity. In both countries, the same pat-
tern for productivity can be observed: labour productivity is increasing 
much faster in manufacturing sectors than in service sectors. This phe-
nomenon is well-established in the literature (for example, Clark 1940; 
Fourastié 1949; Baumol 1967). 
By contrast, real wage development –measured by defl ating average 
nominal wage per capita with consumer prices– reveals substantial di-
vergences (see Figure 1). In France, during the pre-crisis decade, real 
wages were increasing at a similar rate in industry and services, to some 
extent disconnected from the labour productivity developments specifi c 
to each sector, as if an egalitarian principle was guiding wage dynamics 
in France, resulting in fairly homogeneous wage development (at least 
until the crisis) in the two main sectors of the economy.
The situation is very different in Germany. In manufacturing, real wages 
rose at almost the same rate as in France, while in the service sector 
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they stagnated. In contrast to the French case, German wages appear to 
be more signifi cantly correlated with the labour productivity specifi c to 
each sector (see Figure 2). 
Figure 1 Productivity developments in France and Germany  
Note: 1996=100. Source: Ameco.
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Relative prices between the two sectors constitute an essential interme-
diate variable linking the purchasing power of workers –related to con-
sumer prices– to real labour costs (related to the specifi c output price 
in each sector). Suppose that in a given sector the value added price de-
creases relative to the consumer price: if wages in this sector are more or 
less indexed to consumer prices, the change in relative prices, all things 
being equal, will lead to a rise in wage share (Box 1).
Box 1
Let p be the price of value added, pc the consumer price index, w the wage per employee, N 
employment, Q the volume of products and prod =       labour productivity.
The wage share can be written :
share =       or = 
But wage w can also be written: w = s.pc, where s is the purchasing power of wages. The 
wage share therefore be broken down as follows:
share = 
The fi rst term compares the purchasing power of the employee with their contribution to 
production: the employee produces a unitary product (prod) and receives a quantum (s) of 
this product.
But the wage share also depends on the relative price        . If the relative price increases and 
if nominal wages are indexed to consumer prices, then the wage share will increase even 
if           remains constant.
The relative change in the wage share (and hence in the profi t share) between the two main 
sectors will thus depend not only on productivity and wages, but also on the relative prices 
of the two sectors. We obtain:
                =                           =    
This relationship shows that wage shares follow the same trend if the purchasing power of 
the wage increases at the same rate in both sectors (      is constant) and if the relative prices 
(     ) compensate for the relative productivities (          )
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Because consumer prices are the same for employees of both sectors, the relative evolution 
of purchasing power is strictly equivalent to the relative evolution of wages:      =      .
In other words, the relationship also shows that the wage share has the same evolution 
in both sectors, if the diff erences between sectors in unit labour costs are refl ected in the 
changes in relative prices.
Relative output prices tend to be negatively correlated with the level 
of productivity across sectors. This relationship can be understood as 
a mechanism of the redistribution of productivity gains across sectors, 
equivalent to a process of equalisation in profi t shares. This mechanism 
is essential for understanding the relationship between wages, prices 
and productivity at sectoral level. 
Again, a comparison of Germany and France reveals a contrast. Between 
1996 and 2012, the wage share in manufacturing increased by 12.3 per 
cent in France, whereas it decreased by 13.4 per cent in Germany. This 
divergence cannot be explained by productivity, which increased by 52 
per cent in both countries during the same period, nor by the purchasing 
power of wages, which increased only slightly more in France than in 
Germany: +19.8 per cent against +13.5 per cent. Indeed, most of the dif-
ference is explained by relative prices. In France, value added prices de-
creased by 30 per cent compared with consumer prices over the period 
1996–2012. In Germany, they decreased by only 14 per cent. Concretely, 
German manufacturing industry was able to keep a larger share of pro-
ductivity gains (which may also have be ‘imported’ via inputs).
2. Wage regimes in Europe
In this section, we attempt to establish a typology of wage regimes cover-
ing the main countries of the euro zone, using the same indicators. 
We start by examining relative productivity developments in the two 
main sectors. The fi rst fi nding is that the structure observed in France 
and Germany also applies to most other countries: in the service sector, 
labour productivity increases much less rapidly than in manufacturing. 
Relative productivity between the two main sectors follows an upward 
 s
1          
w
1 
 s
2          
w
2   
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movement, of similar magnitude in the major countries, except Italy. 
This provides us with our fi rst broad generalisation: in most countries, 
there is a productivity gap between the two main sectors.
Figure 3 Real wage developments in manufacturing and services   
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Note: 1996=100. Manufacturing (solid line), services (dashed line) and relative wage (grey line).
Source: Ameco.
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 Spain Italy
 Portugal  Greece
Figure 3 (cont.)   
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Second, we examine real wage developments in manufacturing and ser-
vices, defi ned wage purchasing power adjusted for CPI. We thus obtain a 
second broad generalisation: in most countries, wages increased at rough-
ly the same rate in the two main sectors, at least in the period that imme-
diately preceded the crisis; the only exception is Germany (see Figure 3).
Real wage growth depends on productivity, although in recent decades 
real wage growth has tended to lag behind that of productivity. But the 
question is, which productivity measure should be taken as reference for 
wages, because wages may be linked either to average productivity in 
the economy or sector-specifi c productivity. In the fi rst case, wages will 
increase more or less uniformly across sectors. In the second case, the 
wage gap across a sector will refl ect that of productivity and wages will 
grow faster in manufacturing. But we must also look at relative prices, 
which will ultimately determine the effect on the relative wage share. 
For a better understanding of these mechanisms, Table 1 summarises 
the developments of these variables for the whole euro zone during the 
pre-crisis period (1996–2007).
Table 1 Wages, prices and productivity in the euro zone (1996–2007)
Manufacturing Services Manufacturing/ 
services
(1) Labour productivity (prod) 40.2 6.1 32.1
(2) Real wages (s) 5.3 0.7 4.6
(3) Real wages/labour productivity 
(2)/(1)
–24.9 –5.1 –20.9
(4) Relative prices (pi/pc) –15.9 –0.8 –15.2
(5) Wage share 
[s/prod]/[pi/pc]=(3)/(4)
–10.7 –4.3 –6.7
Source: Ameco.
Over the whole period 1996–2007, labour productivity (prod) grew at 
a much faster pace in manufacturing (+40.2 per cent) than in servic-
es (+6.1 per cent). The gaps in purchasing power (s) are substantially 
smaller (+5.3 per cent in industry, +0.7 per cent in services). The ratio 
between purchasing power and productivity (s/prod) declined in manu-
facturing (–24.9 per cent), whereas it remained almost fl at in the service 
sector (–5.1 per cent). Furthermore, relative prices in the manufactur-
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ing sector declined (–15.9 per cent), while in services they remained fl at 
(–0.8 per cent).
Relative price changes therefore narrowed the gap in relative wage 
shares measured on the basis of consumer prices (strictly equivalent to 
relative unit labour costs): it amounts to 6.7 per cent, but would have 
been 20.9 per cent on the sole basis of unit labour costs; in other words, 
without the relative prices effect. This state of affairs is illustrated in Fig-
ure 4, which illustrates how the wage share in the manufacturing sector 
is ‘pulled upward’ by the relative prices mechanism.
The same mechanism holds for all countries: changes in relative prices 
compensate for the productivity gap between the two sectors, transfer-
ring part of the productivity gains in industry to other sectors (see Figure 
5). It is important to understand that the main vector of this redistri-
bution in productivity gains is the homogenous growth in wages across 
sectors.
Figure 4 Wages, prices and wage shares in the euro area   
Source: Ameco. 1996=100.
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Figure 5 Relative prices and productivity 
Note: Euro area = 100.
Source: Ameco. Evolutions 1996–2007. Ameco.
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3. What should an ‘optimum wage regime’ look like?
With reference to the concept of an ‘optimum currency area’, we attempt 
to defi ne an optimum wage regime consistent with a single currency 
area.
Assuming that promoting convergence and social cohesion are impor-
tant principles to be pursued within a currency area, the objectives of 
such a regime would be as follows:
– Objective no. 1: an optimum wage regime should be consistent with 
relatively homogeneous wage growth within each country (across 
sectors), in line with average labour productivity. In other words, 
an optimum wage regime should allow for a redistribution of higher 
productivity gains from the most effi cient sectors, in order that em-
ployees in the less productive sectors benefi t evenly from this gen-
eral advance. In the same time, it should ensure a balanced distribu-
tion between wages and profi ts in the economy as a whole.
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– Objective No. 2: an optimum wage regime should be consistent with 
an upward convergence of real wages among countries, based on 
productivity catch-up. This second objective means that real wages 
should grow faster in countries starting from a lower initial level of 
productivity.
– Constraint: an optimum wage regime should also respect the con-
straint imposed by a single currency area: in that sense, an opti-
mum wage regime cannot lead to systematic distortion of cost com-
petitiveness because it is impossible to correct these distortions by 
nominal devaluations within a single currency area. In other words, 
an optimum wage regime should not lead to systematic distortion 
of wage shares in the tradable sectors (because it would mean, for 
example, that profi t margins would inevitably be cut in countries 
facing less favourable development of cost competitiveness). 
These optimum criteria are far from having been realised in the fi rst pe-
riod of the euro zone:
– The fi rst objective was only partially achieved, since the wage share 
declined in most euro-zone countries in the pre-crisis period. How-
ever, the euro zone allowed –at least before the crisis– for relatively 
uniform wage growth across sectors in most countries. The only –al-
beit notable– exception is Germany.
– The second objective was not achieved. Real-wage dispersion (across 
countries) slightly declined in manufacturing, but not in services. 
Moreover, it is important to stress that wage dispersion has been 
increasing since the crisis, in both sectors (see Figure 6). 
– The constraint in terms of cost- and price-competitiveness was 
not respected either. The wage share in the tradable sector, which 
moved within a relatively narrow range before the establishment of 
the euro area, started to diverge from the early 2000s (see Figure 
7). There has been no interruption of that movement with the cri-
sis. 
It is always useful in this regard to recall that divergences in export per-
formance cannot be explained by differences in cost competitiveness 
(Box 2). However, a single currency area cannot sustainably afford di-
vergences in unit labour costs across its various members.
The euro zone differs from an ‘optimum wage regime’ on two points in 
particular: the absence of real wage convergence and diverging infl ation 
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Figure 6 Wage dispersion 
Note: Wage dispersion is defi ned for each sector as the ratio of the standard deviation of real wages 
(constant 1 996 euros) to the average wage in the euro area (11 countries).
Source: Ameco.
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rates. However, in the optimistic version of the currency area theory, 
convergence was to be achieved via the following virtuous circle: produc-
tivity gains are a priori more dynamic in the least advanced countries; 
this can be accompanied by higher infl ation, which can result in trade 
defi cits. But these defi cits are made up by capital infl ows, which in turn 
increase investment and reinforce productivity gains, so that in the end 
infl ation will slow down and trade defi cits will be reduced (see especially 
Blanchard and Giavazzi 2002). 
What has happened clearly differs from this account and we have to be 
able to explain it.
4. Divergence in production performance
An optimum wage regime, as we have defi ned it, should be able to allow 
for real-wage convergence across countries, based on productivity con-
vergence. We have already noticed that, in most countries, there was a 
similar pattern for relative productivity gains: a faster rate of productiv-
ity growth in manufacturing relative to services. 
Box 2 Unit labour costs and export performance
There is now a large literature showing that unit labour cost divergences cannot account for 
export performance (Chagny et al.  2013). The prevailing view can be summarised as follows: 
‘Thirdly, and perhaps surprisingly, the large dispersion in current account balances across euro 
area countries seems to display a small correlation with ‘narrow’ measures of competitiveness, as 
represented by relative price levels and unit labour costs. Instead, they seem to bear a stronger 
relation with broader, non-price competitiveness factors. It follows that internal devaluation 
policies may have limited success at reducing external imbalances unless accompanied by 
structural reforms that boost some of those non-price factors’ (Estrada Garcia et al.  2012).
In order to complete our analysis, it is necessary to introduce a distinction between tradable 
and non-tradable sectors. In a recent IMF working paper (Shik Kang and Shambaugh 2013), 
the authors note that ‘the growing current account defi cits seem driven by import increases 
and non-trade factors’ and establish a link between capital infl ows and higher wages in the 
tradable sector: ‘Some [countries] –most notably the Baltics, but to some extent Spain, Greece 
and Ireland– appear to have experienced large capital infl ows and optimism-driven booms. 
This raised unit labour costs in the non-tradable sector and increased imports.’ 
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This obviously raises the question of productivity catch-up, particularly 
in the tradable sector. This issue was addressed by a recent paper by the 
European Commission (2013a). The author of the study, Narcissa Balta, 
emphasises an important phenomenon: ‘There is strong evidence that 
the pattern of convergence changed considerably in the euro area prior 
to the crisis.’ 
Initially (1995–2001), things happened according to ‘the neoclassical 
paradigm [that] predicts higher capital fl ows to lower-income econo-
mies because the marginal product of capital is higher than elsewhere 
in these countries’. 
During that period ‘investment increased in all converging economies 
more than in the rest of the euro-area (notably in IE, but also in PT 
and EL) and capital initially fl ew towards the catching-up economies in 
search of more productive uses, supported by strong fi nancial integra-
tion among the euro area countries’.
There was therefore a virtuous circle consistent with the ‘prediction of 
economic growth theory’: economic and fi nancial integration ‘should 
lead to higher income levels across countries, while less advanced econ-
omies should grow faster than more advanced ones, either because of 
more rapid capital accumulation (the neoclassical growth model) or be-
cause of technology diffusion and innovation (endogenous growth mod-
els)’ (European Commission 2013a). 
But this catching-up process went into reverse between 2001 and 2007; 
that is to say, from the launch of the euro: ‘capital continued to fl ow to-
wards most of the catching-up economies (...) driven not so much by mar-
ginal productivity of capital as by higher profi t mark-ups in some of the 
services sectors and network industries’ (European Commission 2013a). 
This shift means that capital fl ows have favoured the low productiv-
ity non-tradable sector, which ‘could be suggestive of an accumulation 
process driven more by rent seeking than by effi ciency considerations’ 
(European Commission 2013a). In another paper, the European Com-
mission (2013c) confi rms this analysis by noting that ‘some vulnerable 
Member States witnessed a shift in profi tability in the non-tradable sec-
tor above that of tradables’, this shift being, according to the European 
Commission, the ‘result of the rapid credit-fuelled expansion of internal 
demand in the pre-crisis years’.
Looking for an ‘optimal wage regime’ for the euro zone
 Wages and collective bargaining in Europe 311
The outcome of this ‘capital misallocation’ is that convergence did not 
occur. This can be checked with the help of total factor productivity, 
that is, the effi ciency with which inputs are being used in the pro-
duction process. Figure 8 shows how this synthetic indicator evolved 
between 1999 and 2007, compared with the productivity level of each 
country in 1999.
There are two clearly distinct groups of countries: ‘northern’ countries 
–which started with a higher level of labour productivity– all improved 
their total factor productivity between 1999 and 2007. ‘Southern’ coun-
tries, by contrast, started with a lower level of productivity and were 
characterised by a decline in total factor productivity. In other words, 
real convergence, in terms of production effi ciency, did not take place 
and the introduction of the euro was, on the contrary, accompanied by 
real divergence.
Relative productive performance correlates well with the changes in the 
contribution of manufacturing production to GDP and with external debt 
developments (Bertola 2013). ‘Southern’ countries have benefi ted from 
massive foreign investment, but these capital fl ows were not oriented 
Figure 8 No convergence of production effi  ciency  
Source: European Commission 2013a.
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towards the manufacturing sector, so that the productive effi ciency of 
the ‘southern’ countries decreased.
The analysis can be further clarifi ed by noting that the profi t rate is the 
main determinant of investment (rather than the ‘profi t mark-ups’ cited 
by the European Commission), and that profi t depends on total factor 
productivity (see Box 3).
Box 3 Profi t rate and total factor productivity
The profi t rate is calculated as the diff erence between value added and total remuneration, 
relative to fi xed assets/capital: R=(pQ-wN)/pK. Dividing both terms by pQ, and rearranging, 
we obtain:
 
Notations:
R: profi t rate, p: price, w: nominal wage
K: capital, Q: product, N: employment
s: real wage (s= w/p), e: wage share (e=s/prod), K/N: capital per capita
prod: labour productivity (prod=Q/N), k: capital effi  ciency (k=Q/K)
Profi t rate therefore depends on three factors: real wage, labour productivity and capital per 
capita. This yields:
 
In the above formula (a dot above a variable indicates a growth rate) ∏glo accounts for total 
factor productivity. The profi t rate dynamics depends on the relative growth of total factor 
productivity and real wage. Profi t rate increases when:
 
We can fi nally calculate the maximum rate of growth of wage smax ensuring a stable profi t 
rate:
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The breakdown of the profi t rate in the ‘southern’ countries shows that 
capital effi ciency (productivity) declined almost from the onset of the 
single currency (see Figure 9). Capital per capita began to grow faster, 
but failed to ‘pull’ labour productivity. These trends are typical of what 
economists describe as extensive growth patterns. This loss in effi ciency 
in turn negatively affected the profi t rate, which was not compensated by 
the increase in profi t share (see Figure 10).
In summary, the absence of convergence in productivity and, in the end, 
of real wages can be explained mainly by capital’s orientation towards 
less productive sectors. 
5. Explaining non-convergence
As noted above, an optimum wage regime should also allow infl ation 
rates to converge. In this section we attempt to identify the structural 
determinants of infl ation across countries. 
– Our fi rst assumption is that the transfer of productivity gains from 
manufacturing to services implies an increase in the general level of 
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Figure 10 Profi t rate in the ‘southern’ 
countries
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prices. We measure the extent of this transfer by the ratio between 
real wages in the service sector and the average productivity of the 
whole economy. We observe that this indicator correlates well with 
infl ation (see Figure 11).
– The second hypothesis is that the infl ation rate also depends on the 
intensity of distributional confl icts, which we approach via the S90/
S10 inter-decile ratio, which compares the average income of the 
richest 10 per cent with that of the poorest 10 per cent in 2000. We 
see also that this indicator correlated well with infl ation (see Figure 
12).
– Bertola (2013) emphasises a third trade-off between reducing in-
equality and economic effi ciency: ‘The slow factor productivity 
growth and declining inequality observed in countries that accumu-
lated negative imbalances may in part have resulted from a tendency 
to trade production effi ciency for social protection: a tendency that 
would have been justifi ed if productivity growth had materialised.’
Here again we fi nd a distinction between the two groups of countries: 
‘northern’ countries performed better, but at the cost of an increase in 
inequality. In ‘southern’ countries (and also in France), total factor pro-
ductivity declined or stagnated and inequality decreased (or slightly in-
creased in the case of Italy) (see Figure 13).
Figure 11 Infl ation and wage in the service sector  
Source: Ameco.
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It can be shown from the same set of data that a wage regime ensuring 
uniform wage growth leads to a reduction in or slower growth of inequal-
ity but also to higher infl ation. 
Figure 12 Infl ation and inequality
Source: Ameco, Eurostat.
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Figure 13 Inequalities and productive effi  ciency
Source: Ameco, Eurostat.
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We summarise the above fi ndings in Figure 14.
6. Towards a devaluation of the ‘internal exchange rate’?
Our analysis above showed that the European wage regime was far from 
optimal in the pre-crisis period after the introduction of the euro. We 
have so far described the formation of wages during the pre-crisis period 
(1996–2007). In what follows, we try to understand the extent to which 
the crisis, and the reforms undertaken since then, have –or have not– 
introduced structural changes.
Since 2009, numerous reforms aimed at moderating wages and ‘fl exi-
bilising’ labour markets have been implemented, with greatly varying 
intensity across countries. We focus here mainly on relative wage devel-
opment between manufacturing and services. 
A key observation is that in most countries since the crisis wages have 
increased less (or declined more) in services than in manufacturing (see 
Table 2). In other words, wage moderation tends to threaten the wage 
regime that prevailed in most countries before the crisis, which ensured 
relatively homogeneous wage growth across sectors. The consequence is 
that implementing these policies contributes to moving us away from an 
optimum wage regime.
Figure 14 The mechanisms of non-convergence  
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Table 2 Diff erences in wage growth rate between services and manufacturing 
sector, 2009–2013
Portugal –9.5 Spain –3.8 Netherlands –2.1
Italy –5.1 Germany –3.4 Ireland –1.9
Greece –4.8 Belgium –3.2 Austria –1.6
Euro area –4.4 France –3.1 Finland –0.5
Source: Ameco.
We are experiencing a (historical) shift in wage policy recommenda-
tions: after ‘internal devaluation’ we now fi nd that the concept of ‘inter-
nal exchange rate’ is increasingly being emphasised. 
A recent paper from France Stratégie (Sy 2014) focuses on the distinc-
tion between tradable and non-tradable sectors and shows that the latter 
also contributes to determining competitiveness on world markets. ‘In 
the non-tradable sectors, the sharp rise in unit labour costs and the lack 
of competition result in dynamic changes in prices and therefore in the 
costs of inputs for the tradable sectors’ (Sy 2014). These fi ndings lead 
the authors to the following recommendations: ‘The competitiveness of 
export sectors would be improved if wages were better linked to the level 
of productivity in non-tradable sectors like real estate, business services, 
legal and accounting services’ (Sy 2014).
The solution proposed by the authors is straightforward: wages in non-
tradable sectors must adjust to specifi c sectoral productivity rather than 
to average productivity, as was in practice the dominant rule in the euro 
area. The objective is, explicitly, to change the wage regime. It is even 
quantifi ed: ‘a drop in the relative price of non-tradable between 4.9 per 
cent and 9.7 per cent’ [is needed] in order to ‘stabilise the net external 
position’ (Sy 2014). Of course, this could be achieved only by an equiva-
lent decrease in wages in the sectors concerned, or by hypothetical pro-
ductivity gains.
Patrick Artus (2014) goes even further in an analysis of the specifi c chal-
lenges faced by France and Italy. It would, according to him, be ineffi -
cient to increase or slow down wages uniformly across sectors ‘because of 
the asymmetry between the two parts of the economy’. What is needed is 
a ‘decorrelation of wages between the manufacturing sector and the rest 
of the economy, to be achieved by establishing in wage negotiations a 
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strong link, at plant-fi rm level, between wage increases and profi tability, 
competitiveness of each of the fi rms’ and ‘[livelier] competition outside 
the manufacturing sector in order to bring prices down’ (Artus 2014).
In the same vein, Stefan Collignon (2013a) proposes to use the profi t 
rate (rate of return on capital) as a reference for wage adjustments. He 
redefi nes competitiveness as the ability of the profi t rate to attract new 
investment. Following these conditions, unit labour costs are to be con-
sidered as ‘overvalued when the return of capital in one country is below 
that of the euro area average or undervalued if it is above this average’. 
In other words, wages must not exceed the maximum wage, defi ned as 
the wage that does not lower the profi t rate, which itself depends on total 
factor productivity (see Box 3).
Collignon goes further in a note for the Committee on Employment and 
Social Affairs of the European Parliament (Collignon 2013b). In this 
note, he proposes a new ‘golden rule’ that ‘must take into consideration 
not only labour productivity, but also capital productivity’. The new and 
better collective wage standard wage bargaining rule would be:
Wage increases = labour productivity increases + infl ation target 
+ increases in the average effi ciency of capital.
These analyses rightly take account of the essential role of cross-sector 
wage prices and productivity dynamics. But they result in recommenda-
tions that, if they were implemented, would foster a disconnection be-
tween wages in the non-tradable sector and average labour productivity 
across the economy. In other words, these proposals aim to generalise 
the German wage regime to other countries, with a growing wage gap 
between tradable and non-tradable sectors.
The distance between such policy recommendations and an optimum 
wage regime –here considered at national level– can be illustrated by 
what we call an ‘incompatibility triangle’ between three core objectives 
(see Figure 15):
– Objective 1: a balanced distribution of the productivity gains at the 
level of the whole economy, via a stable wage share at that level;
– Objective 2: homogeneous wage growth across sectors, in order 
to allow for the redistribution to all employees of the productivity 
gains obtained in the best performing sectors;
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– Objective 3: no deterioration in price competitiveness; in other 
words, to avoid a continuous divergence in unit labour costs and/or 
infl ation rates.
The above analysis shows that a major structural weakness of the euro 
area is that it failed to make these three objectives compatible. 
The fi rst objective was partially achieved before the crisis because the 
wage share declined in almost all countries. The second objective has 
been achieved because wages grew at roughly the same pace in manu-
facturing and services, with the (notable) exception of Germany. But the 
consequence of these partial achievements was a divergence in infl ation 
rates that severely impaired the cost and price competitiveness of the 
‘vulnerable’ countries.
Since the crisis, public policies have been based on the fundamental pos-
tulate that the main cause of macroeconomic imbalances was excessive 
wage growth in the countries in diffi culty. We consider this assumption 
to be misleading. Nevertheless, it forms the basis for many European 
policy guidelines today. What we can do is to analyse these guidelines 
from the perspective of the three dimensions of our ‘incompatibility tri-
angle’.
The result is clear-cut: since the crisis, wage regimes have been moving 
away from the fi rst two objectives of an optimum wage rule. 
The recovery in profi t share from its sharp fall during the recession has 
been accompanied by an increasing wage development divergence be-
Figure 15 The ‘wage incompatibility triangle’
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tween the tradable and non-tradable sectors. The third objective (re-
ducing infl ation differentials and, supposedly, trade defi cits) has been 
partially met but for the wrong reasons. First, because trade balances 
recovered at the cost of recession or very weak growth, which reduced 
imports; second, because wage moderation is not used primarily to im-
prove price competitiveness, but to restore profi t share (see Figures 16 
and 17): ‘profi t margins (gross operating surplus over value-added) in-
creased –particularly in tradable industries– thus absorbing part of the 
reduction in unit labour costs’ (European Commission, 2013b). 
Figure 16 Real wages  
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Figure 17 Indicator of relative export mark-up (2008=100)  
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7. Is there a way out of the ‘incompatibility triangle’?
An important fi nding of our analysis is that European integration is 
incomplete. The euro zone’s institutional design failed to trigger struc-
tural convergence. This lack of convergence concerns, fi rst, productivity 
performance measured, for example, by total factor productivity. Weak 
catch-up in terms of productive effi ciency reduced the scope for wage 
increases and worsened capital profi tability.
As a consequence, the scope for trade-offs between wages and profi tabil-
ity was narrowed signifi cantly. In southern countries in particular the 
decline in wage share was not suffi cient to offset that of capital effi ciency. 
This general observation was complicated further by the contradictions 
generated by the impossibility, within the single currency area, of nomi-
nal exchange rate adjustments and a growing disparity in real interest 
rates that refl ected infl ation differentials. All these mechanisms affect-
ed the tradable and non-tradable sectors differently and wage regimes 
came increasingly under pressure. Distributional confl icts and the weak 
productivity gains in turn fuelled infl ation rate divergence.
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The dominant analysis, especially originating from the European insti-
tutions, postulates that excessive wage growth was the main cause of the 
crisis in the euro area. Consistently, wage moderation and structural –
mainly labour market, but not only there– reforms are presented as the 
key levers for rebalancing the euro area.
These recommendations are directed toward more decentralisation in 
collective bargaining and a disconnection of wages from labour produc-
tivity. This perspective amounts to abandoning the idea of a general op-
timum wage rule. In other words, such proposals do not aim at imple-
menting real convergence within the euro area. Instead of seeking how 
to consolidate an optimum wage regime, their goal seems to move away 
from it.
We defend the idea that the ‘golden rule’ that indexes wages on infl ation 
and average productivity is the fairest rule for distributing productivity 
gains and that systematic capture by fi rms – primarily to benefi t share-
holders – in the name of competitiveness is not economically or socially 
sustainable. Every wage earner should benefi t from the overall growth of 
the economy, irrespective of the sector he is employed in.
Implementation of this golden rule has been hampered by two factors 
in particular. The fi rst is the general drift in wage share during the cri-
sis period. The second, on which we need to insist in this conclusion, is 
the imbalance caused by Germany, which signifi cantly –and early on– 
moved away from this wage rule. The introduction of a minimum wage 
in Germany is good news because it should contribute to preventing or 
at least reducing the wage drift between sectors. 
At European level, the aim of avoiding an increasing wage gap across sec-
tors and to prevent defl ationary risks would benefi t from the introduc-
tion of a minimum wage system. Proposals in this regard have multiplied 
in recent years (Schulten 2014; Brischoux et al. 2014; see also Chapter 
10). Even the new President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude 
Juncker, stated in 2013 that ‘we need a basis of social rights for work-
ers, minimum social rights for workers, including of course one essential 
thing, a minimum wage – a legally compulsory minimum wage in the 
euro-zone member states’ (Stearns 2013).
A European minimum wage would offer an immediate answer and an 
essential tool to prevent wage slippage in the so-called sheltered sector.
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Two other conditions should also be met to move towards the optimum 
wage regime. Both involve profound changes at both country and Euro-
pean level.
If our analysis is correct, the indexation of real wages to average produc-
tivity gains is associated with different infl ation rates, depending on the 
structural characteristics of a given country. Infl ation is an indicator of 
a dual confl ict: between employees and employers for the distribution 
of productivity gains, and between sectors for transfers of productivity 
gains between sectors. Reducing these tensions imply greater institu-
tionalisation of wage indexation rules and homogenisation in collective 
bargaining procedures.
More fundamentally, within a single currency area, an optimum wage 
regime requires efforts towards convergence in productivity. As we have 
seen, this convergence has not occurred. European integration to date 
has instead led to an industrial specialisation that accentuates polarisa-
tion between countries and regions, while capital has not invested in the 
sectors with the highest potential productivity.
Only transfers and investments directed towards sectors in which pro-
ductivity can be raised signifi cantly in the catch-up countries would 
trigger convergence of productivity gains, which in turn constitutes the 
material basis underlying the homogenisation of wage earners’ living 
standards. This is the perspective proposed by the European Trade Un-
ion Confederation with its plan ‘for investment, sustainable growth and 
quality employment’ (ETUC 2013) and its proposals for wages and col-
lective bargaining (ETUC 2014).
Such changes within the European economy may look very remote or 
even out of reach. But if they are not implemented, the polarisation of 
Europe is likely to worsen, between the surplus countries and the others, 
condemned to slower growth and perpetual wage ‘moderation’, or, in 
other words to a ‘low cost’ suboptimal development model.
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Annex: sources and methodology
Our main source is the European Commission’s Ameco database which 
provides sectoral statistics and allows us to distinguish between the two 
main sectors of the economy, manufacturing and services. This parti-
tion approximately refl ects the distinction between tradable and non-
tradable sectors.
This assimilation of the tradable sector to manufacturing industry and 
of the non-tradable sector to services is an imperfect proxy, but it may 
be justifi ed in two ways. The fi rst is practical: it makes possible the use 
of the Ameco database, which provides a set of consistent data. The sec-
ond is an empirical one: this partition suffi ces for identifying the major 
trends and characteristics of each country.
(Labour) productivity is defi ned as the ratio between value added at 
constant prices and total employment. The defi nition of real wages in-
troduces a distinction. From the point of view of employees, it is the 
purchasing power of wages that matters, in other words, the nominal 
wage defl ated by consumer prices. On the employers’ side, their margin 
depends on the nominal wage compared with the value added per person 
employed (in euros) and the real wage must in this case be defi ned in 
relation to added value. 
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Chapter 10
Prospects and obstacles of a European minimum 
wage policy
Thorsten Schulten, Torsten Müller and Line Eldring
1. Introduction
In the context of his ‘core messages’ for the 2014 European election 
campaign the then leading candidate of the European People’s Party 
(EPP) and now the President of the European Commission Jean-Claude 
Juncker (2014a), announced that ‘as Commission president, I will ad-
vocate that all member states introduce a minimum wage adjusted to 
national collective bargaining traditions and economic conditions’. This 
should guarantee that all employees in Europe ‘have an income from 
work suffi cient to ensure that they don’t have to go to the social security 
offi ce’ (Juncker 2014b). By developing a European minimum wage poli-
cy Juncker aims to reinforce the social dimension in Europe and contrib-
ute to a ‘rehabilitation of the social market economy’ (Juncker 2014c). 
The notion of a minimum wage policy coordinated across Europe has 
long been under discussion within the EU (Schulten 2008, 2012). It is 
no coincidence that this idea was originally developed in France in par-
ticular, which has long had a strong national minimum wage system. 
Thus, it was the French Socialists who, in 2004, in their European elec-
tion programme, fi rst called for the introduction of a ‘salaire minimum 
Européen’ (Parti Socialiste 2004). Since then the demand for a Euro-
pean minimum wage policy has been debated in France. The support-
ers of this idea include former president of the European Commission 
(Jacques Delors 2006), who called on the European trade unions and 
employers’ organisations to negotiate on the issue within the framework 
of the European social dialogue. 
More recently, new impetus to the debate concerning the introduction 
of a European minimum wage has been generated by, in particular, the 
French Socialist government. In order to promote the European-level 
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debate about a European minimum wage, the French ministry of eco-
nomic affairs published a conceptual paper outlining some ideas for a 
‘European minimum wage standard’ (Brischoux et al.  2014). The debate 
has also been fostered by some important national developments, such 
as the introduction of a statutory minimum wage in Germany and cor-
responding proposals in Italy. Within the framework of the European 
elections of 2014 it became clear that the idea of a European minimum 
wage policy is now under discussion in all major political camps (Sanial 
2014). The same holds true for the European trade unions which have 
discussed the issue for years and have recently intensifi ed the debate in 
order to clarify their position (ETUC 2014a, 2014b)
The questions of what exactly is meant by a European minimum wage 
policy and how it is supposed to be implemented politically and insti-
tutionally within the EU have to date been addressed mainly in vague 
terms. The implementation of such a political project faces at least three 
fundamental problems: fi rst, there are substantial variations in the lev-
els of the national minimum wage in individual EU states; second, the 
national minimum wage regimes –in other words, the procedures, in-
stitutions and actors who determine the national minimum wage– also 
exhibit major differences; and third, there is the problem that according 
to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU, Arti-
cle 153.5), the EU has no legal competence in the area of wage policy, 
although, in practice, this has not prevented the EU from intervening 
heavily in national wage policies (Schulten and Müller 2015).
The aim of this chapter is to systematically sketch the contours of a Eu-
ropean minimum wage policy by way of a detailed analysis of its po-
tential prospects and obstacles. Because any European minimum wage 
policy has to take into account the different national institutional frame-
work conditions, Sections 2 and 3 will outline the diversity of national 
minimum wage regimes and levels in Europe. Section 4 will discuss the 
normative foundations and the social and economic goals of a European 
minimum wage policy. Section 5 will review the debate within the Euro-
pean trade union movement with a particular focus on the debate within 
the European Trade Union Federation (ETUC) and the Nordic trade 
unions. Finally, Section 6 contains a discussion not only of the specifi c 
proposals on how to implement a European minimum wage policy but 
also of its potential impact in terms of providing effective protection for 
low-wage workers. In the closing Section 7 the contours of a possible 
European minimum wage policy are summarised. 
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2. Minimum wage regimes in Europe 
2.1 Universal and sectoral minimum wage regimes
In all European countries, minimum wages constitute an established in-
strument of labour market regulation (Schulten 2014a).1 The procedures 
and institutions used to determine the minimum wage and the scope 
of minimum wage regulations constitute a key distinguishing feature 
of national minimum wage regimes. A fundamental distinction can be 
drawn between universal and sectoral minimum wage regimes. Uni-
versal regimes are characterised by the establishment of a general wage 
fl oor, usually at the national level, and applying –apart from possible 
exceptions– to all employees. By contrast, sectoral regimes do not have 
a general wage fl oor, but set minimum wages for certain branches or oc-
cupational groups. 
Within the EU, 22 of the 28 states have a universal minimum wage re-
gime with a nationwide minimum wage rate (Table 1). In six member 
states, however, there are only sectoral minimum wage regimes, includ-
ing the Nordic countries Denmark, Finland and Sweden, as well as Cy-
prus, Italy and Austria. Outside the EU most European countries also 
have a national minimum wage, with the exception of Norway and Swit-
zerland. In 2015, Germany switched to a universal minimum wage re-
gime by introducing a national statutory minimum wage.
Minimum wage regimes are also distinguished by the dominant regula-
tory instrument used to determine the respective minimum wage. Basi-
cally, minimum wages can be set on a statutory basis or in collective 
agreements or within the framework of tripartite bargaining involving 
employers, trade unions and the state. In most countries with a univer-
sal minimum wage system the main regulatory instrument is the law. 
This applies, for example, to France, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, the 
United Kingdom and Ireland, as well as to most southern and Central 
and Eastern European countries with a statutory minimum wage set by 
the government. 
In some Central and Eastern European countries the minimum wage is 
negotiated, fi rst and foremost, within the framework of a tripartite body 
1. A detailed presentation of national minimum wage regimes in Europe, with detailed national 
case studies (Schulten et al.  2006; Vaughan-Whitehead 2010). 
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at national level. If a tripartite agreement is reached the resulting min-
imum wage assumes a statutory character. If the negotiations fail the 
minimum wage is set unilaterally by the government. 
There is a distinctive model in Belgium, where the minimum wage is 
agreed within the framework of a national collective agreement for the 
private sector as a whole.2 In Germany, the initial amount of the min-
imum wage was set by a law that came into force on 1 January 2015. 
From now on, however, a ‘social partners’ committee’ will determine the 
level of the minimum wage, which will be implemented by government 
decree. Thus, a system of quasi-negotiations on the national minimum 
wage has been introduced in Germany. The decisive benchmark will be 
the development of average wages laid down in collective agreements. 
Table 1 Universal and sectoral minimum wage regimes in Europe
Law Collective or tripartite agree-
ment
Universal regimes 
(Uniform national minimum 
wage defi ning a general wage 
fl oor)
Western Europe:
France, Luxembourg, Nether-
lands, Ireland, United Kingdom
Southern Europe:
Greece (from 2012), Malta, Por-
tugal, Spain
Eastern Europe:
Croatia (from 2008), Lithuania, 
Latvia, Romania (from 2011), 
Slovenia, Czech Republic, 
Hungary (from 2011)
Western Europe:
Belgium
Germany (from 2015)
Southern Europe:
Greece (until 2012)
Eastern Europe:
Bulgaria*, Estonia*, Poland*, Slo-
vakia*, Croatia (until 2008), Ro-
mania (until 2011), 
Hungary (until 2011
Sectoral regimes 
(No general wage fl oor, but mini-
mum wages for certain branches 
or occupational groups)
Cyprus Northern Europe:
Denmark, Finland, Norway, Swe-
den
Western Europe:
Germany (until 2015), Austria, 
Switzerland
Southern Europe:
Italy
Note: * If a tripartite agreement is not concluded, the decision is taken by the legislator. 
Source: Schulten 2014a.
2. A similar system of national minimum wage agreements existed in Romania and Greece up 
to 2011 and 2012, respectively. Under pressure from the Troika (European Commission, 
European Central Bank and the IMF), however, this was abolished in favour of a unilateral 
statutory minimum wage system (Schulten and Müller 2015).
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In countries with sectoral minimum wage regimes by contrast –with the 
exception of the special case of Cyprus, where there are statutory mini-
mum wages for certain occupational groups– minimum wages are laid 
down solely in collective agreements. The scope of sectoral minimum 
wages thus depends on the robustness of the collective bargaining sys-
tem and collective bargaining coverage in the relevant country. In some 
countries the scope of collectively agreed minimum wages is further sup-
ported by legal extension procedures.3 
2.2 Minimum wage regimes and collective bargaining systems 
Among the countries with sectoral minimum wage regimes a substantial 
number of states have a comprehensive system of collective agreements 
that ensures that a large majority of employees –up to 80 per cent or 
more– are protected by a collective agreement (Figure 1). This group 
of countries includes, in particular, the Nordic states Denmark, Finland 
and Sweden (and to a lesser degree Norway), but also Austria and Italy. 
The high level of collective bargaining coverage in these countries en-
sures a comprehensive minimum wage. However, in some of the coun-
tries with sectoral minimum wage regimes collective bargaining cover-
age is much lower. This applies to Cyprus and Switzerland, with 50 and 
52 per cent collective bargaining coverage, respectively. In these coun-
tries a relatively large number of employees are not covered by collective 
agreements and therefore have no minimum wage protection whatsoev-
er. The relatively low bargaining coverage of 58 per cent in Germany was 
also one of the major reasons why Germany fi nally introduced a general 
statutory minimum wage (Schulten and Bispinck 2014). A similar debate 
took place in Switzerland where, against the background of collective 
bargaining coverage of only 52 per cent, the trade unions campaigned for 
the introduction of a statutory minimum wage but failed to get a major-
ity in a national referendum on that issue (Baumann and Rieger 2015). 
Among the countries with universal minimum wage regimes there are 
both states with low coverage and states with high coverage (Figure 1). 
This indicates that there can be very different forms of interaction be-
tween national minimum wages and wage determination by collective 
3. On the role of extension procedures in collective bargaining see Chapter 11 in this volume.
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agreement (Grimshaw and Bosch 2013; Leonardi 2014). In countries 
with fairly poor collective bargaining coverage, such as most Central and 
Eastern European states, the minimum wage has an important anchor-
ing function for the wage structure as a whole. The development of the 
minimum wage here represents the main benchmark for general wage 
development. In countries with a comparatively high minimum wage 
level, such as France, the development of the general minimum wage 
has a strong infl uence on the development of wages laid down in collec-
tive agreements, especially for lower wage categories. Finally, there are 
countries –such as the Netherlands– in which the scope of the statu-
tory minimum wage is limited to a fairly small group of employees not 
subject to collective bargaining. In these cases it has no infl uence on the 
development of wages laid down in collective agreements, but on the 
contrary follows the development of collectively agreed wages. Overall, 
statutory and collectively agreed minimum wages are not necessarily in 
opposition to one another but can be complementary. In many western 
and southern European countries the statutory minimum wage is thus 
Figure 1 Minimum wage regimes and collective agreement coverage, 2011–
2013 (% of all employees covered by collective agreement)
Note: * Latest available data. 
Source: ICTWSS Database (Version 5.0). For Portugal and Spain: authors’ calculations based on fi gures 
from labour ministries. For Norway: Stokke et al.  (2013). 
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merely a ‘safety net’ for those employees who are not (adequately) cov-
ered by minimum wages laid down in collective agreements.
3. Absolute and relative minimum wage levels in Europe 
3.1 Absolute minimum wage levels
The scope and effectiveness of national minimum wage regimes is closely 
linked to the level of the relevant minimum wage protection, which var-
ies considerably in Europe (Kampelmann et al.  2013; Schulten 2014b).4 
In countries with universal minimum wage regimes three groups can be 
distinguished with regard to the level of national minimum wages (in 
euros) (Figure 2). The fi rst group, with relatively high minimum wages, 
includes seven western European countries. The leader of this group is 
Luxembourg with a minimum wage of 11.12 euros per hour, followed 
by three countries with minimum wages above 9 euros, namely France 
(9.61 euros), the Netherlands (9.21 euros) and Belgium (9.10 euros) 
and three further countries with minimum wages between 8 and 9 eu-
ros, namely Ireland (8.56 euros), Germany (8.50 euros) and the United 
Kingdom (8.06 euros). 
The second group, with national minimum wages between 3 and 8 euros 
an hour, is made up of fi ve, mainly southern European countries: Slove-
nia (4.57 euros), Malta (4.16 euros), Spain (3.93 euros), Greece (where 
the minimum wage was cut by more than 20 per cent in February 2012, 
bringing it down to 3.35 euros), and fi nally Portugal with a minimum 
wage of 3.04 euros. The third group of countries, with minimum wages 
below 3 euros, comprises ten countries all from Central and Eastern Eu-
rope, ranging from Poland (2.42 euros) to Bulgaria (1.06 euros).
Because of the lack of national minimum wages the minimum wage level 
in countries with sectoral minimum wage regimes can be determined 
only by analysing the lowest wages laid down in collective agreements. 
The few recent studies on this indicate that two groups of countries have 
to be distinguished (Eldring and Alsos 2012; Kampelmann et al.  2014). 
4. Up-to-date information on national minimum wages in Europe, as well as numerous non-
European countries can be found in the WSI Minimum Wage Database. An English version 
of the database is available at: http://www.boeckler.de/wsi-tarifarchiv_44064.htm. 
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Figure 2 National minimum wages in the EU, 2015* (per hour, in euros)  
Note: * Eff ective 1 January 2015.
Source: WSI Minimum Wage Database. 
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On one hand, there are the Nordic countries, whose minimum wages 
laid down in collective agreements are substantially higher than national 
minimum wages in the other EU states. On the other hand, there are 
the countries, such as Austria, Italy –and before the introduction of a 
statutory minimum wage also Germany– in which, in some instances, 
relatively low minimum wages are laid down in collective agreements, 
which are substantially below national minimum wages in comparable 
western European countries. 
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Taking the examples of cleaning and hotels and restaurants as two tra-
ditional low-wage sectors, the lowest collectively agreed wages range 
between 13.00 and 20.00 euros per hour in Denmark, Norway and Swe-
den; these wages lie far above the statutory minimum wages in other 
European countries (Figure 3). In Finland, collectively agreed minimum 
wages in both sectors are only slightly above or even at a level compara-
ble to statutory minimum wages in some Western European countries. 
Finally, in Austria and Italy, the collectively agreed minimum wages are 
in both sectors below the wage levels of those European countries with 
the highest statutory minimum wages.
3.2 Relative minimum wage level
The real level of the minimum wage is not derived from its absolute val-
ue, however, but from its relative level in relation to the national wage 
structure. The latter can be measured with the so-called ‘Kaitz index’, 
Figure 3 Lowest collectively agreed minimum wages in countries with sectoral 
minimum wage regimes (per hour, in euros)*  
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Note: * Eff ective 1 January 2015.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on current collective agreements.
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which measures the minimum wage as a percentage of the national me-
dian wage.5 The available data on this –which are published regularly 
by the OECD– are based, however, on non-harmonised national data 
sources and can thus be regarded only as approximate values. According 
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Figure 4 Minimum wage as a percentage of the median wage for full-time 
employees, 2013  
Note: * On the basis of a fi ctive minimum wage of 8.50 euros per hour.
Source: OECD, for Germany: calculations of the WSI based on data from the Federal Employment 
Agency. 
5. The median wage is the wage that divides the overall wage structure into two equal seg-
ments, with one half of employees earning more and the other half earning less. The median 
wage should not be confused with the average wage, which represents the arithmetical mean 
of all wages.
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to OECD fi gures for 2013, minimum wages, measured in terms of the 
median wages of full-time employees in the EU, varied between 61 per 
cent in France and Slovenia and 36 per cent in the Czech Republic, with 
the majority of countries registering a value of between 40 and 50 per 
cent (Figure 4). In Germany, a minimum wage of 8.50 euros per hour in 
2013 would have represented 50 per cent of the median wage. 
Measured in terms of national wage structures statutory minimum wag-
es in Europe are relatively low. They all lie below the so-called low-wage 
threshold, which by international convention stands at two-thirds of the 
median wage. In conformity with the poverty threshold used in inter-
national poverty research a wage that lies below 50 per cent of the me-
dian wage is a ‘poverty wage’. In many EU countries, statutory minimum 
wages are thus not above the poverty wage level (Marx et al.  2012).
In countries with sectoral minimum wage regimes, the relative mini-
mum wage levels can be measured by considering collectively agreed 
Figure 5 Collectively agreed sectoral minimum wages as a percentage of the 
national median wage*
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minimum wages as a percentage of the national median wages (Figure 
4). Considering again the cleaning and hotels and restaurants sectors, 
the Kaitz index for minimum wages laid down in collective agreements 
is usually over 60 per cent, in the case of Sweden even above 70 per 
cent. The only exceptions are Finland (for both sectors) and the Danish 
hotels and restaurants sector, where the Kaitz index is only 53 or 54 per 
cent. These fi ndings are confi rmed by other studies, which found that the 
relative value of minimum wages in sectoral regimes based on collective 
agreements is usually well above the level of countries with universal 
minimum wage regimes (Eldring and Alsos 2012; Kampelmann et al. 
2014).
4. The debate about fair and equitable minimum wages
Considering the often rather low levels of minimum wages in Europe, 
the debate about a European minimum wage policy is fi rst of all about 
the issue of a fair and equitable minimum wage. In international and 
European social law there are several documents which claim that every 
worker should have the right to a ‘fair (minimum) wage’ that guarantees 
a certain socio-cultural subsistence minimum. Although there is no uni-
versally accepted defi nition of a fair wage one can identify at least two 
lines of discussion. The fi rst is the debate on ‘living wages’, which is very 
much inspired by developments in the United States and within Europe 
became rather prominent in particular in the United Kingdom and more 
recently also in Ireland. The second line is the debate on an adequate 
relative minimum wage level, which aims to defi ne a fair minimum wage 
in relation to average or median wages. This debate started as early as 
the 1970s within the Council of Europe and has become more prominent 
at EU level since the mid-2000s.
4.1 Normative foundations of a right to a fair wage
The normative justifi cation of a European minimum wage policy can 
fi nd support in a series of international and European conventions 
and agreements, from which the principle of fair and adequate remu-
neration can be derived as a basic social right (Schulten 2008; Ofek-
Ghendler 2009). There is already a corresponding clause in the 1948 UN 
General Declaration of Human Rights, according to which ‘Everyone 
who works has the right to just and favourable remuneration ensuring 
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for himself and his family an existence worthy of human dignity’ (Article 
23, para 3). 
In its Constitution, whose original text dates from 1919, the International 
Labour Organisation (ILO) calls for ‘the provision of an adequate living 
wage’ (Preamble) for all employees. The notion of a living wage contin-
ues to stand for a demand that the minimum wage should not amount 
merely to a wage fl oor, but should establish a wage level that enables one 
to maintain a (minimum) standard of living in keeping with the level of 
development of the society in question (Anker 2011). Within the frame-
work of two Conventions (No. 26 of 1928 and No. 131 of 1970), accord-
ingly, explicit minimum requirements are formulated for determining 
minimum wages. According to ILO Convention No. 131 ‘in determining 
the level of minimum wages … the needs of workers and their families, 
taking into account the general level of wages in the country, the cost of 
living, social security benefi ts, and the relative living standards of other 
social groups’ should be taken into consideration (Article 3, para a). 
At the European level, a ‘right of workers to a remuneration such as will 
give them and their families a decent standard of living’ was fi rst laid 
down in the European Social Charter adopted within the framework of 
the European Council in 1961 (Article 4, para 1). Finally, the EU, too, 
with the adoption of the Community Charter of the Fundamental Social 
Rights of Workers at the EU summit in Strasbourg in December 1989, 
recognises the right to ‘an equitable wage’ as a basic social right. In the 
document also known as the European Social Charter all workers in Eu-
rope should receive a wage ‘suffi cient to enable them to have a decent 
standard of living’ (Title I, para 5). The task of a European minimum 
wage policy, accordingly, would be to coordinate national minimum 
wage policies in such a way that the fundamental social right of ‘an equi-
table wage’ is realised throughout Europe. 
4.2 The concept of a living wage
Normative arguments in defence of a fair wage also played a key role in 
the fi rst living wage movements, which emerged in the late nineteenth 
century, when, in a context of low pay, long hours and poor social condi-
tions, political activists and social reformers challenged the dominant 
neoclassical view that the free market forces of supply and demand will 
provide for a fair wage (Figart 2004: 1). Drawing on different ideologi-
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cal justifi cations, all early conceptions of a living wage share the over-
all objective of protecting workers from below-subsistence wages and 
enabling them to maintain an adequate living standard. Against this 
background, the concepts of minimum and living wages were used syn-
onymously. One of the earliest documents that explicitly formulates a 
‘doctrine of a minimum living wage’ is Pope Leo XIII’s 1891 encyclical 
‘Rerum Novarum’ in which he demands that ‘the remuneration must 
be enough to support the wage earner in reasonable and frugal comfort’ 
(Ryan 1912: 32–33). 
The fi rst modern living wage movement emerged in the mid-1990s in the 
United States, when activists in Baltimore, Maryland, pushed the city 
government to address the problem of in-work poverty and low-wage 
work by passing a so-called ‘living wage ordinance’ requiring any fi rm 
holding a contract for service work to pay their workers a living wage, 
which at the time was more than 70 per cent above the federal minimum 
wage (Luce 2002). From there the idea spread quickly across the coun-
try so that in 2012 there were living wage ordinances in more than 140 
cities, counties and universities (Luce 2012: 12). In Europe, the revival 
of the living wage concept took place in 2001 in London where a broad 
community coalition called ‘London Citizens’ managed to get political 
support from the Greater London Authority to implement the idea of a 
living wage. In 2011, London Citizens launched a Living Wage Founda-
tion responsible for setting a living wage rate for the rest of the United 
Kingdom outside London. After a slow start, the UK living wage cam-
paign convinced approximately 1,300 employers with around 80,000 
workers to sign up and pay a living wage on a voluntary basis. In Lon-
don alone there are over 400 accredited living wage employers with over 
20 000 workers (GLA 2014: 5). The success of the UK living wage cam-
paign triggered a lively debate in Ireland to launch a similar campaign 
as a means to address in-work poverty, which has increased sharply as a 
result of the current crisis.6 
An important factor that spurred the re-emergence of living wage cam-
paigns in the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ world (including Ireland) is the fact that the 
minimum wage concept has increasingly failed to prevent in-work pov-
erty. Referring to the United States, Grimshaw states that living wage 
campaigns emerged ‘in a context of a failed societal system of institu-
6. For a more detailed account of the current debate in Ireland see Collins (2014).
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tional regulation: low minimum wage rates, weakened unions, and pri-
vatization of public services’ (2004: 101). Similar criticism has been lev-
elled by living wage activists in the United Kingdom against the national 
minimum wage, which they view as too low, with lower rates for young 
workers not comprehensive enough to keep workers out of poverty with-
out welfare payments by the state to supplement earnings (Grimshaw 
2004; Wills 2009).
The key objective of the living wage approach of ensuring that every 
worker can make a decent living from what he or she earns is refl ected 
in its calculation which usually follows the basic living costs approach 
(GLA 2014).7 This implies the calculation for different household types 
(and regions) of a wage that is needed to cover the costs of a standard 
basket of goods and services in order to achieve an acceptable standard 
of living. While the composition of this basket is highly time- and place-
specifi c, it usually includes the costs of: a nutritious low-cost diet, basic 
acceptable housing, clothing and footwear and other costs of a decent 
life, such as transportation, child care and education, health care, rec-
reation and cultural activities, communication and personal care (Anker 
2011: 6). Based on this empirical method, the UK living wage was £7.85 
in 2014 which was more than 20 per cent higher than the national mini-
mum wage of £6.50. Taking into consideration the higher cost of living 
in London, the London living wage of £9.15 was 40 per cent higher than 
the national minimum wage.8 
4.3 Debates on a fair (minimum) wage at European level
An early attempt to operationalise the concept of a fair wage was un-
dertaken within the framework of the European Council in the 1970s 
(Lörcher 2006). This primarily involved fi nding criteria for verifying 
compliance with the European Social Charter. After long discussions the 
European Council reached agreement on defi ning an ‘equitable wage’, 
which, in line with the European Social Charter, should be at least 68 per 
7. For a detailed methodological review of the various ways to measure living wages see Anker 
(2011).
8. The calculation of the London living wage is based not only on the basic living costs ap-
proach, but also on the income distribution approach, which takes 60 per cent of the median 
wage as the benchmark. The level of the living wage is then calculated as the average of the 
two fi gures resulting from the basic living costs approach and the income distribution ap-
proach plus a 15 per cent margin to cover against unforeseen events (GLA 2014).
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cent of the national average gross wage. In the mid-1990s, the defi nition 
was changed and henceforth the basis for the minimum wage was to be 
at least 60 per cent of the national average net wage. This defi nition is 
still used by the European Council in monitoring compliance with the 
European Social Charter (Schulten 2012). 
Within the EU, the debate about adequate wages started in the early 
1990s (Schulten 2008). In order to implement the right to an ‘equitable 
wage’ laid down in the 1989 Social Charter, the European Commission 
set up an international group of experts at the end of 1990 to look into 
the scale of low wages in Europe. After the group already at that time 
recognised the existence of a substantial low wage sector (Schäfer 1991) 
the European Commission published its fi rst Opinion on an Equitable 
Wage in 1993. This document emphasises that ‘low wages represent a 
problem in all countries of the European Communities’ and ‘very low 
income levels at both individual state and Community level … [cause] 
problems concerning justice and social cohesion that could have a det-
rimental effect on economic performance in the long term’ (European 
Commission 1993). 
Given the existence of a low wage sector in Europe the European Com-
mission called on the member states to ‘take appropriate measures to 
protect the right to an equitable wage’. Besides the member states the 
‘social partners’ were also called upon to address the issue of an ‘ad-
equate wage’ at ‘Community, national, regional and local level’. For itself 
the European Commission formulated the task of keeping an eye on the 
development of national wage structures in Europe and of monitoring 
national implementation of the right to an adequate wage through fur-
ther studies (European Commission 1993).
The European Commission’s Opinion can be interpreted as a fi rst hesi-
tant and still very vague attempt to coordinate national minimum wage 
policies at the European level. In particular, the European Parliament 
had spoken out in favour of a much more far-reaching Opinion in the run 
up to the report and in this context had proposed binding requirements 
with regard to national minimum wage policies. Thus in early 1993 in 
the report by the European Parliament’s Committee for Social Affairs, 
Employment and the Working Environment (the so-called Wilson Re-
port) the ‘introduction of a fair reference wage at the national level’ was 
called for, to serve ‘as basis for collective bargaining’. Furthermore, all 
member states were supposed to introduce ‘mechanisms to establish a 
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minimum wage related to the national average wage’ (European Parlia-
ment 1993).
In the second half of the 1990s, however, the development of a Europe-
wide coordinated minimum wage policy foundered on the obduracy of a 
number of member states. For the Progress Report on equitable wages 
presented by the European Commission in 1997 (‘Equitable Wages – A 
Progress Report’) only seven member states were even willing to provide 
data on their national wage structures (European Commission 1997). 
The majority of EU member states took the position that minimum wage 
policy is a purely national matter and that no competences should be 
established at the European level in that regard. 
In fact, already in the early 1990s, when social policy competences at 
the EU level were extended, the area of ‘remuneration’ was explicitly ex-
cluded from the scope of the new social policy chapter of the European 
Treaty (TFEU Article 153, No. 5). On top of that, quite a few govern-
ments, with a view to ‘labour market fl exibilisation’, far from seeking 
to limit the low wage sector and precarious employment, had begun to 
champion them. This also explains why in the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights in the European Union, which was adopted at the EU summit in 
Nice in December 2000, the wage issue was no longer even taken up and 
the establishment of a right to an adequate wage came to grief in the face 
of the resistance of numerous national governments from the very outset 
(Lörcher 2006). 
Since the end of the 1990s the European Commission has given up trying 
to develop minimum wage policy as a European policy area in its own 
right. In numerous publications the European Commission –especially 
DG Economic and Financial Affairs– has, on the contrary, embraced the 
neoliberal demand for ‘wages in line with productivity’, thus favouring 
wider wage differentiation and expansion of the low wage sector. On the 
other hand, in various social policy documents of the European Commis-
sion, largely produced by DG Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion, 
a more open and positive approach towards the need for an adequate 
wage can be found (for example, European Commission 2012). 
After a group of German, French and Swiss economists had presented 
their relatively widely read ‘Theses for a European Minimum Wage Pol-
icy’ in 2005 (Schulten et al.  2006a) the topic was taken up again in the 
second half of the 2000s, especially by the European Parliament (Eldring 
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and Alsos 2012; Schulten 2012). In an opinion presented in 2007 it was 
stated that ‘in many Member States the minimum wage is set very low 
or at below subsistence level’ (European Parliament 2007: 469). Against 
this background a year later the European Parliament called on the Eu-
ropean Council ‘to agree an EU target for minimum wages (statutory, 
collective agreements at national, regional or sectoral level) to provide 
for remuneration of at least 60 per cent of the relevant (national, sec-
toral, etc.) average wage and, further, to agree a timetable for achieving 
that target in all Member States’ (European Parliament 2008). 
4.4 Economic arguments for a European minimum wage policy
Besides the more normative discussions on fair and equitable minimum 
wages, more recently economic arguments have increasingly played an 
important role in the demand for a European minimum wage policy 
(Schulten 2012; OFCE et al.  2013; Brischoux et al.  2014). So far, the 
economic debate has focused mainly on the possible impact of minimum 
wages on employment. For a long time the debate was shaped largely by 
representatives of neoclassical labour market theory, according to which 
minimum wages by their very nature have negative effects on employ-
ment. The continuing infl uence of this belief is attested by the current 
EU crisis management, which prescribes that the allegedly too high min-
imum wages in numerous countries should be frozen or – as in the case 
of Greece – dramatically cut (Schulten and Müller 2015). 
However, more recent international empirical research on minimum 
wages overwhelmingly takes the view that existing minimum wage re-
gimes have no negative effects on labour markets (for a summary see 
Schmitt 2012; Bosch and Weinkopf 2014). Against this background, an 
alternative theoretical approach to minimum wages based on Keynesian 
economics focuses on the infl uence of the minimum wage on general 
wage development and thus the development of aggregate demand (Herr 
et al.  2009; European Commission 2012). The macroeconomic signifi -
cance of the minimum wage can vary considerably within the framework 
of the specifi c national minimum wage regime. In many European coun-
tries, however, the development of the minimum wage not only infl u-
ences wages in the lower wage segment, but also forms an important 
benchmark for wage developments as a whole. The higher the relative 
value of the minimum wage the more the wage structure of the economy 
can be compressed from below and the lower the wage differentiation 
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between different groups of employees. A more egalitarian wage struc-
ture, however, boosts aggregate demand because the propensity to con-
sume of low wage earners is much greater; that is, they spend a much 
higher proportion of their income and save less. 
Against the background of high unemployment, wage development in 
Europe since the outbreak of the crisis in 2009 has been characterised 
in many countries by persistent real-wage losses (Schulten and Müller 
2015). These losses have contributed substantially to the collapse of ag-
gregate demand and thus have exacerbated economic stagnation in these 
countries. EU crisis management has been a decisive factor in triggering 
a downward spiral in wage policy that has encouraged strong defl ation-
ary tendencies and now has even brought a European defl ation crisis 
into the realm of possibility. On top of all that, Europe overall continues 
to be characterised by stark economic imbalances between (current ac-
count) defi cit- and surplus countries, reductions in which have to date 
not been discernible, in particular with regard to the surplus countries 
(notably Germany). 
A European minimum wage policy could constitute a substantial starting 
point for closer coordination of wage policy in Europe, which fi rst and 
foremost as a kind of European defl ation brake could prevent further 
falls in real wages and also stabilise aggregate demand. Furthermore, 
especially in the surplus countries a sharper increase in minimum wages 
could boost the domestic economy and thus help to reduce economic 
imbalances in Europe (OFCE et al.  2013; Brischoux et al.  2014). 
5. The diffi  cult debate within the European trade unions 
5.1 The minimum wage debate within the ETUC
The debate about a European minimum wage approach is a recurring 
theme within the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC).9 The 
more recent revival of the debate within the ETUC was triggered mainly 
by three developments: fi rst, the increase of in-work poverty and low-
wage work in many EU countries as a consequence of the current crisis 
and the crisis management approach pursued by European and national 
9. For a summary of the debate until the mid-2000s (Schulten 2008).
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policy-makers; second, and closely linked to this, the internal demand 
from some affi liates –notably but not exclusively from the CEE coun-
tries– to start a discussion about a European minimum wage approach 
because of their diffi cult situation in the national context (ETUC 2014a: 
3); and third, the fact that Jean-Claude Juncker, the new president of the 
European Commission, attaches great importance to the issue of mini-
mum wages, which is why the ETUC sees the need to develop its own 
concept to participate in the debate at European level (ETUC 2014a: 5). 
The debate within the ETUC is dominated by two opposite positions. On 
one hand, a substantial number of affi liates from Central and Eastern 
Europe are pushing for a European approach and on the other hand, 
affi liates from the Nordic countries, for reasons outlined in more de-
tail below, reject a European approach to the issue. Moreover, there is 
also some opposition to a European minimum wage approach among 
Italian trade unions (Furaker and Loven Selden 2013; Leonardi 2014). 
The Central and Eastern European affi liates have turned to Europe for 
help because they hope that a joint European approach can make up 
for the adverse conditions in the national context. The situation of the 
Polish ETUC affi liates illustrates the situation in many CEE countries. 
The Polish affi liates’ capacity to address the problems of in-work poverty 
and low wage work by themselves is limited by the following factors: a 
minimum wage which is just at the poverty threshold of 50 per cent of 
the national median wage and therefore too low to effectively protect 
low-wage workers; a highly fragmented and decentralised system of col-
lective bargaining with extremely low collective bargaining coverage and 
union density, which puts them in a weak bargaining position; a political 
climate hostile to trade unions and, linked to this, negative experiences 
with tripartite discussions about minimum wage developments and, fi -
nally, real wage development that consistently lags behind productivity 
development. The Polish trade unions therefore hope that a European 
minimum wage campaign would help them to improve their situation in 
the national context. 
Against this background, the ETUC is in an extremely diffi cult moderat-
ing position in trying to broker a compromise between these two opposed 
views. The ETUC position on a European minimum wage approach is 
based on three key assumptions shared by all the affi liates. First, wage 
setting is and should remain a national responsibility (ETUC 2012a). 
The objective of a European minimum wage approach pursued by the 
ETUC is therefore not to impose one particular minimum wage regime 
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–for instance, a universal regime with statutory minimum wages– on 
all countries. The objective rather is to come to a common political un-
derstanding of an appropriate level of minimum wages measured in the 
context of the overall wage structure which would then be implemented 
in accordance with national customs and practices. Second, this level 
should be high enough to ensure a decent living standard (ETUC 2012b). 
The ETUC therefore usually refers to the defi nition of the Council of Eu-
rope, whose European Committee of Social Rights stipulated that a fair 
and decent wage is at least 60 per cent of the average net wage (ETUC 
2014b: 2). The third basic assumption is that the preferred way of ensur-
ing decent wages is through collective agreements negotiated by strong 
trade unions (ETUC 2012b). The European minimum wage approach 
should therefore always be discussed in the broader context of strate-
gies to strengthen collective bargaining coverage (for instance, through 
erga omnes rules and other forms of extending collective agreements) 
and trade union density. However, in the absence of these conditions, 
minimum wages can be considered an alternative tool to provide a fl oor 
and to address the problems of inequality, in-work poverty and social 
dumping (ETUC 2012b: 6; 2014a: 1).
In light of the different internal views, the ETUC and its affi liates, so far, 
have failed to agree on a more binding European minimum wage ap-
proach based on guidelines or other procedural coordination rules that 
go beyond these common understandings. However, in light of the chal-
lenges mentioned above the ETUC intensifi ed the debate at its collective 
bargaining school in Warsaw in October 2014. Here, the issue of a Euro-
pean minimum wage approach was discussed in the broader context of 
developing an overall trade union strategy for fair and equitable wages 
in Europe. This broader debate included not only the issue of an appro-
priate reference for the setting and implementation of minimum wages 
but also the crucial question of how to support national affi liates in es-
tablishing and strengthening collective bargaining institutions (ETUC 
2014a, 2014b). 
A European minimum wage policy is not much of an issue in most of the 
sectoral European trade union federations. An exception, however, is the 
European Federation of Public Service Unions (EPSU) which, with its 
2006 campaign against low pay, pursued an approach that was similarly 
broad to the one pursued by the ETUC most recently. The 2006 EPSU 
campaign against low pay included both a ‘political campaign on stat-
utory minimum wage rates and a co-ordinated campaign of collective 
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bargaining targeting minimum wages in collective agreements’ (EPSU 
2006: 18). More recently, EPSU confi rmed its commitment to tackle low 
pay by continuing its campaign to increase minimum wages to at least 60 
per cent of average monthly wages in countries with statutory minimum 
wages and to at least 70 per cent in countries where minimum wages are 
set by collective agreements (EPSU 2009: 2). In its most recent resolu-
tion on collective bargaining adopted at the Congress in May 2014, EPSU 
dropped the distinction of different levels for different minimum wage 
regimes. EPSU instead embraced the concept of living wages in order 
to protect lower paid workers. In addition, EPSU is still committed to 
supporting its affi liates in their attempts to improve ‘minimum wages in 
collective agreements and statutory minimum wages where they exist, 
continuing to assert the aim of achieving legal minimum wages that are 
at least 60 per cent of national average wages’ (EPSU 2014: 10).
The key challenge for the ETUC and the sectoral trade union federations 
alike is not so much to technically defi ne a commonly shared reference 
level for national minimum wages. The most challenging task in devel-
oping a European minimum wage approach is to generate a common 
understanding of a broader political idea and project around the issue of 
minimum wages in the context of which the national affi liates can mobi-
lise their members. The ETUC’s attempt to frame the issue more broadly 
in terms of a political project to achieve fair wages in Europe is a fi rst 
step in this direction, despite the reservations that still exist in some of 
its affi liates, especially those in the Nordic countries.
5.2 The minimum wage debate in the Nordic countries
The Nordic countries are characterised by relatively high unionisation 
rates and high collective bargaining coverage, although the trade unions 
have lost some of their strength over the past 15 years (Nergaard 2010). 
Trade unions and employers’ associations have the main responsibility 
for wage regulation in all these countries, but only Sweden and Denmark 
apply this arrangement exclusively. Finland, Iceland and Norway also 
have mechanisms for legal extension of collective agreements, but none 
of the countries has adopted statutory minimum wage schemes (Eldring 
and Alsos 2012, 2014). 
Since EU enlargement in 2004, a major challenge to the Nordic mini-
mum-wage regimes has been in the internationalisation of labour mar-
Prospects and obstacles of a European minimum wage policy
 Wage bargaining under the new European Economic Governance 349
kets. The infl ux of labour migrants and service providers from Central 
and Eastern European countries has challenged the labour market mod-
el and the collective agreements’ ability to halt low-wage competition 
and social dumping. This development has triggered debates on the need 
for supplementary measures with regard to minimum wage setting, but 
so far this has mainly concerned the possible introduction or strengthen-
ing of mechanisms for the legal extension of collective agreements. 
To the extent that the issue of a national minimum wage has been 
debated in the Nordic countries, trade unions tend to be very much 
against it, while some employers’ associations argue in favour.10 The con-
cept of a statutory minimum wage has arisen most frequently in Nor-
way, especially as a possible alternative to the extension of collective 
agreements. In the Norwegian context, a statutory minimum wage does 
not appear as a supplement to extensions –as in many other European 
countries– but as an alternative. Proposals for a statutory minimum 
wage are to some extent used by the employers as a hostile response to 
various initiatives by the trade unions to improve and activate the ex-
isting extension mechanism (Eldring and Alsos 2012). In Denmark, the 
white collar trade union federation FTF has argued in favor of statutory 
minimum wage regulation, and in particular legal extension of collective 
agreements, but so far with minimal or no support from other trade un-
ions or the employers’ side. FTF has also urged the Nordic unions to join 
in the debate on a possible European minimum wage policy (Preisler 
2015).
So far, all proposals for a European minimum wage policy have been met 
with deep scepticism in the Nordic countries, and in particular among 
the trade unions. The resistance must be understood in light of the exist-
ing minimum wage systems in these countries. There is a widespread 
concern that statutory schemes may undermine the autonomy of collec-
tive bargaining, hamper the normative effect of collective agreements, 
exert a negative pressure on wage levels and weaken the incentives for 
being organised among both workers and employers. Even though some 
workers may stand to gain from a common minimum wage fl oor, the 
fear is that a great many others will fall towards a statutory minimum 
10. For the minimum wage debate in the Nordic countries see also the contributions of the 
special issue of the Nordic Labour Journal (February 2015) on ‘The minimum wage — fi t for 
the Nordic region?’ (http://www.nordiclabourjournal.org/i-fokus/minimum-wage-for-the-
nordic-region).
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level below the collectively agreed minimum rates. A relevant question 
is whether a European minimum wage scheme that entails reservations 
concerning the maintenance of national traditions for minimum wage 
setting could meet the demands of those countries that do not wish to 
establish a statutory minimum wage. However, even though the Nor-
dic labour markets have a relatively low proportion of working poor and 
low wages, none of the countries have a watertight regulatory system. 
This applies to Norway in particular, where only half of the employees in 
the private sector are covered by collective agreements and only a minor 
proportion by extended agreements (Eldring and Alsos 2014).
It might appear strange that the apparently robust and sustainable 
Nordic labour market regimes could feel threatened by a European 
minimum wage policy that is intended primarily for countries with low 
minimum wage levels or no functioning minimum wage regimes. Some 
would also claim that the Nordic trade unions have failed to grasp the 
scope of the low-wage problem in some European countries, thereby 
attenuating their sense of solidarity. From the Nordic perspective, the 
question remains whether the introduction of a statutory minimum 
wage in the long term will undermine the Nordic wage-setting model 
and provide less protection for workers in the Nordic labour markets 
than today. As a result, the Nordic countries have so far maintained 
their negative attitude towards both national and European policy ini-
tiatives that might interfere with their current minimum wage-setting 
systems. 
6. Possible implementation of a European minimum 
wage policy
6.1 Political-institutional implementation
The implementation of a European minimum wage policy would require, 
fi rst, that the EU countries were able to reach agreement on criteria for 
an equitable minimum wage. In order to take national wage differences 
and related different levels of economic development in Europe properly 
into account such criteria could take their bearings only from a relative 
minimum wage that would stand in a particular ratio to the national 
wage structure. Most proposals for a European minimum wage policy 
thus aim at establishing a European minimum wage norm, defi ned as a 
certain percentage of the national average or median wage. 
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Besides agreement on the content of a European minimum wage policy, 
however, a number of political and institutional obstacles would have to 
be overcome. This involves, fi rst, the fundamental problem that regula-
tory competences in the area of wage policy are explicitly ruled out in the 
European Treaty. On the other hand, in recent times the EU has been 
perfectly willing to intervene in the (minimum) wage policy of individual 
member states, sometimes massively (Schulten and Müller 2015). This 
has been most striking in the so-called crisis states –such as Greece, Ire-
land and Portugal– where the Troika (made up of the European Com-
mission, the European Central Bank and the IMF) have linked the provi-
sion of fi nancial support to extensive ‘reform’ requirements, including 
drastic intervention in wage and collective bargaining policy. Further-
more, with the establishment of the European Semester, the EU has cre-
ated an institutional framework for the purpose of imposing also wage 
policy requirements on individual member states as part of a Europe-
wide coordination of economic policy. 
Against this background, it is perfectly conceivable that, within the 
framework of the European Semester, recommendations on the devel-
opment of national minimum wages might be made, oriented towards a 
common European minimum wage norm. Experiences with rather ‘soft’ 
governance reforms of this kind, especially in the fi eld of social policy 
within the EU, are not particularly auspicious, however, because in prac-
tice they are not very binding and national actors show little inclination 
to comply. With regard to the development of a European minimum 
wage policy, therefore, they might possibly be only a fi rst step that would 
later be followed by ‘harder’ governance reforms, such as the adoption 
of a directive. The latter would in all probability require a change of the 
European Treaty, however. 
Given the different national minimum wage regimes in Europe, a Euro-
pean minimum wage policy will ultimately be accepted only if it forgoes 
institutional harmonisation of national minimum wage regimes (for 
example, the Europe-wide introduction of statutory minimum wages). 
Thus the question arises, however, of how implementation of European 
minimum wage norms could be ensured at national level. This would be 
less problematic in countries with a universal minimum wage, in partic-
ular if they are based on statutory guidelines. It would be more diffi cult 
for countries with sectoral minimum wage regimes, in which wages are 
laid down exclusively in collective agreements and universal wage norms 
have been unknown to date, as in the Nordic countries, in particular.
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In principle, there are two possibilities for implementing a European 
minimum wage policy without introducing a statutory minimum wage: 
fi rst, employers and trade unions could conclude a national framework 
agreement about a universal wage fl oor, as they did, for example, in Aus-
tria.11 Second, it would be possible to increase the scope of sectoral col-
lective agreements by enforcing the instrument of extension in order to 
guarantee the general application of sectoral minimum wages. As the 
example of Finland shows, such a system could be used to implement an 
(almost) universal wage fl oor via collective bargaining.
6.2 Impact of a possible European minimum wage policy 
The effects of a possible European minimum wage policy are only hypo-
thetical, especially because they would be directly related to the specifi c 
European minimum wage norm chosen. The only study available to date 
was produced by the European Foundation for the Improvement of Liv-
ing and Working Conditions (Eurofound), which attempted to evaluate 
the consequences of a European minimum wage policy (Aumayr-Pintar 
et al.  2014: 82ff). The study assumes the introduction of a hypothetical 
minimum wage norm of 60 per cent of the median wage, which in most 
European countries is substantially above the existing relative minimum 
wage level (Section 3.2). 
According to the Eurofound study in 2010 in the EU as a whole 16 per 
cent of all employees would have benefi ted from the introduction of such 
a European minimum wage norm (Figure 6). In absolute terms this rep-
resents more than 28 million workers.12 The foreseeable impact of such a 
European minimum wage standard varies considerably from one coun-
try to another, depending on the size of the country’s low-wage sector. 
The calculation ranges from just 7 per cent in Finland and Sweden to a 
staggering 24 per cent of workers in Germany and Lithuania who would 
have benefi tted from a European minimum wage policy. 
11. In 2007, the Austrian employers and the trade unions concluded a national framework 
agreement on a minimum wage of 1 000 euros a month, which was not supposed to be 
undercut in any sectoral collective agreement.
12.  The absolute fi gures were obtained directly from the authors of the Eurofound study.
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Figure 6 Workers on less than 60 per cent of the national median wage, 2010 
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7. Conclusion 
For more than two decades there has been a debate on the idea of a Eu-
ropean minimum wage policy. Recently, the debate intensifi ed in light of 
the strong increase of social inequality and poverty (even among those 
in work) in many European countries as a consequence of the crisis and 
the crisis management based on austerity and structural reforms. In par-
ticular, the dramatic social consequences of the crisis management have 
revealed that, in many European countries, the existing minimum wages 
are below the subsistence minimum and, therefore, are insuffi cient to 
effectively protect low-wage workers and to prevent in-work poverty. 
Thus, in the context of the crisis, the fundamental social right to an ‘equi-
table’ and ‘adequate’ wage –as called for in, among other things, the Eu-
ropean Social Charter and the Community Charter of the Fundamental 
Social Rights of Workers– is being violated on a massive scale in Europe. 
Despite the dramatic social consequences, the obvious failure of the cur-
rent EU crisis management also represents a window of opportunity 
because the need for alternative concepts and a change of policies is be-
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coming increasingly apparent. In this context, political support for and 
societal acceptance of a European minimum wage policy have increased 
considerably. A European minimum wage policy is not only being put 
forward as a tool to ensure ‘adequate’ minimum wages throughout Eu-
rope but also as a basic building block of a broader macroeconomic reor-
ientation away from the current supply-side policies towards a demand- 
and wage-led model of growth that takes into account the important role 
played by wages in boosting internal demand and social cohesion.
However, as our analysis illustrates, the implementation of such an ap-
proach still faces major obstacles – both institutionally with respect to 
the diversity of national minimum wage regimes and levels and politi-
cally with respect to the different views even within the European trade 
union movement. Against this background, a European minimum wage 
policy would have to meet three key requirements. First, it would have 
to refrain from imposing a specifi c model and absolute minimum wage 
level on the member states. Instead, the key task is to reach agreement 
on a European minimum wage norm that defi nes a minimum wage as a 
certain percentage of national median or average wages. Second, such a 
relative level should be suffi ciently high to effectively protect low-wage 
workers. By gradually raising national minimum wages, for example, to 
60 per cent of national median wages up to 16 per cent of all workers in 
the EU could benefi t from a European minimum wage policy. Third, in 
view of institutional diversity and the different views within the Euro-
pean trade union movement, a European minimum wage policy must 
take account of the fact that statutory and collectively agreed minimum 
wages are functionally equivalent for the purpose of ensuring the com-
prehensive application of minimum wages. Any discussion of a Euro-
pean minimum wage policy must therefore also include measures to 
strengthen national collective bargaining systems in order to increase 
collective bargaining coverage. Thus, a European minimum wage policy 
is compatible with retaining existing national industrial relations and 
wage-setting systems.
If understood in this sense, a European minimum wage policy could 
make an important contribution to reducing (income) poverty and (in-
come) inequality. However, its impact would not only be limited to the 
social dimension. Economically, it would instigate a considerable de-
mand boost and thus create new potential for growth and employment, 
as well as counteract the current risk of defl ation in Europe. Finally, in 
view of the current legitimacy crisis affl icting European politics in many 
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EU countries, a European minimum wage policy would also have broad-
er political implications because it could represent a concrete political 
project for reviving the idea of a ‘social Europe’, thereby helping to ‘re-
gain people’s trust in the European project’ (Juncker 2014c).
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Chapter 11
The role of extension for the strength and 
stability of collective bargaining in Europe
Thorsten Schulten, Line Eldring and Reinhard Naumann
1. Introduction
Nearly two-thirds of all employees in the European Union fall within 
the scope of a collective agreement, which makes Europe’s collective 
bargaining coverage higher than that of any other region of the world 
(European Commission 2015: 28). The reason for this relatively high 
collective bargaining coverage lies fi rst of all in the predominance of 
multi-employer bargaining in many European countries.1 There is a 
clear-cut relationship between the level and the coverage of collective 
bargaining, as countries in which multi-employer bargaining predomi-
nates in general have a much higher bargaining coverage than countries 
in which company bargaining predominates (Visser 2013). While multi-
employer agreements cover various companies of a certain bargaining 
unit –mostly a branch or sector– independent of their specifi c state of 
industrial relations, in company bargaining systems the existence of a 
collective agreement depends directly on the particular power relations 
between workers and employers at the individual fi rm. 
Over the past two decades most traditional systems of multi-employer 
bargaining in Europe have undergone profound changes and have given 
more space to company bargaining (Marginson 2014). In most cases 
the decentralisation of collective bargaining took place in an ‘organised’ 
manner within the framework of multi-employer agreements and often 
led to a system of two-tier or multi-level bargaining. Against the back-
ground of the current economic crisis in Europe, however, several Eu-
ropean countries – in particular in southern Europe – have experienced 
the emergence of a more radical form of decentralisation, leading to a 
1. See also the contribution by Keune in this volume (Chapter 8).
Thorsten Schulten, Line Eldring and Reinhard Naumann
362 Wage bargaining under the new European Economic Governance
signifi cant weakening of multi-employer bargaining and a sharp decline 
in bargaining coverage (Schulten and Müller 2015).2 
The strength and spread of multi-employer bargaining depends mainly 
on two factors. The fi rst is the existence of strong and encompassing bar-
gaining parties that are able to guarantee a certain bargaining coverage 
through their own organisational strength. During the past two decades, 
however, there has been a decline in union density in almost all Euro-
pean states, leading to a signifi cant weakening of labour’s bargaining 
power. Against that background, it is all the more astonishing that the 
spread of multi-employer collective bargaining and bargaining coverage 
have remained particularly stable in many European countries (OECD 
2012a; Visser 2013). Thus, there is a second factor that determines the 
spread and stability of multi-employer bargaining systems, namely the 
existence of supporting policies and regulations on the part of the state. 
As already argued by Traxler et al.  (2001: 194ff) in many European 
countries state support is the most important variable explaining high 
bargaining coverage. The most important instrument here is the admin-
istrative extension of collective agreements, which makes them applica-
ble beyond the immediate contracting parties, covering all workplaces 
and workers in a certain area and/or sector. The agreement’s reach can 
thus be signifi cantly increased, thereby buttressing the collective bar-
gaining system as a whole. 
Despite the importance of state support policies for the stability of col-
lective bargaining, there are still only a few studies that explicitly exam-
ine this issue of extension on a comparative basis (Traxler and Behrens 
2002; Ahlberg and Bruun 2009; Stokke 2010; Kamanabrou 2011; Ker-
ckhofs 2011, Schulten 2012; Visser 2013). The analysis in this chapter 
therefore looks beyond the predominantly legalistic discourses to the 
question of the current signifi cance of extension for the development 
and stability of collective bargaining systems in Europe. It fi rst discusses 
some theoretical arguments on the pros and cons of extending collec-
tive agreements and analyses its signifi cance from the perspective of the 
various social actors (the state, trade unions and employers) (Section 
2). Thereafter, an empirical overview is provided of the different legal 
2. See also the contribution of Jesús Cruces, Ignacio Álvarez, Francisco Trillo and Salvo Leon-
ardi in this volume (Chapter 3).
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requirements for extension in Europe and its spread and use in practice 
(Section 3). In a further step more recent trends in the use of exten-
sion are analysed by elaborating the examples of Portugal, Norway and 
Germany (Section 4). The chapter also examines the importance of ex-
tension for collective bargaining coverage in Europe and asks how it is 
related to the organising power of unions and employers (Section 5). Fi-
nally, the main arguments are summarised in order to discuss the future 
role of extension with regard to the strength and stability of collective 
bargaining in Europe (Section 6).
2. Basic function of extension of collective agreements
The basic function of extension procedures is closely bound up with the 
particular nature and purpose of collective agreements. Rooted in the 
structural imbalance of power between labour and capital, the original 
aim of collective agreements was to limit competition between individu-
al workers by means of collective arrangements and to safeguard certain 
(minimum) labour standards. Over time, however, with the emergence 
of national collective bargaining systems, the social and economic regu-
lating functions of collective agreements have been extended, particular-
ly in Western Europe (Bispinck and Schulten 1999; Visser 2013). From 
the workers’ point of view, the immediate protective function has been 
supplemented by a distributive and participative function, enabling 
them to exercise democratic participation in economic development. 
From the employers’ perspective, collective agreements mainly have a 
cartel function, by creating a certain competitive order in which com-
petition on wage and labour costs is largely abolished. In addition, there 
is an order and peace function which ensures that, during the validity 
of a collective agreement, enterprises can count on the plannable and 
mostly undisrupted conduct of their economic activities. Finally, from 
the state’s point of view, collective agreements whose particular charac-
teristic is ‘autonomous self-regulation’ (Sinzheimer 1916/1977) have an 
important function of easing the burden of the state, as they enable the 
authorities to steer clear of regulating certain potentially confl ictual is-
sues of labour, wage and, to some extent, social policy. 
The extent to which collective bargaining is able to perform these regu-
latory functions depends, fi rst and foremost, on the reach of the respec-
tive bargaining systems, and this is determined by three basic factors. 
The fi rst signifi cant element is the bargaining level, which defi nes the 
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applicability of the collective agreement, both geographically (regional/
national) and functionally (enterprise, sector or multi-sector). Second, 
collective agreement coverage depends directly on the organisational 
strength of the employer organisations and trade unions involved. This 
is because collective agreements are directly applicable only to those who 
are party to them, namely organised workers in organised businesses.
Third and lastly, the coverage of a collective agreement can be broad-
ened by extending its applicability to workers and enterprises that are 
not organised within one of the contracting parties. A fundamental dis-
tinction must be made here between two approaches. First, there is the 
extension of bargaining coverage to non-organised workers in organised 
workplaces. In order to prevent workplaces bound by collective agree-
ments from sidestepping this coverage by taking on non-organised em-
ployees, most European countries have a legal erga omnes provision for 
such cases (Kamanabrou 2011). This means that collective agreement 
provisions in workplaces bound by those provisions are also applicable to 
their non-organised employees. In practice, even in countries that do not 
have erga omnes provisions, such as Germany and Norway, agreement 
provisions are generally applied to all employees within the workplaces 
covered. One reason why equal treatment of organised and unorganised 
employees is in the employer’s own interest is that more advantageous 
collectively agreed provisions would otherwise provide employees with a 
strong incentive to join the union. 
The second approach is the extension of agreement coverage to unor-
ganised workplaces. Here, the usually preferred means is a declaration 
of general applicability, through which the state, by a legislative act, 
extends the scope of the collective agreement beyond those workplaces 
that are direct members of the contracting party. In addition, a number 
of countries have functional equivalents of extension, which also enables 
the state to ensure a high level of agreement coverage. One possibility is 
to have a legal erga omnes provision that applies to employers, by means 
of which the collective agreement is also virtually automatically appli-
cable to unorganised fi rms. Furthermore, the state may also build into 
procurement legislation a requirement to abide by the prevailing collec-
tive agreement (Schulten et al.  2012). However, this approach –known 
in Germany as a ‘small extension’– is restricted to public procurement, 
in contrast to the ‘big extension’. Finally, the state may at the outset ac-
cord collective bargaining status only to such bodies –such as economic 
chambers– membership of which is compulsory, which is an indirect 
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means of achieving full coverage for collective agreements. This is the 
case, for example, in Austria. 
State-supported extension of collective agreements by means of a decla-
ration of general applicability or another functional equivalent some-
times runs into confl icting interests among the bargaining parties (for 
an early example, see Hamburger 1939). From both employers’ and em-
ployees’ point of view, extension of collective agreements has the attrac-
tion of depriving individual enterprises of the opportunity to secure a 
competitive advantage by undercutting collectively bargained standards. 
This makes a substantial contribution to the stability of the collective 
bargaining system, inasmuch as competition from outsiders tends to 
undermine the cartel function of collective agreements and can, once it 
becomes suffi ciently widespread, exert such pressure that the very ex-
istence of the collective agreement may be called into question. On the 
other hand, the employers may see a certain level of outside competition 
as wholly desirable, because it opens up exit options for fi rms, thus in-
creasing their bargaining power vis-à-vis the unions. 
Based on neoclassically oriented insider/outsider models, the thesis has 
also been advanced that large enterprises that are well established in the 
market have a particular interest in extension, as it enables the setting 
of certain collectively agreed standards that newly founded fi rms are un-
able to meet. Such standards discourage new fi rms from entering the 
market (Haucap et al.  2001) and therefore might have negative effects 
on overall economic performance (Murtin et al.  2014; Villanueva 2015). 
However, an objection to this view of extension as a protectionist instru-
ment for market insiders is that provisions in collective agreements are 
only minimum standards, which are often surpassed precisely by larger 
and well-established fi rms through additional local bargaining. If new 
markets are created, there is, on the contrary, often the problem that a 
lack of binding sector-wide collective agreements often leads to a sig-
nifi cant deterioration of working standards as competition is mainly on 
labour costs. This has often been the case, for example, after the liberali-
sation and privatisation of public services (Schulten and Brandt 2012). 
In legal debates, extensions of collective agreements are often criticised 
as breaches of what is called ‘negative freedom of association’ (see, for 
example, Sittard 2010). This term is applied mainly to fi rms’ right to de-
liberately decide not to join an employers’ association and to make their 
own arrangements about working conditions. However, other lawyers 
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take the view –which in Germany has also been confi rmed by the Federal 
Constitutional Court– that while an extension of a collective agreement 
does impose restrictions on a fi rm’s freedom to decide that are similar 
to labour law provisions, this should nonetheless not be considered a 
breach of negative freedom of association, as it is not associated with any 
obligation to be a member of a particular organisation (see, for exam-
ple, Kempen 2006: 1105; Lakies 2006: 1339). A similar position is taken 
by the International Labour Organization (ILO) which, in its Collective 
Agreements Recommendation from 1951 (No. 91), explicitly points to 
extension as a possible instrument for promoting collective bargaining. 
As long as the extension concerns a collective agreement that was con-
cluded by the most representative parties in each case, it does not, in the 
ILO’s opinion, constitute a violation of freedom of association (Gernigon 
et al.  2000: 62f).
From the state’s point of view, extensions are a way of supporting the 
collective bargaining system without interfering in the contracting par-
ties’ autonomous decision-making. This is a ‘legislative act of a particular 
kind’ (Lakies 2006: 1342), through which collectively bargained stand-
ards acquire the character of general social rights. In this way, the state 
can increase its own powers of guidance without –as, for example, in 
the case of statutory minimum wages– having to take responsibility for 
the substantive content of the settlements. In many cases, the offl oading 
function that collective agreements have for states can become opera-
tive only once the collective agreement provisions concerned have been 
declared generally applicable. This is particularly the case when social 
policy tasks are transferred to the bargaining parties, but it also applies, 
for example, to the setting of living minimum wages. 
At fi rst sight, trade unions have a rather ambivalent view of the exten-
sion of collective agreements. Unlike the employers’ associations, the 
unions often fear that extension might tend to decrease their organising 
power, as it will reduce the incentive to join a union and will consid-
erably increase the free-rider problem. It also implies greater political 
dependency on the state and, depending on the political colour of the 
government in offi ce, this may also work against the unions. Scepticism 
about extension is particularly prevalent among strong unions with rela-
tively high densities. 
On the other hand, experience shows that unions are often not in a po-
sition to secure comprehensive collective agreement coverage purely 
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on the basis of their own organising strength. That being the case, the 
extension of collective agreements does make it possible for a union to 
extend its infl uence considerably beyond its own organising arena and 
to exercise a power of public settlement. Thus, an established extension 
practice may also be seen as an expression of trade unions’ ‘institutional 
power’ (Schmalz and Dörre 2014). Whether extension really does have a 
negative impact on union organising rates is a question that can only be 
answered empirically (cf. Section 4).
3. The spread and use of extension in Europe
Although the extension of collective agreements is mainly a character-
istic of European industrial relations, their earliest precursors, at the 
end of the nineteenth century, were to be found not in Europe but in 
New Zealand and Australia (Van der Veldt 2002). The fi rst nation-wide 
regulation on extension was introduced in Germany with the Collective 
Agreement Order of 1918, followed during the 1920s and 1930s by sev-
eral other European countries. Before the outbreak of the Second World 
War, more or less extensive legislative provisions on extension were in 
place in eleven European countries (Austria, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, 
France, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Switzer-
land and Yugoslavia; Hamburger 1939). The most comprehensive laws 
on extension were adopted in the mid-1930s in France and the Neth-
erlands (Dufresne and Maggi-Germain 2012; Rojer and van der Veldt 
2012). During the Second World War, extension was even temporarily 
introduced in the United Kingdom, which has otherwise had a strictly 
voluntaristic tradition of industrial relations (Kahn-Freund 1943). 
After 1945, most European countries returned to developing their col-
lective bargaining systems along their traditional pre-war lines. In most 
continental and southern European countries, administrative exten-
sion became an integral part of the national collective bargaining sys-
tem, whereas the Anglo-Saxon and Scandinavian countries mainly did 
without legal requirements with regard to extension. Finally, in the 
1990s and 2000s, the possibility of extension was made legally possible 
throughout central and eastern Europe as part of the reconstruction of 
collective bargaining systems in these countries (Kohl 2009: 30).
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3.1 The current importance of extension in practice
Of the 30 European countries considered below (including all 28 EU 
states plus Norway and Switzerland) only six have no legal requirements 
for administrative extension of collective agreements (Table 1). These 
are, in addition to the special case of Cyprus, the Nordic countries Den-
mark and Sweden, along with two countries that have an ‘Anglo-Saxon’ 
industrial relations tradition, the United Kingdom and Malta. There is 
also no legal procedure for administrative extension in Italy. Due to Ar-
ticle 36 of the Italian constitution, however, every worker has the right to 
‘fair remuneration’, which in case of dispute Italian labour courts usually 
defi ne as the remuneration laid down in the relevant collective agree-
ment. This system might be interpreted as a more indirect form or a 
functional equivalent of extension (Treu 2014). 
The great majority of the European states considered here (24 out of the 
30) have legal requirements on the extension of collective agreements. 
The use of administrative extension in practice, however, differs widely. 
One can distinguish three groups of countries in which extension is used 
‘frequently’, ‘to a limited extent’ or ‘rarely’. In countries with ‘frequent’ 
use of extension, the majority of all sectoral or national agreements are 
regularly declared to be generally applicable. Countries in this group in-
clude the Benelux states, France, Spain and Finland. Until recently the 
group also covered Greece, Portugal and Romania, but they have recently 
undergone an extreme reduction in the number of extensions after some 
fundamental changes in the legal requirements (for Portugal see Section 
4.1). To these should be added Austria and Italy, which both have func-
tional equivalents according to which most collective agreements are de 
facto universally applicable. In Austria most sectoral collective agree-
ments are signed on the employers’ side by economic chambers, which 
have compulsory membership, so that all companies are covered by the 
agreements. A similar chamber system also existed in Slovenia, but com-
pulsory membership was abolished in 2008 (Banerjee et al.  2013).
There is a second group of countries with a ‘limited’ use of extension. 
Here extension is limited to a small number of sectors, in particular 
in more labour-intensive and domestic-oriented branches with a high 
number of small and medium-sized companies (for example, construc-
tion). Countries belonging to that group are Germany, Switzerland, Ire-
land and Norway, as well as a few central and eastern European coun-
tries, such as Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia. 
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Finally, there is a third group of countries in which the legal possibility 
for extension is only ‘rarely’ used in practice so that an extended collec-
tive agreement is absolutely exceptional. This group contains the Baltic 
States (Pärnits 2014), Poland and Hungary, as well as, more recently, 
also Greece and Romania.
To a certain extent the use of administrative extension or functional 
equivalents corresponds to the established classifi cation of industrial re-
lations systems in Europe. For example, taking the approach of Jelle Vis-
ser, who distinguishes a total of fi ve different industrial relations systems 
across Europe (European Commission 2009: 51), the following ranking 
in the use of extension can be made: extensions of collective agreements 
have traditionally been most widespread in the southern European in-
dustrial relations system (France, Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal), 
which in every case except Italy is marked by strong state infl uence. The 
use of extension is also of high relevance in most continental European 
industrial relations systems (Austria, Benelux countries, Slovenia) with 
the exception of Germany and Switzerland, where it only started to gain 
importance more recently (Eldring and Schulten 2012). 
In the central and eastern European industrial relations model, as re-
constructed post-1990, there is in general a legal possibility to extend 
collective agreements, but it is only limited or rarely used in practice. 
Table 1 Use of extension of collective agreements in Europe in 2015
Frequently: The majority of sectoral 
agreements are generally applicable
Belgium, Finland, France, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Spain 
(Greece, Portugal and Romania until 2011)
Limited: Only a limited number of sec-
tors have agreements that are generally 
applicable 
Austria*, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic , Germany, Norway, 
Ireland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Switzerland (Portugal since 2012 
and Slovenia since 2010)
Rarely: Almost no agreements are 
generally applicable 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland (Greece and 
Romania since 2012)
Functional equivalents: Most sectoral 
agreements are de facto generally 
applicable
Austria, Italy (Slovenia until 2009)
No legal requirements for extension Cyprus, Denmark, Italy**, Malta, Sweden, United Kingdom 
Notes: * Only in sectors and professions that are not members of the Austrian Economic Chamber. ** No 
legal provisions for extension, but indirect forms of extension through established practice of labour court 
judgments (functional equivalent).
Sources: Stokke (2010); Kerckhofs (2011); Schulten (2012); Visser (2013).
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Finally, there are the Anglo-Saxon and Nordic industrial relations sys-
tems which, despite all the differences between them, are both based 
on strongly autonomous collective bargaining systems with little inter-
ference by the state. Thus, in both systems most countries do not even 
have the legal requirements for extending collective agreements. There 
are, however, two interesting exceptions, namely Finland and Norway. 
In Finland the use of extension became very widespread after a labour 
law reform in the early 1970s (Ahlberg and Bruun 2009; Hellsten 2011), 
while in Norway the use of extension is a more recent phenomenon and 
is so far limited to a small number of sectors (see Section 4.2 below).
3.2 Preconditions and procedures for the use of extension
The extension of collective agreements is generally subject to many pre-
conditions, which may impede or facilitate their spread (Table 2). Most 
countries have requirements regarding the representativeness of a col-
lective agreement that is to be declared generally applicable. In principle, 
there are two basic variants of representativeness: one relies on collec-
tive bargaining coverage and the other is based on the importance of the 
trade unions and employers’ associations that concluded the agreement. 
The fi rst group of countries, in which the representativeness require-
ment is determined by bargaining coverage, includes Finland, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia and Switzerland. In these countries, an 
agreement can be extended only if it already covers a certain number of 
employees. Often the necessary coverage quorum is set at 50 per cent of 
all the employees in workplaces covered by the agreement, regardless of 
union membership. In the case of the Netherlands extension requires a 
‘meaningful majority’ of workers covered, which in practice is usually 
interpreted as coverage of between 55 and 60 per cent. In the case of 
Portugal the coverage quorum introduced in 2012 was set at 50 per cent, 
but in 2014 the government created the possibility to bypass this restric-
tive criterion by introducing an alternative one: employers’ associations 
at least 30 per cent of whose members are SMEs do not need to reach 
the 50 per cent threshold (see Section 4.1). In contrast, a recent reform 
of the Collective Bargaining Act in Germany abolished the former 50 per 
cent coverage quorum and replaced it by a more vague provision accord-
ing to which the agreement should have ‘predominant importance’. The 
latter was intended to give the parties involved somewhat more fl exibil-
ity to declare collective agreements universally binding (see Section 4.3).
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Table 2 Requirements and procedures for the extension of collective agreements in 
selected European countries, 2015
Requirements Application Decision
Belgium Representativeness of the bargain-
ing parties 
One or both parties 
to the agreement
Ministry of Labour
Bulgaria Representativeness of the bargain-
ing parties
Joint request of 
both bargaining 
parties
Ministry of Labour
Croatia Public interest One or both parties 
to the agreement
Ministry of Labour aft er 
consultation with the 
Tripartite Commission of 
the Economic and Social 
Council
Czech Republic Representativeness of the bargain-
ing parties
Joint request of 
both bargaining 
parties
Ministry of Labour
France Representativeness of the bargain-
ing parties 
One or both parties 
to the agreement, or 
the state
Ministry of Labour aft er 
consultation with the 
National Collective Bar-
gaining Commission 
Finland Representativeness of the agree-
ment to be proved by at least one of 
the following criteria: 
1. 50% bargaining coverage of all 
employees
2. high organisational density of 
both bargaining parties
3. established bargaining practice 
in a sector 
No application 
needed/
automatically 
checked
Independent commis-
sion appointed by the 
state
Germany Public interest
Agreements should have ‘predomi-
nant importance’
Joint request of 
both bargaining 
parties
Ministry of Labour 
aft er approval by the 
Collective Bargaining 
Committee 
Netherlands ‘Suffi  cient’ bargaining coverage of 
all employees (55–60%)
One or both parties 
to the agreement
Ministry of Labour
Norway Documentation of migrant workers 
performing work under condi-
tions below the collectively agreed 
standards
One or both parties 
to the agreement 
Independent commis-
sion appointed by the 
state (one each from 
employers and trade 
union plus three inde-
pendent members)
Portugal 50% bargaining coverage of all 
employees
(30% if the majority of companies 
are SMEs)
One or both parties 
to the agreement
Ministry of Labour 
Thorsten Schulten, Line Eldring and Reinhard Naumann
372 Wage bargaining under the new European Economic Governance
Requirements Application Decision
Romania 50% bargaining coverage of all 
employees
Joint request of 
both bargaining 
parties
Ministry of Labour
Spain Representativeness of the bargain-
ing parties
No application/decision needed, as the repre-
sentative collective agreement automatically 
becomes applicable, without further checking, 
to all enterprises within the bargaining area 
defi ned (sector/region). 
Slovakia Exclusion of companies with fewer 
than 20 employees, with more than 
10% disabled workers, which have 
been operating in the market for a 
period shorter than 24 months 
One or both parties 
to the agreement 
Ministry of Labour aft er 
consultation within 
a Tripartite Advisory 
Committee
Slovenia 50% bargaining coverage of all 
employees
One or both parties 
to the agreement 
Ministry of Labour
Switzerland 50% bargaining coverage of all 
employees and employers
50% bargaining coverage of all 
employees (in some sectors with a 
high number of migrant workers) 
Joint application by 
both parties to the 
agreement
Tripartite commis-
sion
Federal Council/
Canton
Tripartite commission 
Table 2 (cont.) 
Source: Stokke (2010), Kerckhofs (2011), Schulten (2012), Visser (2013).
A more fl exible regulation exists in Finland which also has the 50 per 
cent coverage quorum as one criterion, but adds the organisational 
importance of the contracting parties as well as the importance of the 
agreement in the past as additional criteria (Hellsten 2011). This leaves 
some room for discretion, so that in certain cases agreements with less 
than 50 per cent coverage can be declared generally applicable. Finally, 
the most restrictive regulation can be found in Switzerland, which even 
has a double quorum, requiring that at least half of all employees and 
employers are covered. However, in recent years a number of sectors 
have been particularly affected by labour migration, for which the re-
quirements for extension have been relaxed so that in these cases, only 
the agreement’s coverage of employees is taken into account (Eldring 
and Schulten 2012). 
In a second group of countries covering, for example, Belgium, France, 
Spain as well as many central and eastern European states, it is not the 
particular collective agreement but the importance of the parties sign-
ing the agreement that is decisive in determining its representativeness. 
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If the trade unions and employers’ associations involved are defined as 
representative the agreement can be extended irrespective of its in-
dividual bargaining coverage. Consequently, no minimum coverage 
is required in order to extend a collective agreement. The idea be-
hind this concept is that employers’ organisations and trade unions 
not only represent the immediate interests of their members but also 
perform an important regulatory function for society as a whole. The 
criteria on how to determine an organisation as representative may 
differ from country to country. On the trade union side, for example, 
the representativeness criteria often draw on union density and/or 
the election results for representative bodies at company level; this is 
the case, for example, in France or Spain. Sometimes representative-
ness is also determined in relative terms so that only the largest trade 
union and employers’ association in the respective area is seen as rep-
resentative. In the Czech Republic, for example, only collective agree-
ments concluded by the largest organisations can be extended (Kroupa 
2006).
Apart from representativeness, some countries have further require-
ments for extending collective agreements. In Croatia and Germany, for 
example, there is the more unspecifi ed provision that the extension has 
to be ‘in the public interest’. In Norway, before an agreement is extended, 
it has to be proved that foreign workers are not receiving the collectively 
agreed conditions. This refl ects the origin of the Norwegian regulations, 
which were introduced as a means of avoiding social dumping as a result 
of growing labour migration (see Section 4.2). Finally, some countries 
have explicitly excluded particular groups of companies from extension. 
In Slovakia, for example, collective agreements cannot be extended to 
small and newly-established companies with fewer than 20 employees 
or in operation for fewer than 24 months. Formerly, extension even 
needed the consent of the companies affected. This provision, however, 
was abolished with the most recent reform of the Slovakian collective 
bargaining law (Bednárik 2015). 
To launch an extension procedure, most countries require explicit appli-
cation from one or both of the contracting parties. In France, an applica-
tion for extension can also be made by the state (Dufresne and Maggi-
Germain 2012). No application is needed in Finland, where all sectoral 
agreements are checked automatically to see whether they should be 
extended. The same holds true for Spain, which has an erga omnes pro-
vision according to which all collective agreements are automatically 
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extended to non-organised workplaces in the respective bargaining area, 
without any special legislative act. A similar arrangement existed in Ro-
mania until the erga omnes regulation was abolished with the Labour 
Law revision of 2011 (Trif 2014).
In most countries the fi nal decision on the extension of a collective agree-
ment is taken by the Ministry of Labour, often after consultation with 
trade unions and employers’ associations. In Germany, the decision has 
to be approved by a majority of the national Collective Bargaining Com-
mittee, which is composed equally of representatives of the peak-level 
trade unions and employers’ organisations. Consequently, both parties 
have a de facto veto power to block an extension. Finally, in Finland and 
Norway it is not the Ministry of Labour but an independent commission 
that decides on extension.
All in all, the requirements and procedures for extending collective 
agreements also infl uence the frequency of its use in practice. Most 
countries with a frequent use of extension prescribe the representa-
tiveness of bargaining parties as the major legal criterion and not a bar-
gaining coverage quorum, which seems to be a somewhat higher hurdle. 
The major exception is the Netherlands, which has a very high number 
of extensions despite a relatively high bargaining quorum. Behind the 
Dutch story stands a high degree of acceptance and support for exten-
sion procedures among both trade unions and employers’ associations 
(Rojer and van der Veldt 2012). The support of both parties is also a ma-
jor precondition for frequent use of extension in other countries. How-
ever, under certain circumstances stricter rules for extension can also 
lead to a signifi cant decline, as shown by the example of Portugal (see 
Section 4.1) 
4. Recent developments in the use of extension – 
Portugal, Norway and Germany
In order to discuss recent developments in more detail the following sec-
tions provides three small case studies covering Portugal, Norway and 
Germany. While Portugal is an example of a sharp decline in the use of 
extension, in Norway and Germany the instrument has recently gained 
more importance.
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4.1 Portugal
The current Portuguese collective bargaining system was established in 
the fi rst decade after the overthrow of the dictatorship in 1974, when 
the trade unions were able to oblige employers to accept comprehensive 
collective framework agreements with detailed regulations on workers’ 
rights, work organisation and workers’ tasks (Naumann 2006). Accord-
ing to the Portuguese Constitution (Article 56) trade unions have a fun-
damental ‘right of collective bargaining’ (Article 56) with the exception 
of the public sector, in which wage bargaining is still prohibited (DGAEP 
2013). In Portugal there are three types of collective agreement: 
(i) branch-level agreements (Contrato Colectivo de Trabalho, CCT);
(ii) company agreements (Acordo de Empresa, AE); and 
(iii) agreements of groups of companies (Acordo Colectivo de Trabalho, 
ACT).
Until recently, most collective agreements were concluded at branch 
level (Table 3). As the Portuguese economy is dominated by small com-
panies, it is the employers who have a particular interest in creating a 
certain competitive order within branches. The agreements of groups of 
companies are a special form of multi-employer bargaining with a lim-
ited number of fi rms, which became relevant in particular in formerly 
nationalised public industries and utilities. There are also a number of 
company agreements (especially in some larger fi rms) but with fairly 
limited scope. 
The role of extension in Portuguese collective bargaining 
Collective agreements in Portugal cover directly only those workers who, 
fi rst, are employed by companies that are affi liated with the signatory 
employers’ association(s) and, second, are members of one of the signa-
tory trade union organisations. There is some evidence that in practice 
companies apply collective agreements to all workers no matter whether 
they are trade union members. In addition, Portugal has a long tradition 
of administrative extension, so that unorganised companies in a certain 
area or sector are also covered by the respective collective agreement. 
According to the Portuguese Labour Code (Código do Trabalho) (Arti-
cles 514–516), the Ministry of Labour had the possibility to extend every 
collective agreement if requested by employers and/or trade unions. 
Until recently, there were no further criteria for extension (for exam-
ple, concerning the representativeness of an agreement or that of the 
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bargaining parties). Thus, in practice Portugal had a system of quasi-
automatic extension, in which a majority of multi-employer agreements 
were regularly extended (Table 3).
While, according to different sources, only between 11 per cent (Addin-
son et al.  2015) and 18 per cent (ICTWSS Database, see below Figure 4) 
of workers in Portugal are members of a trade union, the widespread use 
of extension has largely contributed to fairly high collective bargaining 
coverage. Until the 1990s, almost all workers were covered by a valid 
collective agreement. Since then formal bargaining coverage has shown 
a slight decline, to 87 per cent in 2013 (Figure 1). Formal coverage, 
however, includes all collective agreements in force, including frame-
work agreements and agreements that often have not been renewed for 
a longer period. In order to measure the real importance of collective 
bargaining in Portugal a more important fi gure is current bargaining 
coverage, which takes into account only the annually renewed collec-
tive agreements. The latter can be taken as an indicator of the extent 
Figure 1 Collective bargaining coverage in Portugal as a percentage of all 
workers entitled to collective bargaining   
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to which especially wages are regulated by collective agreements. Until 
the late 2000s, current collective bargaining coverage varied mainly be-
tween 50 and 60 per cent. The high number of annual extension decrees 
underlines its importance for the scope and stability of the Portuguese 
collective bargaining system. The latter became obvious when in 2004, 
after some legal reforms in collective bargaining, the conservative gov-
ernment under Prime Minister Barroso temporarily stopped extending 
collective agreements and current collective bargaining coverage imme-
diately fell.
Recent changes in the legal criteria and practice of extension 
The widespread use of extension in Portugal has been strongly sup-
ported by both trade unions and the majority of employers’ associations. 
Criticisms of the system come mainly from some economists who –often 
supported and promoted by the Bank of Portugal– see extension as a 
barrier to the downward fl exibility of wages, which from a neoclassical 
point of view has negative consequences on employment (for example, 
Addison 2015; Martins 2014; Murtin et al.  2014; Portugal and Vilares 
2013). These criticisms have been supported by some international or-
ganisations, such as the OECD, which openly demanded the abolition 
of extension in Portugal in order to promote more company bargaining 
(OECD 2012b: 10). 
In 2011, when Portugal was forced to ask the EU and the IMF for a bail-
out, the national government had to sign a Memorandum of Under-
standing (MoU) with the so-called ‘Troika’ comprising the European 
Commission, the European Central Bank (ECB) and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), in which it committed itself to a set of reforms in 
various policy areas.3 Labour market policy in general and the revision 
of the wage-setting mechanism in particular have played a particularly 
prominent role in the MoU.
In order to reduce labour costs and to promote wage fl exibility at the 
individual fi rm-level, the MoU called on the Portuguese government to 
‘defi ne clear criteria to be followed for the extension of collective agree-
ments and commit to them’. Furthermore, it stated that ‘the representa-
tiveness of the negotiating organisations and the implications of exten-
sion for the competitive position of non-affi liated fi rms will have to be 
3. The 2011 MoU is documented in European Commission (2011).
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among these criteria’ (European Commission 2011: 80). The aim of this 
reform was pointed out more explicitly in the second review of the Mem-
orandum: ‘The authorities’ new commitment not to grant automatic ex-
tension of collective agreements in 2012 should reduce wage pressures 
inconsistent with the economic situation of fi rms not represented in the 
bargaining process’ (IMF 2011: 11).
A few months after the MoU was signed, the extension of collective 
agreements was almost completely suspended by the newly elected con-
servative government, even before reform of the legal criteria for exten-
sion was adopted. Finally, in October 2012 the Portuguese government 
passed Resolution 90/2012, which introduced a 50 per cent threshold, 
in accordance with which the employers covered by collective agree-
ments have to represent at least half of the workers in the respective 
sector before it can be extended.4 The decree was introduced against the 
resistance of the two major trade union confederations, CGTP-IN and 
UGT, as well as the most important peak-level employers’ organisation, 
CIP (Confederação Empresarial de Portugal). In a meeting with repre-
sentatives of the Troika the CIP declared that suspension of extensions 
‘favours unfair competition, restrains and disintegrates organised inter-
est, fosters the informal economy and is deadly to collective bargaining’ 
(CIP 2012). 
In most sectors the proportion of workers covered by collective agree-
ments is clearly below 50 per cent, which makes an extension unlikely. 
Since 2011 the number of annual extension decrees has varied between 
9 and 17 in comparison with more than 100 in previous years (Table 3). 
Along with the crisis and its profound economic uncertainty this was 
one important reason for the strong decline in the number of branch-
level agreements. Without extension many employers no longer support 
branch-level agreements as outside competition cannot be avoided. The 
strong decline in the number of branch-level agreements fi nally led to 
a dramatic fall in current bargaining coverage to a historical low of less 
than 10 per cent (Figure 1). Although some observers have tried to down-
play the changes by referring to the still fairly high formal bargaining 
4. Resolution 90/2012, adopted on 10 October 2012, opened up the possibility for extending 
the agreements of employers’ associations with less than 50 per cent representativeness if 
SMEs were exempted from the respective agreement. It seems that no association has made 
use of this possibility. Offi cial designation of the resolution: Resolução do Conselho de Min-
istros No 90/2012; available at: http://dre.tretas.org/dre/304490/ 
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coverage (Addison et al.  2015), the fact that less than 10 per cent of 
workers currently have renewed wage agreements marks a more funda-
mental crisis of Portuguese collective bargaining.
In reaction to growing criticism from both trade unions and employers’ 
associations, in June 2014 the government passed Resolution 43/2014, 
which revised the criteria for extension.5 The new resolution has added 
an additional criterion according to which an extension is also possible if 
at least 30 per cent of the contracting employers association’s members 
are small, medium and micro-companies. Taking into consideration that 
more than two-thirds of Portuguese companies employ four workers or 
less (GEE 2013), this new criterion meant that probably almost all em-
ployers’ associations would qualify for the extension of their agreements. 
However, this new regulation has not had an immediate impact on col-
lective bargaining so far. It remains to be seen whether extension could 
regain a stronger role to restabilise Portuguese collective bargaining.
4.2 Norway
Norway’s law on the extension of collective agreements (Lov om all-
menngjøring av tariffavtaler m.v.) was introduced only in 1994, as a 
consequence of Norway’s signing the EEA agreement. The background 
was a fear that the country’s inclusion in EU’s joint labour market would 
lead to a fl ow of foreign ‘cheap labour’ into Norway. The purpose of the 
act was to ensure that wages offered to foreign workers were equal to 
those of Norwegian employees. However, the expected infl ux of foreign 
workers failed to materialise and application of the new Act became rel-
evant only after the EU’s eastward enlargement in 2004. During the past 
ten years Norway has received large numbers of labour migrants and 
posted workers, in particular from Poland and the Baltic states. Trade 
union density is low compared with the other Nordic countries; in the 
private sector only 50 per cent of employees are covered by collective 
agreements (Stokke et al.  2013) and there is no statutory minimum wage. 
The infl ow of migrant workers from the accession countries has exposed 
existing weaknesses in the regulatory system, with a large section of the 
labour market being left more or less open for low wage competition and 
5. Resolution 43/2014, adopted on 26 June 2014 (Resolução do Conselho de Ministros No. 
43/2014 can be consulted at: http://dre.tretas.org/dre/317923/ 
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‘social dumping’ (Alsos and Eldring 2008). Although it implied a shift 
from the long-standing tradition of leaving all responsibility for ensur-
ing minimum wage levels to the social partners, the development led the 
Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions (LO) to apply for extension of 
certain collective agreements. The extension mechanism was soon recog-
nised to be one the most powerful tools for combatting wage dumping in 
the Norwegian labour market, but still only a few agreements have been 
extended. As of today, parts of the collective agreements in construction, 
shipbuilding, agriculture, cleaning, fi sh processing and electrical work 
are extended (Table 4). All in all, extended collective agreements cover 
around 10 per cent of all workers in private industry.
Purpose and process
There is a considerable difference between Norway and other European 
countries with regard to the purpose of its erga omnes measures (Stokke 
2010). In most European countries the objective of extending collective 
agreements is to ensure their widespread diffusion in the labour market. 
When the law on extension was introduced in Norway, it was empha-
sised that this was not the objective, but rather to ensure that the wage 
levels and labour conditions offered to foreign workers are equal to those 
of Norwegian employees. In 2010, the act was amended to also include 
the objective of ‘hampering unfair competition’ in its purpose paragraph. 
The Norwegian system also takes a separate approach in terms of the cri-
teria to be fulfi lled before a collective agreement can be extended. Most 
European systems specify the parties entitled to apply for extension, the 
Table 4 Extended collective agreements in Norway (as of May 2015) 
Sector
(Year of introduction)
Minimum wage rates in euros per hour*
Unskilled workers Skilled workers
Construction (2007) 19.60 21.80
Shipbuilding (2008) 17.40 19.20
Agriculture (2010) 13.10–16.70
Cleaning (2011) 19.60
Fish processing (2015) 19.50 20.70
Electricians (2015) 20.30 24.20
Note: * Calculated on the basis of the average exchange rate for 2014.
Source: Authors’ composition.
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requirements of the collective agreement to be extended and the precon-
ditions for an extension to be approved. The precondition for enforcing 
an extension in Norway is that it is probable that, without such an ex-
tension, foreign workers would perform work under conditions that are 
generally inferior to the norms stipulated by nationwide collective agree-
ments for the relevant occupation or industry, or to the general condi-
tions prevailing in the relevant location or trade. This type of criterion 
is not found in any other country. The decision to enforce an extension 
is made by the Tariff Committee (Tariffnemnda), which is appointed by 
the government. The committee comprises three independent members 
(currently, a judge from a district court heads the committee and the 
two other independent members are academics from the University of 
Oslo), one representative from the employers’ organisations and one 
from the trade unions, meaning that neither employers nor unions can 
veto a decision. The provisions extended are made generally binding by 
means of administrative regulation. The law only allows for extension of 
provisions regarding wages and other individual working conditions and 
addresses the provisions to be encompassed by a decision on a case-by-
case basis. In particular cases it can also determine wage levels and la-
bour conditions other than those stipulated by the collective agreement. 
To date, only very few of the provisions in collective agreements have 
been extended. The extent to which such provisions should be made gen-
erally binding has been a contentious issue ever since the initial deci-
sion to use this instrument (in 2004). The employers’ organisations in 
particular have argued that provisions regulating issues that are already 
covered by applicable law should not be extended. Subsequent decisions 
by the Tariffnemnda have taken this criticism into account, resulting 
in extension only of provisions that regulate issues not already covered 
by legislation, mainly those that specify minimum wages for skilled and 
unskilled workers (see Table 1). This characteristic, as well as those men-
tioned above, makes Norwegian practice somewhat different from other 
European erga omnes instruments (Alsos and Eldring 2008).
Experiences and eff ects
In 2011, an evaluation of the government’s action plan to combat social 
dumping included the measures that were implemented to improve the 
system for the general application of collective agreements. The overall 
conclusion was that the situation would probably have been consider-
ably worse without the measures implemented. This was true in particu-
lar in the areas with extended collective agreements, where regulations, 
controls and sanctions were strengthened, and much less in areas with-
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out erga omnes extensions. In sectors without generally binding agree-
ments the risk of low wage competition and wage dumping was still very 
high (Eldring et al.  2011). The evaluation documented that the majority 
of employers in the affected sectors had a positive attitude towards the 
generally binding agreements, although employers in export-oriented 
industries, such as shipbuilding, were somewhat more sceptical.
A central, but complex question concerns the extent to which generally 
binding agreements affect labour migrants’ wage conditions. An analysis 
of register-based wage data showed that few employees in the relevant 
sectors had wages below the minimum rates in the collective agreements, 
although central and eastern European workers in the construction and 
shipbuilding industries on average earned less than native workers (El-
dring et al.  2011). A more recent study indicates that the average wage 
among construction workers has increased as a result of the extension, 
and that the share of workers with wages below the collectively agreed 
minimum wage has shrunk (Bratsberg and Holden 2015). Because the 
register data do not include posted workers or short-term and unreg-
istered migrants, there is a risk that the register data overestimate real 
wage levels. A survey carried out in Oslo in 2010 among Polish migrants 
documented that 19 per cent earned less than the legally extended mini-
mum wage, of which most were posted workers and/or worked in the 
black market. Despite the tendency towards non-compliance with the 
regulations in certain segments of the labour market, the evaluation re-
port concluded that the situation would probably have been worse with-
out the legal extension of collective agreements (Eldring et al.  2011). 
An overall refl ection is that as long as only a few sectors are covered by 
generally binding agreements, there are ample opportunities for wage 
dumping in large parts of the labour market. 
The trade unions have mixed views on the legal extension of agreements. 
Their main fear is that it would exacerbate the free-rider problem and 
also that it would interfere with the strong principle of autonomous col-
lective bargaining. After a few years’ experience with the mechanism, 
however, the scepticism has turned into enthusiasm, above all because 
extensions have proved to be effective in the struggle against social 
dumping, but also because it is has become a useful tool in the unionisa-
tion of labour migrants. Extension means that the unions can help mi-
grants to get the minimum wage, even if there is no collective agreement 
in their company (Eldring et al.  2012; Hardy et al.  2012). 
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Despite the largely positive experiences, the introduction of the extension 
mechanism has not been uncontroversial. The service sector employers’ 
association Virke has repeatedly declared that they wish to replace the 
extension scheme with a statutory minimum wage, and even the Con-
federation of Norwegian Enterprise (Næringslivets Hovedorganisasjon, 
NHO) has repeatedly stated that it sees a national minimum wage as a 
more attractive solution than extensions of collective agreements. In the 
Norwegian context, a statutory minimum wage does not appear as a sup-
plement to extensions (as in many other European countries), but more 
as an alternative. The proposal for a statutory minimum wage is used by 
the employers almost as a threat, in response to various trade union ini-
tiatives to improve and activate the current extension scheme (Eldring 
and Alsos 2012). As of today, the situation is more or less deadlocked; 
the unions want to strengthen the mechanism and argue that the docu-
mentation criteria are too strict, and that the period for each extension 
should be prolonged. The previous Red-Green government adopted the 
fi ght against social dumping as a kind of ‘power brand’ and implemented 
several revisions of the extensions act. The current, conservative, gov-
ernment has declared that the extension mechanism will continue, but 
so far seems unwilling to enter into discussions or initiatives related to 
improving the system.
As described above, EU enlargement to the east in 2004 was an immedi-
ate rationale for introducing the extension of collective agreements as 
an instrument to combat low-wage competition in Norway. However, 
extensions focus on industries with a high number of labour immigrants 
and presuppose that the partners wish to extend the agreement to all em-
ployees of the industry in question. To date, only a few agreements have 
been extended, and we can fi nd industries that have low coverage by col-
lective agreements where there are no mandatory minimum wage rates. 
As things stand, it seems likely that more agreements will be extended 
in the coming years. There has been a clear tendency towards new ap-
plications for extension in recent years and several unions have signalled 
that they are considering initiating extension processes within their sec-
tors. However, there is still a certain tension between the labour market 
parties related to the extension mechanism, with regard to both exten-
sion procedures and the content of extended agreements. The latter has 
been most pronounced in the shipbuilding sector, where the decision to 
extend parts of the collective agreement has been disputed in court by 
nine shipyards and the main employers’ confederation NHO. Despite a 
very clear Supreme Court ruling in 2013 in favour of the current practice, 
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the employers are still claiming that the extension, which includes the 
right to compensation for travel, lodging and board, is disproportionate 
and that it is hampering competition. However, due to the composition 
of the Tariff Committee, disagreement between the bargaining partners 
does not necessarily hinder new extensions. In the longer term, confl icts 
related to the extension system will probably affect the further develop-
ment and future of the mechanism. Whether this will lead to deteriora-
tion or strengthening of the current system will probably depend on the 
strength of the bargaining partners, the situation in the labour market 
and, not least, how the national political landscape evolves. 
4.3 Germany
With the adoption of the Collective Agreement Order (Tarifvertragsord-
nung) of 1918 Germany was the fi rst country in Europe to introduce a 
nationwide regulation on the extension of collective agreements (Ham-
burger 1939). After the Second World War the newly adopted Collective 
Agreement Act (Tarifvertragsgesetz, TVG) of 1949 contains a separate 
paragraph on ‘general bindingness’ (Allgemeinverbindlichkeit), which 
determines the legal preconditions for extension; these are basically still 
valid today. On the application of at least one bargaining party the Ger-
man Federal Ministry of Labour –or in case of regional agreements the 
ministry of labour of the affected federal state– has the possibility to 
declare a collective agreement universally applicable if the following pre-
conditions are met (Table 5):
– the employer directly covered by the agreement represents at least 
50 per cent of the affected workforce (until 2015);
– the extension is ‘in the public interest’;
– the extension has the support of the national or regional Collective 
Bargaining Committee (Tarifausschuss), which is composed of rep-
resentatives of the peak employers’ and trade union organisations 
on a parity basis, so that both parties have a de facto veto.
In the mid-1990s Germany introduced a second extension system 
through the Posted Workers Act (Arbeitnehmer-Entsendegesetz, 
AEntG) of 1996 (renewed 2009) in order to cover also posted workers 
from foreign countries. In comparison with the fi rst system based on the 
Collective Agreement Act the second system based on the Posted Work-
ers Act was originally more restricted as, in terms of content, it could 
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cover only minimum wages and conditions and in terms of scope it could 
be used only by a limited number of sectors (Table 5). However, the pre-
conditions for an extension on the basis of the Posted Workers Act were 
somewhat less restricted, as there is no minimum threshold for collec-
tive bargaining coverage and no need for confi rmation by the Collective 
Bargaining Committee.
Use of extension in practice
In contrast to many other European countries, in Germany the exten-
sion of collective agreements has always been of only limited importance 
(Bispinck 2012). During the 1950s Germany saw the development of a 
fairly comprehensive collective bargaining system, which in most sec-
tors guaranteed a high bargaining coverage of between 80 and 90 per 
cent, so that there was no need for state support. However, there was 
always a limited number of sectors in which extension played an impor-
tant role in stabilising sectoral collective bargaining. They included more 
labour-intensive branches with a high number of small and medium-
Table 5 Two systems for extension of collective agreements in Germany* 
Preconditions, procedures, 
content and scope
Collective Agreement Act 
(1949)
Posted Workers Act
(1996/2009)
A quorum of 50% 
collective bargaining coverage
Until 2015: Yes
Since 2015: No
No
Extension has to be
‘in the public interest’
Yes Yes
Application for extension Until 2015: At least one party
Since 2015: Both parties
Both parties
Confi rmation by Collective 
Bargaining Committee
Yes No
Content of 
extended agreements
No limitation Limited to minimum wages and 
other minimum conditions
Sectoral scope Total economy Until 2015: Limited to certain 
sector
Since 2015: total economy
Collective agreements 
to be extended
National and 
regional agreements
Only nationwide agreements
Note: * In bold: Newly introduced provision under the Law on the Strengthening of Collective Bargaining 
Autonomy (Bundesregierung 2014); valid from 1 January 2015.
Source: Update of Schulten and Bispinck 2013.
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sized companies, such as construction, retail trade, textiles, hotels and 
restaurants, as well as various craft trades.
At the beginning of the 1990s there were around 400 original branch-
level agreements that were declared generally binding. This correspond-
ed to 5.4 per cent of all original branch-level agreements. Until the mid-
2000s there was a continuous decline in the number and proportion of 
extended agreements (Figure 2). Since then they have remained at an 
extremely low level. In 2014 there were only 233 extended collective 
agreements, equivalent to 1.6 per cent of all branch-level agreements.
Figure 2 Extension of collective agreements in Germany, 1991–2014 (total 
number of extended agreements and percentage of all branch-level 
collective agreements*)  
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Most of the agreements that are still extended on the basis of the Col-
lective Agreement Act are framework agreements that cover working 
time, holidays, special bonuses, pensions and so on, but not regular pay. 
Very few wage agreements have been declared universally binding on 
the basis of the Collective Agreement Act. In recent years, however, a 
growing number of wage agreements have been extended on the basis 
of the Posted Workers Act (Table 6). In contrast to the former, how-
ever, the latter cover only sectoral minimum wages and not wages as 
a whole.
Reform of the legal framework for extension
During the past two decades German collective bargaining has experi-
enced a continuous decline and partial erosion (Schulten and Bispinck 
2014). German bargaining coverage decreased from around 80 per cent 
at the beginning of the 1990s to less than 60 per cent in 2014. Against 
that background there has been a growing discussion on how to restabi-
lise German collective bargaining (Bispinck and Schulten 2009). Among 
other things, there was a broad debate on how to reinforce the instru-
ment of extension in order to reinforce the bargaining system (Schulten 
and Bispinck 2013).
Table 6 Collectively agreed minimum wages extended on the basis of the 
Posted Workers Act
Sector West 
Germany
East 
Germany
Sector West 
Germany
East 
Germany
Construction 11.15/14.20 10.75 Agriculture 7.40 7.20
Roofi ng 11.85 Care 9.40 8.65
Electro trade 10.10 9.35 Commercial 
cleaning
9.55/12.65 8.50/10.63
Painting 10.00/12.80 10.00/10.90 Further training 13.35 12.50
Stonemasonry 11.30 10.90 Meat industry 8.60
Scaff olding 10.50 Waste disposal 8.86
Laundry services 8.50 8.00 Hairdressers 8.00 7.50
Chimney 
sweeping
12.78 Textiles & cloth-
ing
8.50 7.50
Temporary 
agency work
8.80 8.20
Source: WSI Collective Agreement Archive (June 2015).
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In July 2014 the German Parliament fi nally adopted a legislative pack-
age on ‘strengthening free collective bargaining’ (Gesetz zur Stärkung 
der Tarifautonomie), which apart from introducing a national statutory 
minimum wage also includes some revisions of the legal preconditions 
for extension of collective agreements (Bundesregierung 2014; see also 
Table 5). The most important change is the abolition of the 50 per cent 
bargaining coverage threshold for extension on the basis of the Collective 
Agreement Act. Because, against the background of declining bargaining 
coverage, the threshold became a more and more substantial obstacle to 
the use of extensions it has now been replaced by a more fl exible regula-
tion which gives the Ministry of Labour more space to decide whether 
or not an extension is in the public interest. Another important revision 
concerns extension on the basis of the Posted Workers Act, which is no 
longer restricted to certain sectors but can now be used throughout the 
whole economy. All in all, it is hoped that the less restrictive criteria can 
promote the use of extensions in Germany and therewith can make a 
contribution to reinforcing the bargaining system.
5. The importance of extension for collective bargaining 
coverage and its relationship with the organisational 
strength of unions and employers’ associations
5.1 Extension and bargaining coverage
The importance of extension for the scope of collective bargaining sys-
tems in Europe may be seen most clearly if its use is compared with col-
lective agreement coverage in individual European states. At fi rst sight, 
collective bargaining coverage varies widely across Europe, ranging from 
99 per cent in Belgium to 9 per cent in Portugal (Figure 3). The countries 
with very high coverage of 80 per cent or more are mainly states that 
make frequent use of administrative extension or functional equivalents. 
The only exceptions are Denmark and Sweden, where high coverage is 
achieved without extension, purely through the organisational strength 
of the contracting parties. High bargaining coverage can also be found 
in Slovenia which currently makes only limited use of extensions but 
still benefi ts from the period before 2009 when bargaining coverage was 
ensured by means of employers’ compulsory membership of economic 
chambers (Banerjee et al.  2013). On the other hand, the group with 
low agreement coverage of 50 per cent or less is composed mainly of 
countries with limited or rare use of extensions or –as in the case of the 
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United Kingdom– lacks legal requirements for any form of extension. 
In these countries, too, there is a strong correlation between bargaining 
coverage and the organisational strength of the contracting parties. 
All in all, this confi rms the thesis propounded by Traxler et al.  (2001: 
203) that, in principle, there are only two ways of achieving high collec-
tive agreement coverage. One, the Nordic way, which ensures high cov-
erage through a high organising density, particularly on the union side, 
is absolutely exceptional, bound up with a whole series of political and 
Figure 3 Collective bargaining coverage and the use of extension 2011-2013* 
(as a percentage of all employees covered by a collective agreement)  
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institutional peculiarities of the Nordic model of capitalism.6 However, 
the continental and southern European path of achieving high collec-
tive agreement coverage through comprehensive use of extension can be 
seen more as the rule. As an expression of the institutional power of the 
bargaining parties, extensions of collective bargaining have also contrib-
uted to keeping agreement coverage relatively stable in many countries, 
despite a fall in union density (Visser 2013). Conversely, a reduction 
of administrative extension or its functional equivalents might lead to 
a signifi cant decline in bargaining coverage, as has been the case more 
recently in Greece and Portugal. At the same time, the relaxation and in-
creased use of extension can help to stabilise or even increase bargaining 
coverage, as seen for example in Norway or Switzerland.
5.2 Extension and union density
Trade unions sometimes fear that frequent use of extension might have 
a negative impact on union density as workers obtain collectively agreed 
standards for free and therefore lose a major incentive to become a un-
ion member. A frequent use of extension might also lull the unions into 
‘institutional security’ (Hassel 2007) and make them highly dependent 
on the state, while at the same time preventing them from building up 
their own organisational power basis. When the state revokes its sup-
port for extension this could become highly problematic as the unions 
might be too weak to defend high collective bargaining coverage by their 
own organisational power alone. Recent developments in countries such 
as Greece or Portugal might be a good example of such a development. 
However, if unions rely only on their organisational strength, in most 
European countries collective agreements would cover only a minority 
of workers and collectively agreed conditions would not be transformed 
into universal working standards (Schulten 2013).
A comparison of the use of extension and union density in Europe, how-
ever, shows that there is not at all a clear correlation (Figure 4). On one 
hand, Denmark and Sweden, two of the three countries with the highest 
6. In particular, the so-called Ghent System comes to mind here (except for Norway, which did 
not have this system), under which the trade unions administer the unemployment benefi t 
funds and thus have particular recruitment opportunities. Recently, however, conservative 
governments in both Denmark and Sweden have put through political reforms that have led 
to a weakening of the Ghent System and a clear decline in union density (Kjellberg 2011).
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union density, have no extension instruments at all. On the other hand, 
in Finland, union density has clearly risen since the introduction of ad-
ministrative extension in the early 1970s (Ahlberg and Bruun 2009). In 
Norway, too, there is no evidence that the increasing use of extension has 
had negative consequences for recruiting new union members (Eldring 
et al.  2012). 
There are other countries, such as Spain, the Netherlands and, in par-
ticular, France, which at fi rst sight seem to confi rm the proposal that 
high bargaining coverage secured by extension has a strong negative im-
pact on union density. However, there are also a couple of other coun-
Figure 4 Trade union density and the use of extension, 2011–2013* (working 
trade union members as a percentage of all workers)   
Note: * Most recent data.
Source: ICTWSS Database (Version 5.0).
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tries with a similar low union density in which extension plays only a 
limited role. All in all, the overall European picture shows that different 
kinds of combinations between the use of extension and union density 
are possible. In fact, the organisational strength of trade unions depends 
on a wide range of economic, social and political factors and cannot be 
reduced to a single issue, such as the use of extension. From the trade 
union point of view high bargaining coverage, which depends solely on 
extension, is of course a risk. However, this risk will be less if organi-
sational and institutional power are strengthened as a complementary 
strategy.
5.3 Extension and employers’ density
The relationship between the use of extension and employers’ organising 
power is a different matter. Earlier studies already identifi ed a clear pos-
itive correlation in this regard (Traxler 2004). Comparing both issues 
with more current data from eight countries with the highest employers’ 
density of at least 70 per cent, seven countries have made frequent use 
of extension (Figure 4). The fact that employers know that they will be 
covered by a collective agreement anyway obviously seems to create an 
incentive for them to join an employers’ association in order to exercise 
their voice option (and perhaps to benefi t from other services of the as-
sociation). A high employers’ density, which in most European countries 
is much higher than union density, also strongly supports high bargain-
ing coverage (Visser 2013). Thus, the use of extension supports the col-
lective bargaining system, not only through direct widening of bargain-
ing coverage, but also through the more indirect effects on employers’ 
associations.
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Figure 5 Employers’ density and the use of extension, 2008–2012* (members 
of employers’ associations as a percentage of all employers)   
Note: * Most recent data.
Source: ICTWSS Database (Version 5.0), for Portugal: Quadros de Pessonal 2013, for Norway: Stokke et 
al.  2013.
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6. Conclusion: the future of extension as a factor in 
stabilising collective bargaining in Europe
This chapter has shown that the use of administrative extension is of high 
importance for the scope of collective bargaining in Europe. In many 
European countries, it has ensured high and stable collective bargaining 
coverage, which supports the use of collective agreements as a central 
institution for the regulation of employment conditions, something that 
is often regarded as a cornerstone of the European social model. In the 
wake of the current economic crisis, however, in many European coun-
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tries collective bargaining systems are under strong pressure to follow a 
strategy of a more radical decentralisation, leading to a hollowing out or 
even abolition of multi-employer bargaining (Marginson 2014; Schulten 
and Müller 2015). The outcome of these ‘reforms’ is a drastic decline in 
collective bargaining coverage and a widespread devalorisation of collec-
tive agreements as an instrument for determining working conditions.
In the neoliberal strategy of dismantling collective bargaining the dimi-
nution or even abolition of administrative extension is a core issue. 
Drawing on the tiny number of econometric studies which on the basis of 
neoclassical labour market models claim to fi nd evidence of the negative 
impact of administrative extension on employment performance (Mur-
tin et al.  2014; Villanueva 2015) the ‘decrease of extension’ is justifi ed 
as an ‘employment-friendly reform’ (European Commission 2012: 103). 
The impact of such a ‘reform’ can be observed most clearly in Portugal 
where the Troika imposed the introduction of representativeness criteria 
for the use of extension, thus provoking a strong decline in the number 
of extension decrees and, consequently, contributing to the dramatic fall 
in bargaining coverage. Similar developments could also be observed in 
Greece and Romania, where the use of extension has de facto been abol-
ished. 
Besides the situation in many southern and central and eastern Euro-
pean countries, there are, however, also some countervailing develop-
ments that indicate a strengthening of collective bargaining through an 
increased use of administrative extension. The most prominent exam-
ples here are Norway and Germany where in recent years extension has 
continuously gained importance. While Germany has further relaxed its 
legal requirements for the use of extension, the Norwegian experiences 
are being debated intensively in other Nordic states, such as Denmark 
and Sweden. In particular, the consequences of EU enlargement and 
the growing number of migrant workers has functioned as a catalyst for 
the increasing importance of extension as an important instrument to 
counter social dumping (Eldring and Schulten 2012). A further boost 
has come from some important rulings of the European Court of Justice, 
which tend to accept only universally applicable collective agreements as 
legitimate limitations on basic European freedoms (Kocher 2010). 
If collective bargaining is to remain a distinctive feature of European 
labour market regulation many European countries need to undertake 
a ‘reconstruction of their bargaining systems’ (Ewing and Hendy 2013) 
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in order to make sure that a majority of workers will again be covered 
by collective agreements. Such reconstruction cannot be organised by 
trade unions and employers’ associations alone, but also needs the sup-
port of the state. Therefore, instead of supporting its abolition, the Eu-
ropean Union should actively promote administrative extension in order 
to strengthen collective bargaining all over Europe.
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Concluding remarks 
A transnational coordinated reconstruction of 
collective bargaining as a precondition for 
inclusive growth in Europe
Thorsten Schulten and Guy Van Gyes
‘Europe has learned many lessons from the recent fi nancial and economic 
crisis. We see very clearly now that in a highly integrated Union, and even 
more so in a monetary union, our economies and our successes are linked. 
Although the EU has a number of instruments for the co-ordination of eco-
nomic policy the crisis has shown that they have not been used to the full and 
that there are gaps in the current governance system. There is broad political 
agreement that this has to change and that the EU needs to be equipped with 
a broader and more effective set of policy instruments to ensure its future 
prosperity and standards of living.’
European Commission: 
Enhancing economic policy coordination for stability, growth and jobs – 
Tools for stronger EU economic governance COM(2010) 367/2 
‘I regard the growth of collective bargaining as essential. I approve minimum 
wage and hours regulation. I was altogether on your side the other day, when 
you deprecated a policy of general wage reductions as useless in present 
circumstances.’
John Maynard Keynes in a letter to 
Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1 February 1938
The focus of the present book is the recent policy shift in European eco-
nomic governance in which wages and wage formation systems are un-
der attack. The book has: (i) evaluated and critically reviewed the policy 
theory backing this new policy approach; (ii) assessed its impact; and 
(iii) outlined and argued for another view on the role wages and collec-
tive bargaining can play in a more productive and sustainable EU socio-
economic perspective. The book takes as its starting point the strategy of 
inclusive growth embraced (in principle) by Europe, which is – accord-
ing to many observers – key to a productive and sustainable European 
socio-economic approach.
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1. Current views on wage bargaining under the new 
European Economic Governance
Strong unions and comprehensive collective bargaining within the 
framework of which the majority of workers are protected by collective 
agreements have been widely regarded as a cornerstone of the European 
social model, as it developed in the fi rst two decades after the Second 
World War in many western European countries (Visser 2013), thereby 
delivering a ‘golden age’ of inclusive growth. Strong unions were seen 
as a necessary countervailing power against the more destructive ten-
dencies of capitalism, while comprehensive collective bargaining was 
regarded as the core institution for promoting a more equal distribution 
of income as a major precondition for sustainable and inclusive growth. 
Along those lines the European Commission (2015: 3) even recently ar-
gued, in the latest Industrial Relations Report of DG Employment, that 
‘countries with strong social dialogue institutions are among the EU’s 
best performing and most competitive economies, with a better and 
more resilient social situation’.
In contrast, however, a counterview has become more and more infl uen-
tial among European policymakers during the past three decades. With 
strong mainstream academic support and promotion by neoliberal in-
terests this counterview regards unions and collective bargaining mainly 
as institutional rigidities that hinder ‘effi cient market allocation’. Conse-
quently, there is a more or less open demand for a ‘decrease’ in collective 
bargaining coverage and an ‘overall reduction in the wage-setting power 
of trade unions’, as pointed out a few years ago in the already famous DG 
ECFIN report on ‘Labour Market Developments in Europe’ (European 
Commission 2012: 104).
Within the framework of the new European economic governance, neo-
liberal views on wages and collective bargaining have become even more 
prominent and have guided various policy reforms and interventions. As 
the crisis in Europe came to be interpreted largely as a crisis of competi-
tiveness, wages were seen as the core adjustment variable for ‘internal 
devaluation’, which are supposed to restore competitiveness by reducing 
labour costs. Although all policy interventions on wages and collective 
bargaining ultimately take place at national level, they have very much 
been promoted through European economic governance procedures 
(European Semester and Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure). In the 
case of countries under the European Stability Mechanism these inter-
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ventions have been imposed in a more authoritarian and fairly undem-
ocratic way by the ‘Troika’ (the European Commission, the European 
Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund).
The new political interventionism in the area of wage policy basically 
takes two forms (Schulten and Müller 2015). First, many countries have 
directly intervened in current wage developments through wage cuts and 
freezes in the public sector, but sometimes also in the private sector with 
more or less open violations of collective bargaining autonomy. Second, 
in many countries the state has promoted ‘structural reforms’ of collec-
tive bargaining and wage-setting systems. These reforms, which were 
usually imposed against the resistance of trade unions and sometimes 
even of employers’ associations, have aimed at a more radical decen-
tralisation of collective bargaining in order to increase downward wage 
fl exibility at company level. 
As a result, a considerable diminution of multi-employer agreements 
and collective bargaining coverage have been witnessed, especially in 
southern countries such as Portugal and Spain (see Chapter 3 in this 
volume). Besides limited exceptions (for example, Slovenia), this policy 
framework has also been dominant for a while in the catch-up countries 
of central and eastern Europe. A low-wage economic strategy is embed-
ded in a non-developing or receding context of institutionalised collec-
tive bargaining, occasionally interrupted by (tripartite) political settle-
ments to increase minimum wages (Chapter 5). As such, these policies 
refl ect the trend of dismantling collective bargaining in the United King-
dom since the 1980s (Chapter 6). Low-wage competition has also been 
introduced in the political debate in the Nordic countries, as Chapter 4 
of this volume shows. On one hand, German wage ‘leadership’ has led 
to the heightened adoption of organised decentralisation bargaining in 
Denmark and Sweden. On the other hand, liberalising labour mobility 
has led to social dumping in sectors such as construction, transport and 
food industry.
2. The failure of internal devaluation 
As a direct result of this new European and national interventionism in 
wage policy, a series of countries – in particular in eastern and south-
ern Europe – have faced a signifi cant decline in real wages, as well as a 
strong increase in wage inequality. The economic consequences of these 
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wage developments have been negative. Although many countries were 
– at least on paper – able to improve their cost competitiveness by re-
ducing unit labour costs, this did not lead to the hoped-for export-led 
recovery (Le Bayon et al.  2014; Uxó et al.  2014). In contrast, the decline 
in real wages had a strong negative effect on the development of domes-
tic demand and thus contributed to the persistence of economic stagna-
tion and high unemployment. Moreover, as many European countries 
have followed the same strategy of wage restraint in an already stagnat-
ing economic environment, this has largely contributed to a decline in 
price development and has put the threat of a Europe-wide defl ation on 
the agenda.
The failure of internal devaluation calls into question the dominant 
mainstream narrative of the economic crisis in Europe and its underly-
ing assumptions regarding the role of wages (Chapter 7 in this volume). 
First of all, there is a widespread view that the countries that are still suf-
fering from the crisis basically have a problem of weak competitiveness 
which in the past was exacerbated by ‘too high’ wage increases. Turning 
to real wage developments and productivity increases, however, wage 
restraint has been ongoing in the 2000s almost everywhere in Europe, 
leading to a signifi cant fall in the wage share and a redistribution from 
labour to capital (Lavoie and Stockhammer 2013). 
Secondly, there is often no clear correlation between unit labour cost de-
velopments and export performance, as the latter depends fi rst of all on 
export demand. Moreover, competitiveness is not only about costs but 
also about a wide range of non-price factors, such as innovation, quality, 
originality, brand image and services, as well as sectoral specialisation. 
According to recent scholarship these non-price competitiveness factors 
are much more able to explain the export performance of a country than 
the narrow view based on wages and labour costs (for example, Storm 
and Naastepad 2015). Consequently, the development of export indus-
tries cannot be promoted by wage restraint, but only by a more specifi c 
structural and industrial policy, as well as by a modern and effi cient pub-
lic infrastructure.
Finally, there is a narrow focus on an export-led strategy as a supposed 
‘royal road’ to economic recovery. Such a perspective is highly problem-
atic for at least two reasons: fi rst of all, it is simply physically impossi-
ble that all countries could follow an export-led development model and 
rely on running a trade surplus. Export-led development strategies that 
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attempt to defy this fundamental truth are likely to result in senseless 
downward competition among countries on issues such as wages, social 
security contributions and tax. Apart from that, however, the focus on 
export-led development strategies largely ignores the fact that in almost 
all European countries most economic activities still take place in the do-
mestic economy (Feigl and Zuckerstätter 2012). Under such conditions 
possible positive effects of wage restraint with regard to the price com-
petitiveness of export industries will usually be offset by the negative ef-
fects on private demand, so that the overall consequences for economic 
growth will be negative. A typical example of this was Germany during 
the 2000s, when both wages and private demand grew well below the 
European average (Schulten 2015).
3. An alternative view of wages for more inclusive 
economic development
During the 2000s wage developments in most European countries were 
characterised by falling wage shares and growing wage dispersion (see 
Chapter 2 in this volume). As a consequence, wage-led private demand 
systematically lagged behind and hindered these economies in realising 
their growth potential. In order to compensate this structural demand 
gap, two different economic models have emerged in Europe. One is an 
export-led growth model (followed by most northern European coun-
tries) where weak domestic demand came to be at least partially com-
pensated by growing trade surpluses. The other was a debt-led growth 
model (followed by many southern European countries) which promot-
ed a domestic demand boom based on private debt rather than income. 
With the crisis it became clear that both models – which depend on each 
other – are not sustainable (Hein 2012).
Under the conditions of the crisis the problem of weak demand was at 
fi rst further exacerbated as many countries not only followed a policy of 
strict ‘austerity’, but also saw a signifi cant fall in real wages. In the mean-
time, it has become more and more obvious that these policies promoted 
by the new European economic governance procedures have failed to 
create a way out of economic stagnation, so that a growing number of 
political and economic actors are demanding that these policies be re-
nounced. Besides the necessary shift from austerity to more investment, 
there is also a need for a strong shift in wage policy. As the Director for 
Employment, Labour and Social Affairs at the OECD, Stefano Scarpetta, 
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has put it: ‘Any further reduction of wages risks being counter-produc-
tive because then we would run into a vicious circle of defl ation, lower 
consumption and lower investment’ (quoted in Financial Times, 3 Sep-
tember 2014, see also OECD 2014a).
An alternative economic development model based neither on increas-
ing private debts nor on increasing trade surpluses requires a much more 
equal distribution of income and wealth in order to solve the demand 
problem. A more sustainable growth strategy could therefore only be an 
inclusive growth strategy; at least on paper this became the offi cial guid-
ing principle of the Europe 2020 strategy (European Commission 2010). 
As the OECD (2004b) put it, inclusive growth aims to ‘take all on board’, 
in order to make sure that all people can gain from economic develop-
ment. There is a fairly broad consensus that an inclusive growth strategy 
basically needs to reverse the ongoing trend towards growing inequality 
of income and wealth. However, the role of wage policy in such an inclu-
sive growth model has so far been largely neglected. This is even more 
astonishing because wages are still the major source of income for most 
people and as such the main source for private demand. 
An inclusive growth strategy requires a supportive wage policy which 
goes beyond the traditional ‘golden wage rule’ according to which wages 
should grow in line with national trend productivity and target infl ation 
rate. A new ‘optimum wage regime’ in Europe, as suggested by Chagny 
and Husson (Chapter 9 in this volume), calls for wage developments that 
are solidaristic in the sense that they avoid increasing wage differentials 
between the various sectors and lift up wages at the lower end of the 
scale. Moreover, wage developments should be allowed – at least for a 
certain period – to be more expansive in order to reverse the downward 
trend in wage shares. As recent studies have shown, more expansive and 
solidaristic wage developments in Europe could contribute to a signifi -
cant push in growth and investment (Onaran and Obst 2015; Kelly and 
D’Arcy 2015).
4. Institutional preconditions for a more expansive and 
solidaristic wage policy 
A shift in the current economic development model in Europe towards 
a more wage-led and inclusive growth model needs institutions that are 
able to support such an alternative strategy (Berg et al.  2015). As far as 
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wage-setting and collective bargaining are concerned, however, recent 
‘structural reforms’ promoted within the framework of the new Europe-
an economic governance have led to the paradoxical situation in which 
more macroeconomic-oriented coordination of wages becomes less and 
less possible (see Chapter 8 in this volume).
With the more radical decentralisation or even individualisation of wage-
setting, wage developments tend to follow the business cycle closely and 
thus to promote pro-cyclical economic development. While in times of 
economic downturn more decentralised systems indeed show much 
greater downward wage fl exibility, in periods of economic upswing they 
might lead to much faster wage growth. In any case, more decentralised 
wage-setting systems generate much higher wage dispersion as wage de-
velopments depend highly on the economic performance of individual 
fi rms.
In contrast, it was one of the basic insights of Keynesian economics that, 
especially in times of economic crisis, strong wage institutions are nec-
essary in order to prevent a downward development of wages and to 
maintain their role as economic stabilisers. Keynes (1936: 14) himself 
even claimed in his General Theory that ‘it is fortunate that the work-
ers, though unconsciously, are instinctively more reasonable economists 
than the classical school, inasmuch as they resist reductions of money-
wages’.
Today, support for more inclusive economic development in Europe re-
quires not only the prevention of further wage cuts and freezes, but also 
a more coordinated approach to more expansive and solidaristic wage 
developments. A macroeconomic coordination of wage policy, however, 
is possible only with adequate wage-setting institutions that make it 
possible to set wages beyond the scope of the individual fi rm. What are 
needed are basically three elements: adequate minimum wages, encom-
passing collective bargaining and strong trade unions.
Regarding minimum wages all European countries have determined 
more or less universal wage fl oors. In addition, in many countries – es-
pecially those with fairly weak collective bargaining – the development 
of statutory minimum wages has an important signalling function for 
wage development overall. However, the level of minimum wages is of-
ten fairly low and not able to prevent poverty. Against that background, 
a European-wide coordinated minimum wage policy would have the task 
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of ensuring decent wages for all workers (Chapter 10 in this volume). It 
would have to promote above-average wage increases at the lower end of 
the wage scale and thus encourage a signifi cant push of private demand. 
As calculated by Eurofound, an increase in all minimum wages to 60 per 
cent of the respective national median wage would benefi t about 16 per 
cent of all workers in Europe (Aumayr-Pintar et al.  2014). 
Regarding collective bargaining, the situation in Europe is diverse (Eu-
ropean Commission 2015). Collective bargaining coverage varies among 
countries between almost 100 per cent and only around 10 per cent. High 
bargaining coverage, with the majority of workers covered by collective 
agreements, requires a comprehensive system of more centralised mul-
ti-employer bargaining (Chapter 8 in this volume). Furthermore, it usu-
ally also needs supportive regulation by the state, for example, through 
the widespread use of collective agreement extensions. Instead of weak-
ening or even destroying multi-employer bargaining structures, the EU 
should, together with European trade unions and employers’ associa-
tions, launch a broad campaign to strengthen collective bargaining and 
increase bargaining coverage (Chapter 11 in this volume).
Finally, industrial relations researchers have long known and even econ-
omists of the International Monetary Fund (Jaumotte and Buitron 2015) 
have recently confi rmed that a more inclusive growth model based on a 
more egalitarian distribution of incomes requires much stronger trade 
unions. Although it is fi rst of all the task of the unions themselves to 
increase their organisational power base and to reverse the trend of fall-
ing union density, it is also society’s responsibility to enable and support 
the development of strong trade unions. All in all, a shift towards a more 
sustainable and inclusive economic development model would require 
a broad-based reconstruction of collective bargaining as part of a more 
fundamental renewal of industrial democracy in Europe.
Institutional restoration would also contribute to a better European gov-
ernance strategy. Despite the lip service to social dialogue, the approach 
adopted by Europe in recent years has been hampered by democratic 
defi ciencies, as refl ected in the social protests in southern countries and 
the growing legitimacy problems of the European project.
Concluding remarks
 Wage bargaining under the new European Economic Governance 409
5. Challenge of transnational coordination (capacity)
A basic premise of this volume is that, in these times of globalisation 
and crisis, Europe needs an inclusive growth strategy that focuses on re-
ducing inequality and enhancing real income growth among a broad(er) 
group of people (the ‘99%’) than today. Restoring and supporting collec-
tive bargaining on wages is defi ned as a key factor in this strategy.
Finally, it is important to stress the transnational coordination challenge. 
Successful combination of both elements is key: coordination as govern-
ance method and at supra-national level in Europe. The main advantage 
of collective wage bargaining in the proposed strategy (as illustrated in 
this volume) is the coordinating effort that would act as a ‘counterforce’ 
against market forces, which are simply not delivering. The analyses of 
the book show that, on one hand, we are already witnessing this kind of 
European transnational coordination. However, it is politically imposed 
and does not promote, but rather distorts the necessary market-correct-
ing function of wage bargaining institutions. It shows, also, that in such 
a policy context in the countries in which collective bargaining has re-
mained in fairly good shape (mainly north-western Europe), trends of 
wage moderation, freezes and beggar-thy-neighbour policies have been 
dominant. Strengthening national institutions is necessary, but will 
probably not be suffi cient to diffuse the outlined ‘policy turn’ in Europe. 
Structural innovations in ‘vertical’ coordination at European level will be 
very important for success. Before starting a discussion on the needed 
changes in the governance structures of the European macroeconomic 
social dialogue or the functioning of bipartite – sectoral and cross-secto-
ral – social dialogue, it is important, in our opinion, to have a clear view 
on the following matters, which at the moment are still very ‘open’ policy 
questions.
The proposed restoration requires a broadening of horizontal subsidiari-
ty at the European level, in which trade unions and employers’ associa-
tions are given the chance to address the wage-related challenges of an 
inclusive growth strategy, for which they are better placed to fi nd negoti-
ated solutions. However, experience of social market implementation in 
Europe shows that in many countries policies have to be developed by 
means of a ‘carrot and stick approach’ to make horizontal subsidiarity 
deliver (Visser 2013: 56). What innovative and positive role can the Eu-
ropean semester approach play in this regard?
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Successful growth strategies depend on complementarities, as the litera-
ture on political economy has shown convincingly (Morgan et al.  2010). 
The main driver of the neoliberal approach that currently dominates in 
Europe is fi nance-led capitalism (Hein 2012). Just as this fi nance-led 
strategy strongly affects the kind of wage bargaining that takes place, a 
wage-led strategy will have to think and act on the complementarities 
needed in the fi nancial economy.
European debates are still very strongly driven by the cost perspective of 
export sectors. We have already questioned the cost perspective in this 
conclusion, but it is equally important to broaden debates on wages at 
the European level to the more shielded service sectors. The stories of 
labour mobility dumping in the Nordic countries in Chapter 4 and the 
detected ‘imbalances’ in the service sector mentioned in Chapter 9 hint 
at this necessity.
6. En avant!
Building blocks have been offered in this book for constructing an al-
ternative view of wage bargaining under the new European Economic 
Governance today. Pressing questions have been outlined that seek a po-
litical answer. Mobilising capacity for the strategy is another important 
step in this regard (Hyman 2015). An important role and responsibil-
ity should be given in this campaign to the European labour movement 
(ETUC and sectoral federations), because, as we have indicated, the ‘pol-
icy turn’ needs to be transnationally coordinated or it will not take place. 
Aggregating interests in a solidaristic way beyond national borders is the 
fi rst fundamental challenge of such strategic union campaigns, while the 
second is a search for coalition partners.
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EU country codes 
AT  Austria
BE Belgium
BG Bulgaria
HR Croatia
CY Cyprus
CZ Czech Republic
DE Germany
DK Denmark
EE Estonia
EL Greece
ES Spain
FI  Finland
FR France
HU Hungary
IE Ireland
IT Italy
LT Lithuania
LU Luxemburg
LV Latvia
MT Malta
NL Netherlands
PL Poland
PT Portugal
RO Rumania
SE Sweden
SI Slovenia
SK Slovakia
UK United Kingdom
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